Punishment And Privilege: The Politics Of Class, Crime, And Corporations In America by Grasso, Anthony
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations
2018
Punishment And Privilege: The Politics Of Class,
Crime, And Corporations In America
Anthony Grasso
University of Pennsylvania, anthony.grasso7@gmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations
Part of the Criminology Commons, Criminology and Criminal Justice Commons, History
Commons, and the Political Science Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/3074
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Grasso, Anthony, "Punishment And Privilege: The Politics Of Class, Crime, And Corporations In America" (2018). Publicly Accessible
Penn Dissertations. 3074.
https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/3074
Punishment And Privilege: The Politics Of Class, Crime, And
Corporations In America
Abstract
As the global leader in incarceration, America locks up its own citizens at a rate that dwarfs that of any other
developed nation. Yet while racial minorities and the urban poor fill American prisons and jails for street
crimes, the state has historically struggled to consistently prosecute corporate crime. Why does the American
state lock people up for street crimes at extraordinary rates but demonstrate such a limited capacity to
prosecute corporate crime? While most scholarship analyzes these questions separately, juxtaposing these
phenomena illuminates how the carceral state’s divergent treatments of street crime and corporate crime share
common and self-reinforcing ideological and institutional origins. Analyzing intellectual history, policy
debates, and institutional change relating to the politics of street crime and corporate crime from 1870
through today demonstrates how the class biases of contemporary crime policy emerged and took root during
multiple junctures in U.S. history, including the Gilded Age, Progressive Era, New Deal, and post-war period.
This reveals that political constructions of street criminals as pathological deviants and corporate criminals as
honorable people driven to crime by market dynamics have consistently been rooted in common ideas about
what causes and constitutes crime. By the 1960s, these developments embedded class inequalities into the
criminal justice institutions that facilitated the carceral state’s rise while the regulatory state became the
government’s primary means of controlling corporate crime. The historical development of mass
incarceration, the corporate criminal law, and regulatory state should not be viewed as autonomous
developmental threads, but as processes that have overlapped and intersected in ways that have reinforced
politically constructed understandings about what counts as “crime” and who counts as a “criminal.”
Degree Type
Dissertation
Degree Name
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
Graduate Group
Political Science
First Advisor
Marie Gottschalk
Keywords
American Politics, Class, Corporations, Mass Incarceration, Race
Subject Categories
Criminology | Criminology and Criminal Justice | History | Political Science
This dissertation is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/3074
 
 
PUNISHMENT AND PRIVILEGE:  
THE POLITICS OF CLASS, CRIME, AND CORPORATIONS IN AMERICA  
 
Anthony J. Grasso 
A DISSERTATION 
in 
Political Science 
Presented to the Faculties of the University of Pennsylvania 
in 
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the 
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
2018 
 
Supervisor of Dissertation      
______________      
Marie Gottschalk       
Professor of Political Science       
 
Graduate Group Chairperson 
_________________ 
Matthew Levendusky, Professor of Political Science 
 
Dissertation Committee  
Adolph Reed   Professor of Political Science 
Rogers Smith   Professor of Political Science 
  
 
PUNISHMENT AND PRIVILEGE: THE POLITICS OF CLASS, CRIME, AND 
CORPORATIONS IN AMERICA 
 
COPYRIGHT 
2018 
Anthony J. Grasso 
 
This work is licensed under the  
Creative Commons Attribution- 
NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 
License 
 
To view a copy of this license, visit 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/us/  
iii 
 
For my Mom, my first teacher 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
I owe a debt of gratitude to the people who supported me as I completed this dissertation. 
First, I would like to thank my family. I have always admired my sister Christine. One of 
the most intelligent and positive people I know, she is an ideal role model, gifted writer, 
and truly good person. I could ask for no better model of perseverance than my father 
Tony. He taught me what it means to be committed in both a personal and professional 
sense. My mother Beth, to whom this project is dedicated, did not get to see me complete 
the dissertation, but her faith in me gave me the encouragement I needed to finish it.  
 
My dissertation committee deserves tremendous thanks. It has been a privilege to work 
with Marie Gottschalk. She has been an exceptional advisor since my first day of 
graduate school, and I am deeply grateful for the remarkable amount of time, energy, and 
effort she has put in to mentoring me as a scholar and encouraging me to do the project I 
wanted to do. Marie exhibits a rare level of commitment to her students. I am indebted to 
the kindness of Rogers Smith. His ability to make time for students, all while juggling a 
list of professional commitments and distinguished titles that sound more fit for four 
people than one, is a testament to his dedication to mentorship. He always provided clear 
and insightful feedback that spoke to the project’s most challenging aspects. And as is the 
case for so many people, the classes and conversations I had with Adolph Reed have been 
some of the most formative of my academic career. His guidance has profoundly shaped 
how I think about and understand American politics. His advice always left the project 
improved and his excitement about my research always left me feeling encouraged.   
     
There are many others at Penn who have supported me. The Penn Political Science 
Department and Robert A. Fox Leadership Program provided me with research funds and 
resources to complete my project. Bill Laufer at the Zicklin Center for Business Ethics 
Research particularly provided me with institutional support, resources, advice, and 
encouragement on numerous occasions to further my work.  
 
I became interested research at Rutgers, and many there deserve my thanks. Lisa Miller’s 
work got me engaged in questions about law, crime, and politics, and my experience as 
an assistant for Andrew Murphy exposed me to academic research. Perhaps no one is 
more responsible for getting me into academia than Milton Heumann. From advising my 
thesis to offering me advice through graduate school, he has always been in my corner. I 
am lucky to have had him as my first academic mentor and grateful to call him my friend.  
 
I am fortunuate to have been able to share my graduate school experience with a kind and 
supportive group of peers. I am lucky to have had many great friends who offered me 
encouragement, solidarity, and on occasion necessary distractions over the past six years. 
Their influence runs throughout these pages. 
 
Finally, my thanks to my wife Kelly, who made every aspect this process so much more 
enjoyable. Her immeasurable support made this project possible, and I thank her for the 
love, happiness, and encouragement she has given me.  
v 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
PUNISHMENT AND PRIVILEGE: THE POLITICS OF CLASS, CRIME, AND 
CORPORATIONS IN AMERICA 
 
Anthony Grasso 
Marie Gottschalk 
 
As the global leader in incarceration, America locks up its own citizens at a rate that 
dwarfs that of any other developed nation. Yet while racial minorities and the urban poor 
fill American prisons and jails for street crimes, the state has historically struggled to 
consistently prosecute corporate crime. Why does the American state lock people up for 
street crimes at extraordinary rates but demonstrate such a limited capacity to prosecute 
corporate crime? While most scholarship analyzes these questions separately, juxtaposing 
these phenomena illuminates how the carceral state’s divergent treatments of street crime 
and corporate crime share common and self-reinforcing ideological and institutional 
origins. Analyzing intellectual history, policy debates, and institutional change relating to 
the politics of street crime and corporate crime from 1870 through today demonstrates 
how the class biases of contemporary crime policy emerged and took root during multiple 
junctures in U.S. history, including the Gilded Age, Progressive Era, New Deal, and post-
war period. This reveals that political constructions of street criminals as pathological 
deviants and corporate criminals as honorable people driven to crime by market dynamics 
have consistently been rooted in common ideas about what causes and constitutes crime. 
By the 1960s, these developments embedded class inequalities into the criminal justice 
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institutions that facilitated the carceral state’s rise while the regulatory state became the 
government’s primary means of controlling corporate crime. The historical development 
of mass incarceration, the corporate criminal law, and regulatory state should not be 
viewed as autonomous developmental threads, but as processes that have overlapped and 
intersected in ways that have reinforced politically constructed understandings about 
what counts as “crime” and who counts as a “criminal.” 
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CHAPTER 1: THE POLITICS OF CLASS, CRIME, AND CORPORATIONS IN 
AMERICA IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
“Laws are like cobwebs, which may catch small flies, but 
let wasps and hornets break through.” 
-Jonathan Swift, 17071 
 
Nearly a decade has passed since the onset of the Great Recession. The economy 
has made steady improvements in that time, but the economic collapse reshaped the lives 
of millions of people who lost their homes, jobs, and savings in its wake. The Financial 
Crisis Inquiry Commission’s 2011 report indicated that the recession was not just an 
accident. The word “fraud” was used over 150 times to describe the actions of the 
financial officers and agents who precipitated the crisis.2 In 2010, Congress passed the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act to comprehensively 
reform the financial industry, create a Consumer Financial Protection Board, and 
mandate new regulations on high-risk financial instruments and speculative trading. At 
the bill signing, President Barack Obama stated that “unless your business model depends 
on cutting corners or bilking your customers, you’ve got nothing to fear from reform.”3  
Obama’s statement seemed to offer a real promise that through Dodd-Frank, the 
state would rein in financial fraud and never let a similar disaster unfold again. But such 
bold rhetoric is not new to American politics. In the early 2000s, the energy-trading 
company Enron perpetrated one of the biggest frauds in U.S. history with help from the 
                                                             
1 Jonathan Swift, “A Tritical Essay Upon the Faculties of the Mind (1707),” in The Works of Jonathan 
Swift, vol. IX (Edinburgh: Archibald Constable and Co., 1814), 338. 
2 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, “Financial Crisis Inquiry Report: Final Report of the National 
Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States” (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, January 2011); Jed S. Rakoff, “The Financial Crisis: Why Have No 
High-Level Executives Been Prosecuted?,” The New York Review of Books, January 9, 2014. 
3 “Obama’s Remarks at the Signing Ceremony,” New York Times, July 21, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/22/business/22regulate-text.html?mcubz=0. 
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accounting firm Arthur Andersen. After Enron’s collapse, Congress passed the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 to monitor corporate accounting, auditing, and financial disclosures. 
Upon signing the bill, President George W. Bush said, “Every corporate official who has 
chosen to commit a crime can expect to face the consequences.”4 Years earlier, President 
George H.W. Bush made similar claims. Over 1,000 Savings & Loan Associations 
(“S&Ls”) shuttered in the 1980s upon going insolvent as financiers profited through risky 
speculative investments and junk bond operations. After the collapse, Bush signed the 
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act, stating, “This legislation 
will…put in place permanent reforms so these problems will never happen again.”5 
It is a recurring pattern for policymakers to “discover” the problem of corporate 
crime and provide a solution only to “discover” it again during the next crisis.6 In spite of 
this, the state has never developed the ongoing capacity to prosecute corporate crime. 
This stands in contrast to the broader development of the criminal justice system. As the 
global leader in incarceration, America locks up its own citizens at a rate that dwarfs that 
of any other developed nation. Yet while racial minorities and the urban poor fill prisons 
and jails for property crime, drug use, and violent crime, the state has struggled to punish 
those who have made millions of dollars at the cost of ruining millions of lives. 
Industry leaders who cause such massive collapses routinely defend themselves as 
different from and more redeemable than the street criminals penalized so harshly by the 
                                                             
4 George W. Bush, “Remarks on Signing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,” July 30, 2002, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=73333. 
5 Nathaniel Nash, “Savings Cure May Kill the Patient,” New York Times, August 3, 1990, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1990/08/03/business/savings-cure-may-kill-the-patient.html?mcubz=0. 
6 William Laufer, Corporate Bodies and Guilty Minds: The Failure of Corporate Criminal Liability 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 69; Robert Tillman, Henry Pontell, and William Black, 
Financial Crime and Crises in the Era of False Profits (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 2. 
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justice system. After the collapse of Enron, its CEO Jeffrey Skilling famously insisted 
that, “We are the good guys…We are on the side of the angels.”7 Angelo Mozilo, the 
CEO of Countrywide who drove his company deep into the sub-prime mortgage business 
prior to the Great Recession, asserted that “we didn’t do anything wrong” and that the 
“tides go in and out. This is just another tide.”8 Even after precipitating economic 
devastation, it has been commonplace for executives to defend themselves as rational and 
morally upright community leaders who should not be confused with common criminals. 
 Herein lies the project’s fundamental puzzle: why does the American state 
excessively incarcerate the urban poor and racial minorities for street crimes while 
turning a blind eye to the crimes of corporate executives which, in many ways, are far 
more damaging than everyday street crimes?9 Scholars offer a variety of answers. For 
one, corporate actors can defend themselves with well-financed legal teams that most 
defendants cannot afford.10 Accounts of “too big to fail” politics have argued that the 
state also views corporations as “too big to jail” and fears that punishing corporate crime 
                                                             
7 ABC News, “Enron’s Ex-CEO Skilling on Hot Seat,” ABC News, January 6, 2016, 
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/story?id=87377&page=1. 
8 Julia La Roche, “ANGELO MOZILO: ‘No, No, No, We Didn’t Do Anything Wrong,’” Business 
Insider, September 2, 2014, http://www.businessinsider.com/mozilo-says-he-did-not-do-anything-
wrong-2014-9. 
9 For analyses of the extent of annual damage inflicted through corporate crime, see Michael L. 
Benson, Shanna R. Van Slyke, and Francis T. Cullen, “Core Themes in the Study of White-Collar 
Crime,” in The Oxford Handbook of White-Collar Crime, ed. Shanna R. Van Slyke, Michael L. 
Benson, and Francis T. Cullen (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 1–24; Michael Levi, 
“Sentencing Respectable Offenders,” in The Oxford Handbook of White-Collar Crime, ed. Shanna R. 
Van Slyke, Michael L. Benson, and Francis T. Cullen (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 
582–602; Russell Mokhiber, “20 Things You Should Know About Corporate Crime,” Harvard Law 
Record, March 24, 2015, http://hlrecord.org/2015/03/20-things-you-should-know-about-corporate-
crime/. 
10 Matt Taibbi, The Divide: American Injustice in the Age of the Wealth Gap (New York: Spiegel and 
Grau, 2014); David O. Friedrichs, Trusted Criminals: White Collar Crime in Contemporary Society 
(Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth, 1997). 
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could hurt the economy.11 Historically oriented scholars suggest that deregulation and the 
growth of the financial industry since the 1980s has glorified corporate crime as a social 
good.12 And well-resourced corporations can use their political and financial clout to 
capture regulatory agencies and shape legislation in their favor.13  
These are all valuable explanations for why the state has struggled to prosecute 
corporate crime during the late twentieth century prison boom. But while they are not 
wrong, they are incomplete. These arguments are ahistorical, as the state struggled to 
punish corporate crime well before the 1980s.14 And to the detriment of the literature, 
scholars typically analyze corporate crime in isolation from the politics that have driven 
mass incarceration.15 This has left unexplored how the political development of the 
carceral state and the state’s stunted capacity to punish corporate crime are related. 
Alternatively, this dissertation juxtaposes these phenomena to illustrate how the 
criminal justice system’s divergent treatments of street crime and corporate crime share 
                                                             
11 Brandon L. Garrett, Too Big to Jail: How Prosecutors Compromise with Corporations (Cambridge: 
Belknap of Harvard University Press, 2014). 
12 Tillman, Pontell, and Black, Financial Crime and Crises; John Hagan, Who Are the Criminals? The 
Politics of Crime Policy from the Age of Roosevelt to the Age of Reagan (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2010); Rana Foroohar, Makers and Takers: The Rise of Finance and the Fall of 
American Business (New York: Crown Business, 2016). 
13 Gregg Barak, Theft of a Nation: Wall Street Looting and Regulatory Colluding (Lanham: Rowman 
and Littlefield, 2012); Daniel Carpenter and David Moss, Preventing Regulatory Capture: Special 
Interest Influence and How to Limit It (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Gretchen 
Morgenson, Reckless Endangerment: How Outsized Ambition, Greed, and Corruption Led to 
Economic Armageddon (New York: Times Books, 2011); for a good review of literature 
demonstrating that the costs of white-collar crime outweigh the costs of street crime by several orders 
of magnitude, see Benson, Van Slyke, and Cullen, “Core Themes in the Study of White-Collar 
Crime,” 13–14; see Rebecca Katz, “United States,” in Encyclopedia of White-Collar and Corporate 
Crime, ed. Lawrence Salinger, vol. 2 (New York: SAGE, 2005), 838–41 for an argument that the costs 
of corporate crime are uniquely high in the U.S. since it is the world’s preeminent capitalist power. 
14 Christopher D. Stone, Where the Law Ends: The Social Control of Corporate Behavior (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1975); Laufer, Corporate Bodies and Guilty Minds. 
15 Hagan, Who Are the Criminals?; Taibbi, The Divide are two notable exceptions that will be 
discussed. 
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common and self-reinforcing ideological and institutional origins.16 This demonstrates 
that the historical development of mass incarceration, corporate criminal law, and the 
regulatory state should not be understood as autonomous developmental threads. These 
processes have intersected and overlapped in ways that reinforce politically constructed 
understandings about what counts as crime and who counts as a criminal. Divergent 
political constructions of street criminality and corporate criminality have regularly been 
rooted in common currents in American political thought and criminological discourse. 
While the street criminal has been constructed as pathological, irredeemable, and 
deserving of incarceration, the corporate criminal has been constructed as a rational, self-
interested individual whose behavior can be guided with mild regulatory interventions.  
  By examining how prevailing intellectual and ideological discourses about crime 
shaped institutional development, criminal justice, and regulatory policy since 1870, this 
project illustrates how the punitive character and class biases of contemporary U.S. crime 
policy emerged and took root. Since the late nineteenth century, policymakers have relied 
on prevailing ideologies about what causes and constitutes crime to design policy. This 
facilitated the construction of a criminal justice system designed to punish the poor and a 
regulatory state built to channel the wealthy away from criminal sanction.  
The origins of these institutional arrangements can be found in late nineteenth 
century politics, when scholars of the emergent school of criminal anthropology 
articulated new ideas about crime. They posited that the criminal was a naturally 
                                                             
16 "Street crime" technically refers to crimes committed in public, including property crime and 
vandalism, but is more commonly used to refer to crimes common among lower class citizens, 
including drug use and violent crime. "Corporate crime" refers to crime committed by a corporate 
entity or by employees acting on behalf of a corporation.  
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occurring phenomenon with a biological constitution predisposed to violence and 
amorality. Criminal anthropologists built on evolutionary and eugenic research that 
attributed poverty and inequality to individuals’ biological dispositions, and thus operated 
with a preconceived notion that the likely criminal was a lower-class citizen. They 
consequently focused on behaviors common among disadvantaged populations. This 
imbued criminal anthropology with a series of a priori assumptions about what counted 
as crime and who was a likely criminal that instilled class biases into crime discourse. 
Policymakers used these ideas to justify punishments for populations viewed as 
pathologically criminal, including blacks, immigrants, organized labor, and the poor.  
Arguably criminal behaviors took on different substantive meanings when 
committed by people who did not fit this image of the criminal type. This is visible in late 
nineteenth century discourses about economic regulation and the robber barons. Debates 
about regulating the new large corporations dominating the economy and the men 
running them hinged less on whether executives did “bad things” and more on whether 
they were judged to be “bad people.” The economically motivated businessman was seen 
as an inversion of the natural criminal, a man whose virtuous disposition was not inclined 
to crime. Once judged as non-criminal persons, the debatably criminal actions of 
executives were rationalized as outcomes of healthy market dynamics and capitalist self-
interest rather than criminal temperaments. This framing provided for a stark contrast 
from prevailing discourses of criminality that depicted lower-class offenders as inherently 
defective. The regulatory state was in part designed as an alternative to the criminal 
justice system for respectable offenders who did not warrant punishment and could be 
monitored through carefully crafted rules intended to guide their behavior.   
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These developments established ideological and institutional precedents that 
conditioned subsequent crime politics. From the Gilded Age through Progressive Era, 
New Deal, and post-war period, criminal justice institutions developed to identify and 
punish people deemed pathologically prone to criminality. Through the twentieth century, 
crime and regulatory politics remained frontloaded with class biases inherited from late 
nineteenth century politics. Interpretive understandings of the “corporate criminal” never 
matched established ideas of the natural criminal guiding the development of the criminal 
justice system, so the regulatory state channeled corporate actors away from the prison.  
By comparing how street crime and corporate crime have been politicized, the 
project provides new insights into the class disparities of American criminal justice. The 
limited prosecution of corporate crime has persisted alongside a growing carceral state 
because distinct conceptions of street and corporate criminality have been embedded into 
state institutions. These ideas are rooted in shared ideologies about what causes and 
constitutes crime that have been hardened through the development of the criminal justice 
system and regulatory state. Strategies to dismantle the carceral state and enhance the 
prosecution of corporate crime must recognize how political constructions of different 
types of criminality guide the state’s responses to different varieties of criminal behavior.  
The project makes five major contributions to extant scholarship. First, it speaks 
to research about ideas and institutions in American political development (APD). Crime 
policy is an important area to study the interplay of ideas and institutions. Political actors 
have regularly deployed and modified intellectual and ideological constructs of crime to 
advance their goals and shape who and what is considered criminal in American law.  
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Second, the project insists that scholars of the carceral state be attentive to the 
Gilded Age and Progressive Era. Contemporary law-and-order rhetoric attributes crime, 
especially among lower-class citizens, to individual personal faults while obscuring the 
structural roots of crime.17 This mirrors nineteenth-century discourses about the 
biological pathologies of criminals. This is no simple coincidence. Ideas associated with 
bio-essentialist crime theory shaped the carceral state’s institutional foundation and 
conditioned the evolution of crime discourse over the twentieth century. The distinction 
that street criminals are pathologically irredeemable and corporate criminals are 
respectable and rational took shape and was sewn into institutional frameworks in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. After biological crime ideologies were 
discredited in the mid-twentieth century, political actors continued to operate within an 
institutional context embedded with class-skewed practices and premises informed by 
biological theory. This tied policymakers to a governing class ideology of crime even 
after explicitly biological ideas of criminality and human behavior declined in influence.   
A third contribution is to analyses of corporate crime. Scholars acknowledge that 
regulatory agencies have discretion to respond to corporate crime through administrative 
controls, but rarely explore the political basis of this institutional design. This project 
explores how ideational constructs of the corporate criminal have shaped regulatory 
development and the state’s underdeveloped ability to prosecute corporate crime.  
The project also speaks to literature about the regulatory state. Scholars often fail 
to recognize how debates about regulatory policy have been intertwined with debates 
                                                             
17 Stuart Scheingold, The Politics of Street Crime: Criminal Process and Cultural Obsession 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992). 
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about crime. Dating back to the Interstate Commerce Commission’s creation in 1887, 
regulatory agencies have internalized a political construct of the corporate criminal that is 
less “criminal” than lower-class offenders. This project’s wide historical lens highlights 
how and why the regulatory state was designed to siphon off corporate crime from the 
criminal justice system while investigating the effects this has had on American politics. 
A fifth contribution is to literature on business-government relations in the U.S. 
Corporations are uniquely powerful interests, but research often overlooks nuances in 
how they exercise their power. In debates over regulation, corporate actors have secured 
their favored policies by framing their policy preferences within prevailing political, 
social, and economic discourses. Corporate actors who have drawn on dominant ideas 
about criminality to frame their preferences in these debates have been more successful 
than those who attempted to use sheer force to attain their goals. By speaking to dominant 
discourses of a moment, strategic business leaders have made their policy goals appealing 
to policymakers. This illustrates how political and ideational discourses can condition the 
range of policies that can be pursued at a given moment, even by powerful interests.  
Class and criminality have been mutually constitutive constructs in American 
politics. Class hierarchy and street criminality have regularly been explained as products 
of a shared set of faults among lower-class citizens. With pathological constructions of 
street criminality embedded into the criminal justice system and respectable constructions 
of corporate criminality embedded into the regulatory state, both institutions reflect and 
reinforce a class-skewed understanding of who and what counts as “criminal.” 
The relations between the carceral state, corporate criminal law, and regulatory 
state are underappreciated in current scholarship. Analyzing these developmental threads 
10 
 
together reveals understudied dynamics about U.S. crime politics that have shaped public 
policies and institutions traditionally not considered in broader analyses of American 
criminal justice. The shared roots of the state’s divergent treatments of street crime and 
corporate crime must be fully understood if they are to be transformed. 
Project Overview 
The project’s timeline encompasses several periods of American political 
development. Beginning in 1870, policy and institutional change is traced through the 
Gilded Age, Progressive Era, New Deal, post-war period, and Great Society. By relying 
on an examination of intellectual history in conjunction with primary source analyses of 
legislative histories, case law, agency documents, and archival sources, the project 
connects shifting ideas about crime to institutional development and policy change.  This 
illustrates how political developments ingrained class inequalities into the criminal justice 
institutions that have facilitated the carceral state’s rise since the 1960s while the 
regulatory state has become the state’s primary means of controlling corporate crime.  
To highlight differences and commonalities in how policymakers have 
conceptualized street and corporate criminality, the empirical chapters are structured into 
pairs. The first pair examines the Gilded Age, with chapter two focusing on the politics of 
street crime from roughly 1870 through 1900 and chapter three studying the politics of 
corporate crime during the same period. Chapters four and five are organized similarly to 
examine the early twentieth century Progressive Era, and chapters six and seven study the 
politics of street crime and corporate crime from the Great Depression through 1960s.  
Many scholars identify the politics of the 1960s as a proximate trigger for the 
prison boom, pointing to the southern strategy and conservative backlash to civil rights 
11 
 
and Johnson’s War on Poverty as ushering in a new brand of punitive politics that 
facilitated the rise of the carceral state.18 Scholars of business history also emphasize the 
importance of the 1960s, when the rise of consumerism promoted robust regulatory 
reforms that led to a significant uptick in the political mobilization of corporations.19 This 
project illustrates how common institutional and ideological roots influenced both of 
these developments. The basis for contemporary punitive crime politics was laid over the 
course of the previous century when ideological frameworks stigmatizing street criminals 
as pathological shaped the institutional terrain on which the carceral state evolved. 
During the same period, the channeling of corporate crime into regulatory arenas was 
facilitated by elements of this crime discourse. In the 1960s, this institutional context 
steered anti-business impulses towards regulatory rather than criminal justice reform. 
This reveals how the ideological and institutional basis for a class-biased system of mass 
incarceration originated out of long-standing trends in American politics. 
The dissertation takes 1870 as its analytic starting point for several reasons. First, 
in the late nineteenth century, large corporations emerged and developed in ways that 
adapted to and reshaped the American economy.20 Business crimes were not new in the 
                                                             
18 Michael Flamm, Law and Order: Street Crime, Civil Unrest, and the Crisis of Liberalism in the 
1960s (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005); Vesla Weaver, “Frontlash: Race and the 
Development of Punitive Crime Policy,” Studies in American Political Development 21, no. 2 (Fall 
2007): 230–65; Michael Tonry, Punishing Race: A Continuing American Dilemma (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2011). 
19 David Vogel, Fluctuating Fortunes: The Political Power of Business in America (Washington: 
Beard Books, 1989), 16–37; Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson, Winner-Take-All Politics: How 
Washington Made the Rich Richer--and Turned Its Back on the Middle Class (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 2010), 95–115; Timothy Werner and Graham Wilson, “Business Representation in 
Washington, DC,” in The Oxford Handbook of Business and Government, ed. David Coen, Wyn 
Grant, and Graham Wilson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 261–84. 
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late 1800s, but the size of corporations altered the scope of corporate crime and its 
character as a social and political problem. As corporations became capable of abuses on 
an unprecedented scale, American business posed new challenges to American politics.  
This periodization does not imply that there was no status differentiation in 
punishment prior to 1870. Criminal codes entailed class biases long before the industrial 
revolution, and racial biases were written into southern Black Codes after the Civil 
War.21 But early nineteenth century criminal justice was localized and municipalities kept 
poor records, leaving it difficult to study who was punished and why during these years.22 
The few analyses that try find that states fostered a relative equality in punishment when 
compared to Europe, sentencing planters and laborers to comparable rates of monetary, 
carceral, and corporal sanctions in the colonial era and nineteenth century.23 However, 
these analyses use unreliable data, and the emergence of large corporations in the late 
nineteenth century changed the nature of inequality in American society. 
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The project also begins in 1870 because crime politics experienced a critical shift 
at this moment. Preceding 1870, American penology was largely built on the classical 
school of criminology. This philosophy embodied the ideas of Cesare Beccaria, who 
linked criminal sanction to deterrence and claimed that punishment should be swift, 
certain, and proportional to the crime committed in order to deter criminal behavior. 
Beccaria said sentences should not be too severe because he ascribed a degree of 
rationality to the potential criminal and assumed that he or she could be deterred through 
moderate sanctions.24 Then in 1870, the American Congress of Corrections published its 
“Declaration of Principles” directing U.S. prisons to focus on rehabilitating offenders.25 
The rehabilitative ideal went on to supplant deterrence-based penology and older 
philosophies of punishment.26 But rehabilitative ideology’s nominal progressivism was 
compromised by its reliance on the developing school of criminal anthropology.   
Founded by Italian scholar Cesare Lombroso, criminal anthropology attributed 
criminal behavior to the biological constitution of offenders. Lombroso claimed to 
identify physiological characteristics and congenital atavistic traits that were indicative of 
a primitive biological inheritance predisposed to criminal behavior. He referred to 
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individuals with such traits as “born criminals.”27 Scholars of crime and human behavior 
readily imported Lombrosian philosophy to America, fitting it into an intellectual context 
favoring eugenics and scientific racism. Combining criminal anthropology with bio-
deterministic research on poverty, scholars proceeded to link socioeconomic inequality 
and crime to a singular defective biology. This caused criminal anthropological scholars 
to narrowly focus on crimes associated with lower class and poor populations. 28   
Scholars relied on this work to design two prongs of the rehabilitative ideal—one 
premised on reforming and releasing inmates and another on punishing those deemed 
“incorrigibles” who proved immune to reform. The incorrigibles concept reflected 
Lombroso’s idea of born criminals. Incorrigibles were viewed as driven by natural 
biological impulses that left them irrational, rendering Beccarian deterrence philosophy 
useless and warranting severe rather than moderate punishment. This construct of 
incorrigibility was imbued with the class biases that shaped criminal anthropology. By 
taking for granted what counted as crime and who was likely to commit it, rehabilitative 
ideology narrowly defined who counted as a criminal by focusing on lower-class citizens 
while obscuring the structural roots of crime under an emphasis on individual defects.    
The influence of biological theories of behavior was not limited to studies of 
crime and poverty. Similar themes appeared in the work of economists like William 
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Graham Sumner who used Herbert Spencer’s concept of “social Darwinism” to 
rationalize capitalist economics. The disadvantages of lower classes were attributed to 
their pathologies, but capitalists’ successes were credited to their natural superiority, an 
argument that was readily accepted by leaders of industry. With natural selection serving 
as a biological apology for the inequalities of capitalism, these ideas synthesized the 
glorification of Protestant ethic, classical economics, and evolutionary theory in a way 
that justified conservative thought and opposition to proposals for economic regulation.29 
Legislators and corporate interests articulated comparable ideas in debates over 
the criminal provisions in the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887. This logic formed the 
basis of a regulatory ideology deployed by lawmakers and leaders of major railroads. 
According to this perspective, executives were driven by healthy self-interest and market 
dynamics, not amoral dispositions. Even if their actions shared affinities with crimes like 
theft, their behaviors took on new substantive meanings because they were committed by 
respected members of society. The economically motivated capitalist was not a born 
criminal, but a man who rose to the top by virtue of his character. Even if he engaged in 
harmful or unethical behavior, he did not require penalization to change his ways.  
Regulatory ideology shaped the design of the Interstate Commerce Commission 
as an alternative to criminal courts for controlling railroads. Regulatory ideology does not 
rule out criminal sanction for corporate actors but gives regulators the discretion to 
respond to criminal behavior through civil and regulatory sanctions. These are not simply 
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alternatives to incarceration the way fines or probation are, which are substitutes or 
supplements to imprisonment in the wake of a conviction. In the regulatory approach, 
agencies are permitted to respond to prosecutable criminal behavior through responses 
like cease and desist orders, injunctions, or warning letters that do not carry the stigma of 
criminality. In this way, a corporate actor can commit multiple offenses, be sanctioned 
through administrative interventions each time, and never once be charged with a crime. 
The regulatory approach permits regulators to ascribe alternative meanings to behaviors 
legally defined as criminal by using regulatory sanctions in lieu of prosecution and 
emphasizing market dynamics as the targets of reform rather than individuals.   
Rehabilitative and regulatory ideologies work together to serve projects of class 
sorting and ideological messaging. Rehabilitative ideology sorts lower-class offenders 
into prisons for either rehabilitation or containment, while regulatory ideology sorts 
corporate offenders into administrative venues under the presumption that businesspeople 
are rational individuals who will be responsive to mild sanctions. Together, they send a 
message that only certain types of people count as “criminal” and deserve punishment.  
With the rise of rehabilitative ideology, policy debates over crime became 
centered less on questions of what to punish and more on questions of who to punish. 
This was different from earlier modes of crime theory, such as deterrence or retributivist 
schools, which emphasized consistency in punishment for criminal acts.30 Rehabilitative 
thought rested on the notion that punishment should be individualized. Two people 
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convicted of the same crime must receive different sentences if they have different 
dispositions and rehabilitative potential. Alternatively, regulatory ideology was built on 
the idea that corporate criminals did not fit the conventional ideational construct of the 
“criminal” frontloaded with class-skewed assumptions. These ideologies have become 
entrenched in the criminal justice system and regulatory state over time, embedding 
premises and practices into institutional arrangements that have preserved a durable class 
ideology of punishment long after Lombrosian theory was refuted.  
Although they are few and far between, there have been scattered historical 
examples of financiers being convicted of crimes. But juxtaposing the development of the 
carceral and regulatory states highlights that harshly punishing corporate criminals would 
exacerbate the problems of mass incarceration, which is overlooked by many scholars of 
corporate crime. Savage sentences for those like Bernie Madoff (150 years) and Sholam 
Weiss (845 years) satiate public demands for punishing white-collar criminals.31 These 
cases are exceptions, not the norm, and they defuse political demands for systematic 
change to the political economy and regulatory state by making examples out of a few. 
Subjecting a handful of corporate criminals to brutal sentences obfuscates how 
regulatory ideology has inhibited the state from developing the consistent will and 
capacity to prosecute corporate crime. Instead of calling for harsh justice for corporate 
offenders, this project complements the responsive regulation model of John Braithwaite 
and Ian Ayres. In their model, regulators rely on a “regulatory sanctions pyramid,” 
initially responding to corporate offenses through regulatory tools before escalating to 
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criminal sanctions for repeated or dangerous behavior.32 They theorize that this would 
encourage regulators to employ a mix of sanctions that would deter corporate crime, a 
notion that has received empirical validation from scholars of corporate crime 
deterrence.33 This indicates that the more regular prosecution of serious and repeated 
behavior coupled with modest sentences would more effectively deter corporate crime 
than the inconsistent use of prosecution coupled with wildly harsh sentences.34  
Policy choices made in the nineteenth century established discursive parameters 
and institutional arrangements that conditioned the development of crime and regulatory 
policy through the twentieth century. The institutional bifurcation of street crime and 
corporate crime hardened class divisions in American society by stigmatizing one class of 
offenders as more “criminal” than the other. With rehabilitative and regulatory ideologies 
embedded into the criminal justice system and regulatory state, policymakers remained 
tied to a class ideology of punishment that made it difficult to conceptualize street and 
corporate criminality in comparable terms. Assessing these developments relies on 
research about ideas and institutions in American political development, the carceral 
state, corporate criminal law, regulatory state, and business-government relations.  
Ideas, Institutions, and American Political Development 
Recent work in the APD canon has closely explored the relationship between 
ideas and political development.35 Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek contend that 
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authoritative coalitions within political orders alter the ideas channeled through 
institutions to guide development.36 Skowronek has also argued that policymakers can 
recover political purchase in old ideas by modifying their purposes in pursuit of new 
goals.37 Robert Lieberman has claimed that development springs from “friction” between 
mismatched institutional and ideational patterns that become uncomfortably situated 
within one another over time.38 While these scholars provide frameworks for assessing 
how ideas can facilitate or impede change, Rogers Smith’s “spiral of politics” model 
offers a general theory of how political actors, ideas, and institutions interact. According 
to the theory, political development occurs within an environment of established 
institutions and ideas. Political actors can use preexisting ideas to promote coalition 
formation and change, which modifies the ideational and institutional universe. While 
actors can exert agency by articulating new ideas, prevailing ideational and institutional 
patterns can also condition development and constrain the expression of new ideas.39  
The spiral model helps to explain how, why, and when political actors use ideas 
by directing attention onto the varying processes through which ideas and institutions can 
promote change and stability. It complements the work of scholars who have emphasized 
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how political actors use ideas to build coalitions, persuade opponents, and induce 
institutional change.40 The theory also recognizes that while history can limit the 
potential avenues for change, it is not deterministic, as path dependencies can abruptly 
change at punctuated junctures or development can unfold gradually through layering or 
drift.41 It also stresses timing and sequence, as major changes can be driven by seemingly 
minor or contingent events that can establish rigid developmental trajectories. This 
project relies on the spiral model to examine the role of ideas in American crime politics 
because it captures a variety of dynamics that can shape political development.  
Ideas about what causes and constitutes crime and how the state can best respond 
to it have been crucial to American political development. A range of ideational forces 
has shaped crime politics since the colonial era, including Puritan principles, racial 
ideologies, and law-and-order politics.42 Understudied in this literature are the legacies of 
biological theories of crime and rehabilitative and regulatory ideologies, which instilled 
class biases into the label of criminality that have solidified over time.  
These class biases have been hardened by ideational and institutional forces. For 
instance, chapter four illustrates that twentieth century variants of crime theory associated 
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with psychology and culture maintained a focus on individual defects inherited from 
criminal anthropology. Chapter six shows that while some scholars of the 1930s broke 
from criminology’s focus on individual faults by attributing crime to social and economic 
forces, policymakers channeled these ideas into rehabilitative frameworks that reoriented 
them to focus on individual defects rather than macro-economic reform. This 
demonstrates how new ideas can be reshaped by existing institutional contexts. Although 
untied from biological theory, policymakers in the 1930s operated in an institutional 
setting infected with the class-biased premises of biological crime ideologies.  
Modern penal practices continue to reflect the principles of rehabilitative 
ideology. For instance, sentences remain individually tailored based on defendants’ 
personal traits and behavioral histories. Even strict sentencing guidelines consider an 
offender’s criminal history. America’s reliance on criminal history in sentencing is highly 
unusual in comparative perspective, and it is largely a legacy of the rehabilitative ideal 
and its emphasis on sentencing individualization.43 Contemporary labels for recidivists 
like “career criminal” mirror ideas about natural criminality and remain colored with 
class-biased assumptions about who is likely to rehabilitate or recidivate.44 In contrast, 
while prosecutors and judges view deterrence as paramount in white-collar cases, 
favorable impressions and preconceived notions of white-collar criminals check their 
impulse to punish “respectable” offenders viewed as unlikely to recidivate.45  
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Regulatory ideology has also remained a persistent force in political development. 
After shaping the Interstate Commerce Commission in the nineteenth century, regulatory 
ideology has been repackaged by different coalitions over time. Those evolving coalitions 
reflected shifts in the relative power of different sectors of the political economy. While 
railroads were the first advocates of the regulatory model in the nineteenth century, the 
financial sector adapted it in the early twentieth century. By the New Deal, Wall Street 
financiers, investment bankers, and securities exchanges were leading proponents of 
regulatory ideology. These ideas travelled over time due to changes in the political 
economy that led different coalitions to repurpose them for historically specific 
circumstances. By the 1930s, regulatory ideology was so institutionally ingrained that 
even foes of corporate power in the Roosevelt administration accepted tenets of 
regulatory ideology in ways that limited the state’s will to initiate corporate prosecutions.  
Changes in the social sciences also altered how rehabilitative and regulatory 
ideologies were politicized. Initially articulated by sociologists and anthropologists, these 
ideologies were reshaped by eugenicists, cultural theorists, and economists in the 
twentieth century. In the New Deal era and mid-twentieth century, new ideas articulated 
by social structure and conflict theorists were stifled by rigid institutional frameworks 
built upon rehabilitative and regulatory ideologies.  
 The project links an analysis of intellectual history to political development 
through primary source analyses of legislative histories, case law, and commission and 
agency documents. This tracks how various coalitions and political actors deployed ideas 
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about crime to pursue policy change and institutional development. It shows how these 
ideas have promoted punitive policies for street criminals and regulatory sanctions for 
corporate offenders based on shared assumptions about what it means to be a criminal.  
Race, Class, and the Political Development of the Carceral State 
 In recent years, an interdisciplinary literature has grown examining the causes and 
consequences of mass incarceration. Given this project’s core arguments, it naturally 
builds on this body of work. Many scholars start by pointing to the 1960s as key to the 
rise of the carceral state and suggest that a conservative backlash to civil rights and the 
Great Society fueled the Republican Party’s southern strategy and a new brand of 
racialized punitive politics.46 Others have challenged this narrative, highlighting how 
law-and-order campaigns through U.S. history incrementally built a state capable of mass 
incarceration.47 Scholars have also shown that the racial biases of American criminal 
justice long predated the southern strategy, comparing the carceral state to older systems 
of racial caste like Jim Crow.48 And liberals have not been innocent in this story—in the 
early twentieth century, 1940s, and modern era, liberals embraced brands of harsh justice 
politics that promoted racial inequality.49 This highlights the deep historical roots of the 
carceral state and shows that punitive politics has long been a bipartisan persuasion. 
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This project situates itself against literature emphasizing the 1960s while building 
on research exploring the carceral state’s deep historical origins. While the rejection of 
the rehabilitative ideal in the 1960s is often taken for granted by scholars as a catalyst for 
carceral growth, this project shows how rehabilitative ideology helped construct the 
institutional and ideological landscape on which the carceral state emerged.50 The ideas 
associated with bio-determinism that shaped the rehabilitative ideal cannot be discarded 
as antiquated ideational relics. Many rehabilitative practices, like indeterminate 
sentencing, are still in use today or shaped modern penal practices. Even though bio-
determinist crime theories have waxed and waned in influence over the twentieth century, 
institutional practices associated with rehabilitation still infect the criminal justice system 
with ideas of innate criminality. This has kept policymakers tied to a class ideology of 
punishment even after biological theories of criminality fell out of favor.     
 Research on the long history of the carceral state commonly emphasizes links 
between race and punishment. This is a warranted focus given the racialized character of 
the prison population, but historical links between class and crime are often overlooked in 
this research. This project focuses on how class ideologies of punishment have been 
embedded into state institutions and policies. This does not mean that race will be 
ignored. Rather, class-driven analyses can compensate for drawbacks to scholarship that 
exclusively emphasizes racial disparities. Adolph Reed and Merlin Chowkwanyun have 
argued that racial disparities studies often attribute inequality to “institutional racism” 
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and individual racial animus without contextualizing these trends in social and economic 
relations.51 This project explores how racial ideologies have shaped crime politics while 
heeding Reed and Chowkwanyun’s warning by considering how racial ideologies have 
interacted and overlapped with class dynamics in American crime politics. 
This approach brings APD research on the carceral state into dialogue with 
analyses of the relationship between prison systems and political economic dynamics.52 It 
does so by drawing on research in critical criminology. Critical criminologists adopt 
Marxist analytic frames to argue that the state politicizes crime to stigmatize the poor and 
justify their exploitation.53 Loïc Wacquant’s work shows how critical criminology can be 
attentive to both class and race. He contends that the carceral state hides the social 
disorder produced by neoliberalism by compelling the poor to transform into worker-
citizens or face incarceration.54 Wacquant argues that prisons and ghettos work in tandem 
to perpetuate inequality among an increasingly black subproletariat, linking the racialized 
character of mass incarceration to the rise of a post-Keynesian state.55  
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This project complements the work of critical criminologists by showing how 
ideational constructs of crime have helped the state to define criminality with a class 
slant. While speaking to literatures on race and crime, this approach emphasizes issues 
related to class inequality that are sometimes downplayed in political science research by 
showing how poverty and criminality have regularly been politicized as products of a 
common set of individual failings.  
By situating an institutionally grounded analysis within a critical criminological 
framework, the project contributes to a subset of the mass incarceration literature on the 
criminalization of poverty. Particularly, modern banishment laws criminalize behaviors 
common among the urban poor like sleeping in public so that police can displace them 
out of neighborhoods.56 Katherine Beckett and Steve Herbert have shown how 
policymakers frame these laws as crime prevention mechanisms by politicizing poverty 
and homelessness as indicators that an individual is likely to fall into serious crime and 
should thus be preemptively contained.57 This rationale is not new but was fundamental 
to rehabilitative ideology and the vagrancy law reforms of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. These statutes are largely retooled vagrancy laws written to pass 
constitutional muster after the Supreme Court struck down vagrancy laws in 1972.58 
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By putting literatures on race, class, and crime into dialogue, the project reveals 
the broad political purchase deterministic constructs of criminality have had in American 
politics. The labels “incorrigible” and “born criminal” served as categories that were 
populated with blacks, immigrants, organized labor, the poor, and the mentally ill in 
different places at different times. The deterministic disposition of criminal anthropology 
was a fertile basis out of which various prejudices could flourish.59  
The project makes one final contribution to carceral state research. This literature 
naturally focuses on crimes the state has penalized severely, devoting attention to the War 
on Drugs, three-strikes laws, and mandatory sentencing.60 But this focus inadvertently 
reinforces preexisting notions about what counts as crime by taking as a starting point the 
behaviors the state chooses to punish harshly. Scholars rarely analyze the dynamics of 
mass incarceration alongside the state’s inconsistent response to white-collar crime.   
There are two notable exceptions to this trend, and this project complements both 
while rectifying their shortcomings. One is Matt Taibbi’s The Divide. Taibbi argues that 
as income inequality has grown, so have disparities in punishment, as the poor are 
controlled by a system harshly punishing small offenses like welfare fraud while Wall 
Street financiers freely commit frauds on much larger scales. While compelling, Taibbi’s 
account lacks rigor and nuance in certain respects. He overlooks the historical persistence 
of class inequality to emphasize how income disparities today produce unequal justice 
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outcomes and ignores how political institutions have developed in ways that enforce class 
inequalities in punishment.61 
The arguments made in this project more closely mirror those made by John 
Hagan in his book, Who Are the Criminals? Hagan argues that scholarly ideas of crime 
have historically been linked to shifts in governing ideologies, and that structural 
criminology fostered progressive crime politics during the “age of Roosevelt” (1933-
1973) while career criminal criminology produced punitive policies for street criminals 
and lenience for white-collar offenders in the “age of Reagan” (1974-2008).62 While 
Hagan’s work provides noteworthy insights, it falls short in other regards. By beginning 
his analysis in the 1930s, he overlooks consistencies in crime policy across the Reagan 
and Roosevelt eras that are traceable to the influence of rehabilitative and regulatory 
ideologies. Further, while Hagan studies white-collar crime generally, this project focuses 
on corporate crime, or crimes committed by a corporate entity or individuals acting on 
behalf of a corporation. This entails closer attention to specific dynamics and processes, 
like the development of the regulatory state. Through a broad historical timeline and 
narrowed analytic foci, the project provides new insights into the interplay between ideas 
about crime and governing ideologies.   
The Punishment of Corporate Crime 
Research on corporate crime is concentrated in the disciplines of law and 
criminology and is typically inattentive to historical trends in U.S. politics. The 
ahistorical character of this research is surprising given the prominence of Edwin 
                                                             
61 Taibbi, The Divide. 
62 Hagan, Who Are the Criminals? 
29 
 
Sutherland’s 1949 book White-Collar Crime in the canon. In the book, Sutherland studied 
980 legal decisions brought against seventy corporations in the early twentieth century. 
He found that only 20% of charges were brought in criminal court while 80% were 
handled through regulatory sanctions, civil courts, and equity proceedings despite the fact 
that all of the behaviors were defined as crimes.63 Sutherland’s conclusions are typically a 
starting point for corporate crime scholars today, with some suggesting that controlling 
corporate crime through regulation rather than prosecution is “the American way.”64 This 
uncritical acceptance of Sutherland has caused many researchers to study corporate crime 
in isolation from the general dynamics of American crime politics.  
Alternatively, this project situates an analysis of corporate crime within the 
general currents of American crime politics. Only a few criminological scholars have 
done this. One of the first was Christopher Stone, who claimed in 1975 that the criminal 
law evolved to deter individuals rather than corporations and that the corporate criminal 
law should be abandoned in favor of a focus on regulation.65 Recently, Gregg Barak’s 
Theft of a Nation (2012) provides a criminological analysis of the social construction of 
fraud and the design flaws in regulatory frameworks in relation to the 2008 financial 
crisis.66 But these works do little to connect historical inquiry to politics. This project fills 
this gap by assessing the political construction of corporate criminality over time.  
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Positioning an analysis of corporate crime next to an analysis of the carceral state 
also avoids the implications made in many studies of corporate crime. Numerous analysts 
have criticized the state’s lackluster response to the behavior that caused the Great 
Recession and insist on subjecting financiers to lengthy prison terms.67 While there are 
problems in the way the state responds to corporate criminality, subjecting executives to 
brutally long prison terms is not the solution. Extreme sentences like those given to 
Madoff or Weiss quench the public’s short-term demands for punishment while 
neutralizing political momentum that could be directed towards political economic 
reform or structural changes to regulatory frameworks. For example, the state’s harsh 
sentencing of Madoff satisfied public demands for justice but overshadowed the fact that 
the SEC failed to uncover his Ponzi scheme even after initiating five inquiries over 
sixteen years preceding its collapse.68 Responses like this detract attention away from the 
fact that agencies like the SEC are grossly underfunded, causing them to focus on easy 
cases to bolster their statistics at the expense of ignoring serious and challenging cases.69 
While there are disputes in the small literature on corporate crime deterrence, a 
series of articles published in 2016 in the journal Criminology & Public Policy indicated 
that deterrence can be achieved without severity.70 The main piece was a meta-analysis of 
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corporate crime deterrence studies by Natalie Schell-Busey and several coauthors. They 
only found evidence of deterrence when agencies used a combination of regulatory, civil, 
and criminal sanctions rather than relying on one type. Qualifying that more research is 
needed to verify their findings, they suggest that “a mix of agency interventions” 
including regulatory and criminal sanctions is the best way to achieve deterrence.71  
Responses to the study were varied. Peter Yeager argued that the glorification of 
noncompliance in corporate culture and rise of "too big to fail” politics compromised the 
criminal law’s deterrent power by making prosecution a rare occurrence.72 His piece 
complements work studying how corporations have weakened the force of law by 
capturing agencies and shaping Justice Department policy to their liking.73 It also builds 
on research suggesting that economic financialization, the “pattern of accumulation in 
which profits accrue primarily through financial channels rather than through trade and 
commodity production,” has glorified the pursuit of profits through illicit means.74 
According to Yeager, these developments create a low risk of legal sanction for 
corporations that reduces the deterrent power of prosecution. John Braithwaite was more 
critical of the piece, arguing that the lack of reliable data on corporate crime makes it 
difficult to study deterrence. Echoing Sutherland, he noted that the discretion afforded to 
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agencies in responding to corporate behavior makes it hard to quantify corporate crime in 
the first place.75 Analyses of corporate crime deterrence are limited by the fact that 
available datasets reflect the dispositions of the agencies charged with reporting them.76 
 Despite their differences, Schell-Busey et al., Yeager, and Braithwaite agreed that 
the responsive regulation approach outlined by Braithwaite and Ayres is the best means 
of monitoring corporate crime.77 Suggesting that the state should initially respond to 
corporate crime through cooperative regulatory approaches before escalating to punitive 
interventions, Braithwaite and Ayres claim that regulations only work as deterrents if 
prosecution is used regularly enough that corporate actors view it as a “big gun” 
constituting a meaningful threat.78 Schell-Busey et al. state that their results validated the 
model by showing that a mix of sanctions had deterrent effect.79 This indicates that 
relying on a combination of sanctions while using prosecution consistently enough to be 
a credible threat is more effective than a few severe sentences. The increased certainty of 
prosecution for serious offenses would enhance the deterrent force of the entire sanctions 
pyramid. This project’s claims comport with the responsive regulation model, noting how 
an overreliance on regulatory sanctions masks corporate criminality, reinforces class-
biased ideas of crime, and weakens the law’s potency without calling for harsh justice.  
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Unpacking the deterrence debate within an APD analysis highlights a central limit 
of this literature. By focusing on what does and does not work to deter corporate crime, 
deterrence research is constrained to considering the effects of existing structures without 
questioning how and why those structures have been designed as they are. This misses 
how favorable ideational constructs of corporate criminality have been embedded into 
regulatory institutions in ways that compromise the law’s force. Understanding the 
interaction of these ideas with state development requires looking outside of traditional 
criminal justice machinery and at the origins of regulatory institutions. 
The Political Development of the Regulatory State 
The regulatory state is a distinctly American model of business-government 
relations.80 While businesses have been hostile to regulators throughout the twentieth 
century and decried regulations as impediments to capital accumulation, the regulatory 
state was designed to support capitalist structures.81 In lieu of public ownership or more 
directive instruments, regulatory frameworks allow the state to react to the economy in 
ways that leave it responsive to industries. Agencies create rules of the road to maintain 
balance in markets without altering the direction or layout of the road itself.82 In contrast, 
a competing literature has presented U.S. agencies as exceptionally hostile to business.83  
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This debate fosters all-or-nothing statements about the U.S. being either pro- or 
anti-business that overlook nuanced qualitative dimensions of regulatory policy. For 
instance, some scholars argue that the litigious and adversarial style of U.S. regulation 
makes the American regulatory state anti-business. But others have shown that businesses 
have resource advantages in court and are adept at choosing which cases to settle to avoid 
hostile rulings and which to push to secure favorable precedent.84 So sweeping claims 
about the regulatory state’s pro- or anti-business inclinations are often overbroad. More 
useful is noting how the regulatory state is both pro- and anti-business. Michael Moran 
captures this complexity in his description of the regulatory state as “snarling and smiling 
at business.” On one hand, it smiles because it was built to sustain capitalist structures 
and intervene in markets only when necessary to restore balance. But regulators snarl 
when they rely on litigation and broad liability rules to exact punitive damages.85  
Understanding this snarling and smiling dichotomy requires an analysis of the 
regulatory state’s origins. There is a sizable APD literature on this topic. Skowronek has 
described late nineteenth century development as “state-building as patchwork,” as 
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reform-driven professionals and bureaucrats secured piecemeal victories against political 
elites in initially designing the administrative state.86 Gabriel Kolko, Gerald Berk, and 
Richard Bensel have shown how corporations helped facilitate the shift from laissez-faire 
economy to a corporate capitalist one overseen by a minimal regulatory state.87 While 
this research outlines economic debates and institutional forces involved in the regulatory 
state’s early development, it overlooks how the regulatory state in part a product of crime 
politics. In many ways, the regulatory state is a relative of the criminal justice system.  
By exploring the origins of regulatory ideology and how debates about regulation 
have been wound up with debates about crime, this project makes sense of the regulatory 
state’s “snarling and smiling” dualism. Agencies snarl at business because they monitor 
activity defined as criminal and reflect the adversarial dynamics of American law. But the 
regulatory state was also designed as an alternative to the criminal justice system for 
corporate actors. Regulatory ideology does not rule out prosecution but gives regulators 
the discretion to attribute non-criminal meanings to behaviors defined as crimes through 
the use of alternate sanctions. This institutional framework channels corporate criminality 
away from criminal justice institutions and can thus be viewed as smiling at business.  
In The Rich Get Richer and the Poor Get Prison, Jeffrey Reiman’s critical 
criminological account veers from traditional Marxist analyses of crime by suggesting 
that the disproportionate incarceration of the poor not only serves a functionalist purpose, 
but an ideological one. By being intentionally designed to fail to reduce crime, prisons 
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send an ideological message that the poor are dangerous.88 By suppressing the criminal 
law under regulatory sanctions, the regulatory state serves an inverse purpose to the one 
Reiman attributes to prisons. The design of the regulatory state both expresses and 
legitimizes the idea that corporate criminals are honorable people who neither require nor 
deserve the types of punishment meted out to conventional criminals.    
The Nature of Business-Government Relations in the U.S. 
Although the regulatory state emerged in response to the rise of large 
corporations, businesses shaped regulatory legislation to facilitate growth and insulate 
policy from popular control.89 As a result, this project is attentive to the ways in which 
businesses can and have influenced political development. Scholars offer many theories 
on the general dynamics of business-state relations. In 1977, Charles Lindblom argued 
that businesses constrain the authority of democratic institutions by limiting the options 
political actors have to those that please business.90 Whether or not corporations enjoy 
advantages that produce suboptimal policy has been debated by scholars of pluralism, 
power-elite theory, agency capture, and lobbying.91 In 1960, E.E. Schattschneider 
famously said that the Republican Party was the “political instrument of big business.”92  
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 For many reasons, this literature tends to promote overgeneralized claims leading 
to the conclusion that big business always secures its policy goals with ease. In three 
ways, this project resists this tendency. First, analyses of business-government relations 
often treat economic, social, and political contexts as static in order to make broad 
statements that the political power of business is near absolute. But David Vogel has 
shown that big business has had “fluctuating fortunes” in U.S. history, growing in 
influence during periods of economic decline when the state is fearful of impeding 
enterprise and losing influence during times of prosperity when the public feels more 
comfortable with regulation.93 This project draws on Vogel’s work, acknowledging that 
business-state relations evolve and adapt in response to the political economic climate.  
Second, scholars often use the phrase "business community” or similar blanket 
phraseology to refer to corporate interests as a homogenous bloc without differentiating 
between businesses of different sizes, sectors, or regions. This ignores divides among 
businesses and within sectors of industry. At certain moments in history business 
interests have concentrated their party allegiances, while at other times they have divided 
into diverse coalitions.94 And while the Republican Party has been the political 
instrument of big business at times, party ideologies shift. With contemporary Democrats 
embracing big business, Schattschneider’s claims seem like a relic of a previous era.95  
Treating the “business community” as a monolithic entity with fixed political 
allegiances obscures the role that specific industries have played in driving change and 
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transmitting regulatory ideology over time. Lead advocates of regulatory ideology have 
reflected shifts in power among sectors of the political economy. Railroads defended 
regulatory ideology in the nineteenth century, the financial sector modified it in the 
Progressive Era, and Wall Street bankers and exchange officials supported it during the 
Great Depression. These shifting coalitions consisted of prominent business leaders from 
different industries dominating the political economy at different times, not a 
homogenous business community. Appreciating how shifting business interests deployed 
similar ideas about crime to affect change and embed favorable understandings of 
corporate criminality into regulatory frameworks entails attention to shifting power 
balances in business-state relations and the political economy.  
Examining splits among businesses highlights when and why certain coalitions 
have been more effective than others. This illustrates the third way this analysis is distinct 
from many studies of business-government relations. Recognizing differences among 
businesses reveals that the successful corporate coalitions have framed their goals within 
prevailing political, social, and economic discourses. By drawing on dominant ideas 
about crime in debates about regulation, business leaders in effective coalitions framed 
themselves as contrasts to prevailing understandings of criminality. 
This demonstrates the conditioning power ideational and ideological discourses 
can have on politics. Businesses are powerful interests, but general analyses of business-
state relations and quantitative assessments of elite influence on policy overlook nuances 
in how that power is exercised. This project shows how successful corporate coalitions 
have framed their policy goals within the discursive parameters of a moment. In the late 
nineteenth century, railroads drew on regulatory ideology to contrast business leaders 
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from ideas of natural criminality. As Progressives favorable to expert administration 
gained power in the twentieth century, the financial industry reframed regulatory 
ideology to emphasize the role administrators could play in preventing crime among 
those who were not naturally criminal. In the 1930s, bankers and exchanges repackaged 
regulatory ideology as a familiar and safe approach to managing the Depression.  
That discursive contexts have conditioned the politicking of businesses leads to 
reinterpretations of historical accounts of corporate power. For instance, in The Age of 
Acquiescence (2015), Steve Fraser argues that while Americans exhibit a complacent 
acquiescence to organized wealth during the “Second Gilded Age” today, the Populists 
effectively mobilized to rein in the power of the robber barons during the “first Gilded 
Age” of the nineteenth century.96 He notes that many business leaders resisted regulatory 
reform during this period by defending laissez-faire, leading him to conclude that the 
creation of regulatory agencies were victories for the Populists. But he overlooks that 
some of the robber barons were not laissez-faire purists. In legislative debates over the 
Interstate Commerce Act examined in chapter 3, leaders from the railroad industry 
pushed for a regulatory commission as an alternative to strict criminal prohibitions on 
their behavior. Essential to their political strategy was how they portrayed railroad 
executives as foils to prevailing conceptions of born criminality—as inherently good men 
with no criminal histories who could be monitored through gentler rules and regulations.  
These business leaders used regulatory ideology to limit state administrative 
authority and obscure the prevalence of corporate crime. By drawing on prevailing crime 
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ideologies, they reoriented the debate and ensured that corporate behaviors that could be 
conceptualized as forms of theft took on distinctive meanings because they were 
committed by men who did not fit prevailing constructions of criminality. Their actions 
were instead rationalized as functions of markets and healthy competitive dispositions.  
Exploring how different business coalitions articulated their goals reveals nuances 
to business-government relations that are unappreciated in current scholarship. Successful 
corporate coalitions have spoken to prevailing political and ideological discourses so that 
their demands resonate with lawmakers. This illustrates that discourses can condition the 
range of policies that can be pursued at a given moment, even for powerful interests, and 
that sometimes businesses lose their political battles. While studies of agency capture, 
party control, and lobbying highlight many ways in which businesses influence politics, 
business-state relations are also subject to ideational, institutional, and ideological forces.  
Dissertation Structure 
 Chapters are structured into pairs to analyze the politics of street and corporate 
crime during specific historical periods. Chapter 2 examines the politics of street crime 
from roughly 1870 through 1900, when criminal anthropology became the prevailing 
framework for understanding criminal behavior. Lawmakers used ideas about inherent 
criminality to justify punishment for blacks, immigrants, poor whites, and organized 
labor. Chapter 3 analyzes the politics of corporate crime during the same period, focusing 
on the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887. In debates over the law, corporate criminality 
was explained as a function of market realities and the competitive dispositions of 
railroad executives, not deviant natures requiring punishment or rehabilitation. These 
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ideas justified Congress’s decision to give the Interstate Commerce Commission 
discretion to respond to corporate crime through non-criminal sanctions.  
 Chapter 4 studies psychological, cultural, and eugenic theories of crime that 
emerged in the early twentieth century. These schools reinforced the idea that crime was 
a function of innate pathologies among “undesirable” social groups such as the poor, 
blacks, and “mental defectives” for whom eugenic interventions were necessary. Chapter 
5 examines regulatory reform during the same period. Progressives’ faith in professional 
administration led them to create the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in 1914 to 
identify anti-competitive practices in industries. But by not giving the FTC power to 
initiate prosecutions, Progressives designed the agency to guide businesses towards 
ethical behavior and push persistently unethical ones out of markets. The chapter also 
discusses the origins and development of corporate criminal liability.   
 Chapter 6 studies the politics of street crime during the New Deal and postwar-
period. In the 1930s, an emergent group of scholars challenged prevailing theories by 
attributing crime to socioeconomic disadvantage. But an analysis of the Wickersham 
Crime Commission’s reports and state-level debates over sentencing reform reveals how 
politicians reinterpreted these ideas to be consistent with the individualized rehabilitative 
model. Although new ideas could have promoted change, their meanings were modified 
as they were channeled through preexisting rehabilitative frameworks that proved 
resistant to change. Chapter 7 examines corporate crime during this period, beginning 
with the Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Bankers and 
securities exchange officials repackaged regulatory ideology in the context of the Great 
Depression by arguing before Congress that criminalizing activity on securities markets 
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would further disrupt the hurting economy. The chapter also examines reforms to 
regulatory proceedings and operations in the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946.  
 In chapter 8, this analysis is connected to the current moment. Developments from 
1870 through 1965 formed the ideological and institutional terrain on which the carceral 
state rests by cultivating a focus on the pathologies of offenders, instilling a class slant 
into constructions of criminality, and channeling corporate crime into regulatory venues.  
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CHAPTER 2: PUNISHING BORN CRIMINALS: CRIMINALIZING POVERTY, 
RACE, AND LABOR IN THE GILDED AGE 
 
“The tramp and the millionaire have always existed… put them down side by side 
naked and helpless on a desert island; and in one year the one will be what he was 
at first, namely, a pauper, while the other will have become a capitalist.” 
- New York Daily Tribune, July 26, 188797 
 
During the final decades of the nineteenth century, industrialization, urbanization, 
waves of immigration, and the emancipation of millions of former slaves upended the 
nation’s political economy and social structure. With all of this change came extreme 
economic and racial inequality, a tremendous concentration of wealth, and intense 
conflicts between capital and labor that ended in working class repression.  
An assessment of crime politics during these decades cannot be divorced from the 
broader political and ideological currents of the late nineteenth century. It was a period of 
frequent political contestation characterized by the use of state violence against a range of 
groups that were politicized as criminal threats. In the wake of the Civil War, racial 
ideologies maintained old racial hierarchies in part by depicting blacks as criminal 
deviants.98 Repressive criminal justice policies targeted immigrants as menaces to the 
evolving urban order that also challenged the nation’s white Anglo-Saxon identity.99 And 
state violence was frequently directed against the urban poor out of fear that they were 
prone to serious crime, especially because they were often perceived as a violent ally of 
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organized labor, with which the state had frequent conflicts. All of these groups were 
viewed as threats to social and economic stability and depicted as criminals.100 
Existing literature treats the punishment of these groups as separate phenomena 
attributable to unique social, political, and economic forces. This chapter illustrates how 
prevailing constructions of criminality in late nineteenth century politics helped to 
facilitate the punishment of all of these populations. Building on dominant currents in 
American political and intellectual thought, late nineteenth century scholars viewed 
criminality as a natural phenomenon. Darwinism and evolutionary theory were a crux of 
Gilded Age political thought, so the emergent school of criminal anthropology, which 
attributed criminal behavior to the biological traits of individuals, was amenable to 
scholars and lawmakers of the late nineteenth century. Studying the development of 
criminal justice policy during this period through the lens of criminal anthropology’s rise 
demonstrates that while diverse dynamics drove the criminalization of various social 
groups, ideas about innate criminality colored all of these debates. The behaviors of 
immigrants, blacks, the poor, and organized labor groups were “naturalized” by being 
attributed to their inherently pathological nature. Each group was seen as a variant of the 
“born criminal” concept articulated by Lombroso. The deterministic disposition of 
criminal anthropology operated as a genus out of which anti-black, anti-poor, anti-
worker, and anti-immigrant anxieties flourished. Thus, the biological crime discourse of 
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the era stabilized multiple systems of inequality by locating the causes of various 
inequalities in nature. 
Section I unpacks the general currents of American political thought in the late 
nineteenth century out of which the born criminal idea emerged and took hold. Section II 
examines how Gilded Age scholars articulated ideas of natural criminality in their work, 
condemning various social groups as inherently criminal and recommending new policy 
instruments to regulate crime.  Their work drove the rise of the “rehabilitative ideal,” the 
philosophy that punishment should reform inmates, but exhibited a dual commitment to 
reform and incarceration. Section III explores how deterministic constructs of criminality 
stigmatized four groups as inherently criminal—the urban poor, blacks, immigrants, and 
organized labor—through examinations of national prison conference hearings, charities 
conference meetings, and reports from State Boards of Charities (SBCs). SBCs were 
advisory boards designed to oversee and supervise state welfare institutions while making 
policy assessments and recommendations to state legislatures, and their annual reports 
demonstrate how ideas about criminal incorrigibility were used by state-level reformers 
to justify punitive public policy. Given the lack of state legislative records from this 
period, SBC reports provide insights into state policy debates, and analyses of SBCs in 
Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and New York—industrialized states with high 
immigrant and urban poor populations—illustrate how deterministic ideas of criminality 
shaped vagrancy law reform.    
I. Ideological and Ideational Currents of Gilded Age Politics  
The late nineteenth century is frequently depicted as a period characterized by 
struggles between capital and labor. For many scholars, this is a warranted focus. As the 
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country moved away from being an agrarian society of small farmers to a manufacturing 
society of large corporations and masses of workers, industrial growth and scientific 
innovation facilitated the emergence of unruly urban centers dominated by financial, 
manufacturing, and transportation corporations. This growth, especially in the North and 
Midwest, promoted rapid industrialization, a concentration of wealth, and exacerbated 
income inequality. The emergence of the large corporation dwarfed Jeffersonian ideals 
about localized agrarian life, and labor organizations and discontented agrarian 
communities clashed with the large corporations running the economy.101 
While conflicts about class and inequality were fundamental to Gilded Age 
politics, this was also an era of nativism, sexism, and racism. Millions of new immigrants 
flooded the country seeking to capitalize on the growing number of jobs in the U.S., 
prompting exclusionary responses to curb non-Nordic immigration. Reconstruction era 
egalitarian ideals were displaced as the seeds of Jim Crow were planted, promoting 
segregation and African-American disfranchisement. Industrialization promoted 
urbanization, but cities were often populated with the out-of-work poor living in abject 
poverty. Numerous ascriptive legal systems were designed to promote restriction, 
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exclusion, and repression for segments of the population that did not fit the nation’s 
middle-class, white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant identity.102  
This heated political context gave rise to multiple countervailing political and 
ideological discourses, two of which are emphasized in this chapter—a populist politics 
challenging the inequalities associated with the growth of industry and a responsive 
conservatism favoring industrial expansion and free markets. Republicans became the 
party of business, seeking to facilitate government assistance to businesses by supporting 
the industrial tariff and aiming to nationalize the economy.103 Democrats remained the 
party of states’ rights, only shifting towards a more distributive and regulatory politics as 
the Populists became credible threats to their survival. But both major parties remained 
dedicated, at least when convenient, to doctrines of laissez-faire, particularly Republicans 
who opposed regulatory initiatives hostile to industry. Alternatively, Populists voiced a 
strict anti-monopolist politics positing that robust administrative reforms to state 
apparatuses could and should be used to create competitive market conditions.104  
 In his analysis of the Gilded Age, historian Robert Wiebe called 1870s America a 
“distended society” in which international markets, large corporations, and mass urban 
centers trampled over the “island communities” of self-contained rural towns that 
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organized American life before the Civil War.105 It was these agrarian communities that 
formed the backbone of Gilded Age populism. Populists articulated a class-based farm-
labor politics, influencing the latter platforms of the People’s Party, Socialist Party, and 
Progressives. Populists preached a redistributive and bureaucratic politics, condemning 
the growth of corporate power and articulating a strict anti-monopolism.106 But while 
populism challenged industrialization, it was not a re-creation of Jeffersonianism. 
Populists used grassroots activism among poor farmers to break from laissez-faire, 
insisting on national ownership of railroads, democratic control over the money supply, 
and anticipating the modern regulatory state.107 The Populists fueled discourses about the 
“robber barons” as ruthless manipulators, painted trusts as “soulless,” and denounced 
business leaders as “morally pathological” and “robbers” of the public good.108 
 At its core, Populism was driven by agrarian discontent and labor activism. 
Populists made some attempts to include the urban proletariat within their discourse, but 
as Steve Fraser has argued, the movement “remained ambivalent about the city.” The 
growth of abusive financial networks was, “an irreducibly urban phenomenon,” and 
Populists often “recoiled from the visage of proletarian squalor and demoralization.”109 
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Their fight essentially pitted farmers and labor against capital, leaving the urban poor and 
immigrants out of their politics.   
This is important when recognizing the broad appeal of Darwinian theory in the 
late nineteenth century. The flourishing of race science, biological determinism, and 
evolutionary theory laid a foundation for the development of the eugenics movement. But 
as Rogers Smith has written, “Across the spectrum…from laissez-faire enthusiasts and 
white supremacists through Socialists and black separatists, leading writers accepted 
evolution in ways that permanently altered how they understood even the features of 
American life they endorsed.” As a result, even “poor white voters suffered from the 
inegalitarian political trends they all too often embraced.” Support for evolutionary 
theory was not universal but was embraced across political ideologies, legitimating racist, 
nativist, and classist sentiments even among segments of the Populists. With poor urban 
whites, immigrants, and African Americans absent from the era’s major political 
coalitions, they were left vulnerable to criticisms that their conditions of inequality were a 
function of the fact that they were socially and biologically “unfit.”110  
 Richard Hofstadter’s The Age of Reform provides an account of Populism in 
which he suggests that Populists were driven by a nativist consensus. His thesis rests on a 
number of questionable premises, and his conceptualization of Populism encompasses 
such a diverse collection of forces that he denies the movement any cohesion.111 He 
overlooks the Populists’ forward-looking redistributive, bureaucratic, and pro-labor 
politics that rejected laissez-faire, as well as divides within the movement over Social 
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Darwinism.112 Still, sizable numbers of Populists invoked Social Darwinist principles to 
legitimate their hostility to immigrants and the poor. They did not use Darwinist logic 
like Progressives would to justify an expansion of state power, nor did they use 
Darwinism like their laissez-faire opponents to naturalize free markets. Rather, they 
entertained essentialist narratives of group difference in endorsing a view of America as a 
white Christian nation. This underscores how Populism was able to coexist with support 
for exclusionary immigration and racial policy.113 
The onset of a robust populist politics hardened conservative opponents who 
remained dedicated to laissez-faire, freedom of contract, and hard money.114 
Conservative countercurrents to Populism built on Herbert Spencer’s theory of Social 
Darwinism. While populist politics portended the emergence of a modern bureaucratic 
state, large segments of the upper middle class clung to free market ideologies, which 
were legitimated through the doctrines of natural selection and “survival of the fittest.”115 
Corporate actors particularly exerted enormous political influence during this period and 
ensured that economic development suited the needs of major industries. Many 
corporations and conservatives remained dedicated to a purist conception of laissez-faire 
and fought hard against demands for economic regulation.116 Some leading scholars, such 
                                                             
112 Postel, “TR, Wilson, and the Origins of the Progressive Tradition.” 
113 See Leonard, Illiberal Reformers for an account of Social Darwinism’s appeal across the political 
ideologies of populism, conservatism, and progressives; For the development of race science, see 
Muhammad, The Condemnation of Blackness; Ann Fabian, The Skull Collectors: Race, Science, and 
America’s Unburied Dead (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010). 
114 Postel, “The American Populist and Anti-Populist Legacy”; Postel, “TR, Wilson, and the Origins 
of the Progressive Tradition.” 
115 Fraser, The Age of Acquiescence, 102; Leonard, Illiberal Reformers, 97–105; Smith, Civic Ideals, 
351–57. 
116 Bensel, The Political Economy of American Industrialization for an account of the political 
economy of industrialization in the late nineteenth century. 
51 
 
as Steven Fraser and Michael McGerr, contend that middle-class resistance checked the 
growing power of corporations by securing significant regulatory reform against the 
wishes of the robber barons.117 Chapter three will expose flaws in this narrative by 
illustrating that while some robber barons remained dedicated to laissez-faire, others 
pushed for regulatory reform as an alternative to criminalization of corporate activities.   
 Laissez-faire economics particularly found scientific validation in the works of 
Herbert Spencer. Spencer’s theory of evolution was not an appropriation of Darwin’s 
work, but he did coin the phrase “survival of the fittest” as his own description of 
Darwinian theory. He portrayed social Darwinism as a variant of political economy that 
could explain the inequalities of late nineteenth century industrial conditions. For 
Spencer, evolution implied support for free markets and opposition to government social 
and economic assistance.118 
 Social Darwinism aligned with the goals of ideological conservatives, and 
economist William Graham Sumner was the most prominent voice making this 
connection. Sumner used Spencerian logic to criticize state provision of social assistance 
for the poor. According to Sumner, markets spurred people to action through competitive 
dynamics that promoted productivity. Natural selection was an unsentimental science, so 
he said that society “does not need any care or supervision” to lead to the emergence of 
the “natural social order.” To reach said order, society must return to the doctrine of 
laissez-faire. Sumner wrote, “Let us translate it into blunt English, and it will read, Mind 
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your own business.”119 If government simply stayed out of the way, society would order 
itself naturally into appropriate social and economic hierarchies. 
Captains of industry used Social Darwinism to justify their perceptions of their 
own superiority, which the next chapter will address. But advocates of Spencerian theory 
also used his logic to reject labor protection, discredit social policy assisting marginalized 
communities, and naturalize classical economics. Pecuniary success was deemed a result 
of thrift, diligence, and intelligence, while socioeconomic struggle was a function of 
natural unfitness. According to Sumner, inequalities in industrial economies were a 
natural process of eliminating the unfit. Such individuals should be left behind for the 
race to succeed and progress.120 
Reverend Josiah Strong’s book Our Country (1885) exemplified how ideas about 
natural inequality manifested in a resurgent nativism. Strong celebrated the nation’s 
economic and scientific advances while articulating fears that immigration posed 
challenges for the nation’s homogeneous citizenry. He feared that ill-educated 
immigrants were sources of vice, crime, and civic incompetence and would be unable to 
assimilate into American culture. He wrote that most immigrants were from “the pauper 
and criminal classes” and cited selective statistics to argue that immigrants were “twelve 
times as much disposed to crime as the native stock.” He wrote that inferior immigrants 
would die off and be left behind in “the final competition of races.” 121 
                                                             
119 Sumner, What Social Classes Owe to Each Other, 119–20. 
120 Sumner, 8–10, 55–58, 107, 114–16, 126. 
121 Josiah Strong, Our Country: Its Possible Future and Its Present Crisis, Revised, 1891 (New York: 
Baker and Taylor, 1885), 56–57, 222. 
53 
 
 Hofstadter’s critical account of the Populists neglects the force with which they 
rejected the brands of laissez-faire economics endorsed by Sumner and their long-term 
influence in shaping Progressivism, New Deal politics, and the Great Society.122 But in 
important ways, Populists shared affinities with their conservative opponents by 
accepting elements of Darwinist and Spencerian theory. The fact that many Populists 
embraced ideas about naturalized hierarchy left room for Darwinist theories of inequality 
to flourish across ideological divides.123 Debates over Populism, nativism, racism, 
socialism, and laissez-faire were crucial to Gilded Age politics, but almost any social 
scientist could enlist evolutionary ideas to support a different view. This consensus on the 
basic precepts of Darwinism and natural selection was fundamental to political 
development during this period. Prevailing constructs of criminality reflected these 
deterministic ideas of human behavior and naturalized understandings of inequality.   
II. The Genealogy of the “Born Criminal” Idea and the Rehabilitative Ideal  
Darwinism clearly numerous political goals outside of legitimating criminal 
justice reform, but Gilded Age constructs of criminality reflected these biological 
ideational currents. Darwinist and bio-determinist theories of criminality played crucial 
roles in the politics of the era by promoting policies that have had enduring legacies on 
American criminal justice. 
Law-and-order campaigns have been recurring features of American political 
development, and their long-term effects can only be understood by examining how ideas 
about crime have evolved and interacted with changing political contexts. Ideas about 
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biology were useful ideational weapons for Gilded Age political entrepreneurs and 
reform-oriented actors seeking to change public policy. These changes were geared 
towards repressing the urban poor, racial minorities, and immigrants who challenged the 
nation’s WASP identity. New ideas of criminality in American scholarship often adopted 
the “born criminal” idea of Cesare Lombroso to justify policies targeting the poor, 
immigrants, and blacks through a discourse of rehabilitation. Given the Darwinist ideas at 
its foundation, the rehabilitative model comported with bio-deterministic ideas embraced 
by Populists, conservatives, and Progressives, and thus had broad political appeal.  
Ideas about crime associated with biology challenged older and established 
ideologies, particularly Beccarian utilitarianism. In his 1764 publication On Crimes and 
Punishments, Italian scholar Cesare Beccaria depicted crime as a function of free will that 
could be deterred through clearly defined terms of incarceration. Beccaria was a 
significant influence on American penology during the Founding.124 But ideas associated 
with biology and evolution advanced new claims theorizing criminality as a natural trait, 
upending deterrence theory’s assumption that each criminal was a rational actor. This 
was driven by the rise of criminal anthropology, the school of thought founded by 
Lombroso. Criminal anthropologists like Lombroso argued that certain biological defects 
rendered some individuals as evolutionary throwbacks unable to control their violent, 
selfish, and amoral natures, thus earning them the classification “born criminal.”125  
Criminal anthropology quickly eclipsed Beccarian deterrence theory in influence 
as Lombroso’s seminal book Criminal Man (1876) became popular in the United States. 
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Importantly, Lombroso’s work sparked the onset of criminological positivism. Positivist 
criminologists claim that through the measurement of criminal behavior, the causes of 
crime can be identified. Whereas Beccarian deterrence theory focused on punishing a 
specific crime—that is, issuing a punishment appropriately proportional to the criminal 
act in order to deter it—criminal anthropology focused on analyzing individuals to assess 
their natural criminality. In short, it focused on punishing the criminal more than the 
crime. In the early the 1800s, most states used sentencing structures influenced by 
Beccarian thought that issued clearly defined terms of punishment in response to specific 
crimes.126 But this changed with the emergence indeterminate sentencing in the late 
nineteenth century, through which sentences were tailored to the individual. This model 
was heavily influenced by Lombrosian theory, as inmates capable of rehabilitation were 
to be reformed and released early while incorrigible ones were to be contained. 
As articulated in Criminal Man, Lombroso’s theory was individualistic and 
deterministic. In the book, Lombroso contended that physiological stigmata like skull 
thickness and protruding ears were indicative of a primitive biological inheritance that 
left an individual predisposed to crime. He argued that 40% of offenders were “born 
criminals.” The final edition of Criminal Man stated that, “born criminals must be 
interned in special institutions for the incorrigible.”127 Lombroso extended the label of 
“born criminal” widely, concluding in an 1891 study of Italian revolutionaries that 34% 
of anarchists shared the stigmata of born criminals. He clarified that the instincts of 
radicals could be used to pursue meaningful social change, but his argument was that the 
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dispositional instinct that drove political revolutionaries was the same one that drove 
criminal behavior.128 He also identified black men as innately criminal, writing in 1897 
that “the great obstacle to the negro’s progress [in America] is the fact that there remain 
latent within him the primitive instincts of the savage.” He attributed high rates of 
homicide in America to the natural criminality of black men.129  
By aiming to punish the criminal rather than the crime, Lombrosian theory was 
built on a biased image of the “criminal type.” Having the traits of a criminal type 
became a more important metric for determining whether someone deserved punishment 
than their behavior. This emphasis on personal pathologies and traits entailed a narrow 
focus on “street crimes” commonly committed by social undesirables and deviants who 
fit this preconstructed idea of the criminal. By emphasizing only specific types of crime 
and criminals, Lombrosian theory rested on class-skewed a priori assumptions about what 
counted as crime and who was likely to commit it. The ideas and ideologies that grew out 
of Lombrosian theory inherited these biases.  
By contemporary standards, Lombroso’s claims were clearly substantiated with 
unsophisticated statistical methods. Nonetheless, his work resonated with American 
penologists. An intellectual milieu dominated by race science and Darwinism was 
amenable to the idea that crime was a function of biology. Some American scholars had 
suggested that criminals were biologically defective even before Lombroso’s work was 
transmitted to the U.S. In his 1877 book The Jukes, Richard Dugdale traced the ancestry 
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of the “Juke” family in New York and concluded that the family’ biology was 
predisposed to crime.130 Though often read as purely bio-deterministic, his work noted 
that bad environments can “produce bad habits which may become hereditary,” revealing 
Dugdale’s commitments to the Lamarckian theory that acquired traits could become 
hereditary.131 This allowed him to acknowledge the variety of social factors that caused 
crime while accepting the idea that crime was still the result of inherited pathologies. He 
concluded that reform was possible for some, but “perpetual imprisonment” was 
necessary for “habitual criminals” for whom “we cannot accomplish individual cure.”132  
American criminal anthropologists were intellectual descendants of Lombroso 
and Dugdale. They adopted deterministic frameworks viewing criminals as naturally 
distinct from ordinary individuals. They understood criminal behavior as immoral actions 
attributable to the pathologically deviant natures of people. And like Lombroso and 
Dugdale, they endorsed treatment for curable offenders and incarceration for incurable 
ones deemed “born criminals.” The men who brought criminal anthropology to America 
were responsible for embedding the idea of the born criminal into a new and influential 
rehabilitative ideology of punishment.  
 Scholars of American criminal justice broadly agree that from the late nineteenth 
century through 1970s, American penology was influenced by the rehabilitative ideal—
the idea that incarceration should be a reformative experience for inmates, equipping 
them to lead law-abiding lives upon release. But since it was built on Lombrosian 
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constructs, rehabilitative ideology conceptualized criminality as a function of individual 
defects rather than a symptom of social, political, and economic forces. Bio-deterministic 
constructs of criminality shaped two prongs of rehabilitative theory—one premised on 
reforming and releasing inmates, and another punishing those deemed “incorrigibles” 
who fit the born criminal image and proved impossible to reform. Thus, rehabilitative 
ideology inherited Lombroso’s class skewed assumptions about what counted as crime 
and who was a likely criminal.  
This class ideology was deeply embedded into rehabilitative theory from its 
origins. In 1870, the American Congress of Corrections held its first inaugural meeting in 
Cincinnati, where it articulated its support for rehabilitative penology. Attended by penal 
scholars, practitioners, and prison wardens, the Congress famously published and 
presented its “Declaration of Principles” at the conference. The Declaration has been 
widely recognized as establishing the rehabilitative ideal.133 The document directed 
prison administrators to implement indeterminate sentencing, “moral training,” 
“industrial training,” and educational programs behind bars.134  
One of the attendees who assisted in the writing of the Declaration was Zebulon 
Brockway. In the following years, Brockway would receive national praise for his 
implementation of these techniques at New York’s Elmira Reformatory. Elmira was little 
more than a work camp in the years immediately after its opening in 1876, but under 
Brockway’s wardenship it established educational programs, indeterminate sentencing 
systems, and a marks system offering rewards for good behavior. This earned Brockway 
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the title “father of the rehabilitative ideal.” Nearly all the reformatories that opened across 
the nation in subsequent decades emulated Elmira.135  
Despite this reformative rhetoric, Elmira’s staff psychologically and physically 
abused inmates while “reforming” them into members of the working class.136 This 
mutual embrace of “rehabilitation” and harsh justice can only be understood by 
examining Brockway’s conception of criminality, which entailed support for both 
rehabilitation and punishment. He endorsed a Lamarckian conception of evolution that 
saw degeneracy as an acquired trait that could become a hereditary cause of crime.137 For 
example, he suggested that a “lack of proper education and other unfavourable 
circumstances” could create biologically transmittable defects in one’s moral and mental 
faculties. Brockway argued, however, that environmental factors contributed to crime 
only indirectly by altering biology and concluded that only 4% of criminals sprang from 
“healthy stock.”138  
His embrace of Lombrosian theory led him to suggest that despite the potential 
influence of environmental factors, inherently inferior types could be identified with 
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reference to physiological traits.139 He argued that such “defective fellow beings” were 
driven by “undeveloped, incongruous, or unbalanced condition[s] of their higher mental 
faculties” that left their “animal instincts” unchecked.140 He proposed that the elimination 
of criminals through rehabilitation and incarceration would lead to “a perfect race.”141  
Given the influence of Lombroso and Lamarck on his thinking, Brockway 
mounted a defense of rehabilitation while espousing a belief in the existence of natural 
criminals who required indefinite containment. He reiterated that indeterminate sentences 
should offer opportunities for inmates to reform while being used to indefinitely contain 
incorrigibles.142 His discussion of the Elmira inmate Macauley—a man first committed 
for burglary, then twice for parole violations—provides a good example of his thinking. 
He suggested that Macauley typified the class of “incorrigible criminals.” Brockway 
stated that, “Such offenders, could they be committed under the absolute indeterminate 
sentence plan, would be continuously held under enough of custodial restraint to protect 
the public.”143 His indeterminate model thus carefully balanced his dual commitments to 
rehabilitation and containment. 
Brockway’s ideological duality conditioned the work of criminologists drawn to 
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his rehabilitative philosophy and to Lombrosian theory. In Creating Born Criminals 
(1997), Nicole Hahn Rafter identifies seven prominent criminologists during the turn of 
the century who built on Lombrosian theory—Arthur MacDonald, Henry Boies, Charles 
Henderson, August Drahms, William McKim, G. Frank Lydston, and Philip Parsons.144 
Their writings also built on Brockway’s philosophy and became essential to the 
development of the indeterminate sentence and rehabilitative model. 
Consistent with emergent progressive trends towards combining scientific 
expertise with policy reform, these men frequently held significant institutional power. 
They constituted a core of scholar-reformers who, like Brockway, were theorists who put 
their ideas into practice. For instance, Arthur MacDonald held a federal appointment with 
the U.S. Bureau of Education. Henry Boies served on the Pennsylvania Board of 
Charities for well over a decade. Brockway regularly served on New York’s Charities 
Board. And Charles Henderson, one of the nation’s most respected sociologists, was 
routinely a headlining speaker at American sociological, medical, and criminological 
conferences. Henderson served as the President of the National Conference of Charities 
from 1898-99, American Commissioner to the International Prison Commission in 1909, 
and president of the International Prison Congress in 1910.   
Arthur MacDonald’s 1893 book Criminology provides a good example of the 
influence of Lombroso and Brockway in these scholars’ works. One of the earliest 
American works dedicated studying crime, MacDonald’s book opened by claiming that 
Lombroso left it impossible to “deny the organicity of crime, its anatomical nature and 
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degenerative source.” MacDonald insisted on the construction of special institutions for 
incorrigibles, as Lombroso did.145 Henry Boies similarly asserted in Prisoners and 
Paupers (1893) that “a large proportion” of prison inmates “were born to be 
criminals.”146 Along with Charles Henderson (1893), Boies argued that criminals should 
not reproduce until they are rehabilitated so their children do not inherit criminal 
tendencies.147 This joint endorsement of Lamarckian and Lombrosian ideologies reflects 
the influence of Brockway on their thinking.  
Support for the rehabilitative model and its assumptions about incorrigibility and 
biology manifested in endorsements of indeterminate sentencing. This was consistent 
among these scholars, who criticized former determinate systems for failing to offer 
offenders adequate reform incentives.148 Alternatively, indeterminate sentences were 
praised as providing reform incentives and serving as a long-term containment tool.149 
For example, MacDonald stated that, “The indeterminate sentence is the best method of 
affording the prisoner an opportunity to reform, without exposing society to unnecessary 
dangers” because it permitted long-term detainment for incorrigibles.150 August Drahms 
(1900) further claimed that the permanent containment of incorrigibles was a more 
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important justification of indeterminate sentencing than granting curable criminals 
incentives to change. Henry Boies’ wrote in 1893 that three convictions, regardless of 
severity, warranted life incarceration.151  In 1901, Boies stated that reformatories should 
separate criminals into “corrigible and incorrigible subdivisions.” He claimed that, “those 
who can be cured will be cured before liberation. The chronic incorrigibles will be found 
to consist of two classes: the incurably vicious, the physical, mental, and moral imbeciles; 
and those whose organization is so defective as to be incapable of restoration…they 
should be confined under entirely different conditions.”152 
From its origins, this rehabilitative model was built on bio-deterministic 
conceptions of criminal behavior and validated by the methodologies of race science. The 
ideal could not have flourished without a favorable political and ideological context 
reflecting a consensus around the precepts of race science and natural selection. This laid 
the basis for the later emergence of the eugenics movement. Growing out of Francis 
Galton’s work, the eugenics movement sought to regulate human evolution by controlling 
breeding. The logic of these reform-oriented penologists led them to defend indefinite 
detention and eugenic solutions like compulsory sterilization, marriage restrictions, and 
extermination to control criminality.153 This rendered rehabilitation a useful weapon for 
pro-eugenics Progressives in the early twentieth century.  
In their works, Brockway, Boies, and other criminal anthropologists emphasized 
crimes common among racial minorities, the urban poor, and working class. Depicting 
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these groups as naturally criminal complemented Spencerian theory and the works of 
Sumner. Sumner’s use of Social Darwinism to wage war social reform and state 
economic assistance by depicting all social and economic hardship as incidental to the 
struggles of natural selection.154 This provided a cosmic rationale for the inequalities 
common among the criminal classes. Sumner thus criticized leniency towards crime, 
arguing that it is a “false doctrine” that “criminals have some sort of a right against or 
claim on society.”155 He argued that if the state were to disperse the “poverty-stricken, 
vicious, and criminal inhabitants” of industrial slums, they would be forced into a society 
where they would either be “crushed by the competition of life” or be incarcerated.156  
These ideas had real political purchase that translated into policy. Gilded Age 
penology was driven by assumptions about what the likely criminal looked like and 
subjective judgments about the reformative capacity of inmates. Behavior and personal 
traits common among the poor and working classes were pathologized as signs of an 
incurable criminal disposition, warranting anything but punishment meaningless. This 
reveals that the racism, classism, and nativism rampant in late nineteenth century politics 
cannot be entirely understood as isolated phenomena. The holistic perspective outlined 
here recognizes the interrelation of these dynamics by showing how deterministic 
framings of criminality were weaponized to punish a range of groups including blacks, 
immigrants, poor urban whites, and organized labor. The ideologies of Lombroso and 
Brockway laid fertile ground in which various ascriptive ideologies could flourish.  
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IV. The Broad Reach of Brockway: The Punishment of Poverty, Race, and Labor  
As inequality became more pronounced, the idea of natural criminality guided the 
restructuring of public policy as part of an effort to control the “dangerous classes.” This 
included social undesirables like the poor, low-income working class, immigrants, and 
racial minorities. This section examines the treatment of four populations deemed 
“incorrigible” criminals and subjected to punishment—tramps, blacks, immigrants, and 
organized labor. Deterministic crime discourse served as an ideological foundation that 
legitimated anti-poor, anti-black, anti-immigrant, and anti-labor sentiments.  
Vagrancy Laws in the Industrial Northeast and Midwest 
The regulation of vagrancy was a contested political question at the turn of the 
century. What to do with the growing population of the urban poor deemed offensive to 
bourgeois sensibilities became a significant concern for lawmakers. Maligned by 
conservatives and neglected by Populists, the urban poor were subjected to enhanced 
social control through a dramatic revamping of state and local vagrancy laws. The urban 
poor often came from the unemployed white working class, but the growing classes of 
vagrants in American cities were generally assumed to consist of immigrant populations, 
so vagrancy law reform was tightly wound up with xenophobic beliefs.157  
Vagrancy laws had a long history in America predating the late nineteenth 
century. Having inherited vagrancy laws from England, Americans have always viewed 
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the poor with a degree of hostility. But unlike the vagrancy statutes of England, American 
vagrancy laws eventually developed to control criminals and social undesirables instead 
of managing worker migration.158 The evolution of these laws, shifting conceptions of 
vagrancy, the relationship of vagrancy statutes to political debates about crime illustrates 
how and why U.S. vagrancy laws diverged from their British antecedents.  
Preceding the mid-nineteenth century, American vagrancy laws generally 
operated similarly to their British counterparts and regulated the flow of migratory labor. 
Jobless transients were rarely punished with extended prison sentences, and typically 
spent a night in the station house if found by police.159 Through most of the nineteenth 
century, urban police were not formally institutionalized. They bore little resemblance to 
the professionalized and regimented forces of today, instead performing general social 
welfare functions beyond crime control like providing vagrants with lodging and meals. 
The duties of mid-eighteenth century urban police thus included managing the welfare of 
the poor, which did not entail harsh criminal sanction.160  
Beginning in 1873, popular understandings of poverty changed. An economic 
crash generated a social crisis as urban poverty became a more visible problem. 
Unemployment estimates soared to 3 million, and some scholars have suggested that 25 
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percent of urban workers were unemployed.161 The crash generated a moral panic over a 
fictitious “tramp army,” an imaginary revolutionary force consisting of homeless men 
that wandered from city to city and threatened the nation’s social and political stability. 
In combatting this “tramp crisis,” the idea of pathological criminality became a tool for 
the state to depict the poor as criminals necessitating containment. Poverty became an 
indicator of an innate criminal disposition, which deflected attention away from the 
socioeconomic causes of poverty and permitted the state to harshly punish vagrancy.162  
As a qualification, many people were forced into poverty during this period, but 
others chose a life of unemployment as a means of protest. Varying synonyms for the 
urban poor thus emerged with distinct meanings. Hobos, for example, were homeless 
man wandering between cities in search of transient work opportunities. Tramps traveled 
between cities, but to avoid work and challenge the cultural archetype of the self-made 
man valuing employment, home ownership, and family life. Both tramps and hobos were 
paupers, which simply was a term for a poor person.163 Despite these distinctions, the 
urban poor were often treated as one mass of deviants in political discourse, and “hobos,” 
“tramps,” and “paupers” were closely linked to criminality. Punishing the poor thus 
served to both hide the disorder produced by the economic crash and discipline people 
who willfully defied prevailing social ideals.  
Dugdale, Brockway, and their protégés concluded that tramps shared the same 
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biological defects as criminals. In 1877, Dugdale argued that the Jukes’ criminality could 
be attributed to the same genetic traits that contributed to their pauperism, including the 
record of laziness, sexual licentiousness, immorality, and idiocy in the family tree.164 In 
1898, Brockway argued that “the deprivation and dissipations of the improvident class” 
produced degeneracies that were “transmitted to generation after generation.” His 
rationalization for punishing the poor asserted that the experiences and social 
environments of poor individuals implanted a tendency towards crime into their biology. 
Brockway concluded that if provided with money, inmates will “proceed to squander 
them before exerting themselves for a living.” He argued that, “such habitual 
improvidence, with its attending poverty, must constitute one of the chief causes of the 
condition of mind we are considering.”165  
Other criminal anthropologists argued that tramps were equivalent to incorrigible 
criminals and necessitated containment. Henry Boies argued that two classes of paupers 
existed: the physically and mentally impaired or the “incorrigibly idle, dissolute, and 
criminal,” including “beggars, vagrants, and tramps.” He argued that this class existed 
due to poor heredity, should be imprisoned, and either “transformed into honest self-
supporters” or kept behind bars “for life.” Boies claimed that pauperism was a crime 
against the state, suggesting that “The attempt to procure an unearned living, the practice, 
or habit of securing it, is in itself a theft from society” warranting a criminal sentence.166 
G. Frank Lydston went even further, claiming to find common physiological defects 
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among the skulls of tramps and born criminals.167 Other scholars described tramps as “a 
distinct social peril” and “constant iniquitous menace[s] to life and property.”168  
 Ideas of natural criminality appeared in policy debates about vagrancy. In 1877, 
the Annual Conference of State Charities focused its deliberations on the tramp crisis. 
Attendees came from a variety of State Boards of Charities (SBCs). These boards had 
close relationships with the American Social Science Association (ASSA) and the social 
scientists and humanitarian reformers that made up the ASSA’s membership.169 
Attendees of the 1877 conference were particularly convinced by Richard Dugdale’s 
address, in which he presented his Jukes research linking poverty, crime, and biology. 
Most attendees dismissed the notion that men were not working because of a lack of jobs 
and agreed that the cause of the crisis was that tramps did not want to work.170  
Attendee Francis Wayland III, the Dean of Yale Law School, particularly attacked 
tramps by claiming that men became tramps due to personal defects in biology. Wayland 
was arguably the most nationally respected expert on poverty during this period. He 
argued that 94-99% of tramps were natural criminals and described the tramp as,  
a lazy, shiftless, sauntering or swaggering, ill-conditioned, irreclaimable, 
incorrigible, cowardly, utterly depraved savage…he seems to have wholly lost all 
the better instincts and attributes of manhood. He will outrage an unprotected 
female, or rob a defenceless child, or burn an isolated barn, or girdle fruit trees, or 
wreck a railway train, or set fire to a railway bridge, or murder a cripple, or pilfer 
an umbrella, with equal indifference, if reasonably sure of equal impunity. Having 
no moral sense, he knows no gradations in crime.171  
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Wayland’s claims reflected broader anxieties common among authors like Lee O. Harris 
who viewed tramping as a precursor to more serious crimes like rape.172 This logic drew 
on themes of evolutionary savagery tied to Lombrosian theory and criminal 
anthropology. Between the works of Dugdale, Wayland, and the scholar-reformers 
associated with the conference of Boards of Charities, physiology was linked to poverty 
and deviant behavior before criminology explored the connection.173  
Political anxieties over tramps were related to demands that indeterminate 
sentences should indefinitely contain the naturally criminal. With the rehabilitative ideal 
taking root, SBCs pushed legislatures into passing indeterminate sentencing laws as both 
curative and repressive tools designed to reform the savable and contain incorrigibles. 
For instance, the Ohio SBC secured an indeterminate sentencing statute in 1885. The 
SBC argued that not only felons, but also petty thieves who had “failed to reform” 
warranted life incarceration. The board relied on correspondence from Brockway to guide 
their structuring of the indeterminate system.174 Indiana followed suit, establishing an 
indeterminate system in 1897 after the State Board repeatedly cited Elmira as proof that 
indeterminate sentencing protected society through “reforming the corrigible criminals 
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and indefinitely containing the incorrigible.”175 In 1891, Illinois similarly passed an 
indeterminate sentencing act by arguing that it was necessary for containing the “the most 
dangerous” and “born criminals.”176 The Pennsylvania Board, on which Henry Boies sat 
from 1887 to 1901, praised the state’s indeterminate sentencing law for increasing 
average periods of confinement for its inmates.177  
The politics driving the indeterminate sentence were wrapped up with arguments 
that laws regulating poverty should look more like indeterminate sentencing, specifically 
in the sense that they needed longer potential maximums so incorrigibles could be 
incarcerated for longer. For example, in 1892, the Ohio Board suggested that recidivist 
misdemeanants were members “of the incorrigible class” and should receive “indefinite 
sentences” so that society could be “protected by [their] permanent imprisonment.” The 
Board favored extended sentences for “all misdemeanants of the incorrigible class.”178 
Indiana’s Board made comparable recommendations in 1891 to expand sentences for 
misdemeanants.179 In 1896, Pennsylvania’s Board suggested that “better results would 
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come from longer periods of detention” for both paupers and serious criminals.180 At the 
1892 National Prison Association Meeting, it was clear that the poor were increasingly 
being categorized as a criminal type when Francis Wayland insisted on “the indefinite 
imprisonment of all habitual criminals, paupers, and drunkards.”181 Wayland would go on 
to defend harsh anti-tramp laws in states like Connecticut in Nevada, since “tramping, 
such as we have seen it, if not a crime at first, soon becomes one.”182 
The fear of innate criminality among the urban poor was not limited to intellectual 
and policy circles. The term “tramp” first appeared in an American newspaper in 1875, 
when the New York Times criticized tramps as willing to “do anything mean or 
disagreeable to maintain themselves in a condition of idleness.”183 In 1877, during the 
height of the tramp crisis, the Chicago Daily Tribune cited New York’s enhanced 
vagrancy law as a laudable reform meant to “check the extent of pauperism, thereby of 
course checking the extent of crime.” The article described vagrancy as a “growing evil” 
that could “endanger society, and result in a frightful increase of crime.”184 Later that 
year, a Tribune article argued for “putting a little strychnine or arsenic in the meat and 
other supplies furnished to tramps” to send “a warning to other tramps to keep out of the 
neighborhood.”185 In 1894, the North American Review wrote that, “The relation of the 
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vagrant to the criminal class…is of the closest character; it is hard to say where the one 
begins and the other ends,” and that they deserved to be “severely punished, and by force 
exterminated.”186  
 The political conflation between tramps and incorrigible criminals resulted in 
policy changes at the state level. Through the final decades of the century, forty states 
revamped their vagrancy laws into “antitramp” acts.187 Of those forty, thirty-seven 
authorized incarceration in penal institutions as a legal punishment for tramping. This 
marked a shift from the vagrancy laws of the earlier nineteenth century, which were used 
to lodge the urban poor for short periods before moving them to different neighborhoods.  
Naturally, state laws varied. While some treated incarceration as a first option, 
other states fined tramps before incarcerating them—although fines, which most tramps 
could not pay, almost invariably led to incarceration. Still others mandated hard labor.188 
The laws broadly embraced expansive definitions of vagrancy, extending the laws’ reach 
beyond disorderly behavior to simply wandering without work. Some laws also converted 
certain misdemeanors into felonies if committed by tramps.189 By the 1890s, many 
observers went so far as to advocate for a national antitramp act.190 Statutes also varied in 
severity; for example, New Jersey sentenced tramps to a maximum of six months, but 
Massachusetts established a two-year maximum and Rhode Island a three-year maximum 
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for tramping.191 States also got creative in targeting tramps. New Hampshire and 
Pennsylvania paid the public for information on the whereabouts of tramps while 
Connecticut and Nevada gave police and prosecutors bonuses for catching tramps.192  
 The expansion of vagrancy laws into antitramp acts entailed sharp changes in 
urban policing. Crackdowns on the poor became increasingly common, especially given 
that tramps were commonly blamed as instigators of working class unrest in cities.193 The 
rate of growth of urban police departments far outpaced the growth of city populations 
from 1882 to 1909, with some city departments in the Northeast and Midwest growing at 
rates doubling population growth. Victimless social disorder offenses topped the lists for 
causes of arrest.194 Increased crime rates at the time were thus not simply functions of 
urban growth, but a reflection of a decreased tolerance for social disorder and poverty.195  
The Dangerous Classes: Punishing Immigrants 
An 1897 survey of antitramp acts found they were generally more severe in the 
Northeast.196 That vagrancy laws were harsher in the industrial core, especially as they 
were transformed into punitive anti-tramp acts, makes sense given that tramps tended to 
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be white industrial workers. But this ran counter to the false but prevailing image of 
tramps as predominantly being indolent immigrants. Given the xenophobic and nativist 
overtones in the work of Sumner, Strong, and others, it makes sense that vagrancy laws 
would be the harshest in Northeastern areas with high immigrant populations.   
Khalil Gibran Muhammad’s rich analysis of the Progressive Era illustrates 
important differences in how freed slaves and European immigrants were punished at the 
turn of the century and how they were pathologized as inherently criminal in race science 
research.197 As an intellectual discipline, race science purported to have discovered scores 
of races globally in the late nineteenth century.198 Included in these categorization 
schemes were immigrant groups coming to America at high rates. Claiming that the 
influx of European immigrants into the U.S. “seems to have something to do with the 
volume of crime in our own country,” Brockway argued that immigrants should be 
subjected to eugenic restrictions. He thought that such eugenic policies would contain the 
spread of their “dangerous tendencies” into American gene pools, highlighting 
Brockway’s conflation of immigrant status with criminality.199  
Scholars of immigration commonly connected immigrant groups to criminality 
and, more frequently, political violence. In 1880, Charles Loring Brace condemned 
immigrants as “the dangerous classes” fueled by “the same explosive social elements” as 
supporters of the Paris Commune.200  In Social Problems (1883), Henry George claimed 
that urban immigrants were “barbarians who may be to the new what Hun and Vandal 
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were to the old.”201 Henry Cabot Lodge wrote in 1891 that lax immigration laws let in 
“low-class labor from the far East” that contributed to the criminal classes.202 These 
authors exemplified the chorus of opinion linking immigrants to crime.203 Newspapers 
called immigrants “scum and offal,” “venomous reptiles,” “reckless foreign wretches,” 
and “human and inhuman rubbish.”204 Arguing that races were not “equally endowed,” 
Daniel G. Britton told the American Association for the Advancement of Science in 1895 
that “the black, the brown, and red races” each had a “peculiar mental temperament 
which has become hereditary” and rendered them “recreant to the codes of civilization, 
and therefore technically criminal.”205 
Exclusionary immigration policy was presented as necessary to prevent letting 
criminal classes flood through the nation’s borders. Policymakers in favor of restrictive 
immigration policy often spoke in terms that stigmatized new immigrants as criminal 
threats. For example, while newly freed slaves were the most frequent targets of lynch 
mobs, immigrants were also subjected to this form of vigilante justice. Recounting the 
lynching of eleven Italian men in New Orleans in 1891, House Representative Henry 
Cabot Lodge (R-MA) denounced the mob’s activity as “deplorable,” but stated that the 
more problematic underlying cause of these events was the “utter failure of any laws or 
regulations which we now have to exclude members of the criminal classes.”206 Theodore 
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Roosevelt, serving on the U.S. Civil Service Commission at the time, referred to the 
lynching as “a rather good thing.”207 Vigilante killings of immigrants were not blamed on 
the instigators of the violence, but rather on the state for allowing criminals into the 
country in the first place. As will be shown later, lawmakers excused the harsh justice the 
state doled out to organized labor by defending the misperception that hostile and violent 
immigrants and an army of tramps were the ones driving labor unrest. 
Given the links drawn between poverty and immigration by Sumner, Strong and 
others, it is unsurprising to see the era’s crime scholars link crime to immigrants. That 
tramps were widely feared to consist disproportionately of immigrant groups helped to 
legitimate their punishment. However, vagrancy laws were not only important in 
Northern states. Enhanced vagrancy laws were connected to efforts to punish groups 
other than homeless white men. In particular, vagrancy laws were important in the South, 
but served a different purpose—preserving the racial caste system.  
Punishing Blackness: The Unique Purposes of Southern Vagrancy Laws 
The 1897 analysis of vagrancy laws which found that they were particularly 
punitive in the Northeast and Midwest ignored how southern vagrancy laws were 
specifically designed to bridge the South’s transition out of a slave-based economy. In the 
South, convict-lease systems relied on vagrancy statutes and were justified by the idea 
that black offenders were innately criminal. The convict-lease system was in large part 
justified by economic factors, as it gave planters cheap labor while the southern economy 
adjusted to abolition. But deterministic conceptions of crime complemented preexisting 
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ideas about black deviance and violence. Vagrancy laws became crucial to Black Codes 
built to control recently freed blacks, and ideas about innate racial dispositions helped 
justify the construction of a unique system of punishment for southern blacks.208 
As David Oshinsky has demonstrated, vagrancy laws were fundamental to turn of 
the century southern criminal justice. But unlike their northern counterparts, southern 
vagrancy laws were more likely to authorize fines as a punishment for vagrancy. Free 
blacks over 18 were required to provide proof of employment in order to avoid a 
vagrancy charge, and if they could not provide proof nor pay the fine, local police would 
sell their labor to whatever planter paid the fine. Police would often perform sweeps of 
local vagrants when local companies were in need of cheap labor. The use of vagrancy 
laws to stock the convict-labor pool solved multiple problems for southern Democrats—it 
provided industry cheap labor, served as a system of racial control, and appeased white 
resistance to funding penitentiaries.  
Political resistance to incarcerating blacks was justified by race science and 
biological literature concluding that blacks were incorrigible and could not contribute to 
society unless compelled. For example, Henry Boies’s Prisoners and Paupers included a 
chapter studying “The Negro Element of Increase,” in which he stated that, “The inbred 
habits of life, confirmed by generations of slavery, when all were the property of a 
master…have tended to utterly obliterate all consciousness of meum and tuum.” Latin for 
“mine and yours,” Boies suggested that blacks lack a biological capacity to distinguish 
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private property, so they were likely to be thieves. Boies states that blacks were 
“compelled often to steal or starve” due to a lack of “conscientious scruples to deter 
them.” 209 While Boies condemned southern states for neglecting to reform black inmates, 
his language provided a basis for condemning blacks as naturally prone to crime. Charles 
Henderson contradicted himself in a similar fashion, suggesting that, “The negro in a 
northern city is urged downward towards pauperism, and especially toward crime, not 
alone by his racial defects, but also by…social prejudices.” But he also claimed that in 
regards to the high levels of crime and poverty among blacks, “The primary factor is 
racial inheritance, physical and mental inferiority, barbarian and slave ancestry 
culture.”210 
Muhammad’s historical analysis provides an in-depth account of the link between 
race science, prejudices about black criminality, and punishment during this period. He 
discusses the nature and prevalence of ideas about innate black criminality in intellectual 
circles, demonstrating how these ideas influenced policymakers in the South and North. 
Muhammad directs attention onto the work of Frederick L. Hoffman, and particularly his 
book Race Traits (1896).211 Relying on 1890 census data, Hoffman showed that the 
proportion of black crime was higher than the proportion of blacks in the population. He 
used this data to conclude that blacks had a “decided tendency towards crime.” Claiming 
that social interventions in black communities had no reformative effects, Hoffman 
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alleged that blacks were criminal by nature.212 Alluding to racial stereotypes, Hoffman 
described rape by black men as marked “by a diabolical persistence and malignant 
atrocity of detail that have no reflection in the whole extent of the natural history of the 
most bestial and ferocious animals.” This analysis drew on common notions, often 
“verified” in race science research, that black men had biological proclivities to rape 
white women.213 Hoffman’s work seamlessly blended white supremacist discourse, race 
science, and Lombrosian theory in ways that reinforced fears that sexual aggression was a 
biologically engrained trait in black men. Hoffman went so far as to defend lynching as 
“the effect of a cause, the removal of which lies in the power of the colored race.”214  
Lynching was a crucial form of crime control from the Reconstruction era through 
the mid-20th century. As David Garland (2010) has shown, lynching was a form of de 
facto capital punishment as local, state, and federal officials acquiesced to the practice, 
especially in cases where black men were accused of raping white women. Garland 
concludes that the “specter” of lynching shapes the dynamics of capital punishment to 
this day.215 Given its influence on the development of the criminal justice system, 
ignoring lynching because it was not a state-sanctioned practice would downplay how 
blacks and immigrants were stigmatized as incorrigible criminals and punished as a 
result. In conjunction with convict-leasing, lynching was in part a response to stereotypes 
about the predispositions of black men.   
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This rationality spread into the work of race scientists purporting to prove that 
blacks were an inherently inferior race. As southern penologist Dr. Albert Henley 
informed the National Prison Association in 1891, “We have difficulties at the south 
which you at the north have not…We have a large alien population, an inferior 
race…The Negro’s moral sense is lower than that of the white man.” Henley rationalized 
the convict-lease system on the grounds that blacks would only work if they were 
compelled and that southern penologists “do not yet know” of any way to meaningfully 
reform black criminality.”216   
The idea that black criminals were incapable of reform had broad appeal. 
Taxpayers in the South often refused to waste money on “incorrigible” young blacks by 
building reformatories. In “Worse than Slavery” (1996), David Oshinsky recounts the 
efforts one Mississippi state legislator who pushed to protect juveniles from the convict-
lease system at the turn of the century by constructing a state reformatory specifically for 
juveniles. However, the proposal faced significant pushback in the state legislature and 
was rejected by legislators who suggested that “it was no use trying to reform a negro,” 
leaving the convict-lease system intact as a means of controlling black youths.217 
The memoirs of J.C. Powell, a convict labor camp captain, also provide insight 
into the link between ideas of innate criminality and the convict-lease system. Powell 
explicitly connected notions of black criminal incorrigibility to poor labor potential. 
Powell wrote, “We have little material for skilled labor among the criminals of the South. 
The bulk of our convicts are negroes who could not by any possibility learn a trade, and 
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how to employ them at anything save the simplest manual toil is a problem not yet 
solved.” Powell argued that black criminals must, and should, be forced to work. They 
were only capable of low-skill labor, and as a result could never learn a useful trade or 
meaningfully contribute to society on their own volition. Since they could not be 
transformed into independent workers, the convict-lease system was designed for 
irredeemable black criminals who needed compulsion to work.218  
Historical accounts from Oshinsky and Muhammad provide insightful analyses of 
the ways in which racialized ideas about criminality contributed to the criminalization of 
blackness. But their works do not recognize how the repression of blacks was, in some 
ways, related to the forces legitimating state violence against immigrants and poor 
whites. Convict-leasing and lynching were driven by ascriptive hierarchical racial 
ideologies that were irrelevant to the punishment of tramps or labor, but southern 
Democrats and penologists were also able to justify convict-leasing through the 
deterministic ideologies that facilitated the repression of poor whites, organized labor, 
and immigrants. These race-based historical accounts miss how racialized punishments 
were partially justified by the same ideational forces driving additional developments in 
criminal justice. In some ways, convict leasing and lynching were expressions of the 
broader deterministic mindset of the late nineteenth century American crime politics.  
Punishing Labor: Equating Organized Labor with Criminality 
Equated with criminals, immigrants, and tramps, organized labor was not immune 
to the violent hand of the criminal law. More than any other group, immigrants were 
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widely presumed to be a driver of labor aggression at the century’s end. The United 
States Industrial Commission, appointed by President William McKinley in 1898 to 
investigate capital-labor relations, ended up dedicating a large portion of its nineteen 
volumes to studying high rates of criminality among paupers and immigrants.219  
This complemented the rhetoric of conservatives, who depicted tramps as the 
instigators of labor agitation. Blending ideas about criminality with xenophobic attitudes 
was a useful strategy to those seeking to quell labor activism. By associating labor 
organizations with radical immigrants and a “tramp army,” conservatives delegitimized 
organized labor by connecting it to ideologies of criminality. Anxieties that an 
insurrectionary labor force could decimate the social order facilitated state repression of 
labor organization in ways that targeted the urban poor and immigrants.220  
Brockway himself noted that “the labor question…bears directly upon crime” 
given that his own research concluded that 82% of prisoners were laborers. He contended 
that many laborers had potential to reform, but his arguments created opportunities to 
connect labor unrest to criminality.221 Other scholars connecting criminality to labor 
protest had a more pejorative perspective. In 1893, Henry Boies argued that American 
cities were welcoming “criminals, anarchists, and ferocious beasts of prey.”222 G. Frank 
Lydston employed an unusual argument in The Diseases of Society, claiming that 
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paleontological discoveries of mammoth and mastodon fossils found that they traveled in 
close packs, suggesting that “among the lower animals true communism is found.”223 
Lydston, like many others during his day, connected the criminal behavior of strikers to 
“foreign-born anarchy” and argued that the pursuit of equality by labor was a result of 
“the ill-advised and incoherent efforts of diseased and undisciplined minds.”224 The large 
immigrant membership of pro-labor organizations like the International Working 
People’s Association seemingly validated these concerns.225  
As a result, when the United States experienced its first nationwide strike in the 
1870s, the middle-class and propertied elements panicked. The strike began with workers 
on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad in Martinsburg, West Virginia in July 1877, but 
outrage over wage cuts and poor working conditions ignited a national response, 
prompting thousands to join the cause. St. Louis, Pittsburgh, and Chicago were shut 
down, and federal troops were sent to seven states and state militias into many more. By 
the strike’s end in August, over one hundred people were dead and thousands injured.226  
Several states responded to the experience of 1877 by expanding criminal 
conspiracy doctrines making it easier to obtain injunctions against labor and repress the 
coordination of dissent before action was taken. Courts commonly ruled that injunctions 
against labor could be sought if it was shown that a strike could damage the “probable 
expectancies” of business. This allowed strikers to be arrested preemptively and 
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summarily tried before a judge for contempt.227  
That tramps were relatively absent from the 1877 strike did not prevent them from 
being politicized as the villains of the events.228 Lee O. Harris attributed the strike in 
Pittsburgh to tramps and Francis Wayland claimed that the series of riots was caused by a 
“standing army of professional tramps.”229 Wayland declared that tramps were “at war 
with society.”230  Newspapers described tramps as the proletariat’s “lowest layer,” 
claiming that they were willing to “gladly participate in any mob action” while wearing 
“badges of red.”231 Other observers—including Allan Pinkerton, who would later found 
the Pinkerton Detective Agency that became crucial in business’s efforts to control 
labor—argued that the unrest was due to communists.232 The 1877 strike was thus 
perceived as caused by a combination of communists, labor organizations, and tramps, 
especially since so many strikers were arrested on broad vagrancy charges.233 
According to this narrative, an army of immigrants, tramps, and labor 
organizations threatened social and political stability. While this idea was widely 
accepted, an alliance between these groups was unlikely in reality. The inflow of 
immigrants undercut the wage labor market and caused labor organizations to advocate 
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for restrictions on immigration.234 The culture of tramping was steeped in Anglo-Saxon 
masculinity, so while some immigrants and blacks were homeless, tramping was a 
racially exclusionary counterculture.235 Even poor whites embraced race science to 
protect the hegemony of native-born white men.236 And while labor initially defended 
tramps as victims of circumstance, they reversed their position as governments blamed 
labor unrest on tramps by calling for antitramp laws to differentiate between honest 
unemployed workers and criminal tramps.237  
Linking labor unrest to populations associated with innate criminality opened the 
door to revisions in the criminal law. States pursued several reforms after 1877 enhancing 
their ability to punish labor. State militias were expanded through private subsidies from 
business.238 Corporations hired private police to fight labor, which facilitated abuses of 
workers’ rights. The deputization of private police during strike suppressions and the 
business-led expansion of state militias underscored a remarkable convergence between 
business, the state, and the criminal justice system.239 Facilitated by anti-statist sentiment, 
the emergence of private police to respond to labor aligned the police with corporate 
interests. And in unintended ways, Populists like William Jennings Bryan inadvertently 
helped to expand carceral institutions by objecting to private policing in favor of public 
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policing.240  
When labor was accused of violence in capital-labor conflicts, it justified severe 
criminal justice interventions. A good case in point is the 1886 Haymarket affair. What 
started as a peaceful rally in support of an eight-hour day ended in violence after an 
unknown person threw a bomb at the police seeking to end the rally. The incident 
validated perceived connections between the natural violence of immigrants and labor, 
even though the identity of the bomber was unknown. In the wake of Haymarket, 
businesses subsidized police crackdowns on known anarchists. Chicago police continued 
to carry on unnecessary raids for years after the threat subsided in order to maintain the 
funding arrangement.241  
The depression of 1893, which increased the population of unemployed men, 
coincided with an increase in strike activity, and again it was widely feared that tramps 
were responsible. At the peak of the crisis in 1894, seventeen groups of unemployed men 
totaling 10,000 people marched towards Washington to demand unemployment relief. 
This physical manifestation of a “tramp army” validated popular links between tramping, 
workers’ rights, and violence. Marchers were frequently arrested on vagrancy charges, 
including Jacob Coxey, the leader of “Coxey’s Army,” the biggest group marching. The 
arrest of Coxey and others broke the movement, calming alarmed conservatives.242  
The 1894 Pullman strike was a particularly crucial moment in American labor 
history. Due to wage cuts in 1893 and 1894, labor discontent within the Pullman Car 
                                                             
240 Gottschalk, The Prison and the Gallows, 102. 
241 Goldstein, Political Repression, 34–40, 42; Smith, Civic Ideals, 363; Fred Shannon, The 
Centennial Years (Garden City: Doubleday, 1969), 236. 
242 Goldstein, Political Repression, 50–53; Arnold Paul, Conservative Crisis and the Rule of Law: 
Attitudes of Bar and Bench, 1877-1900 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960), 129. 
88 
 
Company in Illinois prompted 3,000 employees to strike in June of 1894. Under the 
leadership of Eugene Debs, the American Railway Union (ARU) carried out sympathy 
strikes in 27 state and territories involving over 250,000 strikers. With public anxieties 
piqued over Coxey’s Army, the public landed on the side of railroad management. 243 
With the support of Attorney General Richard Olney, a former corporate attorney with 
ties to railroads, the railroads’ General Managers Association (GMA) secured injunctions 
hampering the ARU’s efforts. Federal troops and marshals were dispatched nationally to 
aid state and local authorities. In total, 190 strikers were indicted and 515 arrested. Under 
the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court upheld Debs’ six-month sentence and the three-
month sentences given to several of his associates for violating the injunctions.244  
The Pullman strike was a crucial conflict not only in that it criminalized labor 
violence while private violence carried out by corporations went unaddressed; the state’s 
victory also put to bed larger debates about the economic order. Labor’s demands for 
workers’ rights ran counter to conservatives’ defense of the economic status quo and law-
and-order responses to labor uprisings. But the ARU was decimated after the Pullman 
loss, prompting other labor organizations like the American Federation of Labor (AFL) to 
swing rightwards to avoid the same fate. Victoria Hattam has shown that the AFL’s 
retreat from leftist politics to business unionism was a response to a conservative 
judiciary that repeatedly overturned the labor movement’s victories in court, one which 
ultimately precluded an embrace of political commitments that could have formed the 
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basis for a broader working class movement.245 Other scholars concur that under 
Gompers’ leadership, the AFL pursued change within the system rather than challenging 
it as a survivalist response.246 The pattern of growing labor militancy, repression, and a 
rightwards swing would be repeated in the future.247 The AFL’s choices at this time 
stunted the development of the labor movement, and it is key to recognize that this choice 
was partially driven by criminal crackdowns on labor in the nineteenth century.  
Links between organized labor and criminality gave the state the validation to 
punish labor and prevent the emergence of a strong leftist politics. The way crime politics 
framed capital-labor conflicts in the Gilded Age helped settle broader debates between 
labor and capital on the terms of political conservatives. The delegitimization of 
organized labor as innately criminal quieted the strongest opponents of corporate power 
and undermined the best means workers had for challenging corporate power and abuse.   
IV. Conclusion 
 Naturalized constructs of criminality were not just functionalist tools in late 
nineteenth century politics. They did not emerge only as a mechanism for solving social 
problems involving poverty, race, and labor on the terms of the white upper middle class. 
These ideas emerged within a larger ideological context amenable to race science and 
bio-determinism. Within this ideational milieu, an embrace of Darwinism and bio-
determinism spanned political ideology. Ideas about “born criminality” and 
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“incorrigibility” were outgrowths of general ideational and ideological currents that had 
broad political appeal.  
 The rehabilitative ideology articulated by late nineteenth century scholars and 
reformers has exhibited remarkable resilience over time. Rehabilitative ideology has 
waxed and waned in influence, but never fully disappeared from American crime politics. 
Parole, probation, and the indeterminate sentence have become durable features of 
American criminal justice. And the notion that crime is best solved through individual-
level micro-interventions—whether that means reformative or punitive interventions—
has conditioned how American scholars, activists, and policymakers conceptualize 
criminality. Criminal anthropologists and rehabilitative scholars fundamentally 
restructured constructions of criminality in American politics by fostering a focus on 
“criminals” rather than “crimes” and on people who fit the image of the likely criminal so 
they can be preemptively detained before committing more serious crimes. By 
conceptualizing criminality as a function of individual faults and traits, rehabilitative 
frameworks naturalized criminality while hardening class and racial distinctions.  
 Rehabilitative ideology and the biological constructions of criminality that 
informed it had wide-ranging effects. During the Gilded Age, anti-poor, anti-black, and-
immigrant, and anti-worker sentiment spawned out of a shared well of ideas and 
ideologies related to rehabilitation and bio-determinism. Treating the punishment of these 
groups in distinctive silos would overlook important dynamics of American politics that 
justified punishment of them all. This sheds new light on the nature of American crime 
politics and the complex ways in which racism, classism, and nativism are interrelated.  
 This reveals important political developments that give us insight into the rise of 
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mass incarceration. The urban poor, blacks, immigrants, and organized labor were all 
punished through the indeterminate sentence and vagrancy laws. The indeterminate 
sentence has been a mainstay of American criminal justice since its creation, but today is 
often believed to be a benevolent alternative to the determinate sentence. This neglects its 
punitive origins and effects. And though vagrancy laws were struck down as 
unconstitutional in the 1960s, many scholars have argued that contemporary ordinances 
regulating conduct common among the homeless and urban poor are merely versions of 
vagrancy laws dressed in modernized language.248 Understanding the development of 
vagrancy laws provides insight into the development of their contemporary counterparts. 
 The story of Gilded Age crime politics illustrates an underappreciated dynamic in 
American political development—the mutual constitution of class and criminality. 
Poverty, socioeconomic disadvantage, and criminality were all theorized as outcomes of 
a common set of personal traits among Gilded Age crime scholars, practitioners, and 
policymakers. By focusing on the atomized individual, criminal anthropology and 
rehabilitative ideology naturalized crime in a way that embedded constructions of 
criminality into class relations. Class hierarchy and criminal behavior became linked as 
associated phenomena and outgrowths of the same individual faults. Being of a certain 
social or economic class became more important than what you actually did in 
determining if you should be punished, and behaviors common among certain classes of 
people were criminalized to preemptively detain individuals deemed prone to crime. By 
naturalizing class difference and criminality, Gilded Age politics charted a developmental 
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trajectory in which class and criminality have defined and been defined by each other.  
 Bio-determinism and Darwinism were essential facets of Gilded Age American 
political thought, but they did more than shape repressive criminal justice policies. 
Darwinist ideologies were also deployed by business leaders as defenses of laissez-faire 
economics. Corporate actors involved in debates over the regulatory state’s design drew 
on laissez-faire defenses of market competition and prevailing notions of criminality to 
depict business leaders as inversions of the born criminal—good men driven by healthy 
capitalist self-interest. By drawing on prevailing discourses in this way, politically savvy 
railroad executives and industry leaders defused the potential for an explosive politics 
founded on the idea that the “robber barons” deserved harsh punishment.  
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CHAPTER 3: PRIVILEGING CORPORATE CRIMINALS: CRIME POLITICS AND 
THE BIRTH OF THE REGULATORY STATE 
 
“The millionaires are a product of natural selection…They may fairly be regarded 
as the naturally selected agents of society for certain work.” 
- William Graham Sumner, 1882249 
 
Criminal anthropology and rehabilitative ideology justified punitive policies for 
racial minorities, the urban poor, and organized labor in the late nineteenth century. 
These developments mostly unfolded at the state and local level. On first glance, the 
prevalence of this discourse was less evident on the national stage where there was no 
national brand of crime politics to invoke the crime-as-pathology discourse. But this 
interpretation rests on a narrow definition of crime politics by only considering the 
politics of street crime. The politics of economic regulation during the Gilded Age was, 
in many ways, a brand of crime politics, and prevailing ideas and ideologies about crime 
featured prominently in regulatory debates.  
 Widely condemned as ruthless and exploitative “robber barons,” the leaders of 
America’s rapidly growing industrial sectors were commonly disparaged as criminals in 
the public eye. As Populists mobilized in response to the conditions of industrial 
capitalism and the abuses of a growing plutocratic class, an angry public embraced the 
rhetoric of corporate criminality. Executives’ actions were deemed harmful and 
dangerous, so it was argued that they should be punished. This rhetoric leads historians 
like Steve Fraser to argue that popular resistance to economic elites successfully limited 
the economic inequalities produced by the Gilded Age industrial order.250  
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 Fraser’s emphasis on this public outcry ignores how and why it failed to produce 
meaningful policy change. Populists expressed outrage at the robber barons and were 
quick to equate their behavior with criminality, so the origins of the regulatory state 
cannot be separated from the politics of criminal justice. However, research emphasizing 
populist rhetoric and literatures on the development of U.S. regulatory frameworks miss 
how crime has been politicized in regulatory debates.  
The “robber barons” were not a homogenous bloc, but a diverse group of 
corporate leaders with different policy preferences who made different strategic choices. 
Fraser is not wrong in suggesting that those who embraced a strict laissez-faire 
philosophy lost in debates over regulation, but not all shared this position. Perceptive 
industry leaders, cognizant of the political climate, fought for rather than against 
regulatory reform by articulating a regulatory ideology that framed their arguments 
within prevailing modes of American political thought, including dominant discourses 
about criminality. Their endorsement of a regulatory commission was voiced in 
opposition to demands for straightforward criminalization of market activity. A 
commission was presented as an appropriate alternative for ethical business leaders who 
would be responsive to light sanctions and administrative guidance, minimizing the need 
to codify severe criminal sanctions. Only by framing their goals within prevailing 
discourses were these business leaders able to reach a favorable compromise in the 
creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission.   
Fraser’s narrative thus simplifies the political development of the regulatory state. 
It is true that many conservatives and corporations exhibited a dogmatic adherence to 
laissez-faire, but other sectors of business endorsed regulatory reform. These corporate 
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interests, particularly railroads, combined the rhetoric of laissez-faire adherents who 
naturalized markets through Social Darwinist language with prevailing rhetoric about 
crime in which criminality was explained through similar Darwinist principles. This 
promoted a unique regulatory ideology in which corporate executives were depicted in 
contrast to dominant understandings of criminality. Railroad leaders used these ideas to 
advocate for regulatory reform in ways that minimized state intervention into markets.  
In their endorsement of regulatory ideology, argued that rapacious businessmen 
should be viewed as natural capitalists rather than natural criminals. The natural capitalist 
became an inversion of the born criminal, one whose competitive and creative nature led 
him to succeed in the market. Railroads were thus able to alter the nature of regulatory 
debates. Instead of focusing on whether businessmen committed criminal acts, debates 
were focused on whether businessmen were criminal types. Legislative deliberations 
became centered on determining whether the average businessman’s behavioral history, 
character, socioeconomic background, or personal traits demonstrated a criminal 
propensity.  
 Debates about the Interstate Commerce Act became less about whether executives 
did bad things and more about whether they were bad people. Situating the debate within 
the framework of regulatory ideology made for a stark contrast between railroad 
officers—reputable men with no criminal record—and prevailing ideas natural 
criminality. Corporate actions that could reasonably be compared to theft took on unique, 
non-criminogenic meanings because they were committed by people who did not fit 
prevailing constructions of criminality. Instead, corporate crimes were viewed as rational 
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responses to market dynamics and healthy displays of capitalist self-interest, not 
manifestations of criminal dispositions warranting rehabilitation or incarceration.  
Again, regulatory ideology does not rule out prosecution as an option. Rather, it 
promotes a degree regulatory discretion that allows regulators to respond to criminal 
behavior through non-criminal sanctions, permitting corporate actors to evade the label of 
criminality even after they commit criminal acts. Regulatory ideology thus treats 
corporate crimes as “less criminal” than street crimes, and it does so by virtue of the traits 
of the perpetrators. The regulatory approach to corporate crime is consequently more 
attentive to correcting market conditions rather than the people running businesses.   
 The emphasis on punishing the criminal, not the crime, turned debates over the 
Interstate Commerce Act’s criminal provisions into a moral and political choice as to 
whether corporate executives were judged to be “bad people,” regardless of the nature or 
consequences of their actions. The prevailing interpretive understanding of corporate 
criminality that emerged from these debates was a logical reciprocal to prevailing ideas 
of natural born criminality. This helped to produce institutional arrangements that 
channeled corporate criminals, who lacked criminal dispositions, away from the criminal 
justice system and into regulatory venues like the Interstate Commerce Commission.  
Siphoning corporate crime off from the criminal justice system was a political 
decision that has had long-term institutional and ideological ramifications. Regulating 
rather than punishing the activities of corporate executives reflected a choice to embed 
normative meaning into these actions that was distinct from the normative meaning 
ascribed to street crimes. That corporate executives were deemed superior to poor and 
working-class criminals is predictable, but the a priori positing of corporate criminals as 
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not innately criminal and thus not deserving of punishment is a testament to the class 
character of the crime ideational framework. The choice to control corporate malfeasance 
through regulatory oversight has conditioned the subsequent development of the 
regulatory state while conveying the ideological message that corporate crime is different 
and somehow less “criminal” than common street crimes. 
The following section reviews key changes in the industrial economy and the 
development of the large corporation in the late nineteenth century. Section II describes 
trends in prevailing modes of political, economic, and criminological thought that 
depicted the corporate criminal as a natural capitalist and granted scientific legitimacy to 
market competition. Section III explores how these ideas and ideologies manifested in 
debates over the Interstate Commerce Act. Section IV reviews how the politics of 
corporate crime evolved in the aftermath of the Interstate Commerce Act’s passage.     
I. The Development of the Nineteenth Century Political Economy 
As the nation industrialized in the final decades of the nineteenth century, the 
nation’s small towns described as autonomous “island communities” by Robert Wiebe 
transformed into a “distended society” in which citizens shed small town ideals to 
accommodate a bureaucratic state capable of ordering a national market.251 This 
experience with a more localized economy fueled resistance to the growth of corporate 
capitalism and elite power Steve Fraser highlights in The Age of Acquiescence (2014).252  
Literature on Populism often stresses the movement’s enduring ideological impact 
and the reining in of corporate power during this era. Primarily southern and western 
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farmers and laborers, the Populists articulated a class-based politics that was previously 
unable to attain national support. But after they gained traction in the nineteenth century, 
the movement laid ideological foundations that would condition early twentieth century 
Progressivism and New Deal politics. However, Populist coalitions also demanded 
radical change that hardened conservative dedication to laissez-faire and freedom of 
contract.253 This is often overlooked by scholars who overstate the power of populists by 
concentrating on the radical character of their ideology and potency of their rhetoric.  
Some scholars are more attentive to how and why populist political energies 
failed to produce institutional reform. They tend to attribute this failure to the fragmented 
nature of the working-class. Scholars like Jefferson Cowie and Martin Shefter suggest 
that the lack of a coherent working-class identity inhibited workers from fighting 
corporate power with any sense of class-consciousness.254 Others recognize how 
influential business coalitions countered populist politics by advocating a conservative 
politics in policy arenas.255 
The arguments in this chapter complement literatures highlighting the limited 
achievements of Populists in securing reforms by showing how agents of big business 
politicized crime to their advantage in order to shape regulatory reform. Legislators allied 
with corporations, especially railroads, articulated more favorable depictions of corporate 
criminality in policy arenas than was presented in popular rhetoric. This was critical in 
containing attacks on corporate abuse and the robber barons. Historical analyses of the 
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regulatory state’s origins understate the influence debates about crime had on its 
development, but understanding these debates requires examining the broad story of 
economic and regulatory development in the late nineteenth century.   
The corporations that appeared in the final decades of the nineteenth century were 
unusual by historical standards, dwarfing the businesses that drove the local economies of 
previous decades. Alfred Chandler has argued that such large enterprises emerged at this 
moment to coordinate the growing national market, and railroads served as organizational 
models replicated across various industries. But a nationalized market posed unique 
challenges for large businesses. Requiring vast amounts of capital to be raised quickly, 
corporations became increasingly reliant on investment banking, facilitating a rapid 
growth in the financial industry. Institutional maintenance and financial coordination on a 
national scale also required the operation of diverse geographic units and detailed cost 
accounting procedures. To adapt to these changes, railroads employed specialized tiers of 
managers trained to perform distinctive tasks. Chandler argues that the class of 
professional managers performing these distinct functions was essential to reconstituting 
business enterprises into larger hierarchical organizations.256  
Chandler’s account has since been critiqued as excessively functionalist by 
depicting the emergence of large corporations as an adaptive and inevitable response to 
the development of a nationalized market and new technologies. Historically oriented 
political scientists have revised this narrative by demonstrating that politics were crucial 
to reconstituting the industrial order. Describing late nineteenth century development as 
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“state-building as patchwork,” Stephen Skowronek has demonstrated that political elites 
and judges resisted attempts to undermine prevailing institutional arrangements as 
piecemeal administrative reforms displaced judicial regulation of industry. This limited 
the state’s reconstruction into one capable of managing the new industrial order, throwing 
the state into a constitutional stalemate that was not settled until the ICC emerged in 1920 
as the “signal triumph of the Progressive reconstitution.”257  
 In Alternative Tracks (1997), Gerald Berk highlights other dynamics that shaped 
political economic development. He demonstrates how the industrial order was molded 
by constitutional and political choices through which courts buttressed a system of large 
national railroads by revising receivership laws and locating control over corporations 
with officers and directors rather than shareholders. In a case study of the Great Western 
Railroad, he shows that an alternative economic model that was regional, relied on flat 
hierarchies, split authority between owners and managers, and achieved economies of 
scope offered distinct advantages to a large national model. That the latter prevailed was 
due to political and constitutional choices.258  
More generally, Richard Bensel has shown how the Republican Party constructed 
the industrial economy. As agents of big business, Republicans represented the financial 
core and manufacturing belt in the Northeast and Midwest. Countering Chandler’s claim 
that the corporation was a response to market forces, Bensel shows that a minimally 
regulated national market was a precondition Republicans deliberately pursued to enable 
large corporations to grow. But this goal was a liability for Republicans, as producers in 
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the West and Plains states paid exorbitant rates to large railroads to ship their goods to 
urban markets. Republicans kept the market minimally regulated by using tariff policy to 
attract labor, western sheep raisers, southern sugar refiners, and Union veterans to their 
coalition in order to maintain their opposition to market regulation.259 The emergence of 
corporations was an outcome of this push for an unregulated national market. Bensel 
complements the work of Gabriel Kolko, who concludes that by 1900 American politics 
was dominated by businesses that facilitated a shift away from a laissez-faire economy to 
a corporate capitalist one with a minimized regulatory state.260  
While Progressives would later embrace corporate capitalism, many Gilded Age 
robber barons deployed laissez-faire ideology as a weapon to fight discourses critical of 
corporate power. Businessmen were aware of the rhetoric depicting them as callous and 
manipulative thieves. As discussed, evolutionary theory was embraced by supporters of 
various political ideologies during this period, including laissez-faire proponents.261 
Doctrines of “survival of the fittest” and natural selection not only legitimated racial, 
gender, and class hierarchies while protecting the place of the upper-middle classes—
they also validated the sense of superiority among industry leaders.  
 Business leaders embraced the precepts of Spencerian theory and accepted 
Darwinist discourse as a justification for their own conditions. Not only was natural 
selection doctrine an apology for inequality; it also satisfied elites’ desire for a scientific 
rationale of individualist economics. The men who popularized Spencer in the U.S. were 
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typically conservatives who used his philosophy to paralyze efforts at social and 
economic reform. Spencerian theory rationalized capitalist economics by attributing 
inequality to the pathologies of the poor and the superiority of capitalists.262 Again, 
William Graham Sumner was in large part responsible for the theoretical move of 
applying Social Darwinism to capitalist economics.  
 Sumner and Spencer embraced property rights and individualism as instruments 
in humanity’s battle for progress and as laws of the economic jungle. In their philosophy, 
schemes of state regulation would only impede racial progress. More appropriate would 
be to reward rather than disincentivize voracious economic competition so as to promote 
racial improvement. By grounding laissez-faire economics in evolutionary science, they 
offered ammunition to corporations opposed to regulatory reform.  
Drawing on the ideas of Darwinism and race science, defenders of laissez-faire 
drew from similar currents in political thought as those who fought for enhanced 
punishments for vagrants, immigrants, minorities, and labor. But they did so by 
articulating constructs of corporate criminality that warranted less punitive responses 
from the state and by depicting business leaders as healthy competitive capitalists rather 
than criminals. While laissez-faire purists failed to prevent the creation of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission, other industry leaders successfully blended these defenses of 
laissez-faire rooted in Social Darwinism with prevailing discourses of criminality steeped 
in bio-determinism. The regulatory ideology they advocated thus combined arguments 
from proponents of laissez-faire with popular discourses of criminality in order to present 
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corporate criminals as inversions of the natural criminal, helping them to champion the 
ICC as an alternative to the strict criminalization of market activities.  
II. Robber Barons or Natural Capitalists? Constructions of Corporate Criminality 
 Synthesizing classical economics and survival of the fittest appealed to 
businessmen. It resonated with their beliefs in their natural superiority in contrast to the 
lower classes, served as a weapon against critical rhetoric, and rationalized laissez-faire 
and economic inequality. Sumner was the pivotal player in bringing evolutionary theory 
to economics. He argued that, “The millionaires are a product of natural selection…They 
may fairly be regarded as the naturally selected agents of society for certain work.” He 
wrote that while the “intensest competition” may produce inequality, “the bargain is a 
good one for society” because it ensures that “all those who are competent for a [given] 
function will be employed in it.”263 
 Sumner’s defense of the status quo rationalized corporate greed and rapacity as 
natural social goods. Scholars of crime deployed similar arguments in studying the 
actions of business elites that were often condemned as dangerous. Criminologists of the 
period naturally focused on behavior commonly deemed deviant, so it is somewhat 
surprising that some of them addressed economic crime, but they rationalized these 
behaviors as products of a distinctively competitive rather than criminal nature. For 
instance, Charles Henderson claimed that destructive competition and business practices 
among industry leaders were natural and healthy. He wrote that, 
It would be strange…if the ‘captain of the industry’ did not sometimes manifest a 
militant spirit, for he has risen from the ranks largely because he was a better 
fighter than most of us. Competitive commercial life is not a flowery bed of ease, 
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but a battle field where the ‘struggle for existence’ is defining the ‘industrially fit 
to survive.’264 
 
He went on to write that market competition develops a “peculiar type of manhood, 
characterized by vitality, energy, concentration, skill…great foresight…[and] integrity.” 
Henderson concluded that, “the sense of fairness and justice is strong in business 
men.”265  
 Defenders of the status quo deployed language about the natural capitalist to fight 
attempts to criminalize economic activity. For instance, during a banquet honoring 
Hebert Spencer’s visit to New York in 1892, Richmond and Allegheny Railroad 
executive Eugene Leland said that businessmen “give nominal adherence” to doctrines 
designed to govern their behavior because such policies are typically “wholly 
inconsistent” with the realities of business operations. He claimed that “the fundamental 
laws upon which the doctrine of evolution rests have a bearing on the questions that daily 
confront business-men,” promoting competitive dynamics in market that will always 
trump incentives to follow state-made rules and render regulation futile.266  
  Needless to say, these perspectives resonated with the common sense of 
superiority shared by titans of industry like John Rockefeller in oil and Andrew Carnegie 
in steel. With the language of biology providing a scientific validation of laissez-faire, 
this common sense was substantiated through “empirical” findings that corporate abuse 
                                                             
264 Charles R. Henderson, “Business Men and Social Theorists,” American Journal of Sociology I, no. 
4 (1896): 385–86. 
265 Henderson, 385–86, 394; see MacDonald, Criminology, 39–40 for a similar argument claiming that 
prominent men of society have distinctive physiognomies that distinguish them from others. 
266 Eugene R. Leland, “What Mr. Leland Got No Chance to Say,” in Herbert Spencer on the 
Americans and the Americans on Herbert Spencer: Being a Full Report of His Interview, And of the 
Proceedings of the Farewell Banquest of Nov. 11, 1882 (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 
1883), 82–83. 
105 
 
was healthy. In a famous Sunday school address, Rockefeller declared that, “The growth 
of a large business is merely a survival of the fittest.” Employing the metaphors of nature 
and Darwinism, he stated that, “The American Beauty rose can be produced…only by 
sacrificing the early buds which grow up around it. This is not an evil tendency in 
business. It is merely the working out of a law of nature and a law of God.”267 
 In 1889, Carnegie penned a defense of laissez-faire in The North American 
Review. He drew directly on the philosophy of Sumner and Spencer, offering a biological 
foundation for the laws of industrial competition and economic inequality. He dismissed 
critics of the inequalities of industrialism, stating, “It is a waste of time to criticise the 
inevitable.”268 Carnegie claimed that laissez-faire was not only economically sound, but 
also necessary to promote racial progress. He said of laissez-faire that, 
It is here; we cannot evade it; no substitutes for it have been found; and while the 
law may sometimes be hard for the individual, it is best for the race, because it 
insures the survival of the fittest human in every department. We accept and 
welcome, therefore, as conditions to which we must accommodate ourselves, 
great inequality of environment, the concentration of business, industrial and 
commercial, in the hands of a few, and the law of competition between these, as 
being not only beneficial, but essential for the future progress of the race.”269 
 
Carnegie went on to say that “not evil, but good, has come to the race from the 
accumulation of wealth by those who have the ability and energy that produce it.”270 
 The idea of the natural capitalist served as a contrast to the idea of the natural 
criminal, and this gave businessmen ammunition against populist rhetoric that even 
spread to popular discourse. In his book Democratic Vistas, Walt Whitman offered a 
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stinging critique of Gilded Age corruption, but still wrote that, “I perceive clearly that the 
extreme business energy, and this almost maniacal appetite for wealth prevalent in the 
United States, are parts of amelioration and progress.”271  
 These divergent constructions of criminality—the “born criminal” and the 
“natural capitalist”—were rooted in common ideological and theoretical trends. 
Evolutionary and Darwinist discourses naturalized criminality as a class problem by 
depicting the criminal as a natural phenomenon tied to a specific class. In contrast, the 
businessman was not a criminal, but a naturally competitive capitalist.  
The scientific naturalization of pure laissez-faire as endorsed by Carnegie and 
Rockefeller did not prevent any and all regulation of markets. But although the 
proponents of laissez-faire did not defeat attempts at regulatory reform, leaders of the 
nation’s largest industry—the railroads—took a different approach. To justify regulatory 
oversight as an alternative to criminal sanction, railroads and their legislative allies 
brought this language about the natural capitalist to debates over the Interstate Commerce 
Act (ICA) and presented it in contrast to prevailing discourses of criminality. In doing so, 
they successfully distinguished railroad executives from popular constructions of 
criminality while arguing for the creation of a commission in lieu of strict criminalization 
of their actions. This uniquely favorable construction of corporate criminality embedded 
into their regulatory ideology was reflected in the design of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission (ICC).  
III. Crime Politics in the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 
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A Brief Legislative History of the ICA 
 Democrat John H. Reagan of Texas, the lead architect of the ICA, was first 
elected to Congress in 1857 as the representative for Texas’s 1st District in the House. His 
stint in Congress proved short when Texas seceded in 1861, prompting him to resign and 
serve in Jefferson Davis’s cabinet. Ten years after the war ended, he was reelected to the 
House, fueled by agrarian discontent with railroads that charged rural farmers exorbitant 
rates to ship their goods to urban markets. States like Texas where agrarian frustration 
was palpable initially pursued relief through state-level “granger laws” regulating the 
rates railroads could charge shippers. But in 1877, Reagan became the first lawmaker to 
suggest granting the federal government the power to oversee the railroad industry.272  
Multiple versions of an interstate commerce bill were debated before its passage 
in 1887, but Reagan consistently insisted on criminalizing abusive rate-setting practices 
by railroads. Attuned to the anger in his base, his 1877 proposal addressed every 
complaint lodged at railroads by criminalizing rebates, drawbacks, pooling, and long- and 
short-haul discriminations as misdemeanors and punishing the agents responsible with a 
$5,000 fine.273 The bill contained no mention of a commission, meaning that the state’s 
only response to the actions outlined in his proposal was prosecution. This highlights how 
from the beginning of this debate, crime politics were central to the law’s development. 
Legislators of varying partisan and regional alliances agreed that the use of 
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common law to regulate business practice was becoming futile. Corporations were 
growing in complexity and becoming adept at exploiting ambiguities in judicial 
precedent in their favor.274 But questions about whether or not corporate abuses counted 
as crime, whether executives were motivated by criminal intent, and what the most 
appropriate state response was to these behaviors were contested as Congress considered 
various versions of the law. With competing answers being put forward, the one that 
prevailed was that business executives, agents, and officers should be treated as 
inherently good men just seeking to survive in the capitalist jungle. While some corporate 
leaders fruitlessly used this idea to support absolute opposition to regulation, others used 
it as a persuasion tool to garner support for a regulatory approach as an alternative to the 
strict criminalization proposed by Reagan. Even many populist legislators who were 
hostile to railroads came to accept this logic over the course of debate.  
In 1877, Reagan’s initial interstate commerce bill passed in the House with 
support from the South and West before dying in the Republican Senate.275 Railroad 
magnates demanding to be heard by Congress stymied his efforts to reintroduce it in 
1880. In a series of hearings before the House Commerce Committee, numerous 
representatives of railroads pleaded with the committee to instead create a commission to 
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regulate ratemaking, investigate conflicts, and make policy recommendations.276 Reagan 
secured passage of his bill in the House once more in 1885 by incorporating compromises 
to satisfy the most fervently anti-railroad members of his coalition, but the Senate 
responded with a bill sponsored by Shelby Cullom (R-IL) proposing a commission. 
Cullom eschewed a hard line against the railroads and felt that the complexity of the 
railroad system left legislators ill-informed to write policy details. He favored a law 
“which could not possibly harm the railroads or other business interests of the nation.” 
The more moderate Senate, where corporations had more pull, avoided decisions that 
could hurt railroads and favored creating a commission with wide discretion.277  
A committee led by Cullom opened hearings in March of 1885 to explore avenues 
for railroad regulation. A variety of experts and railroad allies testified in support of his 
bill. It authorized the ICC to respond to common carriers violating the law by instituting 
proceedings in equity, the body of law authorized to provide relief through remedies like 
injunctions and other decrees forbidding specific actions.278 The committee’s final report 
claimed that Reagan’s reliance on criminal sanction “would assuredly have retarded the 
building up of the country.” The new bill accommodated calls to punish railroads by 
defining violations as misdemeanors punishable by a $1,000 fine, but also created the 
ICC as an initial venue to adjudicate disputes, pursue equity proceedings to stop 
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violations, and monitor railroad crimes through administrative sanctions.279  
A conference committee ironed out the differences between the bills in 1886, with 
both sides making concessions.280 Long- and short-haul discriminations and pooling were 
banned, satisfying agrarian radicals, in exchange for a commission. The law contained 
provisions through which a carrier’s officers, agents, and directors could be criminally 
punished with a fine of up to $5,000 for violations of the law, which were deemed 
misdemeanors. But the ICC was also allowed to issue cease and desist orders to impede 
those behaviors and was given the authority to petition for proceedings in equity if 
common carriers disobeyed the law.281 As a result, the law defined specific behaviors as 
criminal actions—like rebating, a practice through which railroads attracted business 
from large shippers by reducing their shipping rates and shifting costs onto smaller 
shippers—but gave the ICC a variety of mechanisms to respond to them, including civil 
and administrative interventions. The law did not specify at what point or in what cases a 
violation of the law called for prosecution versus a civil suit, administrative response, or 
equity proceeding, instead leaving that choice to the discretion of the ICC. This meant 
that a railroad could break the law regularly and repeatedly be enjoined or sanctioned by 
the ICC without ever being charged criminally. This statutory design not only 
complicated the application of the criminal law—it expressed an ideological message that 
railroad rate-setting abuses were substantively different than the crimes punished through 
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the criminal justice system.  
This constituted an innovative but comparatively unusual institutional design. 
Comparative work has drawn attention to the relative weakness of American regulatory 
bureaucracies historically and comparing the ICC to its global counterparts throws these 
differences into relief.282 Comparable bureaucracies that emerged in the UK in the 1840s 
and 1870s were granted far more robust powers, as the British treated railroad 
combinations as inevitable and regulated them to minimize injury to shippers. In 
Belgium, Prussia, France, Austria, Italy, and Canada, railroads were either nationalized or 
regulated with the understanding that large combinations were unavoidable and should be 
controlled closely by the state.283 Alternatively, American policymakers relied on a 
combination of regulatory and criminal provisions to enforce competition. This fostered a 
uniquely antagonistic relationship between American business and the state.284 By 
neglecting to nationalize the railroads or directly regulate monopoly, the American state 
relied on a vague set of criminal and regulatory controls that engendered hostile business-
government relations. 
Scott James has meticulously outlined the legislative coalition that drove the 
ICA’s passage. James shows that in 1884, Democratic Party leaders set themselves up for 
a conflict with their own rank-and-file. Agrarians in the Democrats’ base long insisted on 
stringent restrictions on railroads, but Democrats courted Mugwumps in the 1884 
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elections. Republicans who abandoned their party to vote for Cleveland in 1884, 
Mugwumps were a swing constituency that delivered Democrats the White House. But 
“business Mugwumps,” including large manufacturers, commercial wholesalers, and 
others who relied on national transportation services, were supportive of railroads. James 
shows how the demands of coalition maintenance trumped the party’s historic 
commitments. Democratic leaders gamed the lawmaking process to ensure that agrarian 
discontent would be quieted in order to maintain support for a commission and satisfy 
Mugwumps. The party’s commitment to this state-building exercise legitimized the 
ascendance of corporate capitalism through the commission.285  
It is not enough to understand the story of the ICA as purely driven by economic 
debates. A Republican-controlled Senate and a tenuous Democratic-Mugwump alliance 
in the House created a window of opportunity for the creation of a commission, and 
economic ideas were obviously central to debate. But this should not downplay the ways 
in which policymakers politicized crime in this process. Senators, Republicans, and 
Mugwumps politicized ideas about corporate criminality to defend railroads, and even 
Democrats with records of agrarian sympathy came to embrace this ideational 
construction. Politicizing corporate crime was crucial to the interests and legislators 
pursuing the construction of a commerce commission. 
By mixing regulatory and criminal policy, policymakers imbued railroad crime 
with a distinctive meaning that differed from conventional understandings of crime. The 
law sent the message that businessmen were tangibly different than criminals and 
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deserved sympathy from the state.  
Competing Ideas to the Corporate Criminal as “Natural Capitalist” 
 In the ICA, legislators deemed several actions common among railroads to be 
criminal misdemeanors but created the ICC to adjudicate disputes before resorting to 
criminal sanction. Ideas that businessmen were not criminals but “natural capitalists” 
driven by healthy competitive dynamics were crucial to this policy choice. But the 
legislative record reveals that over ten years of debate, lawmakers deployed many 
frameworks to try to understand executives’ actions. Analyzing how these ideas 
competed reveals the complex way crime politics shaped this debate and why the politics 
of the moment favored the conception of corporate criminality that prevailed.    
First, some legislators used a retributivist logic asserting that railroad executives 
should be treated equally to other criminals. The term “retributive” in this context refers 
to the idea that the actions of corporate executives or agents were deemed morally wrong, 
thus necessitating criminal sanction proportionate to the harm done.286 Legislators from 
the south, west, and plains with constituencies aggrieved by railways commonly invoked 
retributivist logic. Reagan was its most ardent advocate. In 1882, he wrote in a minority 
committee report that his bill “does not provide for punishment for anything except for 
manifest wrongs, which injure citizens and the public…it is framed on a theory which 
respects their [the public’s] intelligence and sense of moral right.”287  
Several legislators voicing retributivist arguments relied on James Hudson’s book 
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The Railways and the Republic. Through a case study of Standard Oil, Hudson argued 
that, “greed for wealth can corrupt commercial morality.” He summarized how Standard 
Oil coerced railroads into granting rebates for Standard at the expense of their 
competitors. Calling the organization “an unmitigated evil,” Hudson concluded that 
Standard’s actions were crimes against the public.288 Senator James Beck (D-KY) 
referenced Hudson’s work on the Senate floor to note that if “Western bandits” amassed 
the wealth Standard did through comparable means, they would be punished 
criminally.289 Many legislators invoked Hudson’s work to similarly argue that criminally 
punishing railroads was an appropriate expression of moral judgment.290  
Despite being associated with the party of big business, some Republicans from 
regions susceptible to agrarian populism employed this language. Albert Hopkins (R-IL) 
suggested that the law’s criminal provisions were nothing “but the assertion of a just 
principle.”291 Representative John Anderson (R-KS) maintained that, “morally I can see 
no difference between [railroad crimes] and absolute, naked, bald-headed robbery.” He 
supported making “every violation” of the law “a criminal offense.”292 His claims 
explicitly challenged the politically and socially constructed nature of crime, disputing 
the idea that there was any moral distinction between robbery and financial crime. 
Partisanship was thus not an absolutely determinative factor of a legislator’s perspective, 
                                                             
288 James F. Hudson, The Railways and the Republic (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1887), 55, 67–
106, 240, 332. 
289 U.S. Congress, The Congressional Record: Containing the Proceedings and Debates of the Forty-
Ninth Congress, Second Session, vol. 18 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1886), 481. 
290 U.S. Congress, Cong. Rec., 1885, 17:7282 for comments from Reagan (D-TX); U.S. Congress, 
Cong. Rec., 1886, 18:149, 790 (Rep. Sumner), 2111 (Sen. Jones), and Appendix for Rep. Holman. 
291 U.S. Congress, Cong. Rec., 1886, 18:790. 
292 U.S. Congress, The Congressional Record: Containing the Proceedings and Debates of the Forty-
Eighth Congress, Second Session, vol. 16 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1884), 16. 
115 
 
but such arguments were predominantly made by legislators (often Democrats) from 
regions where populist sentiment was strongest.  
Ideas about moral fairness and retributive justice were the starting point of debate 
over the ICA and were essential to Reagan’s initial proposal. However, retributive ideas 
were derided as irrational and unreasonable impediments on markets. Legislators 
commonly criticized this logic as barbaric, outdated, and inappropriate for men who had 
proven themselves to be contributors to society. Nonetheless, this language was central to 
the Populists’ “robber baron” rhetoric and prompted the corporate defenses of laissez-
faire and opposition to regulation tracked in numerous historical narratives about Gilded 
Age populism.293 But focusing on these two camps, the Populists and their most 
conservative opponents, makes it seem like business lost and Populists won. However, a 
closer look at the nuances of this debate reveals that railroads and their legislative allies 
employed diverse arguments, some of which were more successful than others.  
A second and more frequently employed ideational framework was utilitarian in 
nature, focusing on the deterrent effect of the criminal law. For instance, Senator Charles 
Van Wyck (R-NE) and Representatives Poindexter Dunn (D-AR) and Charles O’Ferrall 
(D-VA) used deterrence rationality to justify criminal sanctions. As early as 1884, Dunn 
argued that a commission would lack the force of the criminal law and would permit 
railroad abuses to “go unprevented and unrestrained.”294 Van Wyck claimed that, “the 
only thing required” of the ICC is to “write essays,” which constituted a less effective 
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response than criminal penalties.295 O’Ferrall stated that the penal section of the bill “will 
go much further in securing adherence to the law” than civil or equity remedies.296  
Democrats routinely argued that a commission would fail as a deterrent. 
Representative John Glascock (D-CA) called the commission bill “valueless” with 
weakened criminal provisions, and suggested that the proposed commission had “none of 
the elements of the English commission so potent to regulate railways abuses.”297 
William McAdoo (D-NJ) agreed, decrying the commission as “impotent” and “a 
harmless safety-valve for popular and individual discontent.”298 Thomas Wood (D-IN) 
called it a “farce” to “declare certain acts and practices of railroad companies wrong and 
a crime and then leave it out to a commission to investigate.”299  
Opposition to the commission was strong in agrarian precincts, with Andrew 
Caldwell (D-TN) calling it a “Trojan horse and a deception to close courts” to aggrieved 
parties, and Charles O’Ferrall (D-VA) suggesting that a commission would usurp the 
authority of Congress and the Courts to write and enforce laws.300 In his analysis of roll-
call votes on the Interstate Commerce Act, Scott James found that agrarian Democrats 
widely opposed the commission in the proposals made preceding 1887.301 Party leaders 
seeking to satisfy Mugwumps later engineered the Democrats’ capitulation to the 
commission bill, but during debates, Democrats often opposed the commission by 
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employing retributive or deterrence-based frames to justify strict statutory criminal 
prohibitions.  
Lawmakers aligned with railroads easily inverted this deterrence-based defense of 
criminal sanction by arguing that the ICC would shine enough “sunlight” on corporate 
behavior that it would induce compliance in rational businessmen. In House hearings in 
1882, Chauncey Depew (an attorney for Vanderbilt’s railroads) and Wayne MacVeagh (a 
former attorney general and the chairman of the Pennsylvania Civil Service Reform 
Commission) claimed that “the open sunlight” afforded by a commission would deter 
fraudulent activity without having to resort to criminal punishment.302  
Corporate defenders in Congress readily picked up their logic. Representative 
William Rice (R-MA) stated that the commission afforded “the bright sunshine of 
publicity” and would “be more potent to reform than fines or imprisonments.”303 
Representative John Stewart (R-VT) asserted that a commission’s existence “would exert 
a strong and constant tendency to bring and keep the management of the roads of the 
country within the limits of righteous dealing” in a way that criminal provisions could 
not.304 Senator John Sherman (R-OH) concluded that the ability of a commission to 
enforce obedience “would be greater than the judgment of fifty State courts.”305 The 
deterrence framework thus cut in different ways depending on how it interacted with 
one’s policy preferences. Those who favored criminal punishment employed a Beccarian 
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deterrence logic that criminal law would deter crime, but allies of railroads suggested that 
a commission would deter reasonable executives who did not require the heavy hand of 
criminal punishment to follow the law.  
That Congress created the ICC partially under the theory that “sunlight” provided 
adequate deterrence indicates that the regulatory deterrence argument carried more 
influence than the criminal law deterrence logic. A key reason the regulatory version 
prevailed was that many railroad agents and their legislative allies deployed regulatory 
ideology during debate to suggest that executives were rational men who committed 
crime due to market dynamics and competitive dispositions and would thus be more 
responsive to mild interventions than common criminals. This framework was frequently 
invoked during debate to explain railroad criminality and emphasize the character, 
background, and personal traits of corporate actors. It mirrored the prevailing 
anthropological theories of criminality by drawing attention to the behavioral history and 
disposition of offenders rather than their actions. But by meshing these arguments with 
Darwinist interpretations of laissez-faire, the business criminal became a logical 
reciprocal to the born criminal—a virtuous and productive individual whose arguably 
criminal actions should not be judged as fully criminal because they were functions of 
market dynamics, not personal pathologies. Debates about the law’s criminal provisions 
thus became hinged less on whether executives did bad things and more on whether they 
were judged to be “bad people.”  
While the most ardent corporate defenders of laissez-faire were unsuccessful in 
their fight against regulation in all forms, numerous railroad agents and executives 
deployed regulatory ideology to good effect. Treating the Populists and business 
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community as homogenous entities in opposition during this period oversimplifies the 
complex nature of these economic debates, not least by obscuring meaningful differences 
in the politics of business leaders. The railroads and legislators who drew on regulatory 
ideology designed an agency that reflected the interests of railroads by minimizing the 
criminal oversight of markets. Doing so involved effectively drawing on prevailing 
understandings of criminality and parts of the arguments from laissez-faire advocates.  
Much like in debates over rehabilitation and vagrancy, the political focus in the 
criminal aspects of the ICA debate became punishing the criminal, not the crime. But 
men of high social standing without criminal backgrounds made for a stark contrast to 
prevailing ideas of criminality. Corporate actions that could be reasonably compared to 
theft took on unique substantive meanings because they were committed by people who 
did not fit the image of the natural criminal. Their behaviors were consequently 
interpreted as rational responses to market dynamics and displays of healthy capitalist 
self-interest, not as manifestations of criminal dispositions.  
The “Natural Capitalist” As Inversion of the “Born Criminal” 
The idea that natural capitalists were inappropriately viewed as corporate 
criminals cut across partisan and regional divides. It mirrored the dominant way 
lawmakers, intellectuals, and experts on criminal behavior understood street crime at the 
time. By emphasizing the absence of personal pathologies in corporate offenders and 
their personal dispositions and background, legislators conceptualized corporate 
criminality in a way that reflected the basic ideological features of criminal anthropology. 
This focused their attention on whether they should punish the criminals being targeted 
rather than whether their particular crimes warranted punishment.  
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Legislators aligned with railroads articulated this framing to defend regulatory 
rather than criminal sanctions and persuade others to adopt this perspective. Legislators 
with anti-railroad sentiment in their constituent base eschewed criminal provisions for 
many reasons, but these ideas played a role in their reasoning—either as a reason for 
making that decision or as a post-hoc justification of said decision. In either case, these 
ideas had meaningful political purchase for legislators who needed to justify their choice 
to regulate rather than criminalize railroads.  
A cursory historical analysis indicates that the activities criminalized in the ICA 
were generally monitored through regulatory rather than criminal interventions. 
However, by overlapping criminal sanctions with regulatory ones for a common range of 
behaviors, the law established oft-ignored institutional and ideological legacies. It served 
an ideological function by reflecting and validating the idea that corporate crimes were 
normatively different than street crimes while channeling corporate crime into alternate 
institutional venues from criminal courts, setting an institutional precedent that 
conditioned the development of the regulatory state. 
This reciprocal image of the natural criminal consisted of four facets: corporate 
agents were not driven by criminal dispositions but by healthy competitive ones; their 
worst behavior was a function of market forces that excuse their actions; those market 
forces were also dynamics that produced social goods, imbuing their potentially criminal 
behavior with non-criminogenic meanings; and victims or corporate crime were ignorant, 
vindictive, and would use the criminal law to hurt men who do not deserve punishment. 
This construct reflected the natural capitalist idea that appeared in the work of William 
Graham Sumner, Charles Henderson, and others.  
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Railroads’ lawyers and agents routinely brought the rhetoric of Sumner, 
Henderson, Carnegie, and others to debates over the law. They testified for years 
preceding the law’s passage that railroad men were morally upright and that there were 
no pathologies driving their behavior that necessitated reform or containment. For 
example, legally representing Vanderbilt’s railroads, Chauncey Depew told the House 
Commerce Committee in 1882 that railroad executives “have outlived the penitentiary for 
mistakes.”306 He later stated that the bill did not target the “convicted thief,” but “as fair, 
as honorable, as reputable a class of our fellow-men…as any other.”307 For Depew, the 
officers and agents were not the pathologically deviant “others” depicted in the politics of 
street crime—they were as normal, healthy, and honest as anyone else. To depict them as 
criminals drew on archaic ideas that he argued were inappropriate when applied to this 
class of men. When he told Congress “We have outlived the penitentiary for mistakes,” 
he did not mean we as a society, but rather the class of honorable men running industry.  
John C. Brown made similar arguments. Tennessee’s former Governor and future 
president of the Texas and Pacific Railroad, Brown informed the same committee that 
railroad managers “are just as honest as lawyers, doctors, legislators, and…any other 
class of people.” He argued criminal punishment was excessive for such men. Albert 
Fink, a nationally respected expert railway engineer, made comparable claims in the 1882 
hearings. He stated that, “the evils encountered in the management of this great property 
in this country are not the result of any wickedness on the part of the American railroad 
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managers.”308  By pointing to their moral senses, Depew, Brown, and Fink painted an 
image of executives as more similar to functioning members of society than pathological 
criminals.309 These arguments suggested that corporate offenders did not need to spend 
time behind bars because they lacked the tendencies, traits, and dispositions criminal 
sanction was meant to punish or correct, regardless of what they did.    
 Many Republicans from the Northeast and Midwest drew on this logic in 
legislative debates. Representative Roswell Horr (R-MI) panned Reagan’s bill for 
targeting a class of people undeserving of punishment. He said Reagan’s proposal would 
“take men who stand well among their neighbors, who are honored and respected by 
those who know them best, who are well spoken of by the entire community in which 
they live” and associate them with “‘cut-throats,’ or…‘naked, bald-headed robbers.”310 
Representative Byron Cutcheon (R-MI) criticized the notion of punishing “upright and 
enterprising men” who have “never been accused in [their] community of being 
dishonorable.”311 Both of these legislators vocally noted that criminal sanctions would 
unfairly lump corporate executives into the same category as ordinary criminals. It was 
inappropriate to characterize these men as criminal “robber barons” as populists did. In 
opposition to Reagan’s bill, Representative William Rice (R-MA) alleged that the “the 
managers of these roads are no longer robber barons, but practical and able business 
men.”312 This emphasis on the clean behavioral histories, upright character, and “normal” 
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dispositions of executives justified opposition to the criminal sanctions in the Reagan bill 
and the anti-robber baron rhetoric more generally.  
Lawmakers opposed to criminalization praised the final law’s inclusion of a 
commission, viewing it as a suitable alternative to criminal sanction for men who lacked 
criminal natures. Representative Ralph Plumb (R-IL) stated that the commission was a 
“practical measure,” necessary to alleviate the threat of prosecution for men who are 
“fair-minded and just” with “as much probity as any other class.”313 Even Rep. Albert 
Hopkins (R-IL), an advocate of the criminal provisions throughout debate, came to 
support the commission shortly before the law’s passage. He defended his shift on the 
grounds that “the officers and managers of some of the great railroads of the country are 
just and honorable men can not be denied, and that they manage the affairs of their roads 
in a spirit of fairness to the public must, too, I think, be admitted.”314 Again, the actions 
of executives became irrelevant. The focus of debate was whether or not executives fit 
prevailing images of the criminal person.   
 Many legislators from regions with populist sympathies did not defend criminal 
provisions, despite the anti-railroad sentiment in their constituencies. This is not to 
assume that criminalization would have been more effective than regulation, but 
Populists were strident in their critiques of capitalism and the robber barons. Support for 
punishing rate-setting abuses was strong in the south, west, and plains, and on a symbolic 
level, criminal sanction constituted a stronger attack on railroads than regulation. It 
makes sense that lawmakers like Poindexter Dunn (D-AL), Senator Charles Van Wyck 
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(R-NE), and Reagan opposed the commission as too weak, fearing that its convoluted 
powers left it susceptible to being captured by railroads.315 But they were unable to 
garner support for their perspective, and many Democrats accepted sympathetic 
arguments about corporate criminality to justify their absence from Reagan’s coalition.  
Representative Edward Seymour (D-CT) serves as a good case in point. Seymour 
declared that railroad executives “are no saints,” acknowledging Reagan’s critiques, but 
also admitted that they were “prudent men.” He concluded that they would respond to a 
commission’s interventions without prosecution.316 Days before passage, Senator John 
Morgan (D-AL) said the criminal provisions only served to “make a moral point on” an 
executive, “damage his reputation,” and “hurt his feelings.”317 Similarly, Senator Edward 
Walthall (D-MS) stated that, “I have no word of denunciation for the railroad managers 
of the country as a class.” He argued that railroad industry leaders “are just like other 
men.”318 Ignoring the actions of executives in favor of emphasizing their character gave 
Democrats a justification for supporting a policy that may not have had strong support 
among their base.   
Many of these legislators could have been using these ideas in an instrumental 
sense. While their political allegiances and regional associations indicated otherwise, they 
easily could have been in the pockets of large corporations. However, there is evidence 
that at least some of these legislators were foes of railroads. As Democrats grew more 
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powerful in the 1880s, the Senate—controlled by Democrats from 1879-1883—was 
occupied by opposing camps of Democrats, one more receptive to industrial development 
and another sympathetic to small-town economics. For instance, John Morgan of 
Alabama long exhibited agrarian sympathies that countered the politics of Alabama’s 
other Senator, the pro-business James Pugh. Nonetheless, Morgan supported the 
commission and dismissed the law’s criminal provisions as only designed to “make a 
moral point on” executives.  
Edward Walthall is also a good case in point. A Senator from Mississippi elected 
in 1885, Walthall lacked a long legislative record at the time the ICA was being debated, 
but he was a protégé to the popular Mississippi Senator L.Q.C. Lamar whose advocacy of 
states’ rights was only compromised by his support for federal economic regulation. The 
regional associations and political records of both men suggest that they aligned with the 
agrarian wing of the Democratic Party.319 That they held a favorable perception of 
railroad executives, despite their personal politics and constituents’ attitudes, indicates 
that the ideas put forward about corporate criminality had some meaningful power. 
Whether these ideas convinced them to vote against their politics or helped them mask 
pro-business sympathies, the idea of the natural capitalist as an inversion to the natural 
criminal had political value for them.  
 By arguing that personal pathologies did not drive rate-setting abuses, this pro-
regulatory coalition of railroads and legislators generated the second facet of the 
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“corporate criminal” construct—the attribution of corporate criminality to market forces. 
This argument had several effects. Some legislators conceded that the rate-setting abuses 
were moral wrongs, but also feared that punishing them would interfere with markets in 
counterproductive ways. Alternatively, others argued that because the actions at issue in 
the bill were byproducts of forces that provided social goods, actions that would have 
been labeled criminal in other contexts took on different substantive meanings. In either 
case, criminal sanction was deemed inappropriate because the behaviors were functions 
of markets rather than pathologies. 
Legislative hearings were replete with examples of this reasoning. Pennsylvania 
Civil Service Reform Chairman Wayne MacVeagh argued in 1882 that although rebates, 
drawbacks, and other rate-setting discriminations may cause injury to shippers, they were 
industry norms. He argued that, “no man believes that it is a crime or a wrong” for 
railroads to take these actions, stating that criminal punishment should be reserved “for 
some of the manifold forms of crime, in the ordinary acceptation of that term.”320 
MacVeagh’s use of the phrase “in the ordinary acceptation of that term” is particularly 
telling. It embodied common assumptions about what constituted crime, which economic 
crime did not fit. MacVeagh neglected to challenge this assumption, serving as a 
testament to the class-skewed character of the political construction of criminality.  
During his 1882 testimony, Albert Fink made similar claims. After defending the 
character of railroad executives, he concluded that their arguably criminal behaviors were 
“inherent in the system of railroad transportation itself.”321 Fink repeated this argument in 
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1884, calling it “a great injustice to hold the railroad companies responsible for those 
evils of the transportation business which are the result of the system adopted by the 
people in creating these railroads.”322 His rationale excused harmful or injurious actions 
by railroads as necessary costs of industrialization, and went on to attack the penal 
provisions defended by Reagan while making no reference to the behaviors targeted. His 
argument was rooted in the idea that it was wrong to punish people for actions that were 
not the result of personal “wickedness.” By locating the causes of corporate criminality in 
markets rather than pathologies, Fink defused defenses of the criminal provisions.    
Testimony before the Cullom Committee in 1885 was no different. John D. 
Kernan, chairman of the New York Railroad Commission, argued that penal sanctions 
were inappropriate for regulating railroad’s policies “because they relate to and are a part 
of and share in the vicissitudes and disturbances of business.”323 George Richardson, 
former president of the Northern Pacific Railroad, stated that, “Sometimes the nature of 
trade is such that a man feels excused for being dishonest. It would be very difficult to 
enforce the [criminal] law.”324 By explaining their behavior through reference to markets 
rather than traits, Richardson and Kernan made their behavior seem less “criminal.”   
 Comparable claims were advanced on the floor of Congress. Representative 
William Phelps (R-NJ) claimed that Reagan’s bill foolishly attempted to “interfere with 
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[the] general laws” of the economy.325 He did not defend what the railroads did but was 
concerned that market functionality would be impeded by criminal sanction. This was an 
argument in which ideas about criminality justified Phelps’ preferences for minimalist 
state intervention in the economy.  
 Senator Orville Platt (R-OH) made a particularly emphatic defense of railroad 
leadership using this logic in the days preceding the law’s passage. One of the primary 
leaders of the Republican Party in the Senate, Platt opposed the inclusion of any criminal 
provisions, even as additions to the commission’s administrative interventions. He stated 
that penal sanctions should be reserved for actions that were “inherently wrong” and “not 
a necessary result of the system.”326 Platt argued that if these actions were driven by 
market structures, they were not “inherently wrong” and deserving of sanction.  
 Several Democrats agreed. Rep. Edward Seymour (D-CT) argued that, 
“experience shows that there must sometimes from the necessity of the case be rebates 
and drawbacks” and that criminalizing rebates constitutes “an attempt to make that a 
criminal offense which in the very nature of things ought not to be so made.”327 Senator 
James Pugh (D-AL) called penal provisions “impracticable” because they were designed 
“without any regard to differences or changes in the conditions, relations, or surrounding 
of the twelve hundred railroads running all over thirty-eight States.”328 Rep. Gilbert 
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Woodward (D-WI) similarly argued that the crimes specified in the law were really 
“[errors] of judgment” that “should not be treated as a crime.”329  
Even Representative Martin Clardy (D-MO) agreed with this sentiment. Hailing 
from Missouri with a Populist base, Clardy was the second longest tenured member of 
the House Commerce Committee behind Reagan in the 1880s. But in 1885 Speaker John 
Carlisle went to great lengths to minimize Clardy’s role on the committee, appointing 
Charles Crisp to the second seat over Clardy. Crisp was a second-term representative that 
Democratic leaders felt was controllable, allowing party leadership to accommodate the 
interests of the Mugwumps that favored a commission. In 1885, Carlisle gave Crisp the 
seat instead of Clardy deliberately to minimize the voices of agrarian discontent so that a 
commission bill could be more easily passed.330  
Despite the party’s assumption about his agrarian sympathies, Clardy spoke out 
against provisions in the Reagan bill. He stated that he disagreed with Reagan’s 
assessment “as to the justness” and “equity of the principle” embodied by the penal 
sanctions. He felt that it wrongly punished executives for errors of judgment that, 
although harmful, were outcomes of decisions made in the course of business.331 It is 
telling that even Clardy, who party leaders feared would identify with agrarian radicals 
and oppose a commission, fought the penal sanctions on the grounds that the behaviors 
were not criminal but parts of business life.  
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 The first two pieces of this political construct of corporate criminality formed the 
core of the idea and laid the basis for the two other aspects of it. The notion that market 
structures were the cause of corporate crime led to the idea that punishing executives 
risked impairing economic functionality. In effect, it was a precursor to “too big to jail” 
politics. There was certainly hostility to government intervention in business before this 
point, but with the rise of large corporations, “too big to fail” and “too big to jail” became 
common philosophies of monitoring corporate activity.   
This point was made repeatedly before the House Commerce Committee in the 
1882 hearings. E.P. Alexander, an executive of multiple southeastern railways, criticized 
Reagan’s bill for treating railroad leaders as “robbers…of the most villainous kind” 
because this neglected to weigh the “compensating advantages” of their actions.332 The 
day after Alexander testified, Chicago lawyers Emory Storrs spoke on behalf of several 
western railways. He similarly suggested that criminal provisions would “impair, and, as 
a final result, destroy, inter-State commerce.”333 Weeks later, director of the New York 
and Erie Railway George Blanchard stated before the committee that, “we [railroad 
directors] are not robbers or malefactors.” He claimed that punishing executives would 
interfere with the “great public trusts and benefits” they provide.334 Later during those 
same hearings, Albert Fink suggested that the “evils of the transportation business have 
been magnified to you by interested classes” who have represented those evils “as a great 
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mountain, and its benefit as mole-hills.” He said that an accurate picture would depict the 
benefits as “a great mountain chain” while the evils would be a molehill.335  
Legislators of varying partisan allegiances employed this logic. As early as 1885, 
Senator James Pugh (D-AL), a staunch ally of railroads and big businesses generally, 
argued that the Reagan bill would “impede the whole transportation of business of this 
country.”336 In the days before the final vote, Senator Joseph Brown (D-GA) argued that 
that there “is no reason why Congress should seriously cripple all the great railroad 
interests of this country” due to the actions of “a few bad men.”337 Representative 
Jonathan Rowell (R-IL) similarly expressed these concerns, qualifying his support of the 
bill by criticizing the penal provisions and asserting that “There is another class of men 
who see only a set of robbers in transportation companies,” and that those who seek to 
punish them forget “that a bankrupt railroad company is like any other kind of 
bankruptcy, a bad thing for the community.”338 By focusing on the negative collateral 
consequences of a criminal prosecution, these arguments drew attention to the benefits of 
industrial growth in ways that obscured the harmful actions of railroads.  
Concerns about market functionality raised a concern that formed the final feature 
of the corporate criminal image. It was feared that because the public did not understand 
the complexities of business, they would abuse the criminal law through frivolous 
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prosecutions. Railroad executives were thus not potential criminals, but potential victims 
of a vindictive public.  
A legal representative of several Midwestern railways, attorney Darwin Hughes 
argued before the House Commerce Committee in 1882 that penal provisions would 
create “a hungry and mercenary swarm of informers and spies” hunting for violations.339 
Albert Fink similarly argued that executives would “be treated as criminals” due to the 
allegations of people “entirely ignorant of the facts and the principles” of business. This, 
Fink warned, would “ruin the railroad companies,” and “the commerce of the country.” 
He stated that “the railroads have been wronged, not the people,” because the public has 
condemned railroads as criminals out of “misapprehension and ignorance.”340 Future 
Texas & Pacific Railway President John C. Brown stated that the punitive elements of the 
bill were “calculated to make railways and their officers and agents the prey of a horde of 
harpies.”341 Two years later, Brown repeated that penal provisions would  “crowd the 
dockets with blackmailing informations” because they offer “a premium for men to 
become spies.”342 The assumption became that railroad executives, having not committed 
any crime, would be subjected to unwarranted prosecutions should the criminal 
provisions be included in the law.   
Lawmakers shared this fear, suggesting that the penal provisions were a poorly 
thought out response to populist uproar. Rep. Roswell Horr (R-MI) suggested that the 
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bill’s supporters have “mistaken…local clamor for genuine public sentiment.”343 Senator 
Orville Platt (R-CT) stated in the days preceding passage that the criminal provisions 
punish behaviors “entirely misunderstood in character, in purpose, [and] in results.”344 
Those like Horr and Platt concluded that the bill authorized criminal prosecutions only to 
satisfy an irrational and vindictive public. 
 This reasoning again crossed partisan and regional lines. Representative Edward 
Seymour (D-CT) stated that without a commission, the bill “tempted a new swarm of 
spies and informers.”345 Senator Johnson Camden (D-WV) declared that a “class of 
agitators” was advocating for criminal provisions.346 Senator John Morgan (D-AL) 
argued that the criminal sanctions expose corporations “to a set of men who have no 
other interest in the world in the matter than to levy blackmail and to profit.”347  
 The Commission received the most support from the more conservative Senate, 
although there was agrarian opposition to the commission from Democratic regions in 
both chambers. For example, Representative Andrew Caldwell (D-TN) called the 
commission “a Trojan horse and a deception to close the courts” against the rural 
shippers aggrieved most by railroads, while Charles O’Ferrall (D-VA) stated that a 
commission usurped the authority of Congress to enact the laws and the authority of 
courts to enforce them.348 Similarly, Iowa’s James Weaver (D) expressed dismay that 
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Reagan and the House conferees permitted the commission in conference committee and 
retreated from the unambiguous statutory prohibitions Reagan had long defended.349 
Scott James and Stephen Skowronek both attribute the agrarian House 
Democrats’ capitulation on the commission to the political maneuvering of party 
leadership and the necessity of maintaining their tenuous coalition. James has shown that 
the final votes on the ICA were heavily correlated with partisan allegiance and region. 
Particularly, Democrats from Mugwump districts or areas with a threat of electoral 
contestation were more supportive of the bill, while Democrats from agrarian strongholds 
were more consistently opposed.350 However, in the final House vote, Democrats split 
with 128 in favor and only 15 against, showing remarkable consensus within the party.351 
A bipartisan consensus in both chambers led to a bill that weakened the initial 
statutory prohibitions, gutted the original agrarian proposal, and granted discretionary 
judgment to a commission. How a coalition of railroads and pro-business lawmakers 
politicized crime to achieve their goals is an ignored feature of this debate. The 
discourses they drew from embedded ideologies into regulatory law that distinguished 
corporate crime from street crime. Federal lawmaking relied on a political construct of 
corporate criminality that inverted popular images of natural criminality, which helped to 
produce institutional arrangements that channeled corporate criminals away from the 
criminal justice system and into regulatory venues.   
There are many practical reasons that might explain why legislators from 
Democratic or Populist strongholds with records of support for agrarian demands rejected 
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criminal penalties. For example, many Republican Senators argued that small shippers 
could not defeat large railroads in criminal court and claimed that the commission would 
provide a more effective avenue for relief.352  This argument could easily have been 
appreciated by agrarian Democrats. Nonetheless, the idea that corporate criminals were 
substantively different from “street” criminals had visible political significance during 
these debates. Whether they rejected or accepted the idea, lawmakers who opposed big 
business had to grapple with questions as to whether railroad executives fit popular 
assumptions of what a criminal looked like. The fact that the law submerged criminal 
sanctions underneath regulatory interventions indicates which political understanding of 
corporate criminality, the natural capitalist who could be regulated or ruthless robber 
baron who deserved punishment, prevailed in the debate.  
The complexities of this debate illustrate was is missing by characterizing it as a 
confrontation between Populists and big business. It is true that some business leaders, 
like Rockefeller and Carnegie, drew on the rhetoric of the natural capitalist to justify their 
dogmatic adherence to laissez-faire. But while the ICA may not have been their favored 
outcome, other business leaders articulated a regulatory ideology that helped create a 
commission that served the interests of railroads while limiting the railroads’ 
susceptibility to prosecution. Unlike their strict laissez-faire counterparts, these business 
leaders drew on prevailing understandings of criminality in effective ways to achieve a 
favorable political outcome. While Populists often harshly condemned corporate power, 
many also accepted the era’s Social Darwinist discourses and were thus able to 
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rationalize their anti-robber baron rhetoric with the idea that the robber barons were also 
not fully “criminal.” By speaking to the prevailing ideational currents of the period, 
railroads and their friends in Congress built a sizable enough coalition to lay the 
foundation of a regulatory state that reflected and reinforced the idea that law-breaking 
business leaders should be not be equated with common criminals.    
IV. Crime Politics and the Aftermath of the Interstate Commerce Act 
The politicization of crime in the ICA was entrenched within larger debates about 
economics, state power, and regulation. But in ensuing years, questions about corporate 
crime increasingly became subjects of debate in their own right. This section examines 
three political developments in the 1890s that grew out of the ICA debate and laid 
foundations for changes that will be explored in other chapters. Those developments 
include the passage of the Sherman Antitrust Act, amendments to the ICA, and shifts in 
discourse concerning corporate criminal liability.  
The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 
In 1890, Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act, the statutory cornerstone of 
American antitrust law. The act specified three means of punishing corporate efforts to 
restrain trade or create artificial monopolies. Violations could be punished through 
prosecutions resulting in a $5,000 fine and one-year prison sentence, injunctions, or civil 
suits rewarding triple damages to injured parties. The use of equity and civil proceedings 
to suppress criminal violations mirrored the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act, a 
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fact overlooked by Edwin Sutherland in White-Collar Crime when he argued that the use 
of injunctions and civil remedies to enforce the criminal law originated in Sherman.353 
Notably, the Sherman Act did not create a commission. Discretion over how to 
punish wrongdoing was granted to the Department of Justice. Whereas legislators were 
commonly concerned that the DOJ lacked the institutional capacity to enforce the 
Interstate Commerce Act, lawmakers seemed less concerned with this in passing the 
Antitrust Act. This offers some validation to historical analyses arguing that legislators 
viewed the law as largely symbolic, but the lack of a commission became essential 
decades later in early twentieth century debates over antitrust law.  
 The act, which passed almost unanimously, has been explained as the product of 
consumer interests, producer interests, or as a disingenuous attempt at regulating trusts to 
satisfy the public.354 The legislative record offers significant evidence in support of Mark 
Graber’s argument that Congress intentionally wrote the law vaguely and left the details 
to the Supreme Court in order to avoid politically charged questions.355 Nonetheless, 
legislators’ widespread agreement over the bill is puzzling. Having just gained unified 
control of Congress and the White House, it is surprising that Republicans pursued 
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antitrust policy before tariff policy given the tariff’s centrality to the 1888 election.356 
Historians have also noted that Senators with connections to big business including Rufus 
Blodgett, Henry Payne, Orville Platt, Leland Stanford, William McKinley, and Thomas 
Reed were inactive during debate.357 Sherman introduced the bill in December 1889, and 
it was signed after little debate the following July.358  
An outspoken protectionist, John Sherman (R-OH) denied Democrats’ allegations 
that the industrial tariff fostered trusts.359 He condemned Democrats’ calls for tariff 
reform as a means of checking trust formation as “quack medicine.”360 However, upon 
passage of the McKinley Tariff in September of 1890, Sherman stated industries “must 
not degenerate into monopoly, intro trusts or combinations” after the law’s passage. He 
claimed that if manufacturers formed trusts after the tariff’s passage that he would, “be as 
ready to repeal this law as I am now ready to vote for it.”361 That he threatened to repeal 
the tariff instead of using antitrust law to break up trusts not only reveals that Sherman 
was aware of the relationship between trusts and tariffs, but also that he had little faith in 
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the antitrust law he sponsored. In this context, the antitrust law appears to have served as 
political cover to pass the more controversial McKinley Tariff. 
 What little debate there was over the bill involved some discussions over 
criminalizing trusts and concerns about corporate criminal liability. Sherman’s original 
bill included provisions making violations of the law punishable by a fine of $5,000 and 
prison sentence of five years. Senator James George (D-MS) voiced the only significant 
concern, arguing that the difficulties in proving that a trust acted with the intent to 
prevent competition brought with it difficulties that would render the law ineffective.362 
A revised version in March removed criminal provisions entirely, which Sherman 
attributed to George’s complaints. He concluded that determinations of how exactly trust 
formation should be punished “shall be defined by the courts.”363 When Democrats 
opposed the removal of criminal provisions, including now Senator John Reagan (D-TX), 
Richard Coke (D-TX), and the moderate James Pugh (D-AL),364 Sherman claimed that it 
was “best to omit the criminal clause and to leave that for future consideration.”365  
The bill was transferred to the Judiciary Committee in March, away from 
Sherman. It was amended once more to include penal provisions instituting a maximum 
fine of $5,000 and prison sentence of one year for violations.366 But on the floor, 
Republicans fought to include injunctions in the law as well. Senator George Vest (D-
MO) railed against the regulatory ideology defended by Republicans, contending that the 
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inclusion of fines and injunctions sent the message to trust executives that “You are a lot 
of criminals, thieves, and robbers, but if you will give us a thousand dollars we will let 
you go on robbing.”367 Equity proceedings were incorporated as an alternative to the 
criminal law, giving Republicans the ability to proclaim that they incorporated a “grave 
penalty” while making the law almost wholly nominal in effect.368  
 Five years after its passage, the Supreme Court constrained the scope of the law in 
the decision US v. EC Knight Co. (1895). The EC Knight Company controlled 98% of the 
sugar refining business, prompting lower courts to issue an injunction. When the case 
reached the Supreme Court, it concluded that EC Knight only possessed a monopoly over 
manufacturing, which was confined to one state and thus not vulnerable to congressional 
control via the interstate commerce clause. The Court concluded that the trust did not 
engage in restraint of trade and that its monopoly only “incidentally and indirectly” 
impacted interstate commerce.369 As Arnold Paul has written, EC Knight cleared “the 
way for a tremendous concentration of capital, unrestrained by fear of effective 
prosecution; by the time court views were modified in the next decade, ‘bigness’ had 
become entrenched in the economy.”370 To evade antitrust actions, businesses integrated 
into consolidated holding companies insulated from prosecution.371  
The Sherman Act quickly became a useful tool in the federal government’s fights 
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against labor.372 One of the first cases of the Sherman Act’s application occurred in 1892 
during the general transportation strike in New Orleans. Upholding an injunction against 
the strikers, District Judge Billings stated that in writing the Sherman bill, it sought to 
“include combinations of labor, as well as of capital” in targeting “combinations in 
restraint of commerce.”373 Billings’ conclusions do reflect some of the tensions in the 
debates over the bill. As early as February of 1889, James George expressed concern that 
the Sherman law would target organized labor.374 Sherman stated that unions “are not 
affected in the slightest degree, nor can they be included in the words or intent of the bill 
as now reported.”375 He added an amendment exempting labor that disappeared before 
passage, giving judges a weapon in the state’s efforts to repress labor organizing.  
Railroad Managers, the ICC, and Amending the Law  
 The Interstate Commerce Act did not remain in its initial state for long. Congress 
amended the law on several occasions through the 1890s, and the ICC repeatedly pleaded 
for legislative reforms to improve the law’s efficacy. But many of these changes were 
often made at the behest of railroads and further insulated them from punishment.   
The law was first amended in 1889. While the initial ICA only instituted fines as 
punishment for criminal violations, legislators quickly revived debates about whether 
imprisonment was necessary. Shelby Cullom argued that, “the law will be more strictly 
obeyed and more thoroughly enforced if those guilty of violating it are…made subject to 
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imprisonment,” contradicting his earlier arguments opposing Reagan’s proposals. Cullom 
proposed amendments that passed in 1889 granting courts the authority to mete out fines, 
prison sentences, or both if the ICC referred evidence to the DOJ.376  
While Cullom’s amendments seemed to counter the railroads’ preferences, 
Thomas Bayne’s (R-PA) comments suggest otherwise. His statements on the floor of 
Congress indicate that the passage of these facially strict prohibitions may have been 
disingenuous. Bayne called the amendment “a scheme in the interest of the railroad 
corporations,” noting that railroads favored clear prohibitions on rebating since large 
shippers like Standard Oil frequently extorted rebates from carriers. But Bayne pointed 
out that the criminal provisions would more likely hurt small shippers who erroneously 
underreported the weights of their shipments, not bigger corporations like Standard Oil. 
Given that the purpose of the ICA itself was to protect shippers, Bayne pleaded with 
Congress to hear from both sides before accepting an amendment recommended by the 
carriers it was designed to regulate.377  
On the day of the bill’s passage, Albert Anderson (R-IA) seconded Bayne’s 
concerns. He argued that the proposal was pushed by railroads to divert sanction away 
from executives. He was dismayed that the amendment “makes the shipper particeps 
criminis [an accomplice] with the common carrier” and was critical that “the Interstate 
Commerce Commission was pushing this amendment, unasked and uninvited, on the 
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floor.” He pointed out that the amendment not only directed the law’s attention onto 
small shippers, but onto lower-level employees of railroads, a trend that reflected the 
insistence of railroad presidents that “their clerks and subordinates are the law-breakers, 
and that they [directors and presidents] are honest men and not responsible.”378  
The statements from Baynes and Anderson were futile as Congress approved the 
amendments almost unanimously. There is evidence that railroads were the ones pushing 
for these criminal provisions. Railroads had long been hostile to large shippers, most 
famously Standard Oil, which could strong-arm them into offering rebates.379 Reports 
from the ICC indicate that these amendments were designed to target shippers more than 
carriers. In its first annual report, the commission stated that shippers’ billing practices 
should be the object of punishment. They cited the Chicago Board of Trade’s demands 
for amendments “which should make the fraudulent shipper criminally responsible for his 
conduct.” The ICC agreed and suggested that, “The possibilities for fraud which may be 
contrived between unscrupulous shippers and weak or unreliable employees are 
enormous.” Particularly interesting are the ICC’s comments that the agents who process 
merchandise are often “not upon the highest plane of honorable conduct,” suggesting that 
the dispositions of lower-level agents tend towards criminality more than those of 
executives. The ICC proposed amendments penalizing shippers for false billing, 
classification, or weighing.380  
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The railroads’ demands for harsher criminal provisions served two purposes. 
First, it deflected blame from executives onto lower-level employees who, as the ICC 
argued, operate on a lower plane of conduct. As Albert Anderson stated, the reasoning for 
the amendments “is in keeping with the charge of the railroad presidents and their clerks 
that their subordinates are the law-breakers, and that they are honest men and not 
responsible.”381 Second, the law redirected criminal sanction onto shippers rather than 
carriers, which put smaller shippers—who were the main constituency the bill was 
supposed to protect—in the sights of the criminal law. Through character defenses of 
their executives and directors, railroads were able to deflect blame lower down the 
corporate hierarchy and onto other corporate actors.  
The Political Foundations for Corporate Criminal Liability  
An ongoing debate during the ICA’s passage was whether or not corporate 
entities should be the subject of punishment instead of individuals. For years prior to the 
Interstate Commerce law’s passage, state and federal courts began holding corporations 
criminally responsible for their agents’ actions.382 The Supreme Court would validate this 
practice in 1909, but in the late nineteenth century statutory law remained unclear on the 
question. In debates over the ICA, members of Congress were largely resistant to the idea 
that corporations could be criminally punished and thought it was impossible to attribute 
criminal intent to a faceless organization. But the foundation for the twentieth century 
debates over corporate liability actually had its origins in deliberations over the ICA. 
Shifts towards corporate liability were part of the development of corporate 
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personhood in the common law, as the Supreme Court ruled in the 1886 case Santa Clara 
County v. Southern Pacific Railroad that the 14th amendment’s equal protection clause 
applied to corporations.383 In conjunction with personhood doctrine, the emergent notion 
of corporate “souls” further anthropomorphized the corporation. In order to restore faith 
in the moral integrity of their businesses, directors of railroads and other corporations 
instituted public relations campaigns in the 1870s and 1880s. By highlighting their 
community involvement, provision of benefits, and attention to social justice, 
corporations aimed to counteract public anxieties about corporate wrongdoing through 
metaphors of the “corporate soul.”384 Railroads and other big businesses used this 
imagery to create a legal and social construct of the “corporate body” that had a degree of 
moral legitimacy.  
Despite emergent notions of corporate soulhood and personhood, congressional 
lawmakers and railroad industry leaders were largely opposed to the prospect of 
punishing corporations rather than individuals in the 1880s. Reagan particularly 
disapproved of the idea, repeatedly referring to the adage that “corporations have no 
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bodies to be kicked and no souls to be damned.”385 Former Tennessee Governor and 
future president of the Texas and Pacific Railroad John C. Brown, a foe of Reagan’s 
initial ICA proposal, agreed with him on this issue. He argued before the House 
Commerce Committee in 1882 that, “a corporation…is not an individual” and “cannot be 
vindictive,” claims that he reiterated two years later.386 This rationality suggested that 
guilt is personal, and that to commit a crime one has to have exhibited criminal intent.  
It should be noted that corporate personhood doctrine was used in diverse ways. 
Some legislators cited the idea of corporate personhood to criticize Reagan’s bill. For 
example, Representative Thomas Browne (R-IN) stated that Reagan’s proposal was 
excessively punitive and that, “We ought to treat corporations as we treat others who 
have rights under the law.”387 This logic posited that corporations should be the targets of 
the criminal law in order to afford them the rights granted to anyone accused of a crime. 
The idea of punishing corporations was rarely discussed on the floor of Congress, 
as the general assumption guiding legislative debate was that the law would target 
individuals. But courts continued to issue decisions treating corporations as criminally 
punishable entities through the 1890s.388 Congress’s decision to punish individuals rather 
than corporations set the stage for a political conflict over the question of corporate 
versus individual liability. Political demands for corporate criminal liability came most 
conspicuously from the ICC. Interestingly, the ICC cited the testimony of railroad agents 
as their reasoning for supporting corporate liability. 
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The ICC’s reports in the 1890s indicate that railroad managers consistently 
influenced the Commission’s policy positions. The ICC regularly cited testimony from 
railroad managers as favoring corporate liability because they were unwilling to provide 
incriminating testimony against colleagues. Directing liability against the corporation 
rather than individuals protected middle-tier managers in ways that would make railroad 
employees more willing to turn over incriminating information. The ICC’s reports also 
claimed that district attorneys lacked the institutional capacity to convict individual 
offenders and supported corporate liability as a practical alternative. It is unclear why the 
ICC thought prosecutors could charge large corporations if they lacked the capacity to 
convict individuals. The ICC’s support for entity liability was rooted in the political 
demands of railroad managers seeking to insulate themselves from the criminal law. 
A strong case in point of the railroads’ influence on the ICC appears in the ICC’s 
1890 report. The Commission noted that carriers were resistant to retaliate against 
competitors through prosecution. Because “few carriers feel themselves entirely secure in 
the matter of the observance of the law,” they tried to avoid invoking penal provisions. 
The prevalence of legally questionable behavior as an industry norm impeded the 
criminal law’s enforcement. The report concluded that without cooperation from carriers 
or the injured parties, the ICC was powerless to enforce the law. The ICC concluded by 
considering without definitively supporting the notion of corporate criminal liability.389  
In 1891, the ICC went further by condemning the criminal provisions of the Act 
as “defective” for only applying to individuals and not corporations. The fact that 
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criminal proceedings were instituted against individuals who did not directly benefit from 
the violation created “a sentiment in the minds of the public” that “militates against 
conviction.” The report noted that the ICC’s primary means of enforcement—that its 
findings were to be treated as prima facie evidence in courts—had been gutted by court 
rulings reviewing ICC findings de novo, essentially affording no deference to the 
commission’s findings.390 This left the ICC even more desperate to find a workable 
means of enforcement. 
By 1894, it became clear that railroad managers were pushing for corporate 
criminal liability. The ICC’s report stated the following: 
…we may properly allude to certain modifications of the penal provisions of the act, 
which are advocated by many railroad managers. It is proposed by them to exempt 
the officers and employees of carrying corporations from criminal liability for rate 
cutting and similar offenses, and to impose such liability solely upon the corporations 
themselves. In brief, the argument is that the extreme severity of the present law 
operates to prevent its enforcement; that railway managers will not give information 
against their rivals when the consequence might be the imprisonment of individuals 
with whom their personal relations are friendly and familiar, but that such disclosures 
would be freely made if they resulted only in the imposition of a fine upon the 
offending corporation.391 
 
Railroad managers openly informed the Commission that they would not provide 
incriminating information against individuals with whom they “are friendly and 
familiar,” but would gladly do so if it meant the imposition of a fine against a 
corporation. The Commission claimed that the wrongs committed involved “a high 
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degree of moral turpitude” warranting imprisonment, but that they were not ready to 
attach liability to corporations in lieu of individuals without further consideration.392  
 The 1895 annual report explored this point further. The ICC stated that it was at 
“the special insistence of railroad managers…that the imprisonment features of the 
present law be repealed” and that all penal sanctions be limited to fines. The managers 
argued that the imprisonment clause acted as a “shield to the guilty.” Given the “resultant 
disgrace” following a conviction, managers claimed that persons with knowledge of 
incriminating facts refused to share them with prosecutors, aware “of the possible 
consequences to the wrongdoer.” Yet the report still stated that the ICC was not yet ready 
to take a stand on the question.393  
Testimony from Aldace Walker before the ICC was cited directly in the 1898 
report. As the former president of the Santa Fe Railroad and current receiver of the 
Atlanta and Pacific Railroad, Walker’s testimony demonstrated how high-ranking 
railroad directors and executives perceived the criminal provisions. 
Mr. Walker: …It is very difficult to get the absolute facts which are considered as 
necessary by the courts to punish railroads that are suspected…It results to a 
considerable extent from the reluctance of the railways to help. 
The Chairman: To have the penalties attached to the misdemeanors enforced 
against their rivals? 
Mr. Walker: Against their associates. That puts them in the position of being 
informers, and, as has been said, in this country an informer is worse than the 
criminal in the eyes of the public.394  
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Walker’s testimony indicated that he and other railroad men disobeyed the law because 
of a widespread lack of cooperation among railroads. Industry norms of legal violations 
of the act did not result in prosecution, but instead fostered reciprocal relationships 
between competitors—everyone violated the law, so no one reported it.   
 By the end of the nineteenth century, the ICC completed a reversal in its policy 
position. In 1899, its annual report argued that the law targeted “Men who in every other 
respect are reputable citizens” for “acts which, if the statute law of the land were 
enforced, would subject them to fine or imprisonment.” The commission argued that, “It 
is difficult to estimate the moral effect of such a condition of things upon a great section 
of the community.” It concluded that, “we are convinced that criminal remedies as 
applied to the present situation are utterly inadequate to prevent departures from 
published rates.” In lieu of individual liability, the ICC endorsed corporate criminal 
liability.395  
The ICC’s reorientation towards corporate criminal liability was largely 
facilitated by managers’ demands, but it is remarkable that this is not how the ICC 
justified its policy recommendations in 1899. Instead, it referred to the agents and 
officers punished as “reputable citizens” whose punishment would have a negative 
“moral effect” on the community. That judgments about the dispositions of corporate 
executives emerged in this context even though the debate seemed removed from these 
ideas highlights the broad political purchase of the “corporate criminal” construct present 
in the ICA debates. It is true that the shift towards corporate liability appears to have been 
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rooted in debates about efficacy, but that these ideas resurfaced as the ICC made a 
significant shift in their policy position after a decade of equivocation indicates that these 
ideas were still powerful forces in political discourse. This ideational construct of the 
corporate criminal remained a prevailing idea that policymakers had to address when 
justifying their policy positions. 
By 1902, the ICC’s annual report made strong demands that without amendments 
to criminalize corporate entities, the law’s criminal sections “are practically a dead 
letter.”396 This trajectory towards corporate criminal liability is surprising given the 
attitudes of the ICC Commissioners in the early 1890s. Commissioners’ correspondence 
with lawmakers and attorneys repeatedly expressed concerns that district attorneys lacked 
the resources to carry out litigation under the ICA. Calling them “unequal to the 
work…[and] duties” required of them in the law, commissioners stated that prosecutors’ 
failures to secure convictions made the ICC appear weak. Commissioners frequently 
requested that DAs receive extra resources to perform the functions required of them.397  
In this context, it is hard to understand why the commission shifted towards 
supporting corporate criminal liability. If prosecutors lacked the capacity to charge 
individuals, requiring them to punish large corporate entities without additional resources 
made little sense. There were arguments that the ICC could have made, such as that 
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detecting individual liability within a large corporation was difficult or that corporations 
benefitted more directly from criminal acts than individuals, but these arguments were 
not advanced. Instead, the ICC abandoned their concerns about prosecutorial capacity 
over the course of the decade. This suggests that railroad managers were essential to 
framing and defining what ideas and concerns mattered to this debate. 
The shift towards corporate criminal liability was politically constituted by the 
demands of railroad managers as channeled through the ICC. This complements 
Chandler’s conclusions regarding the “managerial revolution” in American business in 
the late nineteenth century, demonstrating that railroad mangers were key political 
players shaping policy.398 But it highlights how these managers shaped political debate 
by defining the nature and scope of the conflict and delimiting the range of possible 
solutions policymakers considered.399 Chapter 5 unpacks regulatory developments during 
the early twentieth century, further exploring these political origins to corporate criminal 
liability and the doctrine’s development during the Progressive era.  
V. Conclusion 
 Gilded Age constructions of corporate criminality sharply countered prevailing 
constructions of criminality. The thief, the murderer, and the vagrant were born criminal 
and could be preemptively identified on sight based on their class, skin color, or accent. 
In contrast, the ruthless robber baron was born to be a capitalist. His actions may have 
looked similar to theft, but he was a survivor of capitalism rather than a criminal. These 
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divergent constructions of criminality reflected a shared set of assumptions of who and 
what counted as “criminal.”  
 The inequalities of American crime policy have long been rooted in social, 
economic, and material inequalities, but scholars have failed to appreciate how these 
inequalities have been embedded into political constructions of criminality. Of course, 
corporations can avoid prosecution by buying strong legal defense teams, capturing 
agencies, or initiating capital strikes, but the story presented in this chapter reveals other 
dynamics that shape business-government relations. Businesses cannot simply achieve 
their goals by bullying political actors into conceding to their demands. They must be 
strategic, remain attentive to prevailing discourses, and frame their demands within them 
so as to communicate their policy goals in ways that resonate with policymakers and the 
public. While the creation of the ICC was a loss for business leaders who exhibited a 
dogmatic adherence to absolute laissez-faire, it was a victory for those who advocated 
regulatory ideology and deployed prevailing discourses about crime and social 
Darwinism to design the ICC to their liking. This group of business leaders knew that 
supporters of laissez-faire countered anti-robber baron rhetoric with Social Darwinist 
discourse, understood that criminality was popularly conceived in bio-deterministic 
terms, and realized how these ideas could be synthesized into a regulatory ideology that 
could insulate them from criminal sanction. This illustrates how dominant ideas, 
ideologies, and discourses of a moment can powerfully shape how business interests 
behave politically and articulate their policy goals.  
 The Interstate Commerce Commission’s creation is often understood as the laying 
the foundation for the modern regulatory state. But agencies like the ICC are explicitly 
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designed to monitor behavior defined as criminal, and research on the political 
development of the regulatory state often ignores its relation to crime politics. This 
chapter illustrates why regulatory politics should be understood as a brand, or at least a 
relative, of crime politics. The regulatory politics of the nineteenth century were shaped 
by the same collection of ideas and ideologies that informed the politics of street crime 
during this period, but Darwinist theory and bio-determinism were used to conceptualize 
corporate criminality favorably. The strategic use of these ideas entailed articulating a 
unique construct of corporate criminality that diverged from prevailing constructions of 
street criminality, which then became embedded into the regulatory state’s design.  
 Studying street crime politics in juxtaposition to regulatory politics can shed light 
on how prevailing discourses and modes of thought in American politics have been used 
to rationalize inequalities in crime policy. Divergent Gilded Age political constructions of 
street and corporate criminality reflected and reinforced common ideas about who and 
what counted as crime and became embedded into state institutional frameworks. In the 
early decades of the twentieth century, similar developments would unfold out of 
common ideational and ideological currents relating to eugenics and state administration.  
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CHAPTER 4: EUGENICS, CRIME SCIENCE, AND PROGRESSIVES 
 
“I wish very much that the wrong people could be prevented entirely from breeding; and 
when the evil nature of these people is sufficiently flagrant, this should be done. 
Criminals should be sterilized and feeble-minded persons forbidden to leave offspring 
behind them.” 
- President Theodore Roosevelt, 1913400 
 
 As America adapted to rapid industrialization and urbanization, the nation 
continued to experience unprecedented levels of immigration, inequality, labor 
mobilization, and industrial consolidation. But the Progressives of the early twentieth 
century widely rejected the “survival of the fittest” ethos of Social Darwinism that 
dominated late nineteenth century politics. Whereas Gilded Age political actors viewed 
Social Darwinism as a rationalization for the inequalities of capitalism, Progressives 
believed the government could be a powerful tool that could eradicate social ills. 
Progressives insisted that an active government promoting an agenda of social welfare 
could solve social problems related to class warfare, racism, inequality, and criminality. 
They fought for a stronger state that they believed could humanize industrial capitalism.  
 However, Progressives did not believe the system could or should be humanized 
for everyone. Progressives routinely coupled welfarist impulses with a politics of 
exclusion built on scientific racism and eugenics. Instead of allowing natural selection to 
run its course, Progressives pursued an agenda of artificial selection in which the state 
proactively identified the “unworthy,” including mental defectives, minorities, and 
undesirables, and sorted them out of the “worthy” population before they damaged 
society or infected the nation’s racial stock. This governing philosophy produced rigid 
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immigration restrictions, repressive monitoring of poverty, labor, and racial minorities, 
and state sanctioned compulsory sterilization laws.  
The two prongs of the rehabilitative ideal had a natural appeal to Progressives 
articulating an agenda of inclusion for the worthy and exclusion for the unworthy. They 
adapted the works of Lombroso, Brockway, and rehabilitative scholars by attaching them 
to a new set of policy commitments and a new understanding of the state’s role. The state 
should not sit idly by and wait for natural criminals to reveal themselves, but rather 
engage in a process of artificial selection by proactively identifying, detaining, and 
sterilizing them before they committed serious crimes or spread their racial stock. 
Progressives’ social welfarist and exclusionary politics were thus both rationalized in the 
name of progress and necessitated an expansion of the government’s crime control 
powers.  
 In this context, the class-skewed character of the rehabilitative ideal took on a 
new significance. The criminal repression and sterilization of the poor, minorities, mental 
defectives, and criminals became a project of class sorting in the Progressive Era. The 
rehabilitative model directed lawmakers and penologists to look to individuals’ 
behavioral histories, personal and racial traits, and socioeconomic background as 
evidence of their propensity to commit crime. This justified the Progressives’ political 
choices to mete out harsh justice for the poor and disadvantaged while the crimes of elites 
continued to take on alternative meanings. 
 The chapter begins by unpacking the meaning of “progressive” during the 
Progressive Era, outlining core ideological and ideational consistencies across varying 
strands of progressivism in the early twentieth century. This is followed by an analysis of 
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the constructions of criminality produced within this context. Hereditarian theory is 
particularly emphasized, as it was widely embraced by race scientists, economists, and 
eugenicists in the early twentieth century. This section stresses the evolution of the social 
sciences at the turn of the century, showing that while criminal anthropologists and 
sociologists dominated the social science of crime in the nineteenth century, eugenicists 
and economists became critical intellectual forces in the twentieth century. The 
subsequent section explores the legacies of Gilded Age crime politics, illustrating how 
Progressives rationalized forms of class control, racial control, and criminal sanction 
created in the nineteenth century through eugenics-based politics. This is followed by an 
account of how eugenics scholars, reformers, and political activists deployed eugenic 
ideas about crime to secure policy reform through compulsory sterilization statutes. The 
chapter concludes with a brief examination of the influence of progressive constructs of 
criminality on 1920s politics, examining the rise of the crime commission and the 
influence of eugenic criminology.  
I. The Ideational and Ideological Currents of the Progressive Era 
 The label “progressivism” has had multiple meanings over the course of 
American political history. During the Progressive Era, it is important to realize that the 
phrase was not attached to a particular political ideology or set of policy commitments. 
Rather, “progressivism” referred to a specific set of philosophical and governing 
principles about the role the state should play in modern society. Progressives adopted 
such diverse ideological perspectives that in 1912 the three major presidential candidates, 
all from different parties, identified as Progressives.  
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Progressives of varying party allegiances shared a few basic precepts. They 
critiqued the constitution, its emphasis on individual rights, and the role of parties, 
corruption, and bossism in American politics. They favored a state that was administered 
by experts and professionals, advised by knowledge-based communities, and anchored 
governance in science. Discourses of determinism, heredity, and eugenics flourished in 
this setting.401  
 Three ideational and ideological features of Progressive political thought created a 
fertile ideological terrain for these developments. First, Progressives believed that the 
modern state should be guided by science rather than politics. It was thought that 
disinterested, nonpartisan, objective experts would run the state more efficiently than 
politically motivated individuals selected by party bosses. Despite their diverse factions, 
Progressives relied on expertise by drawing from a historically specific set of scientific 
and intellectual discourses that shaped the politics of the early twentieth century.402   
 Central to this discursive universe were the sciences of heredity, including 
Darwinism, scientific racism, and eugenics. These frameworks presented social, moral, 
and economic failure as outcomes of biological inferiority among society’s weakest and 
most defective. But it was the eugenics movement that pushed the conclusions of race 
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science and evolutionary theory to new extremes. Whereas bio-determinist logic during 
the Gilded Age rationalized a “survival of the fittest” approach to economics and social 
policy, eugenics called for a greater expansion of state power. Eugenicists believed it was 
the state’s duty to identify and sort out the unfit as part of an effort to regulate breeding 
and promote racial progress. This replaced the “natural selection” logic of Gilded Age 
politics with a project of artificial selection led by expert administrators who proactively 
identified the unfit to prevent them from propagating.  
This allowed Progressives of varying ideologies to defend invasive and repressive 
legal regimes. Jim Crow laws, restrictive immigration statutes, compulsory sterilizations, 
and repressive policies for the poor, women, and “unfit” became essential to the state’s 
program of improving the nation’s racial stock. Progressives consequently defended 
social uplift for some members of society and repression for others because they relied on 
discourses that lent scientific credence to established hierarchies of race, class, and 
gender, believing that eugenics would enable the state to improve the polity by uplifting 
the worthy and repressing the unworthy.403 So despite similarities with Gilded Age 
political thought, the eugenics movement changed the state’s relationship to the citizen 
by promoting new interventions to monitor social behavior.   
 The Progressives’ embrace of eugenics is related to a second theme of the era’s 
politics—an emphasis on the primacy of the collective over the individual. As Daniel 
Rodgers has argued, Progressives embraced the “rhetoric of the moral whole” while 
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rejecting the individualist ethos of American political culture.404 Progressives articulated 
anthropomorphic depictions of American society as a living organism that needed to be 
cared for.405 But to protect society as social organism required exclusionary politics; 
undesirable groups were viewed as uninvited parasites and social diseases that threatened 
collective national health and survival. This drove the move from natural selection to 
state-administered artificial selection; instead of allowing nature to run its course through 
minimal intervention into economic and social policy, restrictive immigration regimes 
and invasive eugenic policies were means of protecting the social organism of the polity 
from invasive and parasitic undesirables.406  
The Progressives’ embrace of eugenics was premised on exterminating, or at least 
controlling, the unfit to improve the social body. This required the “fittest” to be 
determined prior to the selection process. As a result, eugenicists constructed elaborate 
taxonomic hierarchies of naturally occurring human types to guide the state’s selection of 
the fit and unfit. By asserting the primacy of the collective over the individual, 
Progressives ironically justified great social control over the individual in the name of 
collective health. Their articulation of social unity thus relied on a mix of eugenics and 
race science to justify exclusionary politics and state expansion in service of a greater 
good. Worked into these taxonomic structures were constructs of criminality. 
 This emphasis on science and expertise during the Progressive Era was not simply 
nominal. A third important current of progressive politics was that scientific experts 
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believed it was their duty to be public figures.  Men like Charles Henderson, Frederick 
Winslow Taylor, and Richard Ely threw themselves into academia and public policy 
debates. They worked with professional organizations, held federal appointments, worked 
on state policy boards, and were active members of prominent academic associations. 
Progressives believed that experts should not only identify the public good and instruct 
the public as to what it was—they should help the state pursue it through public service. 
This ensured that eugenics and race science travelled from intellectual circles into policy 
ones.407 
 It was in this political milieu that state-sponsored eugenic selection came to be the 
state’s logic of social control. According to Progressives, it was the state’s duty to 
identify and target biologically inclined criminals, among other defectives, for 
segregation out of the population. This is not to say there was no contestation over 
understandings of criminality in the Progressive Era. Lombrosian theory still persisted 
alongside psychological and eugenic theories. Cultural theorists and critical race scholars 
attacked notions of natural criminality, and their work forged new directions for 
sociological and criminological research. But hereditarian theory and eugenics were 
among the most widely accepted strands of expertise among Progressives studying race, 
economics, sociology, and crime. These discourses fueled repressive crime policy in 
ways that promoted a state-sponsored program of class control.   
II. Constructs of Criminality in the Progressive Era  
The Persistence of Lombrosian Orthodoxy and Its Challengers 
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Late nineteenth century constructs of bio-criminality persisted into early twentieth 
century scholarship. Books by William Duncan McKim, G. Frank Lydston, Philip 
Parsons, and August Drahms transported Lombrosian ideologies about crime into 
twentieth century debates.408 But these scholars were more skeptical of Lombroso than 
their late nineteenth century predecessors while still accepting his basic claims. McKim, 
for example, posited that the criminal type was not simply recognizable by an analysis of 
anatomical differences, even though he agreed that, “the tendency to crime is essentially 
inborn.”409 G. Frank Lydston (1906) similarly concluded that “undue importance” was 
assigned to Lombrosian theory, but still included a chapter in his book on criminal crania. 
He suggested that Lombrosian physiological defects were indicative of “mental or moral 
defects” likely associated with criminal behavior.410 
These scholars’ works only differed from the standard Lombrosian narrative in 
trivial ways. The rationale of McKim and Lydston added an intermediate step to 
Lombrosian theory—physiological defects were signs of inherent moral defects that 
manifested as crime—but left intact a causal arrow from biology to crime. They still 
paired bio-determinism with rehabilitative philosophy, as McKim, Lydston, Parsons, and 
Drahms supported the indeterminate sentence both as a reformative measure and a 
punitive one.411 Their proposed treatments for incorrigibles entailed eugenic solutions of 
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extraordinary severity, including indefinite containment, sterilization, or extermination.412 
Their works maintained the marriage of an ostensibly progressive rehabilitative discourse 
to punitive interventions.  
Despite the work of these scholars, Lombrosian orthodoxy was uncommon among 
Progressives. Two new schools of thought purported to challenge Lombrosian theories of 
crime in the early twentieth century—cultural and hereditarian theories. In an evolving 
social science terrain in which scholars of culture, eugenics, and economics became 
increasingly prominent, the primary intellectual carriers of ideas about crime shifted. The 
ways in which cultural theorists and especially eugenicists built on and modified the 
ideas of nineteenth century criminal anthropologists shaped the character of American 
crime politics in the early twentieth century.  
As will be discussed, hereditarian scholarship was little different from 
Lombrosian theory. Although many presented themselves as breaking from Lombroso’s 
work, hereditarian scholars endorsed ideas of natural criminality first articulated in 
Lombroso’s research and defended the rehabilitative ideal as a tool for the eugenics 
movement. Scholars of culture posed more meaningful challenges to bio-deterministic 
science, but even they failed to wholly dislodge the assumptions of race science and bio-
determinist theory. Cultural theorists commonly articulated essentialist narratives of 
group difference to explain divergences in behavior across race.413 When “black culture” 
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was used to explain disparities in crime, it still pathologized black crime as a distinct 
social problem. Even as a cultural phenomenon, “black crime” was treated as a function 
of one’s racial identity, impeding the capacity for cultural scholarship to fully discredit 
the arguments of bio-determinists and race scientists.     
In The Condemnation of Blackness, Khalil Gibran Muhammad demonstrates why 
Progressive Era cultural theory failed as a counter-discourse to biology. Muhammad 
points to Franz Boas’s publication of The Mind of Primitive Man in 1911 as a critical 
juncture. A foundational text of cultural anthropology, The Mind of Primitive Man 
claimed to break from biological explanations of racial inferiority by arguing that 
perceptions of racial inferiority were truly outcomes of social neglect.414 But Muhammad 
argues that Boas simply “erased the color line and replaced it with a culture line.” By 
linking inferior behavior to black culture, Boas fostered a discursive shift from biological 
to cultural essentialism. His emphasis on the distinctiveness of black culture grounded his 
work in an a priori assumption of racial difference, leaving room for readers to accept his 
arguments in addition to claims about innate racial inferiority among blacks.415  
Other studies of race and culture by scholars like W.E.B. Du Bois attributed crime 
to cultural forces in ways that reinforced the idea that black culture was distinctively 
criminogenic.416 Du Bois’s analysis in The Philadelphia Negro (1899) was a rigorous 
examination of poverty and discrimination against black Philadelphians. He attributed 
black criminality to socioeconomic and cultural forces that could only be understood with 
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reference to the long history of racial repression in America. It was a study of significant 
import that constituted a pivotal reformulation of the concept of race and laid 
groundwork for the development critical race theory. But Du Bois’s contemporaries 
classified his work under the “Negro question,” separating his research from larger 
questions about labor, immigration, and poverty, even though Du Bois made a strong 
case for their interrelation.417 Despite its longer historical significance, The Philadelphia 
Negro’s immediate impact was shaped more by the leading scholars interpreting it than 
its author.  
Nonetheless, even Du Bois’s work was infected with strains of determinism. He 
wrote there were degenerates among blacks just as there were among Europeans, noting 
that “some [blacks] were fitted to know and some to dig.”418 This is a testament to the 
tremendous sway of hereditarian theory in the Progressive Era—even a leading opponent 
of race science feared the excessive breeding of the unfit and argued that there existed, 
within each racial type, natural hierarchies of superiority.  
 Among eugenicists, race scientists, and even cultural theorists, criminality 
remained intimately connected to racial identity and biological makeup. Numerous 
progressive scholars accepted the work of hereditarians and determinists. 
The Emergence of Hereditarian Theory  
Hereditarian theorists often presented their work as challenges to biological 
scholarship, but hereditarian theory was mostly a repackaging of ideas related to bio-
determinism. The central difference between hereditarian and biological theory was that 
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atavistic features were not seen as direct causes of criminality. Rather, they were 
indicative of lower intelligence or moral defects, which were the true causes of crime. 
This was a distinction of marginal import, as in both schools of thought, criminality 
remained a congenital defect requiring predictive containment. The shift from biological 
and anthropological to hereditarian theories of crime kept the basic ideology of crime the 
same while changing its scientific clothing. The more important difference were the 
unique policy implications of hereditarian theory, which insisted that the state play a 
greater and more interventionist role in selecting the unfit out of society. The hard 
science of heredity proved valuable to Progressives. Expressing a deep faith in objective 
science, Progressives relied on the science of heredity to hierarchically order humanity 
into natural tiers of superiority, which justified an agenda of state administered artificial 
selection.  
 Stephen Jay Gould’s The Mismeasure of Man (1981) tracks the origins and 
development of early twentieth century hereditarian scholarship. French psychologist 
Alfred Binet sparked the emergence of psychology as an intellectual field by developing 
mental tests to quantify intelligence and correlate it with human behavior. Binet was an 
“anti-hereditarian,” in the sense that he did not measure mental capacity hoping it would 
uncover each individual’s developmental ceiling. Rather, he sought to use it to identify 
individuals who had unique educational needs.419  
American scholars quickly perverted Binet’s aims, interpreting his tests as proof 
that people had natural limits to their development. Scholars like H.H. Goddard and 
Lewis Terman linked this to criminality. In his seminal book Feeble-Mindedness (1914), 
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Goddard argued that, “The so-called criminal type is merely a type of feeble-
mindedness.” He estimated that 25 to 50 percent of the people in prisons were mental 
defectives “incapable of managing their affairs with ordinary prudence.”420 He suggested 
that criminality was heritable through intelligence.421 Goddard was primarily concerned 
with “morons,” a diagnostic label for people whose testing scored them at a mental age 
between 8 and 12. Morons typically lacked the observable physiological features of 
mental deficiency, and Goddard feared they could be mistaken as healthy and interbreed 
with the healthy population.422  
 In 1916, Lewis Terman built on Goddard’s ideas in The Measurement of 
Intelligence. Terman identified intelligence as the most relevant trait in explaining crime, 
asserting that, “the most important trait of at least 25 percent of our criminals is mental 
weakness.” Like Goddard, Terman saw himself as challenging criminal anthropology by 
pointing to the role of intelligence in criminality. He stated that, “The physical 
abnormalities which have been found so common among prisoners are not the stigma of 
criminality, but the physical accompaniments of feeble-mindedness. They have no 
diagnostic significance except in so far as they are indications of mental deficiency.”423  
It was a trivial difference. Terman and Goddard disagreed that Lombrosian 
stigmata were indicative of a criminal biology but suggested that they were markers of a 
defective intelligence that caused crime. Their causal connections had an extra step but 
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accepted the correlations Lombroso claimed to identify. It is predictable that Terman 
made policy proposals similar to the ones that Lombroso, Brockway, and biologically 
oriented rehabilitative scholars defended. He insisted on “permanent custodial care” for 
the “hopelessly feeble-minded.”424 
 Hereditarian scholarship was closely tied to race science and eugenics 
scholarship, but there were meaningful differences between the three. Hereditarian 
scholarship viewed heredity as the primary explanation for human behavior and 
intelligence, implied the necessity of more state intervention in monitoring the selection 
process, but presented itself as an objective science without the normative spin attached 
to race science and eugenics. Scientific racism alternatively aimed to uncover scientific 
proof of racial inferiority and superiority explicitly in the service of a white supremacist 
agenda. Eugenics constituted both an intellectual discipline and a political and social 
movement, seeking to use the state to improve the human race through selective 
breeding. Hereditarian scholarship, scientific racism, and eugenic scholarship thus 
intersected and overlapped in complex ways. As a movement, eugenics channeled the 
ideas and ideologies articulated in all three fields into political demands for expanding 
the state’s powers to engage in artificial eugenics-oriented selection. The tight 
intertwining of these intellectual and ideological threads justified the targeting of 
undesirables, including criminals, for harsh justice.   
Concepts like “feeble-minded” and “mental defective” emerged in these 
intellectual traditions independent from debates about crime. But scholarship published 
by Goddard and Terman blurred the lines between intelligence, mental illness, and 
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criminality by treating the “feeble-minded,” “insane,” and “epileptics” as “criminal 
types.” Goddard explicitly stated that “Lombroso’s famous criminal types…may have 
been types of feeble-mindedness on which criminality was grafted.”425   
Consequently, early twentieth century scholars of crime defended eugenic 
solutions for criminals, and the idea of incorrigibility became instrumental to their 
theories. It was scholars like Lydston, Boies, and McKim who helped transport ideas 
about innate criminality into Progressive Era politics, while hereditarians like Goddard 
and Terman repackaged these ideas into ideational frameworks amenable to Progressives. 
But it was scholar-reformers who helped put them into practice through policy change.  
As the social sciences evolved in the twentieth century, hereditarian theory was 
deployed by three groups of scholar-reformers to pursue policy reform and depict various 
sub-populations as inherently criminal and unworthy of social assistance. Economists 
presented criminals as inherent defectives that impaired the functionality of the American 
economy and labor market. Race scientists depicted immigrants and racial minorities as 
likely criminals and as threats to the survival of American society. Finally, eugenicists 
used hereditarian theories to label the urban poor, racial minorities, immigrants, and 
mental defectives natural criminals, offering scientific legitimacy to state sterilization 
laws. Although eugenics was a fundamentally racist project, it took a broad range of 
forms and legitimated ascriptive hierarchies of race, class, gender, and ethnicity. The 
embrace of eugenics by a diverse class of scholar-reformers highlights how eugenics 
legitimated the durable racist, classist, and nativist biases of American political culture.  
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Hereditarian Theory and Economists 
Thomas Leonard has shown how economists like Richard Ely, John Commons, 
and Edward Ross pushed for progressive reforms like minimum wage laws in ways that 
embraced social exclusion. Driven by race science and eugenics, Progressive economists 
pursued legislation that would uplift the worthy poor while excluding the unworthy poor, 
including immigrants, blacks, women, mental defectives, and “white trash.” They formed 
the American Economists Association in the late nineteenth century in order to connect 
intellectuals and scholars to policymaking circles.426  
These scholars were Progressives in that they viewed criminals as pathologies to 
the collective social body. Fears of “race suicide,” the idea that the unfit were 
outbreeding their betters, fostered anxieties that natural selection was inefficient at 
breeding out social undesirables in modern society. Scholars of political economy viewed 
criminality as a tendency common among undesirables who were a drain on community 
resources, weakened society’s productive capacity, and thus needed social control, 
typically through compulsory sterilization.  
For instance, Richard T. Ely wrote in Introduction to Political Economy that, “the 
dependent and criminal classes…impair the productive power of the community.”427 He 
wrote that there were three divisions of the unemployable population, specifically “the 
defective, delinquent, and dependent.” He argued that these classes were “morally 
incurable” and “should not be allowed to propagate their kind.”428 Economist Frank 
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Taussig made similar claims, arguing that there existed only two classes of 
unemployables—the aged and disabled, and the “feebleminded” who mostly consisted of 
“irretrievable criminals and tramps” who were “tainted with hereditary disease” and 
should be “prevented from propagating their kind.”429 In these contexts, criminals were 
perceived as defectives and drains on the nation’s political economy.  
Edward Ross’s work particularly carried ideas about criminality carried into 
progressive discourse. He argued that the criminal law should not punish a crime in 
proportion “to the measure of harm” it incurred. This, he said, was more common in 
“rude communities” that over-sympathized with victims. Alternatively, he insisted that, 
“offences should be repressed according to the badness of character they imply.” This 
emphasis on the character of the offender rather than the action reflected ideas from 
nineteenth century debates. Whether someone fit the idea of the criminal type was the 
most important factor in determining their punishment. Ross thus drew conclusions that 
“the trolley company, the quack medicine man, the insurer or rotten ships, and the jerry 
builder” should not be punished as harshly as other offenders “because they are morally 
superior” to ordinary criminals.430   
Ross connected criminal punishment to the health of the collective society. In his 
1896 article “Social Control,” he wrote that society should be focused on the “moulding 
of the individual’s feelings and desires to suit the needs of the group.”431 He said that 
“insuring greater harmony of social life by segregation of the insubordinate and 
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elimination of the criminal, aims…at progress.”432 He drew on rehabilitative ideology to 
package ideas of innate criminality into progressive economics. Ross wrote that, “the 
principle of individual responsibility is another great improvement in the technique of 
control.” He concluded that, “as to the mass of small-witted, weak-willed, impulse-ridden 
human ‘screenings’ that collect in prisons, our care should be to reform the reformable 
and to hold fast the incurable the rest of their days.”433   
These economists regularly argued that artificial selection was preferable to 
natural selection. In his 1901 book Social Control, Ross wrote that “we can regard this 
society as a living thing” and social control “as one of the ways in which this living thing 
seeks to keep itself alive.”434 He wrote a few years later in defense of “sterilization of all 
congenital criminals as the only means of thinning out the bad breeds.”435 He even 
defended Wisconsin’s sterilization statute in 1914 by connecting it crime prevention, 
stating, “Sterilization is not nearly so terrible as hanging a man, and the chances of 
sterilizing the fit are not nearly so great, as are the chances of hanging the innocent.”436 
Economist John Commons similarly wrote that “We cannot placidly rely on any 
abstraction of natural selection to wipe out crime…Evolution is not always development 
upwards.”437 Ely also pointed to the “superiority of man’s selection to nature’s 
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selection.”438 It was through this logic that economists justified sterilization for 
defectives, the unfit, and criminals, among others who were viewed as drains on the 
national economy.   
Hereditarian Theory and Race Scientists 
Race scientists also transported ideas about natural criminality into twentieth 
century debates. It should be noted that the term “race” had broad, vague, and multiple 
meanings to progressive scientific racists, often being used to refer to the human race, 
national races (e.g. “the American race,”) or phenotypic racial categories. The eugenics 
movement largely focused on the preservation of the American Anglo-Saxon racial 
identity, which involved sterilizing or segregating non-Anglo-Saxon elements away from 
native white racial stock. Rather than discussing racial differences between blacks and 
whites, race scientists were more focused on growing immigrant races that posed a threat 
to Anglo-Saxon dominance. Expansive conceptions of racial difference were used to 
connect non-white European populations, like Italian and Irish immigrants, to criminality. 
Scholars of political economy like Commons, Ely, and Ross commonly linked defective 
heredity, and hence criminality, to immigrant populations.439 President William 
McKinley’s Industrial Commission, appointed in 1898 to study capital-labor relations, 
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devoted a significant portion of its reports to linking pauperism and vice crimes like 
alcoholism and gambling to certain immigrant populations like Irish and Italians.440  
Given their emphasis on purifying the Anglo-Saxon race, eugenicists initially 
remained unconcerned with purifying black genetics as long as they were kept within the 
black community. Scholars and medical professionals like Robert Bean and Bernard 
Barrow eventually helped bring sterilization into the South by linking eugenics to black 
inferiority. Bean even applied Lombrosian methods in studying the cranial patterns of 
blacks to make his case. But the South started passing sterilization laws several years 
after Northern states, as Jim Crow laws and anti-miscegenation statutes had long been the 
primary way blacks were kept from interbreeding with whites. Counter-intuitively, 
eugenic solutions like sterilization were delayed in their application to black citizens in 
southern states.441    
Still, race science research about black inferiority persisted within the intellectual 
currents of progressivism. Scholars like William Hannibal Thomas reaffirmed the 
conclusions drawn in Frederick Hoffman’s research. A black man born into a family of 
former slaves, Thomas called blacks “savages,” who were doomed to a “lawless 
existence.” He concluded that blacks were naturally inferior in “mind, morals, judgments, 
and character” to whites.442 Race scientists like Robert Shufeldt and Charles McCord 
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mirrored the work of Thomas and Bean by connecting race and crime.443 Their works 
hardened the well-established link between blackness and criminality within eugenics 
frameworks.  
Hereditarian Theory and Eugenicists 
Progressives were especially drawn to the research of eugenicists who were quick 
to build on the work of Terman, Goddard, and hereditarians. Active players in the 
eugenics movements eagerly picked up this research, funded similar projects, formed 
organizational centers, and lobbied for eugenic policy in the name of social and racial 
progress. Eugenicists had organizational centers and institutional infrastructure that 
enabled their ideas to be heard louder and more clearly than alternative ideas.  
The Eugenics Records Office (ERO) was established in 1910, proclaiming itself 
as the national center for the study of human heredity. Founded by Charles Davenport, 
the ERO sought to sterilize the most defective 10% of the human population. This 
included the feeble-minded, the poor, and criminals, among others. Arguing that the “fact 
of incorrigibility” mandated the sterilization of criminals, the ERO targeted a range of 
criminals from vagrants to convicted felons, defended long sentences for mentally 
defective criminals, and deemed sterilization a condition of release. The ERO served as 
an organizational center for the eugenics movement, producing research and engaging in 
lobbying campaigns.444  
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 In 1916, Arthur Estabrook published a follow-up study of Richard Dugdale’s The 
Jukes under the ERO’s auspices. Titled The Jukes in 1915, Estabrook’s research followed 
the lead of Terman and Goddard. He distanced himself from Lombrosian theory, writing 
that, “There is no evidence in the Jukes which points to the existence of a trait of 
criminality.” However, he concluded that criminality is “closely associated with mental 
defect and lack of moral restraint.” He claimed that there exists a “close correlation 
between feeble-mindedness and crime.”445 Estabrook concluded that, “the eradication of 
crime in defective stocks depends upon the elimination of mental deficiency.” He 
defended sterilization by arguing that it would, “interfere with the real liberty of the 
individual less than custodial care.”446 Estabrook was dedicated studying degenerate 
families in the tradition of Dugdale, having also co-published The Nam Family in 1912 
with Davenport.447 Goddard also studied degenerate families, publishing The Kallikak 
Family in 1912. In the book, Goddard reiterated his conclusion that “Lombroso’s famous 
criminal types” were just “types of feeble-mindedness.”448  
Leading scholars of the eugenics movement continued to tie criminality to 
heredity when advocating for sterilization. In The Passing of the Great Race (1916), 
arguably the most authoritative text on eugenics in the early twentieth century, Madison 
Grant wrote that compulsory sterilization “will in self-defense put a stop to the supply of 
feebleminded and criminal children of weaklings.” He called sterilization “a practical, 
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merciful, and inevitable solution” that “can be applied to an ever-widening circle of 
social discards, beginning always with the criminal, the diseased and the insane.”449 
Another leading race scientist William Ripley wrote in The Races of Europe (1899) that 
certain racial categories are particularly prone to certain varieties of crime.450  
Davenport himself repeatedly linked crime, feeblemindedness, pauperism, and 
heredity. He bemoaned the fact that, “criminality is ascribed to poverty, to bad example, 
to bad or inadequate education, despite the fact of incorrigibility” and concluded that 
eugenicists provided “a more fundamental explanation for these non-social traits” than 
scholars of culture or social disadvantage did.451 He embraced the progressive perspective 
on science and expertise, arguing that eugenicists should actively participate in public 
debates to ensure that “public spirit is aroused” so that the public will is “crystallized in 
appropriate legislation.” He defended sterilization for criminals, claiming that “idiots, 
low imbeciles, incurable and dangerous criminals…may under appropriate restrictions be 
prevented from procreation—either by segregation during the reproductive period or even 
by sterilization.”452   
Davenport was widely acknowledged as a respected national authority on 
eugenics. Most famously, President Theodore Roosevelt endorsed the work of Davenport 
on multiple occasions. Roosevelt called race suicide “the great problem of 
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civilization.”453 In a 1913 personal letter to Charles Davenport, he wrote that, “society 
has no business to permit degenerates to produce their kind.”454 The next year, he wrote 
in a public letter that, “criminals should be sterilized, and feeble-minded persons 
forbidden to leave offspring behind them.”455  
 Research across the disciplines of economics, race science, and eugenics in the 
Progressive era cannot be neatly disentangled. These disciplines were fundamentally 
intertwined and reliant on one another. Each legitimated the nativist, racist, and classist 
impulses of American politics through the veneer of objective science. This provides a 
compelling case that questions about race, poverty, labor, and criminality should not be 
viewed as separate phenomena in the Progressive era. The science of heredity and 
eugenics served as a framework that scientifically legitimated an assortment of ascriptive 
biases. Constructions of criminality spanned across race and class but were all rooted in 
scientistic discourses of crime and heredity.    
III. The Political and Institutional Legacies of Gilded Age Crime Politics 
Criminalizing Class Through Eugenics 
Like many Progressive scholars, economists like Ely, Commons, and Ross sought 
to play an active role in pursuing reform. Many of them worked with or testified before 
President McKinley’s Industrial Commission from 1898 and 1902, participating in its 
analysis of industrial concentration, labor markets, and the impact of immigration on the 
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economy. Thomas Leonard has noted the political attention received by the Industrial 
Commission and its reports, which made recommendations on antitrust law and 
regulatory policy for corporate criminals that are examined in the next chapter. But 
interestingly, eugenic perspectives also appeared in the Commission’s nineteen reports to 
defend harsh justice for street criminals, racial minorities, the urban poor, and 
immigrants.  
In their own work, these economists linked pauperism and criminality to a shared 
hereditary basis. Ely, for instance, wrote that there are two classes of paupers—one that is 
willing to work but simply has not learned the requisite skills for labor, while it is 
“practically impossible” to reform those in the second group that “belongs to the criminal 
class.”456 Frank Taussig similarly tied “criminals and tramps” together as variants of the 
feeble-minded class who are “unemployable.”457 Their language was little different than 
the language of “incorrigibility” employed by Brockway and his adherents, but their 
conclusions were cloaked in the sciences of heredity and eugenics rather than 
anthropology and phrenology.  
The Industrial Commission thus advocated for putting the urban poor and tramps 
to work behind bars, arguing that they were inherently criminal and needed compulsion 
to work.458 Commission members wrote that Italians, Hebrews, and Irish were prone to 
pauperism and criminality, and consequently made up majority of this class of the lazy 
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criminal poor.459 For instance, when Commons testified before the Commission, he 
claimed that “foreigners and children of foreigners are the worst element which we have 
in this country,” made up a disproportionate number of the poor and criminal classes, and 
should be put to work in prison.460  
In its volume on prison labor, the Commission embraced ideas of incorrigibility 
just as scholars like Ely and Taussig did. In evaluating prison labor, the Commission 
identified the Elmira Reformatory as the premier example of prison management. Being 
“intended for the reclaiming of the younger lawbreakers, who could not be properly 
classified as hardened or incorrigible criminals,” the Commission endorsed the 
segregation of inmates based on categories of corrigibility. The Commission suggested 
that reformatories should follow Elmira’s lead of grading convicts in three tiers of 
reformability, with the third grade consisting of “the incorrigible” who should be “kept in 
confinement” and “at such labor as practicable.”461 The Commission endorsed the 
indeterminate sentence, stating if criminals “are becoming habitual criminals, they can be 
sent for a longer time, even to the extent of a life sentence,” which could arguably “be 
applied to all delinquents, including the pauper.”462   
Late nineteenth century trends linking poverty, crime, and heredity persisted into 
the early twentieth century, even though the image of the tramp underwent a significant 
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transformation in popular culture. In Tramping with Tramps (1899), sociologist Josiah 
Flynt argued that it is “better for criminology to study the criminal’s milieu” instead of 
his skull, contesting ideas of innate criminality among the poor.463 This contributed to a 
more positive image of tramps in pop-culture. Vaudeville routines depicted tramps as 
victims of circumstance, not social threats.464 But this trend romanticized poverty by 
labeling behaviors once criticized as faults as virtues. Even Charlie Chaplin’s famous 
“little tramp” character was a thief and con artist.465 Despite its positive connotations, this 
comedic imagery did little to divorce perceptions of tramps from ideas of criminality, and 
kept poverty linked to laziness and deviance.  
As a result, this nostalgic imaging coexisted readily with ideologies and rhetoric 
justifying exclusionary policies targeting the poor. Praising Pennsylvania’s anti-tramp 
law, the Los Angeles Times reported in 1901 that, “Tramps have multiplied here at an 
alarming rate in the last few months, and a notable increase in the number of robberies 
and assaults has resulted.” Brockway connected the criminal poor to cultural 
determinism, with the Washington Post quoting him as saying, “The culture of 
crime…the mass of misdemeanants, and the present shiftless methods of treatment 
produce hardened criminals.”466  
This contrast between the pop-culture image of the tramp and public anxieties 
over the poor was not lost to observers of American criminal justice. In 1901, the Los 
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Angeles Times wrote that, “The hobo of the comic page is an amiable soul, with a tomato 
can; the hobo of real life, when he gets to California, is thoroughly vicious, degraded and 
dangerous…An epidemic of crime invariably follows the coming of the tramps.”467 
William A. Pinkerton stated in 1903 that, “The chief criminal work of this age is done by 
hoboes or professional tramps.”468 In 1907, the New York Times stated that the vagrant or 
tramp “is necessarily a dangerous element, whether or not, or rather even before, he 
blossoms out into a professional criminal.”469 This indicates that those in policy circles 
were less willing to accept the makeover the poor received in popular culture, instead 
holding onto ideas linking criminality to poverty.   
Links between poverty and criminality remained tenacious in intellectual circles 
as well. For instance, The Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and 
Criminology frequently published articles relating poverty to crime.470 In his 1914 study 
of New York’s municipal lodging house, Robert Gault argued that, “A large proportion 
of vagrants” were “pathologic” and 12% “showed definite evidence of defective 
mentality.”471 In the next issue, John Lisle wrote that the tramp class “must be destroyed” 
and that tramps’ criminality “is not due to their failure to bear their share of the social 
burden…but in their dangerous characters.”472 These ideas served as the basis for 
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multiple proposed bills to create a federal criminological laboratory in the Justice 
Department to study the criminal and pauper classes.473  
Journalists and intellectuals clearly held onto the connection between poverty and 
innate criminality, but people with institutional power also shared these beliefs. For 
instance, Director of the National Association for the Prevention of Vagrancy James 
Forbes stated in 1911 that, “It is practically impossible to reform a tramp.”474 State laws 
relating to tramping thus remained as punitive as they were in the Gilded Age. In 1916, 
46 states had statutes authorizing the incarceration of tramps for varied periods of time. 
Twenty of these states authorized a maximum between 3 and 6 months behind bars for 
tramping; eleven authorized a maximum of anywhere from one to three years.475 As 
noted in chapter two, these laws were justified on the logic that vagrancy laws should 
look more like the indeterminate sentence in the sense that they required a longer 
maximum sentence so that incorrigibles could be incarcerated for longer periods of time.  
FIGURE 4.1: Maximum Sentences of Vagrancy Laws in the US States, 1916476 
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In his research, Eric Monkonnen (2004) found that arrests for victimless crimes 
like vagrancy declined in the early twentieth century. He concludes that early twentieth 
century police focused on punishing criminal behavior rather than repressing poverty.477 
But this data should not lead us to overlook the fact that urban police remained agents of 
class control. Monkonnen notes that those who were considered part of the “dangerous 
classes” had both negative and positive interactions with police in the nineteenth century, 
often being lodged and fed by urban police. In the early twentieth century, the police 
became a blunt negative instrument that enforced neighborhood boundaries. As skid rows 
emerged in cities to accommodate seasonal labor, police reinforced class lines by 
ensuring the poor were contained in certain neighborhoods.478 
Progressives continued to associate the urban poor with labor violence, fearing 
them as likely instigators of a working-class revolution. Police often targeted tramps 
while criminalizing protests and strikes.479 While exaggerated, this link was not wholly 
unwarranted; the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW, or Wobblies), helped to infuse 
hobo culture with a leftist fervor. The IWW newspaper Solidarity wrote in 1914 that 
hoboes were “admirably fitted to serve as the scouts and advance guards of the labour 
army,” and could become “the guerillas of the revolution.”480 As Todd DePastino has 
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argued, Wobbly folklore built on the image of the savage tramp to romanticize the 
tramp’s primitivism and masculinity as part of the class struggle.481  
State, local, and federal authorities continued to punish radical labor 
organizations, especially those with high foreign-born membership, into the Progressive 
Era.482 The reports of the Industrial Commission often linked certain ethnic groups to 
working class radicalism, and President Theodore Roosevelt stoked public anxieties 
linking foreign radicals to deterministic discourse about crime.483 Roosevelt claimed that 
the cause of the anarchist’s criminality is “his own evil passions.”484 Politically, the 
repression of labor was still justified by links between criminality, race, and determinism.   
State laws criminalizing anarchy and federal crackdowns on Wobblies satiated 
fears that workers were prone to criminality. Private organizations like the American 
Protective League (APL) also emerged as security forces funded by local businesses to 
infiltrate radical organizations. With the DOJ’s endorsement, the APL demonstrated how 
intertwined the interests of big business, the police, and the state became in controlling 
labor through criminal sanction.485  
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 After a sharp uptick in strike activity in 1919—the height of the first “Red 
Scare”—Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer instituted a series of raids in 1919 
resulting in thousands of arrests. The climax came in January 1920, when federal agents 
arrested between 5,000 and 10,000 individuals across thirty cities. Palmer defended the 
raids by attributing the behavior of radical workers to their innate criminality. He drew 
explicitly on language from anthropological assessments of criminality, suggesting that 
“from their lopsided faces, sloping brows, and misshapen features,” anarchists and 
strikers arrested “may be recognized [as] the unmistakable criminal type.”486  
 Into the twentieth century, the poor and working classes were still viewed as 
dangerous criminals. But eugenics and hereditarian theory were not only crucial to 
helping Progressives rationalize class repression through criminal law. These same ideas 
translated readily into the repression of racial minorities as well.   
Hereditarian Theory, Race, and Crime  
A large proportion of Progressives supported racial segregation. Academics like 
Booker T. Washington and politicians like Theodore Roosevelt clung onto scientific 
discourses of racial inferiority and defended the segregationist policies and strict 
immigration laws of the Progressive Era.487 Within this exclusionary agenda, 
Progressives used ideas about hereditary criminality to defend a harsh justice politics 
targeting African Americans and immigrants.   
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For instance, as reviewed in chapter two, vagrancy laws played an important role 
in southern criminal justice by stocking the convict-lease system. Crimes such as 
“mischief,” “insulting gestures,” and “pig laws” punishing theft of farm animals were 
variants on vagrancy laws and were disproportionately enforced against young black men 
in states like Mississippi, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Louisiana, and Texas. Convict lease 
officially ended in 1928 when Alabama abolished it, but for decades the system 
encouraged police to sweep up vagrants and minor offenders in line with the labor needs 
of a state’s dominant industries.488  
The convict-lease system was not a purely instrumentalist project fueled by 
economic interests, but one also justified by the logic of bio-determinism. State 
legislators and southern medical and penological professionals routinely defended 
convict-lease on the grounds that reformatories would not help to reform an inherently 
inferior race.489 David Oshinksy’s analysis of James Vardaman’s term as Mississippi’s 
Governor from 1904-1908 provides an example of how politicians deployed these ideas. 
Vardaman, nicknamed the “Great White Chief” for his white supremacist politics, 
deployed rhetoric depicting blacks as pathologically criminal. He described blacks as 
“lazy, lying, lustful animal[s]” with an “increased capacity for crime,” favored the use of 
vagrancy laws to compel black men into labor, and defended lynching as an appropriate 
response to black crime.490  
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 The practice of lynching persisted into the Progressive Era and was justified by 
the notion that black men were innately violent and prone to raping white women.491 
Even Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and William Taft qualified their concerns with the 
practice in ways that validated prevailing ideas about black criminality. Contending that 
lynching targeted black men accused of rape, Roosevelt feared that lynching posed a 
challenge to the state’s authority to punish crime. He wrote in 1903 that such cases 
should be processed more quickly in order to preempt lynching.492 Two years later, he 
stated at a luncheon in Arkansas that, “Long delays of justice, abuses of the pardoning 
power, [and] the sluggishness with which either court or attorney moves…[bring] about 
the condition of affairs which produces lynch law.”493 Roosevelt repeatedly stated that 
lynching could be prevented if blacks reported black crime and worked to change black 
culture.494 Taft’s conclusions were little different, as he stated in 1909 that lynching was 
caused by “the uncertainties and injustice growing out of delays in trials, judgments, and 
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the executions thereof by our courts.”495 Both voiced their opposition to lynching not by 
expressing concerns about racial injustice, but by expressing concerns that lynch mob 
justice usurped the state’s authority to punish black men who committed crime.  
Progressives also used racialized crime politics to condemn immigrant crime. The 
U.S. Immigration Commission, known as the Dillingham Commission, particularly 
linked immigrants to criminality. A bipartisan body in operation from 1907 to 1911, the 
Commission concluded that immigration from eastern and southern Europe seriously 
threatened U.S. society. Its reports were essential to the design of the immigration 
restrictions of the 1920s.496 Staffed by a combination of congressmen and experts 
including eugenicists like Jeremiah Jenks, the Commission dedicated volumes to 
studying immigrant physiology, intelligence, and criminality.  
The Commission examined more than 3 million immigrants from over 300 
American communities.497 They linked certain varieties of criminality to certain racial 
categories. For example, Italians were linked to blackmail, extortion, rape, and homicide, 
Russians to larceny, and Greeks to minor ordinance violations.498  The Commission 
concluded by advocating for stringent immigration restrictions and defending literacy 
tests, race-based quotas, and barring unskilled laborers from entry, among other 
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proposals.499 The expansive reach of race science targeted a diverse collection of 
populations as natural criminals deserving of exclusion. 
IV. Crime, Eugenics, and Rehabilitative Ideology  
In 1911, Gina Lombroso-Ferrero, Cesare Lombroso’s daughter, published a book 
summarizing her father’s work. In the opening pages, her father wrote an introduction 
recognizing America as a place where his ideas were given “a warm and sympathetic 
reception” and “speedily put into practice.”500 The reorientation of American penality 
towards rehabilitative programming built on the conception of criminal behavior 
espoused in Lombroso’s work. This rehabilitative penology thrived in the political milieu 
of the Progressive Era. The spread of indeterminate sentencing and sterilization laws 
during this period was driven by ideas rooted in Lombrosian-influenced rehabilitative 
ideology.   
Progressives often endorsed a politics founded on pseudo-science to separate 
mental defectives, minorities, and undesirables from the population’s worthy elements. In 
this framework, the incorrigible criminal idea had a potent political value that allowed 
Progressives to espouse a philosophy of reform while also reaping the benefits of 
cracking down on criminals. In the forty years following Elmira’s opening, seventeen 
reformatories opened across the country emulating Brockway’s model to varying 
degrees.501 Nicole Rafter (1997) and Alexander Pisciotta (1994) have demonstrated how 
the ideas of criminal anthropology and rehabilitative penology influenced the 
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development of these institutions at the turn of the century. But ideas of incorrigibility in 
these older philosophies were of crucial importance in justifying the politics of 
eugenicists. There was significant regional variation in the compulsory sterilization laws 
advocated by Progressives, as some states emphasized psychiatric sterilization while 
others targeted poor citizens or women of color, but in many states, criminality was used 
as a reference point to justify sterilization.502  
Elmira was a leader in facilitating a shift towards the eugenics model. The 
institution hired doctors in the early twentieth century to identify mental defectives 
among its inmates, and as of 1910, 38 percent of the institution’s population was declared 
mentally defective with either congenital or acquired defects indicative of incorrigibility. 
The Massachusetts Reformatory followed suit, concluding that 58% of its inmates were 
incorrigible mental defectives. By 1919, Elmira had a positive reformative prognosis for 
only 4% of offenders, and many of the medical professionals employed by the institution 
explicitly advocated to put such offenders in penal colonies or sterilize them.503  
Outside of Elmira, a variety of Progressive intellectuals, professionals, and 
reformers advocated for sterilization of the criminal classes. Some of the earliest 
endorsements of criminal sterilizations came from doctors who cited nineteenth century 
criminal anthropologists espousing ideas of incorrigibility. In 1899, Doctor A.J. Oschner 
defended sterilization in The Journal of the American Medical Association by noting that 
Lombroso proved that “there are certain inherited anatomic defects which 
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characterize…born criminals,” who commit the majority of crime.504 The next year, 
President of the American Academy of Medicine George Makuen endorsed compulsory 
sterilization. He cited Brockway in stating that penology should be about caring for 
criminals while also preventing their propagation. He claimed that William McKim’s 
suggestion to provide “a gentle and painless death” to incorrigibles was excessive, but 
that McKim’s proposal revealed the broader “drift of thought with reference to these 
matters” in criminological circles. He used McKim’s extreme arguments to depict 
compulsory sterilization as humanitarian. Makuen also cited Boies’ Prisoners and 
Paupers in claiming that “Pauperism, criminality, [and] insanity” are “all one 
interdependent family” that should be grounds for sterilization.505 In the next year’s 
Academy Bulletin, S.D. Risley similarly drew on McKim to depict sterilization laws as 
benevolent.506  
Important players in the eugenics movement drew on ideas linking rehabilitative 
potential to criminal sterilization. In 1904, Dr. Martin Barr explicitly presented 
sterilization as a curative tool for offenders, writing, “Let asexualization be once 
legalized, not as a penalty for crime but a remedial measure preventing crime.”507 In 1908 
the American Prison Association (APA) established a Physicians Association, and at the 
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1908 meeting eugenicist Dr. Charles Carrington stated that he “unreservedly” supported 
sterilization for “habitual” and “incorrigible” offenders.508 At the next year’s meeting, 
Daniel Phelan, Theodore Cooke, and former APA president Charles Henderson discussed 
sterilization as a means of controlling the “incorrigible criminal” identifiable by “physical 
irregularities.”509   
As early as 1893, inmates of reformatories across the country were being 
subjected to compulsory sterilization off the books. Physician Harry Sharp performed at 
least 176 vasectomies in Indiana reformatories between 1893 and 1907, when the state 
finally legalized the practice. A prominent advocate for inmate sterilization, Sharp wrote 
in 1909 that, “In treating upon this subject [of criminal sterilization] there must ever be 
borne in mind the distinct understanding that degeneracy is a defect, and that a defect 
differs from a disease in that it can not be cured.”510 Targeting “confirmed inebriates, 
prostitutes, tramps, and criminals, as well as habitual paupers,” Sharp argued that the 
vasectomy was the most humane means of ensuring that mental defectives would not 
interbreed with the general population.511 However, he noted that, “this operation shall 
not be performed except in cases that have been pronounced unimprovable,” pointing out 
that traditional reformative interventions should be a first resort.512 But he stated that the 
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“decidedly defective individual is very easily recognized,” and argued that this “mental 
abnormality is usually accompanied with prominent physical defects, described by 
Lombroso” and others.513 
In the early twentieth century, Sharp, Barr, and other medical professionals were 
essential in passing sterilization laws in many states. Sharp played an important role in 
Indiana, Ross in Wisconsin, and as the chief physician at the Pennsylvania Training 
School for Feeble-Minded Children, Barr played a critical role in Pennsylvania.514 In 
doing so, these eugenic theorists and practitioners drew on multiple ideas undergirding 
rehabilitative penology, and prominent eugenicists paid attention. Invoking the notion of 
incorrigibility, Charles Davenport defended sterilization as the only way to stop 
incorrigibles from reproducing.515 Similarly, David Starr Jordan of the American 
Breeder’s Association argued that the criminal “can perhaps be healed,” but if he was 
incurable, “he can be kept in confinement; and to physicians, and to them alone, the 
community must look for help in these matters.”516  
This highlights how eugenicists of varying stripes endorsed the logic of 
rehabilitation. Sharp and Davenport viewed criminals as incorrigible, rendering 
sterilization a necessary solution. Others like Martin Barr viewed sterilization itself as a 
rehabilitative procedure for those who had limited rehabilitative potential. For instance, 
Barr rationalized sterilization thusly: 
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Let asexualization be once legalized, not as a penalty for crime, but a remedial 
measure preventing crime and tending to future comfort and happiness of the 
defective; let the practice once become common for young children immediately 
upon being adjudged defective by competent authority properly appointed, and 
the public mind will accept it as an effective means of race preservation. It would 
come to be regarded just as quarantine, simple protection against ill.517  
 
Both punitive and rehabilitative eugenicists drew on presumptions of rehabilitative 
penology to rationalize sterilization. In his typology of sterilization laws for criminal 
offenders, ERO officer Harry Laughlin noted this distinction. He wrote that some state 
laws were “therapeutic” in design (like California, which called the procedure “beneficial 
and conducive” to the inmate), while others were punitive (like Washington, which called 
the procedure “an addition to punishment”).518 This contrast in logic is reminiscent of 
Ross’s defense of Wisconsin’s sterilization statute as more humane than hanging for 
crime. 
 Harry Laughlin’s work particularly highlighted the relationship between 
Lombrosian theory, hereditarian scholarship, and the eugenics movement. Superintendent 
of the Eugenics Records Office for its entire existence, Laughlin frequently cited 
rehabilitative penologists, including Henry Boies and G. Frank Lydston. His treatise 
Eugenical Sterilization in the United States (1922) cited multipage-length quotes from 
Boies’ Prisoners and Paupers (1893), including Boies’ statements that imprisonment 
permitted the reproduction of “those who would perish without its aid” and that, “in no 
sense could the deprivation of [sexual] organs inflict injury or damage to criminal[s].”519 
Laughlin noted that Washington State similarly cited Boies’s work to defend its 
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sterilization statutes from legal challenges. He defended sterilizations for “born 
criminals” and argued that many state sterilization statutes were informed by Lombrosian 
theory. He wrote that, “asexualization can only be justified in the case of born 
criminals.”520   
 Laughlin’s work underscored the relationship between sterilization and 
rehabilitative ideology. He defended the indeterminate sentence as it was envisioned to 
work by Lombroso but wrote that while “Reformation of the individual is humane…but 
absolutely undesirable and poor sociological economy if at the expense of the rights of 
organized society.”521 What to do with the incorrigibles, then, became the central 
problem of rehabilitative thought.  
The opening to Laughlin’s book answered this problem. Laughlin’s close friend 
and fellow eugenicist, Chief Justice Harry Olson of the Chicago Municipal Court, wrote 
the introduction. Olson wrote that “the segregation of incorrigible defectives…as a 
measure of crime prevention is urgently needed…however, in a number of 
states…experiments have been made with sterilization. The two theories of segregation 
and sterilization are not antagonistic, but both may be invoked.”522 Olson’s quote 
illustrates that segregation and sterilization were both seen as appropriate state responses 
for dealing with incorrigible populations. 
 Olson’s career as a prominent jurist shows that support for eugenics was not 
limited to medical professionals and penologists. In his article “The Two Percent 
Solution” (1998), Michael Willrich has demonstrated that the convergence of eugenics 
                                                             
520 Laughlin, 122–24. 
521 Laughlin, 159, 327. 
522 Laughlin, vi. 
197 
 
discourse and urban court operations in the early twentieth century facilitated the 
emergence of “eugenics jurisprudence,” defined as “the aggressive mobilization of law 
and legal institutions in pursuit of eugenic goals.”523 Willrich outlines the history of 
Olson’s Chicago Municipal Court as the prime example of eugenics jurisprudence. Olson 
believed that courts should use psychological testing to identify mental defectives 
requiring long-term confinement.524 In 1914, the Court opened a Psychopathic 
Laboratory to identify genetically predisposed criminals, and tens of thousands of 
defendants were tested in the lab during Olson’s tenure as Chief Justice until 1930. The 
lab assisted judges in sentencing, directed clinical research on crime, and served as a 
model for similar labs in other cities and for a proposed national laboratory. Olson argued 
that crime control was “the first step in the eugenics programme.”525   
By 1922, sixteen states authorized criminal sterilizations. Several laws focused on 
violent and sexual offenders, but others cast a wider net. When signing New Jersey’s law, 
Governor Woodrow Wilson explicitly stated that it was designed to target “the hopelessly 
defective and criminal classes.”526 California’s 1909 law and Oregon’s 1917 statute 
included anyone convicted of any three felonies as eligible for the procedure, and four 
states targeted the “habitual criminal.” Three states provided no definition of the term 
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“habitual criminal” and Kansas vaguely defined it as, “a person who has been convicted 
of some felony involving moral turpitude.”527  
The link between sterilization and crime was not only apparent in state statutes. 
The Supreme Court upheld compulsory sterilization laws in the 1927 decision Buck v. 
Bell. In the most famous passage of the decision, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes 
explicitly discussed criminality. Holmes wrote, 
It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring 
for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who 
are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. The principle that sustains 
compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes. 
Three generations of imbeciles are enough.528  
 
It is significant that Holmes linked degeneracy to crime. In his famous speech “The Path 
of the Law” given thirty years prior to Buck v. Bell, Holmes stated that, “If the typical 
criminal is a degenerate, bound to swindle or murder by as deep seated an organic 
necessity as that which makes the rattlesnake bite…he cannot be improved.”529 Holmes’ 
linkage between criminality and heredity reflected both a broader national acceptance of 
these connections and his personal longstanding beliefs in eugenics. After Buck v. Bell, 
the national rate of sterilizations skyrocketed to nearly 2,000 annually.530  
There is reason to believe that sterilizations were less common in prisons than in 
mental facilities, especially since some states passed sterilization laws that targeted the 
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mentally impaired but not criminals.531 But as Rafter (1997) has shown, early twentieth 
century eugenics research published by the likes of H.H. Goddard and Lewis Terman 
blurred the lines between low intelligence, mental illness, and criminality by treating the 
“feeble-minded,” “insane,” and “epileptics” as various “criminal types.” Further, courts 
with psychopathic laboratories like Chicago’s routinely sent criminal defendants to 
institutes for the feeble-minded. This suggests that the occupants of mental institutions 
where sterilizations were most common may have included many “criminal types,” 
demonstrating how constructions of criminality overlapped with diagnoses of mental 
illness. While not all were convicted criminals, at least 70,000 people were subjected to 
compulsory sterilizations between 1900 and 1970, with the majority of them occurring in 
the Progressive Era. 
The Court’s ruling in Buck v. Bell briefly rejuvenated the eugenics movement, 
leading to a new wave of sterilization laws so that 28 states had them by 1931. 
Nonetheless, eugenics did not exhibit resilience into the latter twentieth century. But how 
the legacies of eugenics conditioned crime politics through the twentieth century will be 
explored in chapters 6 and 8.  
Some scholars suggest that eugenicists created the idea of criminal 
incorrigibility.532 The incorrigibility idea was present in eugenic debates, but this 
argument ignores consistencies between eugenic and anthropological theories of 
criminality. Both treated crime as a function of immutable physiological pathologies, 
concluded that many offenders were incorrigible, and lent scientific credence to the 
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racist, nativist, and classist strands of American political culture. Arguments for 
sterilizing and indefinitely detaining “incorrigibles” were not new in the early twentieth 
century. Eugenic reformers reframed established ideas about crime in pursuit of a new 
policy agenda, repackaging ideas associated with rehabilitative ideology to further their 
aims.  
V. Crime Politics in the 1920s and the Rise of the Crime Commission 
 The crime politics of the 1920s in many ways looked remarkably different from 
the crime politics of the early twentieth century. A series of crime waves and high-profile 
cases fueled new public anxieties over criminality in the 1920s. Culture wars over 
narcotics regulation, prostitution, and prohibition pushed different issues of criminal law 
onto the national agenda.533 The rise of organized crime gave the federal government a 
reason to increase its involvement in crime control. Strike activity was consistently 
derided as criminal, serving to further discredit unionism as a threat to public safety.534 
The Red Scare, Boston Police Strike, and race riots of the early 1920s all laid the basis 
for the federalization of crime control in the 1930s.535 A new managerial penal 
philosophy also took root, focusing on efficiently managing prisoners with little regard 
for their reformation by repurposing rehabilitative tools to make convicts complacent 
inmates rather than reformed citizens. This shift was ostensibly rooted in a 
disillusionment with the rehabilitative model.536 
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While these were major differences, there were also consistencies between 
Progressive Era crime politics and the politics of the 1920s, two of which are essential for 
understanding the crime politics that would develop during the New Deal. First, the 
managerial penology of the 1920s bore key similarities to rehabilitative penology by 
drawing on ideas of incorrigibility. The spread of “habitual offenders laws” in the 1920s, 
1930s, and 1940s were rationalized as mechanisms for incarcerating incorrigibles but had 
roots in these managerial shifts. The relationship between the managerial model and the 
rehabilitative ideal will be studied more closely in chapter six.   
The second major consistency can be seen in how the state and the federal 
governments responded to the unique issues of the 1920s.  Public concerns over gangs, 
prohibition, and culture wars prompted the “crime commission” to become a principle 
instrument of criminal justice reform. Crime commissions were outgrowths of 
progressivism’s reliance on science and expertise. Commonly created at the state and 
federal level, crime commissions were regularly tasked with employing experts to 
address social and political problems related to crime. Crime commissions were so 
common that historian Samuel Walker has referred to the 1920s as “The Era of the Crime 
Commission.”537 Commissions regularly shook up public opinion and created support for 
an enlarged federal role in crime control. The rapid spread of commissions set the 
precedent for the creation of the national Wickersham Crime Commission in 1929, whose 
reports shaped federal crime politics and political discourse about crime during the New 
Deal.  
 Often funded by business interests, state-level commissions as well as one 
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National Crime Commission in 1926 published many reports through the 1920s. They 
addressed a variety of issues relevant to criminal justice including corrections, police 
behavior, law enforcement, and plea-bargaining, and often expressed disillusionment 
with rehabilitation. Often, their prime focus was on the success or failure of prohibition 
and the rise of organized crime. These commissions had real political power, discussing 
numerous reforms that shaped how states responded to crime. In doing so, they regularly 
reviewed popular theories of criminal behavior, informing lawmakers as to which 
theoretical explanations of criminal behavior had the strongest empirical basis. From 
1919 through 1931, at least 35 crime commissions were created at the state or federal 
level to examine such questions.538 Through the reports of these crime commissions, 
scientific experts kept ideas about eugenics, bio-determinism, and innate criminality 
alive.  
Of these thirty-five, the three best known were the Cleveland Crime Survey 
(1922), the Missouri Crime Survey (1926), and the Illinois Crime Survey (1929).539 The 
Illinois Crime Survey endorsed what it called the “School of Modern Penology,” which 
was founded on the logic that “uncontrollable hereditary impulses…[make] the 
commission of crime almost inevitable.” The report supported the “individualization and 
segregation” of inmates called for by rehabilitative ideology but decried the 
sentimentalist impulses of rehabilitative scholars and suggested that extended punishment 
was often necessary. The commission thus expressed approval when they found that the 
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indeterminate sentence had increased the average term of incarceration for inmates.540 
The Missouri Crime Survey similarly linked its support for indeterminate sentencing to 
concerns about incorrigibility, writing that repeat offenders “should be dealt with by 
specially devised habitual criminal laws and be subjected to wholly indeterminate 
incarceration.”541  
 In studying the causes of crime, state commissions routinely validated the ideas of 
eugenics scholars. In fact, biological factors were often the only causes of crime 
commissions explored. The sole examination of the causes of crime in the Cleveland 
Commission’s report came in a section called “Medical Science and Criminal Justice,” 
which directed attention onto juvenile delinquency, mental health, and how health 
workers and medical professionals could detect criminality.542 The Missouri Commission 
also only had one chapter on the causes of crime, called “Mental Disorder, Crime, and the 
Law” which explored “feeble-minded persons,” “psychopathic personalities,” and mental 
disorder among adult and juvenile criminals.543 Similarly, the Illinois Commission’s only 
attention to crime’s causes was a chapter titled “The Defective or Deranged Delinquent,” 
exploring the “psychopathic conditions” of individuals charged as criminals and the 
psychiatric assistance provided to the Cook County Court system by the Psychopathic 
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Laboratory.544 And it was not just crime commission reports that kept the eugenic 
tradition alive; work by H.H. Goddard, Clarence Darrow, and Ernest Hoag and Edward 
Williams kept links between biology, psychology, and crime strong through the 1920s.545 
 There were some commission reports that endorsed perspectives emphasizing the 
sociological or cultural causes of crime. For example, the Chicago Commission on Race 
Relations’ report The Negro in Chicago (1922), published after the Chicago riots of 1919, 
emphasized environmental factors contributing to crime. While it was not a “crime 
commission” but a race-relations commission, the Chicago Commission discussed the 
“tangle of predisposing circumstances” driving black crime, including poor housing and 
deteriorating neighborhood conditions. Its report claimed that socioeconomic factors and 
biased media coverage produced “an exaggerated picture of Negro crime.” But in doing 
so, the report emphasized the distinctive criminal character of black culture as having “a 
pathological attitude towards society.” Such an attitude, the commission concluded, 
promoted “violence and other lawlessness” driven by “a desire for social revenge” 
against a history of abuse. In this way, the few reports that heard the arguments of Du 
Bois, Boas, and others succumbed to the same deficiencies as cultural theory. 
Essentializing black culture as a cause of crime propounded a theory of cultural 
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difference that was rooted in assumptions of racial difference and did little to discredit 
claims that black criminality was a unique social problem rooted in black pathology.546 
While the commissions of the 1920s were responses to a historically specific set 
of concerns, they reflected the progressive tradition of relying on expertise to solve social 
problems. The fact that commissions commonly endorsed the biological tradition 
highlights the tenacity of bio-determinist theories of criminality among experts. However, 
the eugenics movement began to lose steam in the 1920s as eugenicists increasingly 
struggled to secure funding for research and courts began to question the utility of 
eugenics measures. Calls for explicit eugenics laws quieted during the 1920s in favor of 
calls for managerial efficiency in prisons.547 While biological ideas remained alive in 
academic and political discourses to some extent in the 1920s, they began to lose the 
potency to produce policy change they had in previous decades.  
Nonetheless, the ideational structure of the theories expounded Lombroso, 
Brockway, and their eugenicist followers contributed to what is called the positivist 
school of criminology, a school of thought premised on the notion that the causes of 
crime can be scientifically identified through empirical testing. The works of Lombroso, 
Brockway, and their adherents sewed assumptions about class, determinism, and criminal 
behavior into positivist criminology. These assumptions would crucially shape the ideas 
articulated by scholars of crime that aimed to discredit biological and eugenic theories in 
the 1930s and 1940s.  
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One of these assumptions was the basic notion that criminality was a personal 
individual trait that could either be curable or incorrigible. This put an emphasis on the 
focal individual that proved useful for penal practitioners, experts, and lawmakers even 
after support for eugenics measures faded. The idea of incorrigibility, absent its 
biological flavor, was still used to politically through the 1930s and 1940s to portray 
crime as a personal trait that could only be addressed through individual-level 
interventions. Through the New Deal and mid-century, the rehabilitative model 
encouraged policymakers to pursue individual-level reforms to rehabilitate inmates in 
lieu of structural reforms, detaching new social-structural theories of crime from demands 
for economic reform.  
Criminal anthropology and eugenics also established a second discursive 
parameter in positivist criminological scholarship. By explicitly challenging biological 
theorists, positivist social-structural scholars of crime accepted terms of debate dictated 
by biological theorists. Specifically, by only examining the crimes eugenicists and 
anthropologists studied, they focused on crimes common among the poor. Much as 
cultural schools of race and crime inadvertently verified the idea that the crime problem 
was a race problem, social structural theorists reaffirmed the notion that the crime 
problem was a class problem. The influence of these ideas through the New Deal era and 
post-war years will be explored in more depth in chapter six.  
VI. Conclusion  
 The eugenics movement built on the arguments of Lombroso, criminal 
anthropologists, and rehabilitative scholars. But eugenicists repackaged the ideas of 
Lombroso and Brockway to defend a unique political agenda that appealed to 
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Progressives. By advocating that scientific experts could and should play a role in 
weeding out the unfit criminal incorrigibles in order to preserve social health and the 
national racial stock, eugenicists modified preexisting ideas about incorrigibility to justify 
policy proposals that fit within progressive political thought. The repression of the “unfit” 
and emergence of criminal sterilization statutes reflected older ideas of incorrigibility in 
ways that abandoned the Gilded Age emphasis on “survival of the fittest” in favor of a 
program of state-sponsored artificial selection driven by science.  
 In this way, we can see how the story of Progressive Era crime politics can be 
understood on Smith’s “spiral of politics.”548 Operating in a preexisting institutional and 
ideational universe, political actors drew on and refashioned preexisting ideas in ways 
that changed the character of those ideas and promoted institutional change. The ability 
of Progressives to create new ideas was conditioned by preexisting and prevailing ideas, 
and the influence of Lombroso, Brockway, and others on progressive thought is evident. 
But through a creative process of ideational modification and appropriation, political 
actors reattached these altered ideas to a new set of policy commitments that comported 
with progressives’ political philosophy and served their policy goals. By the New Deal, 
the cyclical process of development outlined in the spiral restarted within an ideational 
and institutional universe that had been altered and modified by Progressives.  
 The class-skewed crime politics of the Progressive Era not only reflected trends in 
eugenics, race science, and criminology, but also economics. This chapter showed how 
economists became some of the most vocal proponents of criminal sanction and 
sterilization for the unfit, who they viewed as drains on the nation’s political economy, as 
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economics developed into a prominent intellectual discipline. In this evolving social 
science milieu, economists were key actors who brought comparable ideas into debates 
about economic regulation. Much like Progressives believed scientific experts should 
proactively identify and segregate the unfit out of the population, they also believed that 
scientific experts should proactively identify and segregate unscrupulous businessmen 
out of the marketplace. This rationale embedded into Progressive Era regulatory politics a 
unique political construction of corporate criminality that was rooted in similar ideational 
and ideological trends. 
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CHAPTER 5: REGULATING COMPETITION AND PUNISHING CORPORATIONS 
IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 
 
“The law-making power of the State of New York…has put on the same footing 
prostitutes, gamblers, and corporations… It is a great deal safer…to be a 
prostitute or gambler than it is to be a corporation.” 
 – Walter S. Logan of the New York Bar, 1901549 
 
 Progressives generally viewed laissez-faire economics as outmoded and 
inefficient. The industrial behemoths and robber barons that rose to power in the 
nineteenth century had been viewed as the most “naturally fit” of the late nineteenth 
century economy, but the Progressives of the early twentieth century questioned whether 
or not that was truly the case. 
 The last chapter emphasized how Progressives called into question natural 
selection, Social Darwinism, and survival of the fittest, claiming that undesirable traits 
could sometimes become commonplace absent state regulation. This logic led 
Progressives to insist that natural selection dynamics be replaced with artificial selection 
processes driven by the state. This rationale for state expansion was mirrored in 
Progressives’ regulatory politics. As chapters two and three outlined, market competition 
was politicized as an economic analog of natural selection in the Gilded Age. Absent 
robust state intervention, competition would permit the best in the market to succeed. But 
just as Progressives questioned the efficiency of natural selection, they also questioned 
the efficiency of laissez-faire. Progressives argued that the state could do a better job if it 
actively selected out criminals before they committed crimes and if it actively selected 
unscrupulous businessmen out of markets rather than relying on competitive dynamics to 
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do it. Progressives thus concluded that a stronger state reliant on objective science and 
expertise had a crucial role to play in monitoring the industrial economy.  
Progressives were more critical of corporate power than either the advocates 
laissez-faire or regulatory ideology were in the late nineteenth century. They were more 
disposed to condemn business practices as criminal and were willing to use the state to 
monitor markets as a result. In fact, some progressive economists included the unethical 
businessmen within their eugenic taxonomies of human types. Due to this rejection of 
individualist classical economics, many Progressives also embraced the real entity theory 
of the firm—the idea that the corporation was an autonomous entity with an identity 
distinct from that of its owners or shareholders. Many defended this concept in order to 
give the state a means of regulating corporations and ensuring that businesses act in 
civically and socially responsible ways.  
Intuitively, this suggests that Progressives likely instituted meaningful reforms 
that checked the crimes of large corporations. A closer look reveals a different story. 
While Progressives contended that laissez-faire allowed the unethical rather than the 
fittest to survive, they generally claimed that most businessmen were good people. Only a 
few men in industry were rapacious capitalists driven by primitive predatory impulses. 
The problem was that these few bad men compelled good men to engage in unethical 
activity to effectively compete. Progressive regulatory reforms, most notably the creation 
of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), were built not to protect the public from 
predatory capitalism, but to protect good businessmen from bad ones by preventing the 
bad ones from committing crime in the first place through cooperative mechanisms.  
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As a result, the FTC was designed to work with rather than against business. After 
much debate, the FTC was granted no meaningful way of pursuing criminal sanctions. 
Legislators feared that the threat of prosecution would deter good businessmen from 
innovation and risk-taking, and the FTC reflected the design advocated by Louis 
Brandies. It was built to regulate competition by working with businesses to identify 
industry-specific restraint of trade practices, prevent them from occurring, and discourage 
concentration rather than prosecute criminal wrongdoing. By reframing regulatory 
ideology to new purposes, Brandeis constructed the FTC primarily as an ally to business 
and less as a protector of the public welfare, leaving it vulnerable to cooptation by 
corporate interests shortly after its passage. While this collaborative and cooperative 
approach was a worthwhile pursuit, the lack of any robust enforcement mechanism left 
the FTC with little ability to compel obedience. In the context of Braithwaite and Ayres’ 
sanctions pyramid, the FTC only had cooperative regulatory sanctions at its disposal 
without a credible threat of prosecution backing them up should corporations disobey.   
Further, the doctrine of corporate criminal liability counted as many libertarian 
adherents as it did liberal ones. While advocates of regulation assured that the doctrine 
would allow the state to hold big business accountable, those who opposed regulation 
noted that the principle granted corporations the same legal and constitutional protections 
as a human person. A close analysis of the doctrine’s origins demonstrates that it was not 
liberal progressives who drove its creation, but rather railway managers who insisted that 
it was a more pragmatic means of punishing corporate crime than punishing individuals. 
This history indicates that the railways’ political push for corporate liability was a 
disingenuous move that served to further insulate corporations from the criminal law’s 
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reach. In a criminal justice system premised on the existence of free will and proof of 
criminal intent, corporate criminal liability stands out as an anomaly, and punishing 
corporate entities has proven historically difficult.550 
This chapter begins by outlining core currents of progressive political thought in 
relation to economic regulation. The next section discusses the way corporate criminality 
was constructed within this ideological milieu, highlighting the crucial role economists 
played in this process as economics established itself as a prominent intellectual 
discipline. Then, the relation of Progressive Era constructions of corporate criminality to 
policy change is traced through antitrust law. Given the changing role of the Presidency 
in the early twentieth century, this begins with an analysis of the antitrust politics of 
Presidents Theodore Roosevelt, William Taft, and Woodrow Wilson. This illustrates how 
Progressive antitrust politics created a unique context for the emergence of the FTC in 
1914. This culminated in the design of a commission that was built to protect big 
business from itself rather than protect the public from predatory business practices. As 
the financial sector grew into a dominant force in the political economy, financial 
corporations helped transmit and effectively adapt regulatory ideology in debates over 
financial reform and the FTC. The penultimate section reviews the political development 
of corporate criminal liability, highlighting its broad-ranging political appeal and the 
politicking that facilitated its articulation in the Elkins Act of 1903 and in the Supreme 
Court ruling New York Central and Hudson River Railroad v. New York in 1909. The 
final part of the chapter highlights how these developments shaped the crime politics of 
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the 1920s and set the stage for the Great Depression, while leaving the state with a 
limited capacity to respond to the corporate abuses and negligence that caused it.  
I. Progressive Political Ideologies and Big Business 
 As the last chapter noted, despite their diversity of political views, Progressives 
drew from a shared collection of intellectual discourses relating to race, economics, 
human behavior, and politics.551 Four broad currents of progressivism are essential for 
specifically understanding the politics of regulation in the early twentieth century.  
First, Progressives believed that industrialized society should be supervised by a 
modern administrative state. They expressed a strong faith in the state’s “visible hand” to 
diagnose and treat the social ailments of industrial capitalism.552 Confidence in the visible 
hand reflected Progressives’ rejection of laissez-faire. Progressives viewed laissez-faire 
as economically unsound and obsolete, concluding that markets were not always efficient 
and that an active state could correct for market inefficiencies. Progressives pushed to 
shift regulatory and economic oversight authority from courts and parties to independent 
agencies. As Robert Wiebe noted, the central emphasis of progressivism was that the 
state “should fulfill its destiny through bureaucratic means.”553  
Monitoring industry required more than simply creating networks of regulatory 
agencies. A second tenet of progressivism was a belief that bureaucratic experts who 
relied on objective science should guide these administrative bodies. It was thought that a 
dependence on science would insulate bureaucratic administrators from politics, but true 
                                                             
551 Rodgers, “In Search of Progressivism.” 
552 Chandler, The Visible Hand. 
553 Wiebe, The Search for Order, 166; Skowronek, Building a New American State; Leonard, Illiberal 
Reformers. 
214 
 
autonomy proved difficult to attain. While agencies remained deeply political in their 
behavior and decision-making, Progressives rationalized their faith in scientific expertise 
and bureaucratic administration as alternatives to political decision-making.554  
As with crime politics, social scientists were key players in policy debates about 
regulation. To understand these debates, one must look to the prevailing discourses about 
economics. The field of economics grew in prominence in the 1900s as the American 
Economic Association (AEA), founded in 1885, evolved into a political and intellectual 
force. Richard Ely, Professor of Political Economy at the University of Wisconsin, 
became the AEA President in 1900. The AEA has been under the control of academics 
ever since.555 Ely called economists a “natural aristocracy,” claiming that because their 
authority and power were derived from scientific knowledge, they were wholly 
incorruptible. This commitment to disinterested truth-seeking is what Ely said 
differentiated economists from capitalists pursuing profits or politicians seeking power 
and thus made them necessary to policy debates.556 
Progressive economists thought that they had the knowledge to cure social and 
economic problems while promoting market efficiency and articulated new ideas about 
corporate capitalism, criminality, and regulation that diverged from laissez-faire 
ideologies. Economists critiqued the inefficiencies of Gilded Age capitalism, suggesting 
that the robber barons once deemed the most “fit” were really the most unscrupulous. 
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Constructs of naturalized hierarchies were also incorporated into economic analyses of 
industrial reform. Particularly, Frederick Winslow Taylor’s 1911 book The Principles of 
Scientific Management promoted what was thought to be state of the art business theory. 
His theory of management aimed to improve labor efficiency by fragmenting jobs within 
the production process, thus minimizing the skill requirements of workers, easing the 
execution of their jobs, and simplifying managerial supervision of factory operations. 
Taylorism is now associated with inhumane work conditions, but at the time was 
universally praised. Louis Brandeis, John Commons, Thorsten Veblen, Theodore 
Roosevelt, and even muckraker Ida Tarbell embraced “Taylorism.” But Taylor justified 
his theory with eugenics, believing that workers were lazy, unintelligent, and required 
simple jobs and close supervision to be productive.557  
 This is related to a third crucial theme of progressivism—that Progressives’ faith 
in science legitimated faith in natural hierarchy. Discourses of Darwinism justified 
systems of racial and class oppression and simultaneously infused regulatory discourse 
with naturalized constructions of criminality. Progressive race scientists often included 
categorizations of the rapacious capitalist in their racial taxonomies, presenting them as 
products of archaic predatory instincts. Such scholars argued that Gilded Age analysts 
mistook immoral and unscrupulous businessmen for the “fittest” of the market jungle, 
and that a stronger administrative state was necessary to monitor them.558  
 It is reasonable to think this would lead to harsh criminal laws targeting the 
destructive capitalists. But Progressives’ hostility to the few predatory businessmen was 
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checked by their faith in the character of the majority of businessmen. Among 
Progressives, some defended populists’ insistence for the destruction of large businesses 
while others supported large corporations as inevitable and efficient.559 But a third 
perspective endorsed the model of regulated competition, which fused faith in expertise 
with populist sympathies for markets. Gerald Berk has shown how historical actors led by 
jurist Louis Brandeis convinced policymakers to design the Federal Trade Commission 
based on this model, aiming to foster industry habits of productive experimentation, 
innovation, and collaboration rather than cutthroat competition.560 
 It was within the model of regulated competition that the dichotomy between the 
criminal and ethical capitalist flourished. It was rationalized that ethical businessmen 
needed protection from unethical ones through state regulation, and Progressive experts 
were uniquely well suited to distinguishing the good from the bad. This approach rested 
on a belief that capitalists could be morally rehabilitated and their behavior channeled 
into productive directions by the state without punishment. As a result, the FTC was 
empowered to work with business leaders in ways that promoted cooperation. This 
interpretation of corporate criminality facilitated the regulation of competition, not the 
punishment of cutthroat business tactics, and regulatory ideology was thus intertwined 
into Brandeis’s model of regulated competition.  
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 Progressives thought laissez-faire was inefficient in the same way they thought 
natural selection was inefficient. Just as assertive state interventions monitoring 
criminality like sterilization replaced natural selection with artificial selection, state-led 
market coordination replaced a “survival of the fittest” market mentality with an artificial 
selection process. The state was to be used to weed out predatory capitalists from the 
good ones, direct predatory impulses into productive directions, and displace remnants of 
laissez-faire with state monitoring. This philosophy still entailed a belief in the 
superiority of capitalists but authorized more involvement from the state to efficiently 
sort between bad and good businessmen. So as shifts in discourse from the Gilded Age to 
Progressive Era adapted and transmitted aspects of rehabilitative and regulatory 
ideologies over time, a political shift followed. In place of a natural selection philosophy 
(“born criminals” and “survival of the fittest” markets), Progressives endorsed state-led 
artificial selection as more efficient (eugenics and regulated competition).  
 A fourth and final important theme is that progressives commonly attributed a 
collective identity to social bodies and organizations, including corporations. Much in the 
way Progressives viewed the social body as a collectivity rather than a disaggregated 
collection of individuals, they also embraced the real entity theory of the firm—the idea 
that the corporation was “a real and natural entity whose existence is prior to and separate 
from the state.”561 Leftist Progressives thought real entity theory could be a means of 
holding capital accountable. Aware of the state’s reluctance to regulate industry, they 
depicted corporations as organic entities that had the duty to act in civically responsible 
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ways so as to give the state a way to hold corporations responsible for antisocial behavior 
through doctrines of corporate criminal and civil liability. Corporate criminal liability 
particularly was contingent on the belief that the corporate body possessed the requisite 
mens rea to commit a crime.562 
Despite its leftist appeal, real entity theory had right-wing libertarian supporters. 
Treating the corporation as an autonomous being granted it as much legal protections as 
an individual. This provided a rationale for an anti-regulatory politics aiming to insulate 
the corporation from the state.563 In early twentieth century policy debates about 
corporate criminal liability, both leftist Progressives and conservatives agreed that 
punishing the corporation rather than the individuals within it was a more efficient means 
of sanction. But driven by mid-level railroad managers, the doctrine ultimately served to 
insulate executives from the reach of the criminal law.  
 It is within these ideological currents that constructions of the corporate criminal 
evolved. Gilded Age accounts steeped in the rationality of market competition presented 
robber barons as the naturally fittest of the capitalist setting, limiting state responses to 
predatory business. Progressives were more willing to criticize the unscrupulous 
capitalist, but only as a foil to the ethical businessman, and most Progressives supported 
the large corporation as an efficient phenomenon that should be monitored in lieu of the 
individuals within it. This made for a precarious combination of policy commitments that 
produced a unique set of policy outcomes. The regulated competition philosophy that 
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undergirded the FTC embodied the idea that the state could and should differentiate good 
and bad businessmen and morally rehabilitate the bad ones.  
II. Progressive Era Constructs of Corporate Criminality 
 There were three key facets to the Progressives’ conceptualization of corporate 
criminality. Most fundamental was the idea that market-driven natural selection was 
inefficient, minimal state intervention had allowed the unscrupulous to run upright 
businessmen out of business, and that bureaucratic experts would effectively distinguish 
between good and bad capitalists. As Richard Ely wrote in his 1901 book Introduction to 
Political Economy, “Competition, if unregulated, tends to force the level of economic life 
down to the moral standard of the worst men who can sustain themselves in the business 
community.”564 Edward Ross made similar claims, linking wealth accumulation to his 
concerns about racial progress. In 1903, he wrote that, “The struggle for wealth does not 
bring to the top the intellectual aristocracy…[t]he plutocracy of to-day is far, very 
far…from favoring the multiplication of the best.”565 
 Economist and eugenicist Irving Fisher clarified that while ideas about natural 
criminality justified social repression, ideas about natural corporate rapacity justified 
regulation. In his 1907 article “Why Has the Doctrine of Laissez-Faire Been 
Abandoned?” Fisher discussed the shift from the laissez-faire to “modern doctrines of 
governmental regulation and social control.” He claimed that the lower classes rarely 
knew their best interest, saying that “some men need enlightenment…and others need 
restraint.” This reflected the dichotomy between reformation and incorrigibility. But 
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Fisher went further, arguing that the educated should always “be allowed to dominate,” 
the “ignorant” classes. And for those at the top, cutthroat competition produced 
inefficient outcomes and should be replaced with rationalized regulatory interventions.566  
 Economists recognized that concepts of fitness in Social Darwinist thought were 
contingent constructs. Progressive luminaries like Lester Frank Ward, Henry Carter 
Adams, and John Bates Clark shared this belief. They saw themselves as antagonists to 
Herbert Spencer and William Graham Sumner’s efforts to weaponize Darwinist ideas to 
rationalize laissez-faire, instead understanding natural selection as an environmentally 
conditioned process.567 Like Gilded Age apologists for laissez-faire, Progressives argued 
that those who succeeded in business were naturally distinct human types, but unlike their 
predecessors they critiqued the unprincipled businessman as driven by a natural 
disposition. For instance, famous sociologist Thorsten Veblen argued that the rapacious 
capitalist could be understood as a natural racial type driven by an animalistic predatory 
instinct.568 The most successful capitalists were sometimes products of natural selection, 
but at other times were unscrupulous men who exhibited undesirable traits to thrive in the 
competitive dynamics of capitalism. Progressives thought that state monitoring could 
differentiate such individuals from successful businessmen who were morally sound, and 
thus help to create markets in which ethical businessmen could succeed. Regulation 
would thus save capitalism from itself.  
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 Arguments about the unethical businessman were intertwined with a second 
current in Progressive debates—the idea that most businessmen were ethical and the few 
who were not were reformable. Progressives hinged their support for regulation on the 
need to protect good businessmen, not the public, from their unethical competitors. 
Absent regulation, as economist Edward Ross said, economic life would be brought down 
“to the moral standard of the worst men who can sustain themselves in the business 
community.” This inclination to protect business against itself rather than protect society 
from predatory practices checked their impulses to punish corporate malfeasance.  
 This also does not mean that rationalizations for corporate greed disappeared in 
Progressive Era scholarship on crime and human behavior. G. Frank Lydston particularly 
rearticulated older Gilded Age rationalizations of corporate rapacity. He defended 
businessmen accused of wrongdoing by saying, “None of them have a previous criminal 
record,” reflecting tendencies in rehabilitative ideology to use past behavior as a metric of 
criminal tendencies and rehabilitative capacity.569 Lydston claimed that businessmen 
were driven by a “great inherent capacity for good, and the force of character that makes 
men great,” but that they also can make “great criminals.” He argued that the 
businessman driven to crime is fueled by a different instinct than the typical criminal, but 
one that can still result in undesirable behavior. He wrote that, “Whether ambition results 
in great crimes or in good deeds, the individual will be found to be of a forceful 
character. The petty thief is not impelled by it.” Given that the capitalist lacked criminal 
instincts, Lydston wrote that “Certain influences may divert the force of a strong 
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character in the direction of criminality.”570 His arguments supported regulatory ideology 
by contending that businessmen who committed crimes were inherently good, deserved 
mild regulations rather than punishment, and could be pushed in non-criminal directions 
if the state created healthy market conditions. Hereditarians like Lewis Terman similarly 
endorsed arguments about the innate superiority of the business classes. Terman argued 
that IQ scores perfectly corresponded to class, economic success, and criminality.571 
While progressive economists remained concerned about the rapacious capitalist, 
they presented him as a rare deviation from the positive construct of the businessman 
articulated in laissez-faire ideologies, and one who was still not fully criminal. Edward 
Ross wrote that “The trolley company, the quack medicine man, the insurer of rotten 
ships, and the jerry builder,” should not be dealt with like the common criminal “because 
they are morally superior to him.”572 Thus in Progressives’ logic, businessmen should not 
be punished for two reasons. First, good businessmen who resorted to crime to compete 
with their corrupt rivals should not be punished. They simply needed protection from 
lesser men who engaged in unethical practices and forced their competitors down to their 
level. Richard Ely argued that such men had “inferior natures” and “have not been able to 
endure” the temptations of material power.573 The second reason businessmen should be 
punished is that these weak-willed businessmen tempted by material power did not 
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deserve punishment. Rather, the market conditions tempting them should be corrected so 
they could be encouraged to engage in more productive practices and activities.  
Constructs of businessmen as superior human types clearly did not disappear. 
Chauncey Depew, formerly Vanderbilt’s attorney and now a retired Senator from New 
York, wrote in his autobiography in 1922 that men of fame and fortune succeeded due to 
their “superior ability, foresight, and adaptability.”574 Railroad magnate James J. Hill also 
wrote in his autobiography in 1910 that, “the fortunes of railroad companies are 
determined by the law of survival of the fittest.”575 The idea that businessmen succeeded 
by virtue of their own intelligence, work ethic, and innate ability still persisted, but 
alongside new ideas that unscrupulous competitors were lowering the best in the industry 
down to their level. 
 A third tenet of progressivism that checked the impulse to punish businessmen 
was Progressives’ embrace of real entity theory. Scholars like Richard Ely discussed the 
corporation as an artificial person with a degree of autonomy.576 But viewing the 
corporation as a collectivity rather than aggregation of individuals forced Progressives to 
contemplate whether individuals were the only unit through which selection could be 
monitored or if competition among collective entities like corporations could be 
explained through Darwinism. Thomas Leonard has shown that while Progressives were 
skeptical that industry leaders were the fittest products of natural selection, they were 
willing to accept natural selection doctrine “when the competitors were nations or races 
or even the trusts.” Societies, races, and corporations could be understood as existing in a 
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natural state of competition with one another, meaning that in regulated markets, 
industrial behemoths that outpaced competitors were simply the most efficient.577 
 Treating the corporation as the unit of social control further insulated corporate 
agents from the criminal law. As an artificial person, it was nearly impossible to 
understand a corporation’s criminality in terms of innate predispositions. The difficulty in 
identifying a corporate mens rea rendered it hard to attribute blame to corporate forms. 
Nonetheless, the doctrine of corporate criminal liability was something Progressives from 
both the right and left supported. Its emergence was not simply an organic outgrowth of 
the common law, but a politically contingent outcome.  
Progressives did not discredit ideas about the natural superiority of capitalists 
embedded into regulatory ideology. Rather, these ideas were repackaged into the 
Progressives’ defenses of corporate liability and regulated competition. Richard Ely 
neatly summarized this perspective, writing that, “statutory regulation, well-enforced, 
would simply confirm the efforts of the most intelligent and most just employers” rather 
than the more manipulative and exploitative ones.578 Ely endorsed a logic resembling the 
philosophy of regulated competition, stating that, “Turning now to competitive 
businesses, what is required with respect to them is that sort of regulation which, without 
destroying competition, will raise its ethical level…Regulated competition within its own 
proper sphere is one of the conditions of social progress.”579 John Commons similarly 
wrote that without regulation, all employers are “forced down to the level of the most 
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grasping.”580 The fact that ethical businessmen existed next to unethical ones warranted 
regulation to ensure that the unethical were monitored and reformed without intruding on 
the actions of good capitalists. Regulated competition was less about punishing 
criminality or protecting the public than promoting economic growth in the least intrusive 
way. The Progressives’ perspective on regulated competition thus bundled core elements 
of regulatory ideology into a new brand of politics.  
III. Progressives and Antitrust Reform: Regulating Competition and Criminality 
Given progressive debates over the benefits and drawbacks of industrial 
consolidation, the growth of trusts became an issue of enormous political significance in 
the early twentieth century. From 1890 through 1903, the federal government initiated 23 
antitrust cases, sixteen of which were civil and seven were criminal. Only one criminal 
conviction was obtained despite the frenzy of mergers that occurred in the years 
following the Sherman Antitrust Act’s passage.581 In its early years, the Sherman 
Antitrust Act actually proved most effective in state confrontations with organized labor 
rather than trusts.582 But in 1903, there were signs of change as the Department of Justice 
received congressional funding specifically for an antitrust division.583 This ushered in an 
era of “trust-busting” according to the narratives presented in standard history textbooks. 
In reality, Progressives had varied views on trusts. Only a minority shared the 
strict anti-monopolist attitudes of Populists insistent on the destruction of big business. 
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Most Progressives, including prominent economists like John Commons and politicians 
like President Theodore Roosevelt, saw bigness as inevitable.584 They were not pure 
apologists for corporations and were not hesitant to criticize monopoly, but they 
supported consolidation as more efficient than competition among small business.585 
Others like jurist Louis Brandeis charted a middle ground, hoping to regulate and monitor 
competition through expert-run bureaucracies. Gerald Berk’s analysis of early twentieth 
century antitrust policy demonstrates that Brandeis’s model prevailed in the passage of 
the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914.586 But a long series of political decisions led 
to the creation of the FTC, and the politics preceding its creation were colored with 
questions about the nature of corporate criminality.  
Only by assessing the interaction of competing strands of progressive thought in 
relation to consolidation can we get a full picture of the antitrust politics of the period. 
Roosevelt and his successor William Howard Taft viewed big business as efficient and 
inevitable to different degrees, while Woodrow Wilson embraced regulated competition. 
But despite the bluster of their antitrust politics, each relied on core elements of 
regulatory ideology to advocate for policies to support industrial capitalism. Their 
different approaches built on common ideas about corporate criminality that were drawn 
from the prevailing ideological currents of progressivism. 
Political Context: Variations in Progressives’ Antitrust Politics  
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Most accounts analyze progressive antitrust politics in the context of debates over 
economic growth, stability, and regulation. This is usually a warranted focus. But in 
important ways, the enforcement of antitrust law reflected Progressives’ notions of 
corporate criminality. This becomes clear upon examining the politics of one of the era’s 
most prominent alleged “trust-busters”—President Theodore Roosevelt.   
It is reasonable to focus on the “trust-busting” Presidents of the early twentieth 
century to track understandings of corporate criminality through the development of 
antitrust policy. Stephen Skowronek has argued that presidential leadership has changed 
over time in relation to the emergence of new institutional resources and governing 
responsibilities relative to the institution of the Presidency that have altered the power 
resources and strategies a President has at his disposal to affect policy change. 
Skowronek argues that a major change occurred at the turn of the century, which he 
describes as a shift from the “partisan” Presidency in which Presidents served as the 
broker for national party coalitions by distributing patronage to party factions and local 
machines to the “pluralist” Presidency. In the pluralist mode of governance, which 
Skowronek argues emerged in 1900 with the presidency of Roosevelt, the President 
became “the steward of national policymaking,” who bargained between leaders of major 
governing institutions, national organized interests, and the executive establishment.587 
Beginning with Roosevelt, Presidents played a key role in negotiating between sectors of 
the political economy, warranting closer attention to the actions of Roosevelt, Taft, and 
Wilson than the presidents of the nineteenth century in relation to antitrust policy.  
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Roosevelt was unafraid to condemn big business’s actions as criminal wrongs and 
supported state intervention in response.588 He claimed that if the state acted as “neutral 
ground” to regulate businesses, it would “serve as a place of refuge” for “the lawless man 
of great wealth.”589 He said he supported any and all means of punishing corporate 
wrongdoers.590 But in spite of this rhetoric, Roosevelt remained a pragmatic Hamiltonian 
who accepted industrial consolidation as inevitable and efficient. In his first State of the 
Union Address, he suggested that combinations were “natural” and provided “great good 
to our people.”591 He criticized the Sherman law because it “struck at all business,” 
rendering it “a constant threat against decent businessmen” in addition to criminal 
ones.592 Roosevelt repeatedly insisted that the law should only forbid combinations that 
do “harm to the general public,” cautiously differentiating between “good” and “bad” 
trusts.593  
By anthropomorphizing the corporation, Roosevelt employed physiological 
metaphors to discuss business. He insisted that to “care for the body” of society, 
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industrial development must be promoted.594 He called the railroads “arteries” through 
which the “commercial life-blood of this nation flows.”595 By drawing on Darwinist 
language, he claimed that the emergence of big business was a “mere law of nature.”596 
Comparing economic development and trust formation to notions of human fitness and 
competition appealed to the axioms of Darwinism present in Progressive Era thought.597 
If trusts were natural outcomes of competition, Roosevelt concluded that attempts 
to overthrow the “more prosperous” trusts would be reckless.598 He was critical of 
muckraking anti-business journalists seeking to disrupt the natural economic order. He 
compared muckrakers to “quack” doctors whose solutions would be “more dangerous” to 
the “patient,” meaning the economy, than any “disease” infecting industry. While 
Roosevelt did not offer a blanket defense of big business, he thought that trusts were 
natural and should be treated with care and caution.599 
Roosevelt also discussed the individuals running the trusts through Darwinist 
metaphors. He argued trusts led by immoral men could threaten the economic order. He 
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claimed that the “predatory capitalist” order and men driven by “wolfish greed” 
threatened this system.600 He said that such individuals should be seen as wild predators, 
“stand[ing] on the same moral level with the creature who fattens on the blood money of 
the gambling-house and the saloon.”601  
In spite of his rhetoric, Roosevelt’s criticisms of industry leaders were tempered 
by his belief that such men were capable of moral reform. Roosevelt thought neither 
regulation nor legislation could formalize a system of ethics in business but claimed that 
he could rehabilitate executives through moral leadership.602 Writing about the unethical 
activity among titans of industry, Roosevelt wrote that, “[I]t is only by a slow and patient 
inward transformation” that these men can be “helped upward in their struggle for a 
higher and a fuller life.”603 His public statements aimed to raise the moral standards of 
industry. For instance, he stated in 1905 that using profits as a metric to judge business 
success was a “delusion.” Profits are only a useful metric “so far as it is accompanied by 
and develops a high standard of conduct—honor, integrity, civic courage.”604  
Roosevelt’s antitrust politics thus hinged on two constructs of corporate 
criminality—good trusts were natural and bad trusts needed to be controlled, and 
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unethical businessmen running trusts could be reformed through moral leadership. 
Consequently, Roosevelt’s preferred mode for monitoring trusts was not prosecution or 
regulation, but private agreements in which executives promised to alter their practices in 
exchange for lenience.605 Roosevelt believed that juries were often reluctant to convict “a 
reputable member of the business community for doing what the business community has 
unhappily grown to recognize as wellnigh normal in business,” rendering informal 
agreements more practical.606 His efforts to broker negotiations with trusts is perfectly 
consistent with the model of pluralist presidential leadership described by Skowronek.  
Roosevelt stated that, “publicity is the only sure remedy which we can now 
invoke” to regulate trusts, as “the courts of law are powerless.”607 While he generally 
negotiated private agreements quietly, he occasionally resorted to publicizing the 
activities of trusts as a deterrent measure. He did this particularly by working with the 
Bureau of Corporations (BOC). Established in 1903, the BOC was a predecessor to the 
Federal Trade Commission and was primarily designed to report on major industries and 
search for monopolistic practices. The Bureau’s enacting legislation gave the President 
the right to release any information gathered, which Roosevelt sometimes did.608 More 
frequently, Roosevelt reached informal agreements with corporations by working with 
the Bureau’s first chair James Garfield. While a few publicized high-profile prosecutions 
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maintained his anti-business image, Roosevelt’s relationship with the Bureau exhibited a 
willingness to work with corporations.609 The Bureau actually complicated prosecutions, 
as private agreements with businesses like International Harvester and Standard Oil 
granted organizations immunity from the criminal law.610  
One example of Roosevelt’s approach to antitrust enforcement occurred during 
the Panic of 1907. In the middle of the crisis, Roosevelt permitted U.S. Steel to purchase 
Tennessee Coal and Iron after Gary Frick of U.S. Steel convinced him that the merger 
would keep the market afloat. Shortly thereafter, it became clear that Frick’s claims were 
disingenuous, and U.S. Steel gained tremendous market advantages at a bargain.611 In the 
case, Roosevelt’s faith in businessmen and the advantages of bigness backfired, leading 
him to reach a flawed deal rather than intervene in the market directly. 
Roosevelt’s support for consolidation, faith in the reformability of businessmen, 
and belief that trusts could be “good” or “bad” complicate his image as a trustbuster. His 
actions reflected a desire to save honest business from unscrupulous competitors more 
than protect the public from predatory capitalism. His successor, William Taft, exhibited 
a more aggressive approach. Taft’s administration quickly filed an antitrust suit against 
U.S. Steel after it negotiated its purchase of Tennessee Coal and Iron with Roosevelt, 
angering Roosevelt so much that some suggest it was why he made a third party 
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presidential bid in 1912.612 The case highlights how strong the tensions were among 
Progressives regarding antitrust politics. 
Early in his presidency, Taft attributed the “prevalence of crime and fraud” 
among business to the failure of the criminal law and aimed to bolster the state’s antitrust 
enforcement.613 In four years, Taft and his Attorney General George Wickersham filed 
eighty-nine antitrust suits, more than doubling Roosevelt’s seven-year total.614 
Nonetheless, Taft still expressed faith in the moral capacity of businessmen, arguing that 
antitrust crusades of the early twentieth century encouraged an unfair “impeachment of 
the motives of men of the highest character.”615 He also criticized Roosevelt’s tendency 
to differentiate good from bad trusts, saying the public “ought to rid themselves of the 
idea that such a distinction is practicable.”616 This reveals a core distinction between 
Roosevelt and Taft’s approaches to antitrust. They agreed that there existed good and bad 
businessmen, but unlike Roosevelt, Taft was less willing to tolerate the idea of “bigness” 
by distinguishing between good and bad trusts.   
Perhaps the most significant antitrust case during Taft’s administration came 
against Standard Oil. In its ruling, the Supreme Court held that Standard Oil monopolized 
the petroleum industry and mandated its dissolution into competing firms. But in doing so 
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the Court endorsed the “rule of reason,” which interpreted the Sherman Act as 
authorizing judges to deem combinations illegal only if their effect was to unreasonably 
restrain trade.617 Donald Cressey has discussed how this facilitated a shift away from 
strict liability by requiring that intent be proven in restraint of trade cases, complicating 
the state’s ability to secure convictions by requiring proof of intent from a corporate 
entity.618 
Critics have argued that the rule of reason gave activist judges the authority to 
label a restraint of trade as “reasonable” or “unreasonable” based on their personal 
preferences.619 There does seem to be some circumstantial evidence that this is true, as 
the decision was followed by an immediate reduction in the rate of antitrust 
convictions.620 But more importantly, Standard exacerbated partisan divides over 
antitrust politics. Democrats, who were more attuned towards populist attitudes, were 
incensed at the decision, whereas Progressives were welcoming of it.621 Taft himself 
endorsed the rule of reason, saying he only sought to punish trusts that demonstrated 
intent to suppress competition.622 But the rule of reason assumed the existence of a 
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corporate mens rea, which has proved difficult and long since plagued the enforcement of 
the corporate criminal law.623  
 Taft’s inclination towards tougher antitrust enforcement aggravated corporations 
and contributed to his failed reelection bid.624 After his term, however, he appeared to 
regret his punitive stances. He wrote in 1914 that sentencing trust leaders to prison terms 
would only have deterrent effects “in theory,” because the public is reluctant to punish 
businessmen “for doing what some years ago was only regarded as shrewd business.”625 
Upon his appointment to the Supreme Court, Taft issued several pro-business rulings.626 
Despite expressing stronger opposition to big business than Roosevelt, Taft still accepted 
industrial consolidation as a social good.   
 Roosevelt and Taft embodied varying visions of progressive thought in regards to 
big business, but both packaged elements of regulatory ideology into the political 
currents of the Progressive Era by defending the character of business executives and 
advocating for regulation rather than criminalization of trusts and their leaders. This 
illustrates both the durability of regulatory ideology and the way the “trust-busters” 
fashioned an antitrust politics that combined regulatory ideology with the politics of the 
Progressive Era. In contrast to Roosevelt and Taft, Woodrow Wilson endorsed the 
regulated competition model Brandeis favored, which was crucial in facilitating the 
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design of the Federal Trade Commission and also hinged on familiar constructions of 
corporate criminality from regulatory ideology.  
Woodrow Wilson and Reforming the FTC’s Precursors  
Unlike many Progressives, Woodrow Wilson was skeptical of regulatory 
commissions that he feared would entrench business power.627 He also rejected real-
entity theory as it applied to corporate criminal liability, stating that, “guilt is 
personal.”628 So while he shared many affinities with his predecessors, like his belief that 
businessmen were generally honest, Wilson articulated a different brand of 
progressivism.629 It was under his administration that the Federal Trade Commission was 
created, one of the most significant regulatory innovations of the Progressive Era. 
Constructs of corporate criminality were intertwined into Wilson and Brandeis’s brand of 
progressivism and became embedded into the FTC’s design.  
The FTC was designed with the power to prevent “persons, partnerships, or 
corporations, except banks, and common carriers…from using unfair methods of 
competition in commerce.”630 It was not designed to intervene in markets in particularly 
robust ways and had two institutional warrants—to work with industries in a deliberative 
manner to identify common industry-specific predatory and restraint of trade practices, 
and to curb those practices through education and information provision to corporations. 
It was argued that this would preclude power from becoming concentrated and prevent 
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markets from becoming criminogenic. The law’s only criminal provisions punished the 
inclusion of false entries in reports to the commission, refusal or failure to file reports, or 
the destruction of records. It did not criminalize any specific restraint of trade practices.  
Gerald Berk’s research carefully unpacks Brandeis’s philosophy of “regulated 
competition” and its influence on the FTC. According to Brandeis, economic competition 
was ambiguous. That is, it could promote either good or bad outcomes, like innovation 
and efficiency or concentrated power and abuse. Progressives often glossed over this 
ambiguity, and Brandeis argued that the state should regulate competition to prevent the 
concentration of power by steering predatory competitive instincts into behavior that 
enhanced product quality and production efficiency. Wilson was the ideal candidate to 
assist Brandeis in enshrining this philosophy into law, given his appeal to both populists 
who favored market competition and pro-regulation Progressives dissatisfied with Taft 
and Roosevelt. Especially in his first term, Wilson drew heavily on Brandeis’s counsel.631 
Although Brandeis and Wilson were key players in its emergence, the FTC did 
not come out of nowhere. Its creation was the result of almost two decades of institutional 
development and debates over antitrust policy, within which debates about corporate 
criminality were embedded. The FTC actually had its origins with its institutional 
precursor, the Bureau of Corporations. Created in 1903, the Bureau was designed to 
regulate trusts but was almost entirely advisory. It was authorized to investigate industrial 
consolidation and make policy recommendations, but essentially served a non-invasive 
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information-gathering role for the state and industry.632 The Bureau was a central 
recommendation of McKinley’s Industrial Commission, which claimed the Bureau 
should be modeled off the ICC, investigate industrial consolidation, collect reports, 
disclose the conditions of business, and monitor industries for monopoly.633 But the 
eventual Bureau’s lack of enforcement mechanisms made it non-controversial, ensuring 
its swift passage over more stringent proposals.634  
A need for stronger trust regulation became apparent in the 1910s as public 
anxieties over the growth of a “money trust” spread. As the financial sector became a 
more powerful element of the political economy, fears that a group of wealthy Wall 
Street financiers and bankers controlled a vast number of corporations brought new 
attention to the trust issue. The financiers and bankers feared to be at the heart of this 
money trust were the targets of a high-profile congressional subcommittee inquiry from 
1912-1913. Known as the Pujo Committee for its chairperson Representative Arsene Pujo 
(D-LA), the inquiry’s findings inspired public support for a number of reforms. 
Led by Pujo and legal counsel Samuel Untermyer, the committee found that the 
“money trust” not only was real, but also controlled over $22 billion across the mining, 
manufacturing, transportation, telecommunications, and financial sectors. Headed by the 
Morgan Empire, the trust held 341 directorships spanning 112 corporations. In statements 
before the committee, participants saw nothing wrong in their activity. When asked about 
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how the trust regularly altered stock prices to their advantage, former NYSE president 
Frank Sturgis defended the practice before the Pujo Committee. When pressed on the 
topic, he told the committee, “You are asking me a moral question, and I am answering 
you a stock-exchange question…They are very different things.” He described short 
selling as defensible during panics, and when asked whether it worsened economic 
conditions, he stated, “It might. Self-preservation is the first law of nature…I do not 
consider it wrong.” Sturgis’s comments did not go unnoticed. Newspapers the following 
morning noted that Sturgis’s testimony proved that “manipulation is well approved” and 
considered “regular and legitimate” on the New York Stock Exchange.635  
It was commonplace for the financiers behind the money trust to divorce 
questions of business from questions of morality as Sturgis did by rationalizing corporate 
rapacity as the actions of reasonable men fighting to survive in the capitalist jungle. The 
New York State Chamber of Commerce cautioned the committee against mistaking the 
actions of executives as mala in se when they were only mala prohibita. The Chamber 
argued that criminalizing restraint of trade practices violated economic law because it 
“shackle[d] the genius of this country” while also being “inconsistent with moral law” for 
punishing actions that were not moral wrongs.636   
Much as the robber barons of the nineteenth century did, money trust financiers 
defended their character as non-criminal to rationalize their anti-regulatory politics. For 
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instance, William Sherer, the manager of the New York Clearing House Association, 
defended the discretion clearing-houses had to determine memberships of banks on the 
grounds that “the average business man…is a person of some moral status.” He claimed 
that even in the absence of regulation, abusive practices are not prevalent because 
businessmen “are going to do right anyway.”637 Nonetheless, the Pujo committee’s report 
recommended expanding regulations on stock exchanges, prohibiting holding multiple 
directorships of competing corporations, and regulating the securities industry.638 It 
influenced the design of several reforms, including the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914.  
Lawmakers who supported the law were quick to treat the money trust’s 
monopolistic actions and attempts to restrain trade as crimes. Populist Democrats spoke 
in support of the bill by deploying rhetoric of moral right. Representative Edwin Webb 
(D-NC) said that the law prohibited actions that should be forbidden “in conscience.”639 
Senator Lewis (D-IL) argued that anything contrary to good public policy should “be 
treated as also a violation of public morals.”640 Still their colleagues drew on facets of 
regulatory ideology, criticizing the bill for targeting men who should not be viewed as 
criminals given their track record as upstanding members of their communities. 
Representative Joseph Moore (R-PA) and Senator Albert Cummins (R-IA) argued that 
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the Clayton law’s provisions unfairly punished “the industrious and progressive business 
man” who “has lived an upright, moral, and manly life, building up a character that 
should stand in his support when accused.”641 This language thus mirrored debates during 
the Interstate Commerce Act. Instead of punishing bad behavior, more pro-business 
legislators tried to reframe the debate to be less about whether executives did bad things 
and more about whether they were “bad people.” But in the Clayton Act, it seemed that 
this political reframing did not achieve the desired outcome.    
The Clayton Antitrust Act was in large part based on the recommendations of the 
Pujo Committee’s report. The law did not create a commission but rather clarified the 
Sherman law’s provisions by prohibiting price discrimination, multiple directorships 
deemed anti-competitive, and more closely monitoring acquisitions and mergers. The law 
specified that if a corporation were guilty of any violation, any directors or agents who 
authorized the act would be punished with a $5,000 fine and up to a year of 
imprisonment. It also authorized injunctive relief for any person or firm suffering 
potential losses due to a violation of the statute.642  
Based on this account it appears as though the Clayton Act was a loss for the 
financiers and bankers who fought regulation, given the reforms it made to the criminal 
aspects of antitrust law. This story becomes more complicated upon exploring related 
reforms of the early Wilson Administration. The Pujo committee claimed in its final 
report that given the success of the ICC, the Clayton Act should make few clarifications 
to the Sherman law and be supplemented with a new commission to identify restraint of 
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trade practices specific to various industries.643 Thus, it opened the door to the creation of 
the Federal Trade Commission. Many scholars have since outlined the numerous 
loopholes in the Clayton Act, with some suggesting that the original proposal’s more 
robust criminal provisions were weakened in committee because it served a strategic 
purpose for Wilson by securing southern Democrats’ support for the Federal Reserve 
Act.644 But it also opened the door to Brandeis’s influence in the White House, enabling 
him to play a pivotal role in designing the FTC.645 While the Pujo hearings show how 
elements of the financial sector failed in their efforts to oppose regulation in whole, 
debates over the FTC show how Brandeis carried ideas associated with regulatory 
ideology into Progressive Era policy.  
The Federal Trade Commission Act (1914)   
The FTC Act was a response to anxieties over the money trust and an expression 
of bipartisan backlash to the rule of reason in the 1911 Standard Oil decision. Businesses 
feared the rule of reason would result in politically motivated enforcement, while anti-
corporate forces feared it limited the fight against concentration by aiming to distinguish 
“efficient” from “inefficient” arrangements.646 The FTC was borne out of this conflict, 
with populists insisting on an informational commission designed to prevent bigness and 
Progressives favoring a strong agency to regulate natural monopolies. Ultimately, 
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Brandeis’s model of regulated competition used “progressive techniques to realize 
populist ends,” as Berk has argued. Regulation was used to discourage concentration, 
promote competition, distinguish natural from artificial monopoly, and work with 
businesses to identify industry-specific unfair trade practices.647 
Berk’s research shows that through education on cost accounting, benchmarking, 
and the promotion of trade monitoring, the FTC was built to enhance competition by 
working with rather than against businesses. The agency promoted collaboration within 
industries, encouraging companies to collectively identify effective practices for their 
operations. Even though the FTC lacked the standard features of a Weberian bureaucracy, 
state builders were able to construct a unique bureaucracy that attempted to redirect 
destructive habits into productive ones.648 But Brandeis’s conceptualization of regulated 
competition also entailed the notion that businessmen were rational and could be 
monitored in ways that preempted the need for criminal sanction entirely. Thus, his 
philosophy rested on a construct of corporate criminality embedded into regulatory 
ideology and reflected Progressives’ inclination to protect the good businessmen from the 
bad ones through milder regulation rather than invasive sanction.   
Brandeis’s criticisms of trusts have often been interpreted as a strict anti-
monopolism. It is true that he was critical of trusts and famously condemned the way 
trusts worked with investment bankers not to improve their products or engage in 
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innovation but instead to promote consolidation.649 He insisted that there “are no natural 
monopolies in the industrial world,” and said to describe monopoly as natural was 
“misleading.” But he insisted that the “regulation of competition” was “essential to the 
preservation of competition and to its best development.” While Brandeis was skeptical 
of Progressives’ faith in the state to monitor monopolies, he argued that competition was 
necessary and endorsed a “policy of regulated competition” that he said was “distinctly a 
constructive policy.” Different from both minimally regulated markets and progressive-
style regulation of monopoly, Brandeis’s philosophy threaded a middle ground aiming to 
encourage competition and discourage concentration.650 He was able to pursue republican 
ends of anti-monopolism through a modernized administrative apparatus that appealed to 
Progressives.  
The FTC was thus not granted a warrant to punish unfair trade practices, but to 
work with business to identify industry-specific unfair trade practices. He argued that 
regulated competition would make prosecution unnecessary because the FTC would be 
positive and prophylactic, preemptively identifying and monitoring restraint of trade 
behaviors. This is because according to his theory, restraint of trade was not the result of 
the moral faults of men in business. Rather, the industrial system encouraged men to 
engage in unscrupulous practices in the name of competition. If the system could be 
appropriately monitored and reformed, businessmen would never resort to criminal 
activity, averting the need for prosecution entirely.  
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Brandeis’s statements to the U.S. House Committee on Commerce in January and 
February of 1914 make these aspects of his philosophy clear. His testimony at this 
moment was enormously influential in changing the tenor of debate. Legislators had been 
deadlocked over how strong the FTC should be. Most Progressives supported a strong 
coercive commission, whereas Populists favored a weaker informational commission 
similar to that endorsed by libertarian-leaning Taft Republicans. 651 This impasse created 
an opportunity for Brandeis to walk between both views. His testimony clarifies how his 
philosophy reflected a specific understanding of corporate criminality. Instead of looking 
to the character of business leaders, Brandeis told the committee that “industrial crime is 
not a cause, it is an effect; the effect of a bad system.” He stated that, “if we adopt a good 
system, we are very apt not to have much of industrial criminality.” He suggested that the 
proposed FTC should “prevent breaches of the law and not punish breaches of the law” 
by “preventing the conditions which lead to the criminal tendency.”652  
Brandeis’s emphasis on the commercial environment was connected to his 
genuine faith in the character of businessmen. He stated that the system should be 
reformed so that crime becomes “unnatural,” because business leaders “who could be 
exercising their powers in the right direction…are led by a bad system to do things that 
are harmful to the community.” Brandeis’s support for regulation over punishment was in 
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part driven by this faith in the character of business leaders to be guided by a reformed 
system. He stated that such men do not deserve harsh sanction, because their offenses are 
“not like those cases where the offense involves a moral taint in the individual.”653 He 
explicitly stated that in designing the commission, “Our aim should not be to instill fear, 
but to so develop the commercial conditions that crime becomes unnatural.”654  
This statement reflected a deeper concern shared by economists like Ely, Ross, 
and Commons. While there were bad businessmen lowering the moral standards of 
competition and structural incentives driving businessmen to engage in unethical 
behavior, Brandeis and the era’s leading economists believed that most leaders of 
industry were not bad people. A coercive commission that instilled fear of prosecution 
into economic actors would not only discourage innovation, but also unfairly discourage 
good businessmen who sought to follow the law from engaging in any kind of risk-taking 
behavior. It was thus crucial that the commission did not threaten criminal sanction, but 
simply worked with industry to promote efficiency and innovation.  
 Brandeis’s argument that the state should not punish behavior with no “moral 
taint” mirrored debates about distinguishing mala in se from mala prohibita in regulatory 
law. To Brandeis, unfair trade practices could be harmful to the public welfare but lacked 
the stigma of other crimes. Given that he viewed competition as an ambiguous process, 
he claimed competitive practices could not be labeled inherently good or bad. Rather, 
competition should be encouraged so as to reap its benefits and regulated to identify, 
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preempt, and limit its dangers.655 Consequently, Brandeis’s moral judgment of 
businessmen’s characters was translated into a favorable legal construction of criminality 
in the FTC Act. Despite walking a middle ground, he relied on a construction of 
corporate criminality inherent to regulatory ideology which depicted corporate crime as 
morally superior to street crime and corporate criminals as more rational and reformable 
than street criminals. 656  
 After Brandeis’s testimony in early 1914, the idea of creating a commission with 
these goals in mind reoriented the legislative debate, although some contestation did 
persist. Lawmakers still disagreed over the enforcement powers of the commission, with 
some Progressives demanding a strong commission and some Populists insisting on a 
purely informational one. This is also not to say that after Brandeis’s testimony, ideas 
about criminality became the sole determining factor in these debates. In committee 
reports, legislators from the House clarified that their support for the FTC was informed 
by the apparent success of Roosevelt’s more informal approach to negotiating with 
business.657 Committee reports in both the House and Senate also expressed support for 
the FTC based on the perceived success of the ICC, noting that a similar commission to 
enforce antitrust law would have “prevented or remedied many of the abuses which have 
since grown up.”658 The support for an agency also was a function of a lack of faith in the 
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Department of Justice, which was still underdeveloped institutionally. Given the 
Department’s “varying policies, [and] its lack of tradition, record, and precedent,” the 
Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce concluded that “an impartial quasi judicial 
tribunal similar to the Interstate Commerce Commission” would make more headway in 
antitrust enforcement than criminal prosecution.659  
It was clear that Brandeis was not completely successful in his efforts. He had 
long contended that any notions that the FTC should resemble the ICC, which Congress 
explicitly endorsed, were “delusive.”660 But in important ways, his arguments were 
critical to establishing discursive parameters for legislative deliberations over the FTC’s 
design. Specifically, his contention that the FTC should preemptively monitor industry so 
as to make prosecution unnecessary resonated with lawmakers. This rationale was hinged 
on Brandeis’s belief that businessmen generally wanted to follow the law, and thus an 
agency empowered to work with industry and target industry-specific restraint of trade 
actions would improve the nature of economic competition without criminal sanction.  
As a result, an important question in the debates in 1914 was whether or not the 
restraint of trade practices should be considered mala in se or prohibita. Pro-business 
legislators and industry leaders began drawing on regulatory ideology in ways that 
comported with Brandeis’s model, defending regulation of restraint of trade over 
criminalization. Legislators focused on their moral judgments of executives’ character 
and behavior and reached the familiar conclusion that businessmen were good people 
driven to bad actions by economic circumstance and competitive markets, not personal 
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pathologies. Agents of oil, gas, and steel companies pleaded with legislators to create a 
commission to regulate industry without the threat of criminal sanction, promising 
lawmakers that businessmen “are as anxious to square their affairs with the morality of 
the time as any other class of men.”661  
 Senator Albert Cummins (R-IA), a member of the Chamber’s Interstate 
Commerce Committee, rested his support for the FTC on a moral judgment of character 
and the idea that the agency should work with rather than against businessmen. He 
expressed “a confident belief that the business men of this country are honest, faithful 
men” who generally “intend to obey the law.” He argued on behalf of creating a 
commission to which men who “have a real desire to uphold the law” can turn to for 
advice and guidance “before they are branded as criminals.” He fought against giving the 
FTC powers to initiate prosecutions in restraint of trade cases, stating that “I am 
unwilling that the failure to obey these regulations…shall make the men who conduct our 
business affairs criminals, without consciousness of moral turpitude or moral 
dereliction.”662  
 This was not a partisan interpretation, as Democrats expressed similar ideas. 
Tennessee Senator John Shields of the Chamber’s Commerce Committee expressed his 
support for the Commission by discussing the alternative of criminalization. He stated 
that such an approach would make the assumption that “the business men of this country 
are all engaged in fraudulent practices and conspiracies.” Shields posed the question to 
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his colleagues, “Have our business men a lower standing than criminals at the bar of 
justice?”663 He proceeded to endorse the mode of regulated competition rather than a 
stronger commission sought by more hard line Progressives.  
As with debates over the ICC, centering legislative debate on the character of 
businessmen fostered favorable interpretations of their actions. If businessmen were good 
people, restraint of trade actions took on new substantive meanings distinct from 
traditional definitions of criminality. For example, representatives for the Columbus Steel 
Castings Company told the Senate Interstate Commerce Committee that criminal 
provisions would punish “people who had done things which were not considered to be 
immoral in themselves.” They argued that, “it is always dangerous to attempt too closely 
to define acts which, while in the absence of statutory laws are neither immoral in their 
nature nor savor of criminality.”664  
Pro-business lawmakers voiced similar arguments. Representative Dick Morgan 
(R-OK) stated that, “our criminal laws only prohibit things which are immoral; but when 
we come to prohibit things which are involved in business transactions…we are entering 
not only upon a difficult but a dangerous field, dangerous to business, and very difficult 
to carry out without doing more injury than good.”665 His argument lent weight to the 
Brandeisian approach of creating a proactive prophylactic commission rather than a 
responsive one reliant on criminal sanctions. 
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The difficulties involved in enforcing the Sherman Antitrust Act in comparison to 
the Interstate Commerce Act also led legislators to conclude that a commission was 
preferable to granting prosecutorial authority to the Department of Justice. Given its lack 
of institutional capacity to crack down on corporate lawbreakers, many called into 
question the notion that corporate behavior should be monitored criminally at all. As one 
lawmaker said, the Sherman Antitrust Act “is a mere economic statute and not a moral 
one,” rendering criminal prosecution inappropriate.666 
As Brandeis did, legislators believed that businessmen were honorable people 
whose actions should not be considered crimes or mala in se. Therefore, they viewed the 
FTC as a prophylactic instrument that would improve business competition and economic 
health without threatening to prosecute honest businessmen. The House Interstate 
Commerce Committee concluded that the FTC will produce “an elevated business 
standard” and “better business stability” since it was not designed to be punitive.667 The 
Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce similarly concluded that the FTC would 
“promote fair competition,” but only because it was designed to be “persuasive and 
corrective rather than punitive so far as well-intentioned business is concerned.”668 The 
Commission was designed explicitly to not be punitive so as to avoid catching well-
intentioned businesses in its grasp while improving the moral behavior of the most 
unscrupulous. 
Brandeis successfully articulated his approach during an opportune political 
moment. With a Democrat in the White House, he had a political ally who shared his 
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distaste for monopoly while also identifying as a progressive. But Wilson did not secure a 
majority of the popular vote—with populist Democrats favoring a weak commission, Taft 
Republicans demanding an informational one, and Progressives insisting on a coercive 
agency, a commission could only be created through compromise. By empowering a 
progressive-style commission to attain the ends pursued by anti-monopolists, Brandeis’s 
proposal had enough broad political appeal to secure passage.  
Brandeis’s model rested on a conceptualization of corporate criminality that was a 
core part of the regulatory ideology that emerged in the late nineteenth century. But in an 
evolving social science milieu where economists amassed credibility and a developing 
political economy in which finance became dominant, regulatory ideology had to be 
transmitted and articulated differently in the early twentieth century. When financiers 
replicated the strategy used by railroads in the ICA debate during the Pujo hearings, it 
backfired and generated an anti-corporate media frenzy in a political milieu constantly 
skeptical of concentrated corporate power. But regulatory ideology had begun to evolve 
into a durable governing ideology, even being picked up by corporate opponents like 
Brandeis in new and innovate ways that meshed with the drift of Progressive Era politics. 
When Brandeis incorporated regulatory ideology into his model of regulated competition, 
he repackaged it in a way that had appeal to Populists and Progressives of varying 
ideologies.  
This underscores why it is essential to assess business-government relations 
within an analysis of the political economy’s development, tracing how different sectors 
of industry become more powerful and take leading roles in policymaking. Financiers 
and bankers, not railroads, were the primary carriers of ideas related to regulatory 
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ideology and corporate criminality in the early twentieth century. They also were not 
entirely successful in their initial attempts to counteract anti-corporate sentiment, given 
the explosive findings of the Pujo hearings and passage of the Clayton Act. A more 
favorable outcome only came when Brandeis repackaged regulatory ideology into a 
political agenda that appealed to diverse factions of Progressives, highlighting once again 
that business cannot unilaterally move policy without paying attention to prevailing 
discourses.  
V. The Political Construction of Corporate Criminal Liability 
Progressives grappled with multiple questions inherited from Gilded Age debates. 
A primary one concerned corporate criminal liability, the doctrine that corporate entities 
should be punished criminally for the actions of their agents. Chapter three traced how 
railroad managers defended corporate liability as a practical alternative to individual 
liability in the final decade of the nineteenth century. In the early twentieth century, these 
debates produced policies that inform American corporate law to this day. The doctrine 
of corporate criminal liability, which crystallized between 1903 and 1909, made it harder 
to conceptualize corporate crime as a function of innate pathologies and created 
difficulties in attributing blame and intent to corporate entities. Historically, corporate 
criminal liability has been an ineffective mechanism to rein in corporate abuse.669 
Progressives generally embraced the real entity theory of the corporation, the idea 
that the corporation is “a real and natural entity whose existence is prior to and separate 
from the state.”670 Ernest Freund was one of the earliest individuals to attribute a 
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personality to the corporation, calling it his “organic theory.”671 Real entity theory was 
both ontological and prescriptive; it minimized the supervisory role of the state because 
the corporation possessed its own authority and distinctive personality resembling that of 
a natural human. Therefore, it deserved the autonomy rights afforded to individuals.672  
There was some contention among Progressives as to whether the corporation 
could or should be considered a person. John Dewey argued that corporate personhood 
doctrine was used inconsistently, while others like Thorsen Veblen and John Commons 
rejected neoclassical theory in favor of sociological accounts of market behavior. Leftist 
Progressives claimed real entity theory could hold capital accountable and empower 
unions. By treating corporations as moral communities with autonomy rights, the state 
could require them to act in civically responsible ways, and corporate criminal liability 
could hold business accountable for harmful behavior. But the theory also had libertarian 
appeal since treating corporations as autonomous entities granted them the same legal 
protections as human individuals, legitimating anti-regulatory politics.673  
 The rise of corporate criminal liability occurred within this context of political 
contestation, and its development was more complicated than most accounts suggest. The 
doctrine’s origins are often dated to the Supreme Court’s 1909 ruling in New York 
Central and Hudson River Railroad v. U.S., which held that corporations could be held 
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criminally responsible for their agents’ actions.674 Scholars typically attribute the ruling 
to organic developments in the common law.675 This misses how the doctrine’s 
emergence was contingent on historically specific circumstances. This analysis departs 
from extant accounts of corporate criminal liability by studying the Elkins Act of 1903, in 
which Congress reformed the ICA to make interstate carriers criminally liable for their 
employees’ actions.  
It is true that the common law provided a foundation for criminally punishing 
corporations. Through the seventeenth century, English courts concluded that 
corporations could commit crimes of nonfeasance—failures to prevent certain acts or 
perform specific jobs—but not crimes that involved positive legal violations. This 
evolved out of case law holding governmental units responsible for not maintaining 
roads, canals, and waterways as failures to prevent public nuisances. In the early 
nineteenth century, U.S. courts began recognizing corporations as capable of committing 
crimes of nonfeasance, but rarely for positive legal violations. This kept liability confined 
to a small class of crime while laying a basis for a broader principle of liability.676 
                                                             
674 NY Central and Hudson River Railroad Company v. US, 212 US 481 (1909). 
675 Vikramaditya S. Khanna, “Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?,” Harvard 
Law Review 109, no. 7 (2005): 1479–88; Thomas J. Bernard, “The Historical Development of 
Corporate Criminal Liability,” Criminology 22, no. 1 (1984): 3–18; Sara Sun Beale, “The 
Development and Evolution of the U.S. Law of Corporate Criminal Liability” (German Conference on 
Comparative Corporate Law, Marbury, Germany, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2375318; Ved P. 
Nanda, “Corporate Criminal Liability in the United States: Is a New Approach Warranted?,” The 
American Journal of Comparative Law 58 (2010): 608–9; Andrew Weissman et al., “Reforming 
Corporate Criminal Liability to Promote Responsible Corporate Behavior” (US Chamber Institute for 
Legal Reform, 2008), 2–7, 
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/WeissmannPaper.pdf. 
676 Bernard, “The Historical Development of Corporate Criminal Liability,” 4–6; Nanda, “Corporate 
Criminal Liability,” 606–7; Laufer, Corporate Bodies and Guilty Minds, 9. 
256 
 
Liability rules changed significantly as large corporations emerged in the late 
nineteenth century. Still, judges remained hesitant to attribute liability to corporations 
given the difficulties inherent in identifying a corporate mens rea, or guilty state of 
mind.677 Convictions of corporations were generally for crimes of nonfeasance not 
entailing proof of intent. But through the 1880s and 1890s, prosecutors began to more 
frequently initiate prosecutions against corporations for negligence, internal revenue 
infractions, and other violations requiring proof of intent.678  
In the decision New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Co. v. U.S. (1909), 
the Supreme Court applied corporate criminal liability to all crimes. In the case, the New 
York Central and Hudson River Railroad challenged the constitutionality of the 1903 
Elkins Act, which declared that railroad corporations could be held criminally responsible 
for agents who granted or sought rebates. The Court took the concept of respondeat 
superior governing civil law—the notion that employers could be held responsible for 
employees’ actions performed within the course of their jobs—and applied it to crimes. 
This vicariously imputed liability for agents’ behavior to the corporation, expanding the 
reach of the law to crimes requiring proof of mens rea.679  
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 The consensus among legal scholars and historians is that the 1909 decision was a 
natural outgrowth of the common law.680 These accounts are typically plagued by two 
faults. First, if this explanation is correct, then the U.K. and other common law nations 
should rely on a similarly robust form of corporate liability that developed along a 
somewhat comparable timeline. But most other common-law nations were far slower to 
embrace the doctrine and have done so in a more limited fashion.681 Second, scholars 
typically overemphasize the import of New York Central and the role of judicial agency 
in shaping the doctrine.682   
The Elkins Act of 1903 is an understudied piece of this story that sheds light on 
why Congress imputed criminal liability for rebating to railroad corporations. Tracing 
debates over the law highlights how the relationships between the ICC, Congress, and 
railroads shaped the legislation. Debates over criminalizing rebates occurred primarily 
before Congress and the ICC, and railroad managers convinced members of Congress 
and the ICC that corporate liability was the most pragmatic option for punishing railroad 
crime. By the time the Supreme Court ruled on the question, alternatives to entity liability 
had been effectively discredited by railroads in these other institutional venues.  
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The Elkins Act amended the ICA by imposing a criminal fine of $20,000 on 
corporations that offered rebates to shippers.683 As reviewed in chapter three, ICC reports 
showed that enhanced punishments for rebating were supported by railroads hostile to 
shippers that coerced them into granting rebates. With support from President Roosevelt, 
Attorney General Philander Knox, and railroads, the Act passed almost unanimously over 
concerns that eliminating imprisonment would leave the law ineffective.684  
The ICC’s annual reports greatly influenced debate over the Elkins Act. The 
House Commerce Committee’s first report on the bill directly cited the ICC reports 
reviewed in chapter three, in which the commission argued that corporations should be 
criminally punished in lieu of individuals. The first page noted that punishing agents 
instead of corporations “prevented the enforcement of the law.”685  
The report extensively quoted ICC Chairman Martin Knapp’s statements before 
the committee. Knapp told the House Committee that the ICA was inadequate in two 
respects. First, “the corporation carrier is not liable, but only the officer, agent or 
representative.” Knapp claimed that the “officials of that grade which participates 
actually in transactions of this kind are a sort of fraternity” and are resistant to provide 
evidence that could “inflict punishment and suffering upon some friend or send some 
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associate to jail.” He argued that the individual who gets indicted is almost always “a 
subordinate, a clerk carrying out the implied if not expressed order of his superiors.” 686  
Knapp stated that he found rebating to involve “a very high degree of moral 
turpitude.” However, because of the interpersonal dynamics among railway employees, 
he claimed that, “punishment by imprisonment instead of being an aid is a hindrance.” He 
concluded if the response to incriminating evidence were to punish the corporation via a 
fine rather than prosecute an individual agent, railroad managers “would not hesitate to 
furnish the proof and would actively engage in the prosecution.”687  
Joseph Fifer, another ICC commissioner, employed arguments mirroring the 
legislative debates over the ICA. He claimed that the behaviors targeted by the Interstate 
Commerce law only violated statutory law, but no moral principles. He stated that, 
[T]hese violations are what the law calls malum prohibita, and I care not what 
certain individuals may think of it, mankind generally holds that the same moral 
turpitude does not attach to an act of that kind as does to a crime, which is malum 
in se, such as burglary and larceny, crimes in the absence of all law.688  
 
Claiming that railroads’ crimes were only malum prohibita allowed Fifer to distinguish 
these behaviors from traditional constructs of criminality. When confronted by 
Representative Stewart, who asked, “Do you not think that in the form of malum 
prohibita these railroad corporations commit greater offenses than highway robbery, 
which, you say, is malum in se?” Fifer responded that these offenses “a short time ago 
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were no offenses at all” and that the individuals targeted “have friends…[and] standing in 
the community.”689 Fifer’s comments drew a sharp distinction between street and 
corporate criminals. He defused concerns about whether railroad executives did bad 
things by arguing that they were not bad people. This highlights how prevailing 
discourses produced distinctive political understandings of street and corporate 
criminality that persisted over time.   
As chapter three showed, after hearing extensive testimony from railway 
managers, the ICC concluded that the criminal provisions of the ICA were inadequate. Its 
1903 report thus expressed clear support for the basic features of the Elkins law. 
According to the ICC, directing liability onto the corporation “corrected a defect which 
has been explained in previous reports, because [the law] gave immunity to the principal 
and beneficiary of a guilty transaction.”690 Debate over the bill was brief and it passed 
over concerns that punishing individuals was necessary for the purposes of promoting fair 
outcomes or providing deterrence.691  
When the New York Central and Hudson River Railroad challenged the Elkins 
law in 1909, the company fought against the imputation of liability to the corporation. It 
asserted that fining a corporation for a crime committed by individuals amounts to 
“[taking] the property of every stockholder” and “destroys the presumption of innocence” 
for common carriers. The railroad’s counsel argued that the “presumption of innocence 
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prevails alike whether the defendant in a criminal prosecution be a corporation or an 
individual.” It claimed that in order to secure convictions without adequate evidence, 
“recourse was had to legislation introducing civil analogies into the criminal law,” 
referencing the use of respondeat superior doctrine.692  
The state responded that, “no railway corporation can ever be legally punished” 
for rebating if conviction required proof of a director’s involvement, rendering corporate 
liability the only feasible means of punishment. The state called the corporation “the real 
offender” and claimed that it would be “anomalous and unjust” to punish agents. The 
state’s brief cited committee reports, congressional debates and testimony, and annual 
reports from the ICC indicating that the Elkins legislation “was aimed at the corporate 
carriers because no [alternatives] practically existed.” The government noted that during 
the sixteen years between the ICA and Elkins Act, “no single successful prosecution 
[was] waged against a malefactor” because “the close relations that existed prevented one 
member of that class from testifying against his fellows.” The state thus defended 
corporate liability to cases involving mens rea as a practical necessity, stating that, “We 
think that a corporation may be liable criminally for certain offenses of which a specific 
intent may be a necessary element. There is no more difficulty in imputing to a 
corporation a specific intent in criminal proceedings than in civil.”693 The Court reasoned 
that corporations were the most direct beneficiaries of rebates.  
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The Court drew repeatedly on the annual reports of the ICC as evidence that 
corporate criminal liability was its only feasible option. Justice Day wrote in the majority 
that the futility of punishing individuals was “developed in more than one report of the 
Interstate Commerce Commission, [and] was no doubt influential in bringing about the 
enactment of the Elkins Law, making corporations criminally liable.” The Court 
concluded that to reject the doctrine “would virtually take away the only means of 
effectually controlling the subject-matter and correcting the abuses aimed at it.”694  
While the decision did reflect trends in common law, it was also contingent on 
political circumstance. The popularity of real entity theory shaped the political context in 
which the Justices argued that corporations could be attributed a mens rea. Concerns that 
shaped the ICA’s initial design and questions over whether executives were fully 
“criminal” carried into these debates. And the ideas and ideologies railroads articulated 
before Congress and ICC shaped how the Court ruled on the question by giving the 
Justices congressional and commission documents to cite when writing the decision. 
In the wake of New York Central, corporations devised multiple strategies to 
avoid punishment. Businesses routinely emphasized the complexity of the corporate form 
and their good-faith efforts to prevent wrongdoing through internal compliance rules as 
defenses for crime. Many judges showed mercy when they believed corporations 
exhibited due diligence to avoid wrongdoing. Arguments emphasizing due diligence, the 
complexity of business, and the 14th amendment rights of corporations limited the impact 
of New York Central in its immediate aftermath.695  
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 Literature painting the New York Central decision as an outgrowth of common 
law ignores this longer developmental history. In this light, it becomes clearer that the 
question posed to the Court in New York Central was an artificial binary. In only 
considering whether the state should prosecute corporations or individuals, some scholars 
have noted that the Court failed to consider a third option—to impose civil liability 
against corporations and criminal liability against individuals in cases of corporate 
crime.696 But scholarship misses that this binary was dictated by how railroads framed 
debates over the course of two decades preceding the ruling. Railway managers’ 
testimonies provided Congress, the Court, and the ICC with a choice between two 
options, obscuring alternatives that could have been considered and framing the debate 
on terms favorable to the railway industry.  
What emerged from New York Central was a construction of the corporate 
criminal entity rather than the corporate criminal person. This contrasted the natural 
criminal targeted by the criminal justice system, made it harder to conceptualize street 
and corporate criminality in comparable terms, and hardened the idea that corporate 
crimes lacked the moral stain of street crimes. Scholars have argued, however, that 
criminal businesses actually behave with far less morality than street-level offenders. 
Corporate entities often exhibit a willingness to break or bend legal and moral rules to 
pursue the goal of profit maximization. This has become so commonplace that Joel 
Bakan has argued that corporations are “dangerously psychopathic entities.”697 
In spite of this, the state has not demonstrated a consistent concern with corporate 
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social responsibility. In many ways, the 1919 Michigan Supreme Court case Dodge v. 
Ford helped to legitimate a normative discourse that the primary purpose of corporations 
is to maximize value for shareholders, even if it means pushing the boundaries of the law. 
The case involved a lawsuit between Henry Ford and the Dodge brothers, and it 
articulated the notion that corporations should prioritize shareholder profit maximization 
over the interests of customers, workers, and communities. This symbolized an 
acceptance of potentially unethical behavior as part of the corporation’s legal obligations. 
 Henry Ford was never viewed as a stereotypical robber baron. He publicly praised 
the virtues of the common man, earning him an image as a compassionate businessman 
concerned with the working class. But this was a strategic ploy, as Ford regularly framed 
his competitive choices as benevolent ones, enabling him to build his empire, cut costs, 
and increase efficiency while maintaining support from his workers.698 Thus in 1916, he 
presented a decision to limit dividends to shareholders (despite a cash surplus) as part of 
a strategy to build better cars, a new factory, and pay higher wages.  
 The Dodge brothers, minority investors in the company, were displeased at the 
decision and demanded that part of the surplus be distributed as dividends. Ford rebuffed 
them, as he was hostile to the meddling of shareholders in his decision-making and aware 
that the Dodges planned to use the payout to start a rival firm. In 1917, the Dodge 
brothers filed suit to compel the distribution of dividends and secure an injunction 
forbidding the construction of the new factory. They argued that Ford’s desire to build a 
factory made no business sense because it was founded on a flawed logic that the firm 
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was primarily a means of doing social good and that profit-making was its secondary 
purpose. Ford stood his ground, responding that a business’s purpose should only 
“incidentally [be] to make money.”699  
 The Michigan Supreme Court denied the injunction but mandated the payment of 
dividends. Using specious mathematical analysis, the court reasoned that Ford’s new 
factory would not increase the corporation’s profits. They then chastised Ford for 
pursuing philanthropic goals over profit-maximization, writing that, 
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the 
stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end. The 
discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to attain that end 
and does not extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits or to 
the nondistribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote them to other 
purposes.700  
 
This principle not only tolerates but endorses the promotion of questionable ethical 
incentives. The ruling indicates that if an executive testifies that a corporation’s decisions 
were unrelated to shareholder profits, they will lose legal challenges to those actions. But 
if executives claim that those actions were made in the pursuit of shareholder value, they 
will win. The principle protects any behavior as long as it is justified in terms of pursuing 
profit maximization.701 The court was less concerned with Ford’s actions than his 
motives and prioritized the pursuit of profit while making protection of the competitive 
ideal the primary goal of regulation.702 
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The significance of the Dodge decision is contested among scholars. Some argue 
that the decision is “bad law” and “a doctrinal oddity.” Lynn Stout argues that the 
decision’s significance is that it embodies the normative discourse about the proper 
purpose of the corporation. Others claim that the decision identified profit maximization 
as a primary goal, but not the primary goal of business.703 Still others argue that the 
decision stands as accurate, reasoning that under corporate law, directors and executives 
are required to maximize shareholder value.704  
Regardless of the ruling’s legal sway or immediate effect, its impact has been to 
legitimate a normative discourse in which the corporation’s best interests are linked to 
profit maximization. This has had destructive effects on labor relations by prioritizing 
corporate profiteering over wage expansion, infrastructure improvements, and worker 
safety.705 And despite emerging from the Michigan Supreme Court rather than the U.S. 
Supreme Court, the ruling in Dodge is more than a piece of trivia. Contemporary court 
rulings and recent reports from legal organizations like the American Law Institute reflect 
the principle articulated in the case, and activist investors today often insist that profit 
maximization is the corporation’s primary goal in order to secure dividends and share 
buybacks from companies in lieu of long-term investments in wages and infrastructure.706 
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The principle in Dodge effectively outlawed prioritizing corporate social 
responsibility over profit-maximization, and by the 1920s, the legal construction of the 
corporate criminal made for a notable contrast to the image of the street criminal. 
Corporate entities were legally and morally directed to pursue profit-maximization over 
social responsibility, workers’ rights, and consumers’ interests. With a different ethical 
mandate and without any identifiable pathological contributors to crime, the 
anthropomorphized corporate criminal was a near total inversion of the natural criminal.  
VI. Conclusion: The Political Development of Corporate Crime Politics in the 1920s  
Samuel Untermeyer wrote in 1914, that, “[t]he corporate form is a mere shield 
behind which the individual acts. The now trite saying that guilt is personal should be 
written into every line of the law.”707 As crime politics took a turn in the 1920s, 
Untermeyer’s statement proved prescient. State crime commissions emphasized street 
crimes committed by individuals, largely neglecting the varieties of crime committed by 
corporate entities. In this sense, the corporate form literally acted as a shield for 
individuals within corporations not only from criminal prosecution, but also from the 
attention of observers of the criminal justice system.  
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Often funded by local businesses, it is unsurprising that none of the crime 
commission reports of the 1920s significantly addressed corporate crime. The Missouri 
and Illinois surveys each included a few passing references to antitrust cases in 
comparison to the pages on psychological or eugenic theories of crime.708 Part II of the 
Illinois report included twenty pages on racketeering in comparison to well over 200 
pages on juvenile delinquents, violent offenders, and the “deranged or defective 
delinquent.” The emphasis on the focal individual as the object of crime control, a legacy 
of the Lombrosian shift in criminology, obscured conceptions of corporate crime that 
emerged in the Progressive Era. This laid the foundation for the Wickersham 
Commission and the federal crime politics of the 1930s to focus on street criminals.   
Combined with increased reliance on due diligence and 14th amendment 
protections, corporate entities were increasingly able to evade punishment in the 1920s. 
Courts responsible for enforcing New York Central were reluctant to apply a strict 
interpretation of vicarious liability and expressed sympathy with the realities of business 
operations and the complexity of the corporate form. Accepting corporations’ arguments 
about good-faith compliance efforts and due diligence, the doctrine of corporate criminal 
liability had little value to regulators in the 1920s.709  
As Braithwaite and Fisse have noted, American criminal law exhibits a bizarre 
contradiction. It embraces the individualistic nature of American political culture but 
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allows for corporate responsibility for crime.710 This incongruity becomes clear when 
contrasting the emergence of corporate criminal liability with prevailing trends in the 
criminal law at the time of its development, which included an emphasis on the 
rehabilitative ideal, individualizing sentencing to the offender, and eugenics justice. This 
highlights a basic reality of American corporate law—the doctrine of corporate criminal 
liability is uncomfortably situated within a justice system that emphasizes free will, 
criminal intent, and the individualization of sentencing to the personal traits of offenders.  
By the 1920s, it became clear that Progressives had overestimated the will and 
power of the state to regulate corporations. Presidents Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover all 
pursued revived brands of laissez-faire.711 Appointments to the FTC favored informal 
compliance agreements and information provision became the agency’s primary activity. 
Particularly, William Ewart Humphrey’s term as chair of the FTC during the Coolidge 
Administration earned the FTC the approval of big business and the ire of 
Progressives.712 Even in his positive account of the FTC, Gerald Berk notes that the 
regulated competition model suffered setbacks in the 1920s. While the regulated 
competition model was not destroyed, the FTC’s most robust powers were significantly 
checked. In a series of rulings, most notably FTC v. Gratz in 1920, the Supreme Court 
decided that courts, not the FTC, had the authority to determine the scope of unfair 
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methods in competition. This limited the FTC to policing practices already illegal in 
common law but nothing else practiced in trade.713 
The ideational and ideological tides of progressivism facilitated developments to 
regulatory and legal institutions that reflected particular constructs of corporate 
criminality. Progressives’ endorsement of real entity theory culminated in a doctrine of 
corporate liability that exists awkwardly within a justice system designed to punish the 
individual. Progressives’ faith in the character of businessmen also led to the creation of 
an agency designed to work with rather than against business. Facilitating cooperation 
and collaboration between the state and industry was a worthwhile and admirable pursuit. 
It reflected the Progressive perspective that markets were inefficient and that an expert-
administered state apparatus would effectively sort out and reform bad businessmen 
rather than letting them reduce the general competitive ethics of markets.  
The problem with the FTC’s design can be conceptualized on Braithwaite and 
Ayres’ responsive regulation pyramid. Without the threat of stronger interventions in 
extreme cases, businesses have little incentive to abide by milder cooperative 
sanctions.714 The FTC was explicitly designed without the power to initiate prosecutions, 
and after the Supreme Court deprived the FTC of what coercive powers it was granted, 
the Commission’s capacity for deterrence was severely compromised. By adopting the 
perspective that good businessmen needed to be protected from the bad ones—not that 
the public needed protection from predatory capitalism—the architects of the FTC left it 
without any real power to deter criminality and rendered it vulnerable to cooptation by 
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business. Worried about discouraging innovation and risk-taking, legislators left the FTC 
without any strong enforcement powers, limiting the regulated competition model’s 
success as an alternative to the laissez-faire dynamics of Gilded Age capitalism.   
The investment environment of the 1920s enabled bigger banks to grow in cities, 
and industrial concentration became commonplace. A massive growth in securities 
ownership through the 1920s was driven by businesses that became reliant on securities 
for short-term financial needs and by growing public demand. With massive profits to be 
had in underwriting and securities distribution, there was a decline in banking judgment, 
ethics, and an exploitation of the public that laid the basis for the market collapse of 
1929.715 The tools the state inherited from the Gilded Age and Progressive Era offered 
regulators and lawmakers little ammunition for cracking down on the abuses and 
negligence that caused the Great Depression. Unwieldy doctrines of corporate liability 
and administrative agencies with meaningful regulatory but weak disciplinary powers 
offered few mechanisms for responding to the crisis. Having drawn from a regulatory 
ideology rooted in economics and Darwinism, lawmakers of the early twentieth century 
articulated unique constructions of corporate criminality that gave the state little reason to 
be attentive to corporate crime and a limited capacity to respond to it when it was found.   
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CHAPTER 6: SOLIDIFYING THE CLASS-CRIME NEXUS: IDEAS, INSTITUTIONS, 
AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE NEW DEAL 
 
“Individualization is the root of adequate penal treatment and the proper basis of parole.” 
- The Wickersham Crime Commission, 1931716 
 
 The New Deal has been described by Jefferson Cowie as the “great exception” of 
American politics, one in which the state used its resources to benefit working Americans 
in ways that it never did before and has not since.717 Complementing this account of the 
period is John Hagan, whose book Who Are the Criminals? argues that crime politics and 
criminological theories during the New Deal era were characterized by progressive 
impulses that produced relatively benevolent and equitable crime policy.718 He concludes 
that from the 1930s through 1970s, U.S. crime policy reflected the reformist and 
enlightened political discourse associated with the New Deal regime.  
 The reality of New Deal era crime politics is more complex than these narratives 
suggest. It is true that intellectual developments in criminological theory in the early 
1930s marked a significant break from earlier trends. Scholars like Robert Merton, 
Clifford Shaw, and Henry McKay emphasized how crime was linked to social and 
economic relations and the structural dynamics of the American political economy. But 
the conclusion that their ideas contributed to a new kind of crime politics is the product of 
a hasty analysis of political developments during the New Deal and postwar years.   
 While the New Deal witnessed the development of robust redistributive and social 
welfare policy, the crime politics of the New Deal and postwar period followed a 
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different trajectory. During the middle decades of the twentieth century, there was a 
resurgent interest in the rehabilitation and individualized treatment of offenders. While 
new developments in criminology were heard and appreciated by policymakers from the 
1930s through 1960s, those new ideas were channeled into rehabilitative frameworks. 
This changed the meanings of these ideas. The individualistic and deterministic basis of 
rehabilitative ideology modified theories linking social and economic inequality to crime 
in ways that reaffirmed a class-skewed construct of criminality. Whereas scholars 
connected crime to poverty’s structural roots, once their ideas were reinterpreted through 
the lens of rehabilitation, poverty was viewed as an individual trait correlated with crime 
that required an individualized rehabilitative solution. This robbed the crime theories of 
the New Deal of their most profound insights, dismissed the links they proposed between 
criminality and structural economic factors, and detached them from demands for 
political economic reform as a way to address crime.  
 The window of opportunity for potentially radical ideas about crime to reshape 
policy during this period was narrow. Merton, Shaw, and McKay wrote in the early 
1930s in the immediate wake of the Depression, but through the 1930s and 1940s, 
political and economic discourse changed in ways that eschewed the Roosevelt regime’s 
collectivist and redistributive instincts in favor of a politics that promoted private 
consumption and compensatory policies to drive economic growth and correct for 
inequality. Developments in crime theory followed suit. Scholars who followed in the 
footsteps of Merton, Shaw, and McKay abandoned their predecessors’ macro-level 
emphases on the political economy in favor of a narrow focus on the atomized individual. 
As rehabilitative logic predominated crime discourse, crime scholarship’s emphasis on 
274 
 
the individual fed into a politics of individualized treatment that brought a familiarity 
duality—reformation for those who can change and punishment for those who cannot. 
 Changes in criminological thought were thus not central drivers of development 
in the mid-twentieth century. Rather, the institutional makeup of the criminal justice 
system reshaped the era’s crime theories in ways that deprived them of their urgency and 
most radical implications. This can only be understood upon recognizing how political 
actors were operating within an institutional context imbued with certain practices and 
premises related to rehabilitative ideology. The indeterminate sentence, parole and 
probation, and sentencing individualization had become core features of the justice 
system by the 1930s. This institutional terrain kept policymakers tied to a governing 
ideology in which rehabilitation and individualized treatment were the axiomatic and 
unquestioned goals of the justice system. Even absent explicit biological ideologies, ideas 
about incorrigibility and innate criminal dispositions were still embedded into these 
practices and institutions. Interpreting social-structural theories of criminality through a 
rehabilitative lens modified them to be consistent with rehabilitative ideology’s 
individualistic and deterministic orientation.  
 In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, policymakers constructed key 
features of the American criminal justice system by drawing from an ideational pool in 
which criminal anthropology, evolutionary theory, Social Darwinism, and eugenics 
dominated. These ideas became embedded into the institutional machinery of the justice 
system through rehabilitative reforms. In the New Deal and postwar eras, this 
institutional context interacted with an evolving alignment of political forces and kept 
policymakers tied to the principles of rehabilitative ideology. Lawmakers remained 
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connected to a durable class ideology of rehabilitation and its deterministic assumptions 
even though they did not endorse biological ideas about crime. The institutional 
arrangement of the criminal justice system, and the ideologies embedded into it, ensured 
that there was a limited “New Deal” when it came to criminology.   
 Section I reviews literature exploring the shifting political currents of the 1930s 
through 1960s, showing how the redistributive and collectivist politics of the 1930s was 
in retreat by the late 1930s and how the New Deal regime’s political commitments had 
changed by the 1940s. The section also reviews literature on simultaneous developments 
in crime politics during these years, demonstrating how they reflected these discursive 
shifts. Section II analyzes constructions of criminality in 1930s scholarship, which 
marked a meaningful break from earlier crime theories by emphasizing class relations. 
But through the 1940s and 1950s, crime theory evolved to reflect concurrent shifts in 
political and economic discourse by refocusing on micro- rather than macro-level factors. 
Section III explores how ideas of criminality traveled into politics through the 
Wickersham Crime Commission. The Commission’s reports reveal how political power-
holders reinterpreted the structural crime theories of the New Deal in ways that deprived 
them of their political economic implications. The Commission linked these new theories 
to constructions of the individual criminal, rehabilitative goals, and the individualized 
treatment to offenders, not social and economic reform. Section IV reviews the spread of 
individualized treatment models of punishment from the 1940s through 1960s. An 
analysis of the constitutional validation of indeterminate sentencing, changes in deferred 
prosecution programs, and the spread of habitual offender laws illustrate how 
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rehabilitative ideology served as a framework that extinguished any potential to link 
crime to structural dynamics in crime politics.   
I. Fluctuations in New Deal Politics 
Scholarship exploring the New Deal often depicts the period as marking the 
arrival of the regulated, industrialized, democratic state that Progressives long sought. In 
this account, a liberal consensus emerged after the Great Depression that the state could 
and should actively redistribute wealth. Scholars in this vein claim that the New Deal’s 
regulatory and welfarist measures rationalized the economy, pulled the nation out of 
depression, and reshaped the future of U.S. domestic policy.719 
Many scholars have challenged this narrative. Some suggest that the New Deal’s 
greatest successes were transient and reversed by corporate interests in the latter half of 
the twentieth century.720 Building on power elite theory, new left historians have argued 
that the New Deal regime propped up capitalism from its beginnings and was driven by 
businesses to serve their interests.721 Also emphasizing the New Deal’s illiberal features 
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are historical institutionalists who have outlined the ways Roosevelt’s coalition excluded 
blacks, immigrants, and women from its promises of social generosity while advocating 
for facially egalitarian policies that institutionalized status distinctions.722 And the New 
Deal has critics on the right who, in the tradition of Hayek and Friedman, argue that the 
Roosevelt Administration undermined American values and aggravated the depression.723 
Often, this literature defines the New Deal period as encompassing many years or 
even decades. For instance, John Hagan’s account defines the New Deal as spanning 
from 1933 to 1973. A perspective that eschews generalizations across the New Deal, Fair 
Deal, and Great Society highlights the coalition’s fluidity, shifting political commitments, 
and accommodations with conservatives and corporations. This complements work by 
scholars who have exposed shifts in New Deal liberalism in the 1940s and 1950s.724 
Outlining the political currents of the New Deal and the regime’s ideological evolution 
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provides a foundation for understanding changes in crime politics from the 1930s through 
1960s. 
The Shifting Political Currents of the New Deal 
 Jefferson Cowie describes the New Deal as a historical blip, calling the class 
realignments of the era a short-lived product of circumstance and its social initiatives 
fleeting experiments in redistributive policy.725 The New Deal coalition never fully 
transformed American political culture, as it left in place Jim Crow laws to accommodate 
its southern bloc, ignored the demands of women and immigrants, and struggled to 
organize labor in the South.726 The coalition’s political commitments and policy 
successes ultimately promoted a working-class liberalism that defined workers as native-
born Anglo-Saxon men. The New Deal can be broadly periodized into four phases—the 
first New Deal from 1933-35, when FDR’s initial policies either failed or were 
reactionary policies to keep the economy afloat; the second New Deal from 1935-1937 
when liberals pursued a cohesive Keynesian vision; retreat from 1937 through 1945 in 
the wake of a recession and war; and a postwar period driven by a moderate 
Keynesianism shaped by organized business groups like the Chamber of Commerce 
(COC), National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), and Committee for Economic 
Development (CED).727  
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The choices of the first New Deal were relatively conservative and driven by an 
imperative to prop up the economy. The NIRA, the core of the first New Deal, essentially 
legalized the cartelization of the economy and freed industry from antitrust actions until it 
was invalidated by the Supreme Court. Pillars of financial law including the Glass-
Steagall Act, Securities Act, and Securities Exchange Act were written with help from 
investment bankers and capital-intensive industries to keep the economy stable.728 The 
second New Deal was more redistributive as cornerstones of social welfare policy 
including the National Labor Relations Act (the Wagner Act) and Social Security Act 
were passed.729 But the New Deal found itself in retreat its third phase when Roosevelt 
charted a new pump priming approach to economic management in 1937. Insistent on a 
return to fiscal orthodoxy, he cut public investment and shrank the money supply to 
balance the budget, which prompted a recession. In response, southern conservatives and 
Wall Street moderates coalesced and solidified their opposition to the New Deal after 
1937.730 Most scholars describe the postwar version of Keynesian theory that emerged in 
the New Deal’s fourth phase as “commercial Keynesianism,” a brand of thought pushed 
by corporations and conservatives. Unlike social democratic Keynesianism, it enjoyed 
greater support from private enterprise and was reliant on monetary policy and taxation to 
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promote growth. A bipartisan persuasion, commercial Keynesianism encouraged the state 
to back away from commitments to social welfare and public investment.731  
After the war revitalized popular faith in capitalism, advocates of social 
democratic Keynesianism began to lose debates to corporate Keynesians. Their politics 
robbed social-democratic political impulses of their urgency while fusing social welfare 
to a vision of sustained economic growth. Social and economic policy became less about 
providing security to the working class and more about turning “forgotten men” into a 
mass of consumers with the requisite purchasing power to drive economic growth.732 By 
1945, New Deal liberalism bore little resemblance to the first or second New Deal. 
Demands for redistributive policy were replaced by compensatory policies favorable to 
capitalism.733 Redistribution was dismissed as a hindrance to growth, and increasing the 
consumptive and productive power of individuals was the state’s goal rather than 
promoting a communal social democratic vision.734 The shift to commercial 
Keynesianism left the state with tools that could only redress imbalances in the private 
economy, limited the state’s capacity to challenge capitalist structures, and made state 
spending a means to promote consumption rather than provide economic security.  
In this context, anything that smacked of social democratic Keynesianism was 
quieted. For instance, the National Resources Planning Board (NRPB), created in 1939, 
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was designated during the war to study avenues for economic conversion in the postwar 
years. But the Board’s 1943 publication Security, Work, and Relief Policies rattled 
conservatives. It favored progressive taxation to fund public works projects and welfare 
initiatives and outlined a social democratic benefits program that was incorporated into 
an “economic bill of rights” in Roosevelt’s 1944 State of the Union. Conservatives 
promptly disbanded the NRPB in the wake of the speech.735 This was followed up with 
the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, which limited organized labor to collective 
bargaining and legislative derailment as its only strategies to fight for social rights.736  
By the 1960s, the labor movement’s third-party pretensions had been suppressed 
as labor became an interest group rather a basis for a social or political movement.737 
Since questions of class relations were reoriented to interest group politics in the 1940s, a 
social democratic politics was impossible to achieve during the Great Society. The Great 
Society conceived poverty as a matter of race rather than class relations, promoted self-
improvement to integrate the poor into the economy, and resisted redistribution as a 
solution to inequality. This politics accepted a complacent Keynesianism that did not 
challenge the class compromise of the 1940s.738 It instead relied on a Jeffersonian 
individualism emphasizing rights and individual improvement to promote equality.739 
The developments of 1940s reshaped New Deal liberalism into the 1960s.  
Although Democrats used the term “liberal” as tactical cover to discuss collective rights 
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by tying their politics to nineteenth century individualism, the collective economic vision 
of the New Dealers was resituated under the rubric of individual liberty by the 1940s.740 
The Evolution of New Deal Crime Politics  
In 1934, Franklin Roosevelt became the first president to use the “war on crime” 
metaphor. Speaking at a national conference, he stated that Americans must constantly 
protect themselves against “the lawless and the criminal elements of our population.”741 
For many reasons, crime became a prominent national political issue in the 1930s. 
Politically savvy policymakers including Roosevelt, his Attorney General Homer 
Cummings, and the head of the Bureau of Investigation J. Edgar Hoover politicized crime 
to their benefit. Crime was also legitimized as a national issue by the Wickersham 
Commission. Coming out of the “age of the crime commission” in the 1920s, President 
Herbert Hoover appointed a National Crime Commission in 1929. Called the 
Wickersham Commission for its chairperson George Wickersham, the Commission’s 
final reports explored various questions of criminal behavior, crime policy, and statistics 
while legitimating an increased role for the federal government in crime control.742 
John Hagan has argued that the socially progressive shifts of New Deal politics 
were reflected in crime theory and policy from the 1930s through 1970s.743 Hagan’s 
analysis of the core claims of prevailing criminological theories during these decades is 
thorough and accurate, but there are several problems with his argument. First is an 
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oversimplified periodization scheme that overlooks shifts in political thought in the 
1940s. Explanations of criminality and crime politics moved from emphasizing social-
structural factors in the 1930s to the individual in the 1940s, mirroring broader shifts in 
political and economic thought. Further, Hagan misunderstands how these new ideas 
operated within preexisting institutional contexts. The social-structural crime theories of 
the 1930s were channeled into institutional machinery that changed the meaning and 
political significance of those ideas by reinforcing an emphasis on the individual 
offender.744 A survey of the literature on the era’s crime politics provides a basis for 
contextualizing the relationship between crime theory and policy in these years. 
In Hagan’s defense, some early New Deal policies were unusually progressive by 
the standards of American politics.  For example, the Civil Conservation Corps, which 
provided public works jobs for 2.5 million men, employed a large portion of the 
population that likely would have been incarcerated.745 Brooklyn district attorney Conrad 
Printzlein also operated an innovative deferred prosecution program in Brooklyn from 
1936 to 1940. Today deferred prosecution agreements are a cornerstone of the Justice 
Department’s lax approach to corporate crime, but Printzlein’s initial plan delayed 
charging first-time juvenile offenders for a specified time and dropped the charges if the 
he or she exhibited good conduct during that period. The Justice Department endorsed his 
program in 1946.746  
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In spite of these examples, the populist nature of New Deal era crime politics 
should not be mistaken for progressive crime politics. In the 1930s, crime transformed 
into a federal issue that national lawmakers politicized for personal gain. Roosevelt and 
Cummings routinely made public appeals on crime to foster an anticrime climate. They 
secured several major crime packages in the 1930s and pushed unsuccessful proposals to 
mandate universal fingerprinting, triple FBI personnel, and eliminate the unanimous jury 
verdict in criminal cases. Law-and-order politics became a ticket to political stardom in 
the 1930s, as evidenced by Manhattan DA Thomas Dewey, who used his crusades 
against mobsters and Wall Street to secure the New York Governorship and launch 
several White House bids.747 J. Edgar Hoover appealed to populist impulses by 
politicizing high-profile criminals like John Dillinger or Bonnie and Clyde to facilitate an 
expansion of the Bureau of Investigation’s powers.748 The Bureau also received a shot of 
institutional legitimacy in 1930 when it became the clearinghouse for the Uniform Crime 
Reports (UCR), the first national dataset on crime.749  
The 1940s witnessed shifts in crime politics as the war exacerbated fears of 
communism and foreign threats, which were played up by Hoover. Over 16,000 enemy 
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aliens were arrested by the war’s end.750 Under Hoover’s leadership the Bureau used its 
mandate to spy on fascist groups to criminalize nearly all forms of dissidence by placing 
any organization deemed radical under federal investigation, including leftist 
organizations and labor unions.751  Anti-union laws including Taft-Hartley criminalized 
strike tactics like mass picketing and secondary boycotts, while the investigations of the 
House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) and Senator McCarthy’s hearings in 
the Senate jailed communists under the Smith Act and ensured that citizens could be 
“effectively stigmatized though never convicted of any offense.”752  
The most crucial shift in postwar crime politics occurred at intersection of race, 
crime, and procedural justice. An emphasis on criminal procedure as the best way to 
promote equality in justice outcomes supplanted an emphasis on substantive equality, and 
the state focused on ensuring that prosecutors, judges, and police did their jobs fairly 
rather than critically considering what conduct was being punished.753 As the social and 
economic dislocations of the war produced racial disorder and protest, local and state 
attempts to improve police-minority relations emphasized improving criminal justice 
procedures, protecting individual rights, and professionalizing police more thoroughly.754 
Naomi Murakawa’s work shows how race liberals in the 1940s thought that building a 
procedurally fair system would promote race-neutral criminal justice outcomes. By 
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constraining the discretion of criminal justice practitioners to act on their prejudices, 
liberals believed they could purge the criminal justice system of racial inequality.755 
 Murakawa details how and why this was a problematic strategy. Liberals pursued 
an expansion of federal authority in criminal justice by introducing bills to equip and 
professionalize police to promote racially fair outcomes. But in pushing proposals to limit 
state violence against blacks, they reaffirmed linkages between blackness and crime. By 
claiming that reformed procedural guidelines would produce race-neutral punishment by 
checking the prejudices of police, liberals narrowly defined racial bias as a psychological 
problem rooted in individual biases. This obscured the structural ways racial bias was 
engrained into the criminal justice system. As a result, these reforms provided procedural 
legitimacy to a system that was infused with racialized constructions of criminality.756  
 Mixed into New Deal crime politics in the 1940s was a resurgent interest in 
rehabilitative programming. California sparked a revival of the rehabilitative ideal in the 
1940s by establishing the “Youth Authority” and “Adult Authority,” expert-run boards 
that took control of sentencing away from judges and made determinations regarding 
terms, release dates, parole supervision, and other aspects of sentencing. But these 
attempts to individualize treatment also brought about more sophistication in predicting 
criminality and incorrigibility, as the state constructed prediction tables consisting of 
various personal traits of offenders to predict the criminal tendencies of defendants. In 
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pursuing the rehabilitative ideal, the state adopted a sole focus on reducing recidivism 
and predictively identifying incorrigible defendants.757 
 While earlier New Deal programs exhibited some emphasis on the social and 
economic conditions that cause crime, they were overshadowed in later years as crime 
became a law enforcement issue characterized by questions of procedure and 
rehabilitation. Criminals were treated as individuals trapped “outside of society, not 
organic to it.”758 In this sense, crime politics moved from an emphasis on class-based 
relations to a politics of individualism in the 1940s, mirroring comparable shifts in 
political and economic discourse. This was part of a reorientation in American politics 
from a collective politics to a politics of individualization that made it easier to control 
individuals in the social realm and easier to punish them in the criminal justice realm. 
II. Political Constructions of Street Criminality from the New Deal Through 1960s 
 Hagan argues that New Deal era crime theories focused on social and economic 
relations and that criminology only reoriented its focus back onto individual behavior 
after the onset of the Reagan era in 1973. His analysis of key theories of crime during this 
period is thorough and accurate, so my account draws extensively on his but evaluates 
these ideas within a more nuanced framework of the New Deal.759 The New Deal era was 
not a singular cohesive epoch that persisted unchanged for four decades. The crime 
theories of the New Deal era cannot be divorced from related shifts in political and 
economic discourses during these years. Political actors drew on prevailing crime 
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theories in selective ways and these ideas were modified as they were transmitted into 
policy. This process changed the meanings of these ideas by running them through 
preexisting institutions.  
 Hagan convincingly illustrates how prevailing explanations of crime propounded 
in mid-century can be organized into three traditions—structural functionalism, symbolic 
interactionism, and conflict theory. His argument is that these theories of criminality 
“reflected in many ways the progressive politics of this era,” which is true to an extent.760 
Many variants of these theories posed direct challenges to traditional criminology’s 
emphasis on individual pathologies, especially in the early years of the New Deal. But the 
window of opportunity for these progressive ideas to reshape American crime politics 
was both remarkably small and remarkably fleeting.  
These new theories did not wholly discredit biological theories of crime, but 
simply quieted them. In 1939, Earnest Hooton published The American Criminal, a dense 
600-page defense of the biological origins of crime. Ironically, Hooton opened the book 
by admitting that, “What is known of human heredity really amounts to exceedingly 
little,” but he did not hesitate to draw broad conclusions about biology and crime.761 
Hooton reinforced Lombroso’s findings and leveled criticisms at sociologists by claiming 
that Lombroso had, “never been scientifically refuted by a satisfactory demonstration.”762  
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Nicole Rafter has described Hooton as an “interloper” during a period of change 
in criminology.763 Hooton was an historical anomaly, as few studies during the 1930s 
endorsed Lombrosian theory, but his work highlights how these older ideas were never 
fully discredited. That he was able to garner attention in 1939 foreshadows bio-
criminology’s eventual resurgence in later decades. More importantly, his insistence that 
alternative theories must disprove crime’s biological basis to attain empirical validity 
serves as a testament to the orthodoxy of Lombrosian theory in criminological circles. 
This underscores a crucial problem even in early New Deal theories of crime, 
which is that they took as a starting point the crimes examined by older criminologists. 
To disprove Lombroso and his adherents, they had to study the same types of behavior. 
Consequently, structural scholars directed their focus on street crimes, thus internalizing 
ideological biases embedded within the philosophies they critiqued. This imbued their 
theories with a similar set of a priori assumptions about criminality that reinforced the 
idea that the crime problem was a class problem. Nonetheless, at least in the 1930s, they 
initially offered prospects for breaking from criminology’s emphasis on the individual. 
Early New Deal Era Theories: The Significance of Class Relations 
 Early structural functionalist theories presented the greatest challenge to 
criminology’s emphasis on natural criminality and the focal individual. Structural 
functionalism theorized that crime was an outcome of a breakdown in social institutions 
that typically produce conformity, including the family, school, and community. Early 
structural functionalists focused on class relations and group-level processes. Rooted in 
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Durkheim’s theory of anomie, structural functionalism ascribed criminality to a lack of 
social regulation and “normlessness.” Without appropriate institutions to socialize 
individuals, groups felt a sense of purposelessness and normlessness and thus disregarded 
the standards and values commonly shared by the broader population.764 
 Durkheim’s precepts formed the basis of Robert Merton’s strain theory. Merton 
famously gave anomie theory a structural twist through a Marxist framing. He described 
anomie as an unequal distribution of resources and opportunities generated through social 
structure, arguing that normlessness follows when people lack the necessary means to 
attain socially prescribed goals. Merton emphasized how society identified widely shared 
goals (such as a having family and owning a home) but denied certain groups the socially 
acceptable means to achieve those goals (like educational and employment 
opportunities). As a result, appropriate means for attaining success are only available in 
higher socioeconomic strata. By imposing what amounted to unrealistic goals on the poor 
and low-income working classes, society created a strain that pushed them towards 
criminality. Merton concluded that disadvantaged groups are “in the society but not of it. 
Sociologically, they constitute the true ‘aliens.’”765 
 Merton’s theory was not an explanation for why some individuals deviate, but a 
theory of class relations explaining that disadvantaged groups deviated more because 
they had the greatest disparity between goals and means. Merton provided multiple 
examples of behaviors characterized by strain, describing economically motivated crime 
as “innovation,” drug use as “retreatism,” radical responses as “rebellion,” and 
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“ritualism” as abandoning socially prescribed goals but conforming to prescribed 
means.766 
 While Merton’s was the quintessential structural functionalist theory, Clifford 
Shaw and Henry McKay’s theory of social disorganization was the most influential. 
Shaw and McKay also deployed structural conceptions of anomie but focused on inner 
cities. Their 1931 analysis of Chicago found that people moved in and out of high-crime 
neighborhoods, but that neighborhoods rather than people remained criminal. Problems 
like truancy, infant mortality, mental disorder, and crime were clustered in geographic 
areas. As different groups moved in and out, the neighborhood remained troubled. Shaw 
and McKay explained these problems as outcomes of poverty, residential mobility, and 
ethnic heterogeneity, which weakened the social bonds of the community.767 
 Shaw and McKay’s work was particularly influential. In fact, their research was 
published as a sub-volume of the Wickersham Commission’s report on the causes of 
crime as related to juvenile delinquency. But Shaw and McKay’s work had a racially 
deterministic tinge by concluding that ethnic heterogeneity weakened community social 
bonds, a logic resting on an essentialist conception of ethnicity. Their 1932 work further 
linked criminality to race. In an article that conceptualized anomie in terms of intra-
family strain, they found that crime was significantly correlated to broken homes only 
when their data was disaggregated by race. Given that black youth had the highest rate of 
broken homes, they suggested that black households were specifically likely to generate 
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delinquent children.768 While Shaw and McKay presented structural disadvantage as a 
form of “anomie” driving criminality, they still maintained links between criminality and 
racial difference. Nonetheless, Shaw, McKay, and Merton emphasized class relations 
more than their predecessors and successors. 
 An alternative to structural functionalism was symbolic interactionism, which 
offered a general theory of crime. The explanatory power of structural functionalism 
depended on the individual committing a crime; it could explain crimes committed by the 
poor in disadvantaged neighborhoods, but not comparable behavior among middle or 
upper-class citizens. While structural functionalism offered an explanation for crime 
rooted in social and economic relations, it also buttressed dominant presumptions about 
the type of people who were criminals. Symbolic interactionism alternatively emphasized 
the meanings involved in explaining, labeling, and defining crime. By imposing the label 
of criminality on people, state responses to crime shaped individuals’ self-conception and 
subsequent behavior. This emphasized the role social control agencies and communities 
played in producing criminals through processes of social construction.  
One of the original theoretical works in this intellectual tradition came from 
Edwin Sutherland in 1924. Sutherland focused less on the role of social control agencies 
than associations among social groups. His differential association theory argued that 
criminal behavior is learned via personal relationships. The core of his theory was that an 
individual becomes delinquent if his or her associates define crime so favorably that it 
outweighs any unfavorable aspects of criminal behavior. These labels are transmitted 
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within groups, including business organizations, which are isolated from competing 
perspectives. Sutherland posited that individuals learn the values and techniques that 
drive crime from their narrowly contained social circles.769 
A famous take on symbolic interactionism was labeling theory, which first 
appeared in Frank Tannenbaum’s 1938 book Crime and the Community. Tannenbaum 
emphasized the labels imposed on individuals by social control agencies. In the book, he 
claimed that police interventions change an individual’s conception of the self. By 
segregating people for incapacitation, criminal punishment constitutes a “dramatization 
of the evil,” forcing people into isolation in which they form relationships with similarly 
defined individuals. This becomes a severe problem when adolescent street culture views 
some behaviors as normal while those outside the community view them as a threat. The 
consequent spectacle of punishment creates the criminal in Tannenbaum’s work, 
upending deterrence logics of punishment.770  
Labeling theory was not a positivist theory, as it was concerned with how 
punishment influences self-conceptions rather than empirically identifying the causes of 
crime. But unlike many other explanations of crime, it offered the basis for a general 
theory with explanatory power reaching across social strata. It would later inform 
Sutherland’s theory of white-collar crime and analyses of business culture by Donald 
Cressey in the 1970s.771 However, as criminology returned to emphasizing individualism, 
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labeling theory became more closely associated with street criminality, drug use, and 
juvenile delinquency. 
The third and final major school of criminology to emerge during mid-century 
was conflict theory. Influenced by Marxist ideology, conflict frames directed attention 
onto how dominant social groups used the power of criminalization to control 
subordinate groups. Conflict theories explain criminality as a social construct that is 
shaped by social, economic, and political power differentials.  
Georg Rusche and Otto Kirchheimer’s 1939 book Punishment and Social 
Structure is the seminal Marxist analysis of crime as a social, economic, and political 
construct. Rusche and Kircheimer rejected the emphasis on the atomized individual 
prevalent in criminology and paved the way for the rise of radical criminology by 
amalgamating conflict theory and crime theory. They argued that instantiations of 
punishment systems have historically corresponded to the prevailing means of production 
at a given moment, tracing the evolution of fines, corporal punishment, prison labor, and 
containment from the Middle Ages through the era of industrial capitalism. Rusche and 
Kirchheimer saw punishment as a species of class domination integral to the state’s class 
control matrix. They concluded that punishment provides “the illusion of security by 
covering the symptoms of social disease with a system of legal and moral value 
judgments.” The criminal law was produced by an alliance between capital and the state 
and detracted from the structures causing crime by emphasizing the individual’s faults.772   
                                                             
772 Georg Rusche and Otto Kirchheimer, Punishment and Social Structure (New York: Columbia 
University, 1939), 207. 
295 
 
Rusche and Kirchheimer’s work received little attention upon its release.773 But 
by the 1950s and 1960s, it became foundational to the school of radical criminology. 
Unlike structural functionalism and symbolic interactionism, conflict criminology had a 
theoretical basis ill-disposed to a reorientation towards the individual. A case in point is 
George Vold’s work in 1958, which depicted criminality as a value judgment placed on 
subordinate groups. For Vold, the difference between losing and winning in business-
labor or revolutionary conflicts was the difference between punishment or glorification, 
as he stated that “a successful revolution makes criminals out of the government officials 
previously in power, and an unsuccessful revolution makes its leaders into traitors.”774 In 
1969, Austin Turk defined criminality as a social status dependent on how dominant 
decision-making authorities perceive inferiors, leading poor and nonwhite populations to 
have high rates of criminalization.775 Richard Quinney’s social realist theory argued that 
elites define crimes in ways that produce the “social reality of crime.” Because the 
disadvantaged are not involved in the writing of laws, their behavioral patterns are likely 
to be defined as criminal in elite discourse.776 
The work of these scholars had significant influence in academic circles, but not 
on policy. Radical criminologists, like most Marxist scholars, have struggled to reach 
political circles, since they have had had few political allies to transmit their ideas to 
policy arenas. Thus, while Hagan’s review of conflict theory is an accurate account of the 
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theoretical principles of this school, his conclusion that conflict theories fostered more 
attention to “white-collar and political crimes” primarily applies to academic contexts.777 
As conflict criminologist William Chambliss admitted, “Criminological conflict theory 
has had notable consequences in terms of subsequent theorizing and rethinking within 
mainstream criminology but has had relatively little direct impact on social policy.”778 
Crime Theories in the Latter New Deal  
As the New Deal shifted away from a class-based politics towards an 
individualistic politics of micro-empowerment, theories of criminality followed suit as 
criminology drifted back to its deterministic and individualistic roots. An emphasis on the 
inclinations of individuals reemerged as scholarship refocused on promoting rational 
treatment programs. During the middle decades of the century, criminological science 
reaffirmed its aim to perfect a program of individualized treatment, mirroring the 
resurgence in political attention to the rehabilitative ideal.779 
 Structural functionalism lost its Mertonian emphasis on class dynamics in favor a 
focus on the relationship between individual expectations and criminality. One of the 
most influential and distinctive variants of structural functionalism came from Sheldon 
and Eleanor Glueck. Their book Unraveling Juvenile Delinquency (1950) combined 
Shaw and McKay’s emphasis on anomie within the family, individualized treatment, and 
predictive targeting. They constructed a prediction table built on a five-factor scale to 
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predict the likelihood of an individual’s criminality. The five factors included “discipline 
of boy by father,” “supervision of boy by mother,” “affection of father for boy,” 
“affection of mother for boy,” and “cohesiveness of family.”780 The Gluecks’ work 
received a lot of attention, particularly in California. Leading the way in the rehabilitative 
ideal’s revival and individualizing treatment, the state constructed a table of “base 
expectancy rates” built on the Gluecks’ prediction tables to guide judicial sentencing 
decisions for individual offenders.781  
 Also fitting into the structural functionalist tradition and its focus on anomie were 
cultural theories of crime. Like their Progressive Era predecessors, cultural theories were 
rooted in essentialized and deterministic understandings of racial difference. One of the 
earliest cultural theories came from Frederick Thrasher in 1927, whose analysis of gang 
culture in Chicago concluded that disorderly economic, moral, and social forces 
reinforced individual tendencies towards criminal behavior.782 While Thrasher’s was the 
most famous, his was not the only work to reexamine cultural theory. In a 1938 article 
titled, “Culture Conflict and Crime,” Thorsten Sellin argued that crime was generated by 
“a conflict of conduct norms” between different cultural systems.783 That same year in 
Crime and the Community, Frank Tannenbaum argued that, “crime is a maladjustment 
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that arises out of the conflict between a group and the community at large” and that some 
cultural groups are “maladjusted to the larger society” and “at war with society.”784  
Thrasher, Sellin, and Tannenbaum were preoccupied with identifying groups 
likely to conflict with prevailing culture. Their work foreshadowed delinquent subculture 
theories that emerged in the 1950s and stigmatized certain cultures as pathologically 
deviant. Albert Cohen’s 1955 book Delinquent Boys sparked this trend. In the book, 
Cohen argued that disadvantaged classes adopt delinquent subcultures due to their 
individual failings. He argued that young boys in urban areas engaged in gang behavior 
as a collective reaction to their dissatisfaction with their unsuccessful efforts to adjust to 
middle-class norms. In this perspective, a sense of frustration drove delinquent 
subcultures to repudiate the middle-class standards giving them a sense of inadequacy.785  
Delinquent subculture theories of criminality were often built on assumptions 
about the pathological nature of lower-class culture. In a 1958 article, Walter Miller 
highlighted how this strand of thought divorced an understanding of lower-class crime 
from structural inequality. He wrote that the values of delinquent subcultures were a 
byproduct of the lower-class system, which include, “trouble, toughness, smartness, 
excitement, fate,” and “autonomy.” He concluded that, “Following cultural practices 
which comprise essential elements of the total life pattern of lower class culture 
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automatically violates certain legal norms.”786 His work pathologized lower-class culture 
as something deviant and viewed it through a deterministic lens. 
Delinquent subculture theory bore similarities to a simultaneously emerging 
theoretical explanation of poverty, the culture of poverty theory. This school argued that 
poverty was a function of deviant subcultures that warped values and family structures. 
Coined in the late 1950s by Oscar Lewis, the phrase initially referred to a “way of life” 
adopted by marginalized communities to cope with “feelings of hopelessness and 
despair” upon recognizing the “improbability of their achieving success in terms of the 
prevailing values and goals.”787 In this sense, Lewis’s theory was a model of Marxist 
anomie theory. He described the culture as “an adaptation and a reaction of the poor to 
their marginal position in a class-stratified, highly individuated, capitalistic society.”788 
He claimed that the poor are mislabeled as “shiftless, mean, sordid, violent, evil and 
criminal” without recognition of the “irreversibly destructive effects of poverty on 
individual character.”789 Lewis’s theory eschewed an emphasis on individual faults and 
directed attention onto the structural dimensions of poverty. However, his theory would 
quickly be warped by scholars who merged it with individualistic theories of inequality.  
 For instance, in their 1960 book Delinquency and Opportunity, Richard Cloward 
and Lloyd Ohlin meshed an individualized structural functionalist theory with culture of 
poverty theory. Their “differential opportunity theory” contended that to understand 
various forms of crime, one must consider different types of legitimate and illegitimate 
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opportunities available to those seeking their way out of disadvantaged environments. 
They emphasized three ways people adapted to their differential opportunity structures. 
Some communities had stable criminal subcultures, in which there was a high degree or 
coordination between legitimate and illegitimate sectors like the police and criminal 
underworld, which produced an organized crime culture. A second was a conflict 
subculture, in which conflict and violence disrupted legitimate enterprises and obstructed 
state efforts at social control. The third was a retreatist subculture, in which individuals 
who failed in their opportunity structures retreated to drug abuse.790 
John Hagan has shown that while working for the Johnson Administration, Ohlin 
embedded differential opportunity theory into Great Society policy, which he calls the 
“peak influence of a progressive crime theory.”791 But the influence of Cloward and 
Ohlin’s ideas on policy was not straightforward. Assistant Secretary of Labor Daniel 
Patrick Moynihan’s 1965 report The Negro Family highlights how policymakers meshed 
Cloward and Ohlin’s theory with culture of poverty theory to target the black poor. This 
underscores that there was not a straight line from Lewis to Moynihan. Rather, Lewis’s 
structural account of the culture of poverty was altered by scholars and policymakers who 
interpreted his work through the lens of individualism.   
Moynihan concluded that, “inability to delay gratification” explains “immature, 
criminal, and neurotic behavior” among blacks. High crimes rates among black youth 
were attributed to unstable home lives, and Moynihan cited “family disorganization” as 
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the main cause of black crime.792 This is why Hagan admits that, “the eventual 
implementation of Cloward and Ohlin's ideas bore a tenuous connection to their original 
theory.”793 Lawmakers modified the ideas of Cloward, Ohlin, and Lewis to suit their 
political needs. Although all three claimed that their theories applied to society, not 
individuals, their ideas were worked into policy in ways that focused on individual-level 
dynamics. 
 By the 1960s, structural functionalism had completed a reorientation towards 
individual level processes rather than social ones. Travis Hirschi’s social control theory 
highlights the nature of this change. His 1969 book Causes of Delinquency argued that all 
that is necessary to explain crime is the absence of a bond to social institutions. He 
argued that weaknesses in any combination of four social bonds (attachment to family or 
friends, school or activities, values or principles, and commitments or goals) produced 
criminality.794 In social control theory, no special strain had to exist between goals and 
means to produce deviance. All that was necessary was a reduction in constraining social 
bonds. Hirschi’s theory emphasized personal responsibility by assuming a natural 
tendency towards deviance that required restraint through such bonds. 795 
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These shifts towards individual-level dynamics in structural functionalism 
mirrored shifts in Keynesianism, culture of poverty theory, and other strands of political 
and economic thought. The development of human capital theory—the idea that 
individual traits or skills determine one’s potential capital accumulation—had also begun 
in the late 1930s, gaining political traction in the 1960s through the work of Chicago 
school economists.796 Human capital theory presented poverty as a result of personal 
failures to invest in enhancing one’s own productive capacities, by which logic social 
assistance produced perverse incentives discouraging self-improvement. In the 1960s, 
human capital theory meshed with an individualized culture of poverty theory, 
differential opportunity theory, and social-control theory by putting the onus on 
individuals to reform and correct for social and economic inequalities.  
 Symbolic interactionist research experienced similar shifts. In his 1963 book 
Outsiders, Howard Becker provided the foundation for modern labeling theory, writing 
that “deviance is not a quality of the act the person commits, but rather a consequence of 
the application by others of rules and sanctions to an ‘offender.’”797 But by the 1960s, 
labeling theory and variants of symbolic interactionism almost entirely focused on street 
criminality. For instance, David Matza and Gresham Sykes’s “neutralization theory” 
posited that delinquent youths drifted into deviance through a process of rationalization. 
They claimed that juvenile delinquents adhered to prevailing norms of conduct in their 
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beliefs but drew on “subterranean traditions” of their subculture to “neutralize” those 
norms by denying their responsibility and the legitimacy of those condemning them.798 
Edwin Sutherland’s ventures into symbolic interactionism offered a basis to expand 
beyond street criminality, as he extended his work into corporate boardrooms in his 1949 
book White-Collar Crime.799 But in general, labeling theory focused on juvenile 
delinquency in the latter twentieth century.800 Its emphasis on the social construction of 
crime has even led it to be derided in mainstream criminological circles for lacking a 
positivist bent. Without any theoretical consideration of the origins of deviance, it has 
been criticized as untestable.801 As a result, symbolic interactionist criminology has 
received less political attention than variants of structural functionalism. 
 Research in criminology influenced waves of correctional reform in the New Deal 
and postwar periods, but the relationship between crime theory and policy operated 
differently during these years than it did in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. While the work of scholars like Merton, Shaw, and McKay made meaningful 
distinctions from earlier brands of crime theory, their ideas were reinterpreted within an 
institutional context that changed their meaning. Policymakers operated within an 
institutional network infused with rehabilitative premises that transformed these new 
ideas to focus on individual rather than class dynamics. As political discourse evolved in 
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the 1940s and 1950s, criminology followed suit, solidifying its focus on identifying and 
correcting the micro-level causes of individual criminal behaviors. This illustrates that the 
window of opportunity during which new ideas could have led to meaningful reform was 
narrow. The way in which the potentially radical ideas of the 1930s were constrained by 
institutional contexts and rehabilitative ideological parameters is especially clear in the 
reports and documents of the Wickersham Crime Commission.  
III. The Wickersham Commission, the UCR, and Ideational Modification 
In operation from 1929 to 1931, the Wickersham Commission was established by 
President Herbert Hoover to investigate an array of issues related to criminal justice. An 
11-person committee led by former Attorney General George Wickersham and staffed by 
prominent legal experts including Roscoe Pound, Newton Baker, and Ada Comstock, the 
Commission published fourteen volumes examining a broad range of issues related to 
crime. Building on the success of the state crime commissions of the 1920s, the 
Commission addressed these questions with the help of leading social scientists including 
Clifford Shaw, Henry McKay, Edwin Sutherland, and Thorsten Sellin.  
Fueled by anxieties over gangland murders and organized crime, one of the 
Commission’s most anticipated volumes was on Prohibition. However, the Commission’s 
immediate impact on policy was relatively moderate and it did not resolve issues 
surrounding alcohol.802 This is not to suggest that the Wickersham Commission was 
insignificant. Its final reports reveal crucial dynamics about New Deal era crime politics 
and the way policymakers explained and conceptualized criminality. Further, while its 
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volume on Prohibition was underwhelming, other volumes had more impact. The 
Commission’s most famous report was its eleventh volume on “Lawlessness in Law 
Enforcement,” which documented the frequency of police abuse referred to as the “third 
degree” to obtain confessions. This fueled public resistance to policy brutality and 
spurred public support for legal controls on police behavior. The Commission’s failure to 
address racial inequalities in the use of “third degree” tactics also galvanized the NAACP 
in its fight for antilynching legislation. And in many ways, the Commission has had long-
term impacts on crime policy. Khalil Muhammad has argued that the Commission 
disregarded evidence of racism in the justice system by ignoring how racial biases were 
embedded into the police reports that informed the UCR, thus embedding “invisible 
layers of racial ideology” into the data.803  
In certain regards, the Wickersham Commission marked a sort of New Deal for 
criminology. But its reports also demonstrate how the class ideology of rehabilitation 
constrained the potential for criminology’s New Deal. Several of the Commission’s 
volumes endorsed rehabilitative ideology and the instruments of individualized treatment. 
Its ninth volume on penal institutions, parole, and probation restated the philosophy of 
Zebulon Brockway, arguing that “Individualization is the root of adequate penal 
treatment and the proper basis of parole.”804 Its thirteenth volume on the causes of crime 
and third on crime statistics both built on the presumption that the causes and solutions to 
criminal behavior can be found within the individual. The Commission’s analyses of 
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crime statistics and the causes of crime were both oriented towards perfecting a program 
of individualized treatment based on rehabilitation. It was these currents in New Deal era 
discourse that divorced social-structural theories of crime from their political economic 
implications, tying them to an individualistic and deterministic ideology of rehabilitation.   
In its analysis of crime statistics, the Commission critiqued granting the Bureau of 
Investigation the power to collect and disseminate crime data given that the agency’s 
vested interests could encourage it to politicize crime in selective ways. Nonetheless, the 
Commission signed off on the new Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) created in 1930, even 
though the Bureau was made the clearinghouse for the dataset. The UCR was the product 
of a lobbying campaign led by the International Association of Police Chiefs (IACP), 
Social Science Research Council (SSRC), and Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial 
Foundation (LSRM). While the SSRC suggested that the dataset be based off of 
comprehensive records from courts, prison, and police, the IACP offered the only means 
of coordinating multiple state and local actors to collect the requisite data, ensuring that 
the statistics were compiled based on police reports. The dataset consequently only 
counted seven “index crimes” included in police data to measure criminal activity that 
were all violent and property offenses.805 
Lawrence Rosen’s work offers insights into the politics that created the UCR but 
the Wickersham Commission’s analysis of the data provides a different perspective on 
how the UCR translated into national crime politics. The Commission’s records show 
how lawmakers interpreted the statistics and reveal processes of ideational modification 
through which political elites reinterpreted prevailing ideas about criminality. To 
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understand how ideas about criminality related to New Deal politics, it is more useful to 
examine how the UCR were interpreted rather than what went into their creation.  
For two reasons, lawmakers interpreted the UCR in ways that changed the 
meaning of prevailing ideas of criminality. First, the state saw the collection of crime 
statistics as a means to an end. The systematic compilation of data offered a way to 
empirically test theories about the causes of crime and identify avenues for treatment, so 
the UCR was designed to be a testable dataset that could produce a composite picture of 
the likely criminal. When the Commission reviewed the UCR and the causes of crime, it 
reinterpreted structurally oriented theories of criminality within an individualistic 
framework geared towards identifying likely criminals for rehabilitation or punishment. 
Second, by focusing on individuals and police data, the UCR neglected to include 
corporate convictions and data from regulatory agencies. Federal agencies have quasi-
policing functions to regulate industry, but the data they produce often reflects the biases 
of the agencies’ staff.806 Without including regulatory crimes and corporate convictions, 
entire categories of offenses were absent from the reports, reaffirming the longstanding 
construct of the criminal as a poor street offender driven by personal faults and flaws.  
Just as the Commission legitimized layers of racial ideology within crime 
statistics, it also legitimized the layers of class ideology in the UCR. The Commission 
endorsed the UCR as an integral part of the state’s rehabilitative programming. The UCR 
was thus designed within and interpreted through rehabilitative frameworks. It focused 
entirely on street crimes and was viewed as a means of identifying the individual factors 
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that cause criminal behavior. This affirmed rehabilitative ideology’s class skewed 
premises. By excluding corporate crime from the data and reinterpreting New Deal era 
theoretical criminology through rehabilitative frameworks, the UCR hardened the class 
distinctions in political constructions of criminality.  
To understand how theories of crime were reshaped by political discourse 
requires an analysis of the Commission’s report on the causes of crime and its report on 
crime statistics. An analysis of public and professional input to the Commission also 
sheds light on the character of New Deal era crime politics. The Commission received 
thousands of letters from citizens and legal professionals providing information, advice, 
and explanations for the apparent increase in crime. The Commission directly solicited 
input from judges and prosecutors, valuing their perspectives as frontline crime fighters. 
Given that U.S. judges and district attorneys stand at the intersection of crime policy and 
electoral politics and have strong incentives to sell themselves as law-and-order 
candidates, their responses reveal which framings of criminality appealed to political 
actors in the New Deal period.807 The subsequent analysis thus draws on an assessment of 
the Commission’s reports as well as a survey of letters from district attorneys and judges 
written to the Commission held in the National Archives.  
The Wickersham Commission’s “Report on Criminal Statistics,” its third volume, 
leveled numerous critiques at the UCR. It called the reports “unsystematic,” saying they 
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were “often inaccurate” and “incomplete.”808 It criticized the UCR’s reliance on police 
statistics, noting that precincts’ reports were laden with inconsistencies and rarely 
recorded information about dispositions after arrest.809 The Commission suggested that 
court statistics about prosecution were better indices for measuring crime rates, but noted 
that a comparable lack of standardization in court records also prevented them from 
having any immediate utility to federal officials. The Commission thus expressed serious 
skepticism towards using police reports to tabulate the data but was not confident in any 
proposed alternative. As a result, the report concluded the that police data were “of 
doubtful statistical value,” but expressed fear that changing the basis of the UCR without 
a viable alternative “would undo the work so well begun under the auspices of the 
International Association of Chiefs of Police.” The Commission also criticized the fact 
that the Bureau of Investigation was granted authority to collect the data, arguing that the 
Bureau of the Census would serve this function in a more disinterested way. The report 
concluded that despite its flaws, the UCR “should be conserved” and “perfected as much 
as possible,” until it could be transferred to the Bureau of the Census and incorporate a 
wider array of sources than just police reports.810  
Scholars in APD have noted that timing and sequence are crucial to understanding 
how developmental pathways are formed. In the case of the UCR, had the Wickersham 
Commission’s reports been published a few years earlier, competing proposals to 
authorize a more comprehensive statistical program from a variety of sources may have 
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gained momentum over proposals to rely on police statistics.811 Further, had the reports 
been published earlier, the dataset may have been housed in the Census Bureau rather 
than FBI, separating the dissemination of national crime data from the political interests 
of the FBI. But the institutional linkages formed between police, the FBI, and the UCR 
proved difficult to reverse even shortly after they were established.   
 The Commission viewed the UCR as a means of scientifically discovering the 
causes of crime and predictively identifying likely criminals. The Commission thus 
interpreted the UCR in ways that emphasized targeting individuals for reform or 
punishment rather than addressing structural contributors to crime. This was particularly 
clear at the end of the report on statistics, which concluded with a piece written by Morris 
Ploscowe entitled, “A Critique of Federal Criminal Statistics.” Ploscowe criticized the 
use of police data as a metric for measuring criminality just as the main report did, but 
also noted that collecting crime data was necessary for identifying the causative factors in 
criminal behavior and for rehabilitating offenders.812 He stated that criminal statistics 
were essential for producing a “composite picture of the types of individuals” that are 
likely to turn to crime. He wrote that, 
The fundamental need is for more knowledge concerning the elements entering 
into the crime problem, and the most important of these elements is the individual 
delinquent. Statistics relating to the individual delinquent will not in and of 
themselves enable us to understand the causes of criminality, but by revealing the 
most frequently recurrent phenomena they can indicate broad trends which should 
be bases for further investigation.813  
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Ploscowe concluded that statistics should serve the purposes of “scientific penology” 
which, “demands individualization in the treatment of the prisoner.”814  
Ploscowe’s points mirrored claims in the primary report, which opened by stating 
that among the core principles shared by the Commission’s members was the idea that 
crime statistics should be centralized and published in order to create “a comprehensive 
plan for an ultimate complete body of statistics, covering crime, criminals, criminal 
justice, and penal treatment.”815 The first page of the report stated that, “Statistics are 
needed to tell us, or at least to help tell us, what we have to do, how we are doing it, and 
how far what we are doing responds to what we have to do.”816 Not only did the 
Commission argue that the data was to be used to detail “the volume and character of the 
offenses committed,” but also to get an idea of, “what persons or types of persons, if the 
types may be differentiated, commit these offenses.”817 It is at this juncture that the 
Commission’s thirteenth volume, its, “Report on the Causes of Crime,” becomes crucial.  
The volume on the causes of crime consisted of two parts—one dissenting piece 
written by Henry Anderson on the grounds that the primary report failed to adequately 
specify the causes of criminality, and a majority report written by Ploscowe and the 
remainder of the Commission. With chapters dedicated to biology, mental health, social 
factors, economics, and politics, Ploscowe’s majority report opened and closed by noting 
that nearly all theoretical explanations reviewed had some power in explaining crime to 
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varying degrees and in varying contexts.818 But the report emphasized that, “The soundest 
approach to the problem of the causation of crime…lies through a study of the individual 
criminal.”819 In the Commission’s analysis, new ideas associated with structural 
functionalist criminology were interpreted to focus on individual level faults rather than 
structural political economic forces. 
Interestingly, the first chapter in the majority report examined “Morphological 
and Physiological Factors.” It was a straightforward reexamination of Lombrosian theory. 
The Commission attacked the school of thought, arguing that Lombroso and his 
adherents failed to identify any causal relationship between biology and crime. However, 
they emphasized that Lombroso moved criminological thought in an important direction, 
“By centering attention on the criminal rather than the crime committed.”820 The 
emphasis on the focal individual in academic analyses of crime was thus not an 
inadvertent or accidental legacy of Lombrosian theory. Even Lombroso’s foes 
acknowledged that his emphasis on the individual criminal rather than his or her crime 
was the most fundamental contribution of his work to criminology.  
While throwing doubt onto Lombroso’s claims about atavism, the Commission 
recognized that Lombrosian theory undergirded promising new research. On the first 
page of the chapter, the Commission wrote that the “fundamental idea of Lombroso,” that 
a man’s conduct “find[s] expression in his physical constitution…still underlies present 
research.” The Commission praised work in the field of endocrinology that linked 
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endocrine pathologies to crime. The authors wrote that analyses of “the functions of 
glands of internal secretion in determining body build and personality” have the potential 
to provide an explanation of criminality “in terms of physical and organic conditions.”821  
Regarding psychology, the report closely examined Bernard Glueck’s research at 
Sing Sing that pointed to the prevalence of psychopathy as a driver of crime.822 But the 
report offered stinging critiques of this strand of theory. It warned against the circular 
logic of psychological theories of crime since crime is viewed as evidence of 
psychopathy and psychopathy is viewed as a cause of crime. The authors wrote that this 
“fallacy seems to underlie the whole psychiatric approach to the problem of crime” and 
concluded that the psychological approach to studying crime is just a “modern 
manifestation of Lombroso’s idea that the criminal is a separate type.”823 Nonetheless, the 
chapter on psychology ended on a surprisingly positive note given its overall critical tone, 
with the Commission defending psychology as “in its infancy.” The authors wrote that 
the school’s, “approach to the problem of crime through the study of the reactions of the 
individual criminal may yet prove fruitful.”824   
It was not only the Commission that offered support for biological and 
psychological theories of crime. In response to mailers from the Commission requesting 
their input, numerous judges and district attorneys wrote letters endorsing biological 
theories of criminality. S.E. Metzler, the D.A. in Humboldt County California, 
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exemplified this trend. He informed the Commission that “the greatest number of 
criminals with whom the prosecutor has to deal, is born a criminal, he is a congenital 
criminals [sic], he is defective from the day that he is delivered, and he will remain a 
criminal all of his life.”825 County Attorney Ernest Jenkins of Payne County, Oklahoma 
identified heredity as the primary cause of crime, claiming that “to substantiate that 
statement I would refer my readers to the famous Jukes family.”826 He endorsed 
sterilization as a means of remedying the problem of “habitual criminals.” Governor 
Douglas Buck of Delaware similarly told the Commission that “sterilization appeals to 
me as the best means” the states have to “curtail the breeding of criminals.”827 
The Commission clearly did not ignore biology, psychology, and Lombroso. 
These ideas had meaningful sway both among the Commission’s members and political 
actors operating within the criminal justice system. What is most telling, however, are the 
Wickersham’s Records regarding social, economic, and political theories of crime. The 
report on social factors included an entire sub-volume by Shaw and McKay that focused 
on the role of broken homes in driving juvenile delinquency and particularly how black 
homes were likely to produce delinquent children.828 The chapter on crime’s social 
causes blamed criminality on the absence of adequate parental supervision and also cited 
cultural theory, suggesting that immigrant children are prone to crime due to parents who 
raise them in cultural conflict with American society. The Commission cited scholarship 
                                                             
825 S.E. Metzler, “Records of the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement,” October 
26, 1929, RG 10, Box 66, National Archives II, College Park, MD. 
826 Ernest Jenkins, “Records of the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement,” 
December 6, 1929, RG 10, Box 66, National Archives II, College Park, MD. 
827 Douglas Buck, “Records of the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement,” June 
26, 1929, RG 10, Box 67, National Archives II, College Park, MD. 
828 U.S. National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, Report on the Causes of Crime, 
13:67–68. 
315 
 
about Polish immigrants that blended determinism and social disorganization theory by 
arguing that, “the natural tendencies of an individual, unless controlled and organized by 
social education, inevitably lead to a behavior which must be judged as abnormal.”829  
The chapter concluded that social structures and community institutions inhibit 
natural tendencies towards crime within individuals, a conclusion that was not implicit in 
Shaw and McKay’s original work. The Commission argued that without the relationships 
outlined by Shaw and McKay, some communities are high-risks for becoming criminal, 
drawing on Thrasher’s work to argue that gangs emerge to fill the vacuums left in 
communities by shuttered schools, churches, and other institutions. The chapter 
contended that the breakdown of community and family institutions contributed to 
criminality but argued that more research is needed to link these processes to the race, 
nationality, and psychology of specific communities.830   
The letters written to the Commission help to explain how and why the 
Commission viewed both structural functionalist and biological theories as valid. A good 
case in point is a letter written to the Commission from Judge J.B. Williams of 
Guadalupe County, Texas. Williams wrote to the Commission that he believed, “that the 
tendency to crime is innate or inborn in a child.” However, Williams went on to state that 
two other central causes of crime include “extreme poverty and too much indulgence by 
parents and a lack of co-operation in the selection of their associates.”831 Similarly, a 
letter from Assistant DA A.L. Betke in Denver wrote that while crime can be caused by 
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the environment in which one is raised, heredity is also a crucial factor, claiming that 
most criminals “are inferior mentally and physically to the average man.” He said that 
“with a casual glance [one] can see that these men are considerably different from other 
men.” Betke pointed to the shape of men’s heads and bodies as indicators of their 
criminal nature shortly after discussing how their upbringing and various social forces 
contribute to criminality.832 A Solicitor General in Alabama made a comparable 
argument, emphasizing that lack of employment opportunities is a central driver of 
criminality, but that there are also “our natural criminals as well as their children who 
have a tendency toward crime from the beginning.”833 
 This highlights an important pattern both in the letters written to the Commission 
and the Commission’s reports. Structural functionalist theories of criminality and 
determinist conceptions of innate criminality were not interpreted as mutually exclusive. 
The Commission’s reports partially endorsed social-structural schools of criminology and 
biological ones, and letters from prosecutors and judges often endorsed both. It is critical 
to remember that Merton, Shaw, McKay, and other social-structural scholars were 
explicitly aiming to undermine and refute biological theory. But when their ideas 
translated into politics, many policymakers endorsed both, exhibiting a belief that both 
theoretical perspectives could be valid without discrediting the other.  
Structural functionalist accounts were clearly appreciated by the Commission. But 
by insisting that they link their findings to race, psychology, and continuing to grant 
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support to biological theories, the Commission reinforced the idea that crime was 
pathological among certain populations. These connections revealed an important 
reinterpretation of structural functionalism. The Commission did not view poverty or 
structural disadvantage as conditions conducive to criminality, as Shaw, McKay, and 
others suggested. From the perspective of the Commission, poverty and structural 
disadvantage were correlates of crime associated with other causal connections between 
criminality, psychology, and racial difference. The Commission overlooked the emphasis 
on class dynamics in the works of Merton, Shaw, McKay, and others, instead opting to 
refocus their theories on the focal individual.  
Conflict theories directly challenged these sorts of assumptions, but the 
Commission gave little credence to economic and political factors. The report’s chapter 
on economics called research linking crime and socioeconomic factors “superficial,” 
suggesting that it was overbroad to generalize any direct links between crime and 
poverty.834 The chapter on politics stated that crime should not be understood as a 
political construct driven by the choices of police, prosecutors, and political elites. The 
report actually claimed that the biggest political factor shaping perceptions of crime was 
that most crime went unnoticed by the state. Citing the Illinois Crime Commission, the 
commission argued that police only catch about 20% of felons. This, the Commission 
stated, contributed to an excess of crime in America relative to other countries.835 
The Commission concluded that most of the factors they examined played some 
role in causing crime, noting that there was no singular “criminal psychology” driving all 
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types of criminals. Consequently, the conclusion stated that “this report recommends 
further study of the individual criminal,” particularly suggesting that each criminal 
type—such as the property criminal, sex offender, and murderer—be studied in 
isolation.836 By focusing on the atomized individual, the Commission disregarded major 
contributions from structural functionalism, conflict theory, and labeling theory. The 
report assumed that criminal types could be categorized into discrete groups that could 
only understood with reference to an analysis of individuals, reinforcing a disregard for a 
structurally contextualized understanding of crime even though they were testing 
structurally-oriented theories of criminality.  
Ploscowe and the commissioners recommended that Congress provide funds for 
“the establishment of a criminological laboratory where certain selected prisoners might 
be more intensively studied for the light they may throw upon the elements entering into 
the causation of crime.” A laboratory geared towards the “thorough study of the 
individual criminal…could not fail to provide a body of knowledge of the individual 
criminal from which considerable advance in the ascertainment of causes of crime might 
be made.” 837  This did not pan out as the Commission hoped, but it is a telling 
recommendation. The Commission was far less concerned with structural inequality as a 
cause of crime than it was with studying the individual delinquent and the micro-level 
causes of their individual behavioral patterns.  
 The Commission’s reports made it clear that crime statistics were designed to test 
prevailing theories of scientific penology in order to improve the state’s responses to 
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crime. But by interpreting prevailing theories of criminal behavior through rehabilitative 
frameworks designed to identify likely criminals and determine their reformative 
capacity, lawmakers reinforced a stereotype of the likely criminal reflecting class biases. 
Rather than viewing poverty and social disadvantage as a cause of crime, the 
Commission interpreted the UCR and prevailing theories of criminality through the lens 
of rehabilitative ideology. This encouraged lawmakers to view socioeconomic 
disadvantage not as a structural contributor to criminality, but as a personal trait 
associated with the criminal disposition.  
 Input from judges and prosecutors demonstrate a revealing pattern that sheds light 
on the Commission’s perspective on structural functionalism. A large number of public 
officials utilized the language of structural functionalism to explain crime’s causes, often 
alongside biological explanations of criminality. But in deploying structuralist 
functionalist language, they rarely advocated for structural reform, instead opting for 
punitive policy. For example, C.W. Barrick, a DA in Oregon, claimed that research 
indicated that the cause of crime was a troubled upbringing and home. But he stated that 
paroles are “over done” and that only the worst offenders receive incarceration due to 
overcrowding, meaning that the state ends up “paroling large numbers from the bench 
who should be incarcerated.”838 District Attorney G.G. Jewel of Eaton, Ohio spoke in 
language reminiscent of Mertonian strain theory, stating that the “desire to make up a 
deficit” and “obtain additional money” drives people to crime. However, he reinterpreted 
strain theory through an individualized framing, claiming that offenders are driven to 
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steal money “since their abilities to earn it are none too great,” a logic he used to suggest 
that courts and prosecutors should work more speedily to put people behind bars where 
they “should be taught something useful that will stand them in stead [sic] after their 
release.”839 This reveals that structuralist functionalist theory was not linked to structural 
reform in the New Deal political zeitgeist. Rather, policymakers rationalized structural 
functionalist theory as complementary to the punitive prong of the rehabilitative ideal.  
It is worth remembering that structural functionalism did not offer a general 
theory of crime. The notion that socioeconomic disadvantage generates criminality 
ignores crimes committed by people from upper socioeconomic strata. Theories about 
broken homes, poverty, and crime had explanatory value only applicable to lower-class 
offenders. That is why the Commission’s recommendations for “further study of the 
individual criminal,” was so problematic. By reinterpreting structural theories to focus on 
the individual, the Commission reaffirmed the idea that the likely criminal was poor. In 
its analyses and recommendations for future work, the Commission ignored anyone that 
did not fit the politically constructed image of the “individual criminal” frontloaded into 
its analysis. In an institutional context in which the individualization of punishment was 
the central goal of the criminal justice system, the social-structural crime theories of the 
New Deal were imbued with the individualistic and deterministic flavor of the 
rehabilitative ideal in ways that compromised their political economic foundation.   
IV. Indeterminate Sentencing, Individualizing Treatment, and Habitual Offenders 
In the 1940s, attempts to contextualize crime and inequality in social structure 
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were regularly dismissed in political debates. The disbanding of the NRPB in 1942 serves 
as a case in point. In its report Security, Work, and Relief Policies, the NRPB wrote that 
the problems of juvenile delinquency and crime “are traceable to widespread 
unemployment among young people.” It argued that the state could help check the crime 
problem through the provision of education, health services, public housing, and social 
welfare.840 Upset with the board’s recommendations, congressional conservatives 
immediately disbanded the board.841 In the 1940s, this sort of structurally contextualized 
understanding of crime was political anathema.  
While some early New Deal policies exhibited structural understandings of 
criminality—such as the Civilian Conservation Corps or deferred prosecution 
agreements—latter New Deal discourse focused on the individual. An emphasis on due 
process, rehabilitation, and individualized treatment drove 1940s crime politics.842 These 
shifts affected the general development of American criminal justice but their impact is 
particularly clear in three policy areas that are explored in this section. The first section 
analyzes the spread of indeterminate sentencing during mid-century, paying attention to 
developments in the 1940s that hardened the penal system’s emphasis on individuals. 
Linked to rehabilitative ideology, reforms in indeterminate sentencing brought promises 
of reform and harsh justice, and policymakers reinterpreted structural theories of crime to 
be consistent with the individualized treatment model. The second section explores how 
Conrad Printzlein’s deferred prosecution plan was modified by the Department of Justice 
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to be consistent with discursive shifts emphasizing the individual offender. The final 
section examines New York’s Baumes laws, a series of statutory reforms passed in New 
York in 1926 targeting recidivists. The Baumes laws prompted the spread of habitual 
offender laws across the states from the 1930s through 1960s. Analyses of the Baumes 
laws and state court rulings upholding habitual offender laws reveals how they were 
justified as part of rehabilitative programs taking hold in state penal systems.  
The Spread of the Indeterminate Sentence and Revival of Individualization 
As the linchpin of rehabilitative reform, indeterminate sentencing spread through 
mid-century. Premised on the individualized treatment of the offender, the indeterminate 
sentence subsumed structurally oriented theories of crime into its individualistic 
framework, limiting their connection to structural reform. To understand how this 
happened, it is useful to start with the 1949 Supreme Court case Williams vs. New York.  
In Williams, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of indeterminate 
sentencing. In the case, a sentencing judge in New York imposed the death sentence on a 
defendant based on information not presented to a jury, which had only recommended 
life imprisonment. The Supreme Court upheld the sentence and drew on rehabilitative 
logic to do so. Justice Black wrote that because, “[r]eformation and rehabilitation of 
offenders have become important goals of jurisprudence,” the “punishment should fit the 
offender and not merely the crime.” He concluded that as a result, judges should be 
virtually unlimited in what they can consider during sentencing. Even conduct not 
presented to juries and unrelated to the conviction at hand could be relevant factors in 
individualizing a sentence to a defendant’s rehabilitative potential. That is why Justice 
Black wrote that, “Today’s philosophy of individualizing sentences makes sharp 
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distinctions between first and repeat offenders.”843 That Black connected the logic of 
individualization and rehabilitation not only to recidivism but also to capital punishment 
reveals how deep the link was between rehabilitative ideology and punitive politics.   
Black stated that “highly relevant—if not essential” to determining a defendant’s 
sentence and rehabilitative potential was “the fullest information possible concerning the 
defendant’s life and characteristics.” He wrote that judges should rely on the presentence 
report written by probation officers when sentencing defendants. Probation in America 
dated to the 1840s but became prominent with the rise of the rehabilitative ideal. 
Probation officers supervise offenders released from prison or sentenced to non-custodial 
sanctions. In the early twentieth century, most states passed probation laws to accompany 
their indeterminate sentencing statutes, and Congress passed a Federal Probation Act in 
1925.844   
By the mid-twentieth century, probation officers in most jurisdictions became 
regularly involved in preparing presentence reports (PSRs) for judges. PSRs included 
recommendations regarding sentencing decisions and provided background information 
on offenders for sentencing judges to consider. It was these reports that Black referred to 
in Williams, noting that they outline a range of factors that judges should consider in 
determining appropriate sentences and treatments. Black specifically cited a publication 
from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts summarizing the purpose and design of 
the PSR. The report indicated that the PSR was aimed towards improving individualized 
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treatments and sentences. It stated the following: 
Its [the PSR’s] primary object is to focus light on the character and personality of 
the defendant, to offer insight into his personality needs, to discover those factors 
underlying the specific offense and his conduct in general, and to aid the court in 
deciding whether probation or some other form of treatment is for the best 
interests of both the offender and society.845  
 
The report, the authors said, would assist in “rehabilitative efforts” and help reformatories 
“in their institutional classification and treatment programs.”846  
 It is telling that the publication opened by stating that the PSR was designed to 
uncover information about the “character and personality of the defendant” and “his 
personality needs.” The PSR focused on the individual’s personal rehabilitative potential 
and needs, so factors connected to poverty or social inequalities were not understood as 
structural problems but as factors that created personality faults requiring individual level 
interventions or mitigated sentences. The report stated that the PSR should consist of 13 
sections analyzing a defendant: “(1) Offense; (2) Prior Record; (3) Family History; (4) 
Home and Neighborhood; (5) Education; (6) Religion; (7) Interests and Activities; (8) 
Health; (9) Employment; (10) Resources; (11) Summary; (12) Plan; and (13) Agencies 
Interested.”847 These factors were emphasized with an eye towards “an interpretation of 
the defendant’s problems and needs” and an “evaluation of [the] defendant’s 
personality.”848  
The consideration of an individual’s prior criminal record and behavioral history 
was particularly crucial. The authors not only clarified that a record of prior criminal 
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convictions mattered to individualizing the sentence, but also noted that, “a long 
succession of misdemeanors, even though the final disposition was ‘discharged,’ tells a 
lot about the defendant.”849 This emphasis on the individual’s background and offense 
history was a legacy of rehabilitative ideology embedded into the indeterminate model. 
The consideration of past convictions, personal traits and background, and even charges 
of which the defendant was acquitted were considered relevant as evidence of his or her 
rehabilitative potential in addition to factors like physical health and I.Q.850  
 Socioeconomic status, educational background, family life, and neighborhood 
conditions were all key considerations in the PSR. The authors noted that a probation 
officer should address questions like, “is the neighborhood a delinquent area” and which 
“races, nationalities, and culture predominate” the community. Questions about the 
individual’s educational background were unrelated to the quality of schooling, but rather 
the “defendant’s own reaction to school; his likes and dislikes” and “history of truancy.” 
Questions about religion were premised on the notion that “religion may be a significant, 
decisive factor in enabling an individual to overcome his difficulties,” reflecting the 
presumption that criminality was a function of an individual’s lack of moral sense. Issues 
related to employment did not consider the job opportunities in a community, or lack 
thereof, but rather, “what kind of work is he [the defendant] best adapted? What field of 
employment would he like to follow? What occupational skills has he,” and, “What is the 
employer’s evaluation of the defendant’s personality, capabilities, punctuality, 
reliability?” In addressing reasons for unemployment, the report suggested that these 
                                                             
849 Chappell and Evjen, 7. 
850 Chappell and Evjen, 11. 
326 
 
problems are often personal handicaps that should be addressed in the “health” section of 
the report.851 Employment status was primarily regarded as evidence of an individual’s 
merit, health, and character. The idea that the absence of a wage labor market in a 
community could contribute to unemployment or criminality went unaddressed.  
 A revised version of the report in 1965 made similar interpretations. It stated that 
the PSR’s main objective was to “present the respective problems and needs of the 
individual offender in a meaningful way,” including his or her “needs, capacities, and 
problems.”852 The report repeatedly contended that details relating to an individual’s 
family background and employment history “have relatively little value unless they are 
interpreted in relation to the defendant and how he thinks, feels, and behaves.”853 These 
factors only matter in the sense that a “history of employment instability, family discord, 
similar types of offenses, inability to tolerate tedium, and the need to be on the go, do, of 
course, throw light on the defendant.”854 The 1965 PSR was a useful metric of how courts 
implemented the indeterminate sentence, since by 1970 every state and the federal system 
was using the indeterminate model.855  
The emergence of probation officers and the use of the presentence report fit into 
broader political trends in mid-century crime politics. The enhanced importance of PSRs 
as a part of the indeterminate sentencing process fit into shifts towards promoting a 
procedurally fair justice system in the 1940s. But socioeconomic disadvantage was not 
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viewed as a structural cause of crime like theorists such as Robert Merton intended. 
Rather, these factors became incorporated into a rehabilitative framework emphasizing 
individualized treatment, individual faults, and individual-level solutions. Rehabilitative 
frameworks neutralized the potential for a more progressive crime politics rooted in 
political economic reform offered by new theoretical perspectives on crime.   
The Evolution of Deferred Prosecution  
Before they became one of the Justice Department’s primary tools in corporate 
prosecutions, the deferred prosecution agreements originally envisioned by Printzlein 
changed radically in the 1940s. In 1946, U.S. Attorney General Tom Clark authorized a 
committee of Senior Circuit Judges to evaluate Printzlein’s program. The committee’s 
final report, presented in September of 1947, suggested that the program had a bright 
future. The judges wrote that they saw great value in the Printzlein program and believed 
that its use “should be encouraged.”856  
The DOJ’s endorsement came with serious alterations to Printzlein’s vision. The 
committee wrote that “the plan should never be used except for first offenders,” and 
claimed that recidivists deserved additional punishment. The report stated that deferred 
prosecution should not be used “where there is a strong likelihood that the juvenile has 
sustained delinquency traits and, although technically not a first offender, is actually a 
recidivist who has been caught for the first time.” And for first-time offenders, the 
committee argued that deferred agreements should only be offered “in cases where there 
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is a reasonably good home background.”857  
These constituted crucial changes from Printzlein’s original proposal. Printzlein’s 
plan was designed to give disadvantaged juveniles a second chance. However, the 
judicial committee believed that such deals should only be offered for individuals that 
come from a “reasonably good home background,” which the committee saw as an 
indicator of rehabilitative potential. This implied that deferred agreements should be 
denied to the very people Printzlein wanted to help—juveniles from disadvantaged 
backgrounds. The committee’s understanding of rehabilitative potential was built on class 
assumptions that limited the program’s applicability.  
Second, the report stated that deferred agreements should not be offered to 
individuals with clean records if judges believed the individual might have committed 
prior offenses for which he or she was not caught. This proposition hinged the entire 
implementation of the program on subjective character judgments of individual 
defendants made by sentencing judges. Two first-time defendants could be brought 
before a judge for the same offense, but if the judge believed that one probably had 
committed crimes before—despite no convictions, charges, or compelling evidence on 
the person’s record—he or she should receive a more severe sentence while the other 
could receive a deferred prosecution agreement. Again, this countered the original aims 
of Printzlein’s proposal. Instead of giving individuals an opportunity to avoid exposure to 
the justice system, this approach denied people that opportunity based on a judicial 
evaluation of their personal background and character. The 1946 investigation led the 
DOJ to formalize Printzlein’s practice in 1964 as a rehabilitative tool of the Justice 
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Department, laying institutional groundwork for the deferred prosecution model to 
become a core strategy of the DOJ’s approach to prosecuting corporate crime.858 These 
modifications completely upended the initial reformist spirit of Printzlein’s program.  
The deferred prosecution system was retooled to look more like the indeterminate 
sentencing model. It was reformed to emphasize an individual’s background, personal 
traits, and behavioral history in order to tailor punishment, reflecting the assumption that 
these factors were strong indices of an individual’s rehabilitative capacity. This infused 
Printzlein’s program with the class biases of rehabilitative ideology, suppressing his 
program’s social-structural basis.  
The Baumes Laws and the Spread of Habitual Offender Statutes  
Rehabilitative ideology translated across time not only through the persistence of 
its cornerstone policy innovation, the indeterminate sentence, but also through its 
inseparable counterpart, the habitual offender law.  Beginning in the 1920s, habitual 
offender laws targeting recidivists with longer terms of incarceration spread across the 
states. New York ignited the movement with the famous Baumes laws in 1926. 
Sponsored by state Senator Caleb Baumes, these reforms abolished good behavior early 
release incentives, increased sentences for repeat offenders, and instituted life sentences 
for fourth felony convictions. Rebecca McClellan has presented these reforms as 
consistent with the rise of managerial penology, a philosophy of prison management 
more concerned with keeping inmates complacent than reforming them.859 In some ways 
this is true, but rehabilitative ideology was fundamental to their design.  
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This is clear in the statements of Baumes himself. He defended the laws by stating 
that their purpose was “protection to the public” against “incurable” offenders, not prison 
management.860 In 1927 the New York State Crime Commission reiterated Baumes’ 
arguments, claiming that law’s purpose was to contain offenders who “cannot be changed 
by reform,” not to promote efficient prison administration. The Commission’s report 
noted that the laws implemented ideas criminologists had long articulated about 
individualization, particularly that, “punishments should be made to suit the criminal, not 
the crime.”861   
The Commission stated that, “there is nothing new about this statute” because it 
simply replicated New York’s 1907 habitual offender law that had gone unenforced due 
to poor record-keeping and failures in communication between prosecutors, police, and 
courts.862 For years preceding New York’s passage of the initial law in 1907, the New 
York State Board of Charities advocated for it by drawing on rehabilitative penology. 
The 1905 SBC report cited Brockway, who served on the Board, for using the 
indeterminate sentence to release reformed offenders and provide “permanent detention” 
to “those who by defect of character or constitution” required containment. The SBC 
concluded that a habitual offender law was necessary because “incorrigible offenders 
should be permanently segregated by the state” and that the indeterminate sentence 
“should be relieved of its maximum limit” to contain incorrigibles.863 The SBC’s 1907 
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report expressed support for the law, citing Dugdale and Lombroso as proving that 
habitual criminals are a “distinct class” requiring restraint, and praised the law for 
instituting a “genuinely indeterminate sentence” for incorrigibles.864   
That the Baumes laws replicated the 1907 statute underscores its connections to 
rehabilitation. This was noticeable in the first case prosecuted under the law. After being 
arrested for holding up a store, a 21-year old man was sentenced to life imprisonment 
under the law in August of 1926. His judge had this to say during his sentencing hearing: 
Hanson, you have four other complaints against you in addition to the one older 
offense. You had punishment when you were sent to Elmira Reformatory. It did 
you no good. You are no good to yourself or society. I sentence you to life 
imprisonment and direct that you be kept there for the natural extent of your 
life.865 
 
In design and implementation, the Baumes’ laws were tied to evaluations of rehabilitative 
potential. Journalist Robert Quillen defended it by writing that some offenders are 
“natural-born rebels” who “do not desire the opportunity to reform” and “can not be 
reformed.”866 Baumes made comparable claims before the New York State Bankers’ 
Association, stating that the laws that bore his name were designed “not so much for the 
punishment of the criminal as the protection of society. They are not retributive nor 
vindictive…These laws may provide the last and only chance for the redemption of 
hardened criminals, because if these men go to prison for life they must go to church.”867  
 In response to public uproar after the laws’ passage, New York reinstituted early 
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release incentives and replaced the life sentence with a fifteen-year minimum in 1931.868 
But the damage had been done. Over the next two decades, forty-three states passed 
legislation based on the Baumes laws. Twenty-nine authorized judges to issue life 
sentences for third or fourth time offenders.869 Five states attempted to pass versions of 
the Baumes laws only one year after New York.870 These proposals were similarly 
justified through rehabilitative ideology. For example, in 1927 the county prosecutor in 
Minneapolis said that the state’s proposed version of the Baumes laws “gives prosecuting 
attorneys the power to deal severely with the man who will not reform.”871 Prosecutors 
and judges in Pennsylvania fought for a Baumes law in the late 1920s, going “on the 
record in favor of a new law fixing punishment for crime on the principle that confirmed 
criminals should be ‘permanently removed as a menace to society.’”872   
 As of 1950, forty-two states had statutes that increased sentences for recidivists. 
Thirty-two authorized life sentences in varying circumstances with different degrees of 
judicial discretion. Table 6.4 below outlines these variations. As Professor George Brown 
of St. Lawrence University observed in 1945, the laws were typically, “regarded as a 
reformatory measure” that “contemplates an enhanced punishment for a party who…does 
not reform, but persists in committing other offenses of a like character.”873 
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FIGURE 6.4: State Habitual Offender Laws (1949) 
 
Type of Law No. of States States 
Life sentence, 2 felonies 
(Discretionary) 3 AZ, ME, OK  
Life sentence, 3 felonies 
(Discretionary) 7 
CA, ID, IL,                                    
KS, LA, UT, VA  
Life sentence, 3 felonies 
(Mandatory) 6 IN, KY, MI, TX, WA, WV 
Life sentence, 4 felonies 
(Discretionary) 5 MN, ND, OR, PA, SD 
Life sentence, 4 felonies 
(Mandatory) 10 
CO, FL, MO, NJ, NM,                 
NY, OH, TN, VT, WY 
Life sentence, 5 felonies 
(Mandatory) 1 NV 
Increased terms of 
confinement 11 
AL, CT, DE, DC, GA,                   
IA, MA, NE, NH, RI, WI 
*Compiled by tracing statutory citations from the following three sources: “Court 
Treatment” (1948); Tappan (1949); and Brown (1945).  
 
At the conclusion of his analysis, Brown noted that habitual offender laws can be severe, 
but tied them to the logic of rehabilitation: 
…the indeterminate sentence affords the best opportunity for the treatment of the 
recidivist at this time. For those recidivists who are reformable, the parole 
techniques…become increasingly important… For those lacking reformable 
characteristics, it seems quite possible that the indeterminate sentence can restrain 
them for a period long enough to prevent active danger on their release... If their 
attitudinal distortions or other mental anomalies can be acceptably changed, they 
too would be given consideration for release. If not, they would be restrained for 
life.874  
 
Brown went on to directly attribute the spread of these habitual offenders’ laws to the 
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ideas of Lombroso. He argued that precursors to habitual offender laws could be traced to 
1817 but noted that these laws only punished the re-commission of the same crime(s). By 
1900, “No doubt as a result of the work of Lombroso, the rising popularity of the 
‘habitual criminal’ caused a change in this situation.” Lombrosian theory encouraged 
lawmakers to apply the label “habitual” to any recidivist, regardless of the crimes he 
committed, shaping the political construction of the “habitual offender” in America.875 
Despite numerous proposals, few states initially succeeded in passing their own 
versions of the Baumes laws in the 1920s. Figure 6.5 below shows that states generally 
did not succeed in passing such proposals until the mid 1930s and 1940s.  
FIGURE 6.5: US States with Habitual Offenders Laws, 1926-1947 
 
*Chart tabulated from three sources: Tappan, Brown, and “Court Treatment.”876  
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Even though many states immediately praised the laws after their passage, the rapid 
spread of habitual offender laws coincided with discursive shifts towards individualism in 
the latter stages of the New Deal. Habitual offender laws manifested as the punitive 
prong of rehabilitative ideology in the 1940s during a renewed push towards 
individualized treatment and indeterminate sentencing.  
Two states led the way in penal reform in mid-century. New York, which had 
been recognized as a leader in corrections since Brockway’s term at Elmira, regained 
national attention for the passage of the Baumes laws. California’s Youth and Adult 
Authorities made the state a leader in penal reform, and while the Authorities were 
ostensibly progressive and geared towards rehabilitative programming through 
sentencing individualization, California saw its prison population spike after their 
creation from 5,700 in 1944 to 19,202 in 1958.877 As a result, close analyses of the 
habitual offender laws in New York and California offer insight into the rationale behind 
the laws and their connection to rehabilitative ideology. Judicial rulings from the two 
state court systems are particularly useful, since state legislative records from this period 
are not consistently available and SBCs were no longer in operation.878 Given 
developments in procedural justice in the 1940s, courts were hearing more cases 
regarding criminal justice than ever before. As leaders of penal reform, the California and 
New York court systems thus provide meaningful insight into how habitual offender laws 
                                                             
877 See Walker, Popular Justice, 208–15 on the important role California played as a leader in criminal 
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878 I could not find SBC reports from this era. They may have been in operation, but at the very least 
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fit into broader currents in crime politics in mid-century.  
When the New York Court of Appeals first upheld the Baumes laws, it did so by 
linking them to rehabilitative purposes. In the ruling, the Court wrote that rehabilitation is 
one of the primary goals of incarceration, stating that early release incentives for good 
behavior often “works for the rescue and reformation of the individual.” But the court 
qualified this by stating that, “the laws enacted for the reformation of the criminal should 
be administered with caution and circumspection” to ensure that punishment is meted out 
when necessary. The court stated that in determining a sentence, the defendant’s past 
convictions and behavior “have much to do with the way he should be treated.” The 
Court presented the Baumes laws as a necessary complement to New York’s 
rehabilitative programming for individuals who did not deserve another chance.879 
 Only three year later, the Supreme Court of New York struck down a sentence 
under the Baumes statutes in a ruling that tied the laws to rehabilitative logic. In People v. 
Spellman, a judge sentenced a defendant who had committed three felonies at the same 
time to a life sentence under the Baumes laws. The individual had no priors, but the judge 
determined the three offenses constituted the three strikes necessary for a life sentence. 
The state Supreme Court reversed, stating that the law “humanely and justly required a 
mandatory life sentence only after three or more fully completed, legal, prior judgments 
of conviction, separated sufficiently to offer opportunity for the felon to reform.”880 The 
striking down of Spellman’s conviction underscored that the justification for a life 
sentence under the Baumes laws was premised on having multiple opportunities to 
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rehabilitate. The habitual offenders law was not seen as in conflict with rehabilitation, but 
as an integral part of the state’s rehabilitative programming. In the 1950s, the Supreme 
Court of New York again recognized that the Baumes laws were grounded on 
rehabilitative theory, noting that the “theory of…the so-called Baumes Laws…is that 
they [repeat offenders] have not reformed since their first offense but have persisted in 
breaking the law.”881  
 The California courts upheld the state’s habitual offender law on similar grounds. 
In the 1946 case People v. Richardson, a state Court of Appeals upheld the law in the 
face of challenges that it violated double jeopardy. Dismissing arguments that being 
punished more severely for previous behavior constituted double punishment for the 
same crime, the Court ruled that habitual criminality was not an offense but a status.  
Allegations of previous convictions, and that an accused is an habitual criminal, 
are not allegations of a substantive crime, but are a status which, in the eyes of the 
law, aggravates the position of the perpetrator of the primary offense alleged in 
the indictment in the sense that he comes within the classification of those who 
probably may never be reformed. He has evidenced a predilection to commit 
certain offenses which has become a settled custom, indicating a tendency toward 
repetition. Such an offender, so the Legislature has decreed, is subject to the 
infliction of a longer term of imprisonment.882 
 
Despite the fact that People v. Richardson came from a lower appellate court, it still had 
significant sway. It was cited 58 times between 1946 and 2013, and 43 of those instances 
occurred before 1970 during the proliferation of habitual offender laws. California courts 
have long since ruled against claims that habitual offender laws violate double jeopardy, 
deciding that the laws do not create an offense but a status for those “who have proved 
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immune to lesser punishment” and require more severe sanction.883 State courts in 
Washington, Minnesota, Nebraska, and New Jersey rejected double jeopardy challenges 
on grounds similar to those deployed by the New York and California court systems.884  
  In 1967, the California Court of Appeals rendered a ruling that was almost a 
replica of the New York Supreme Court’s 1930 ruling in People v. Spellman in which a 
defendant was sentenced to life after committing three offenses simultaneously. Noting 
that the label of habitual criminality could only be earned through “separate trials,” the 
court ruled that for the habitual offender law to apply, a defendant’s convictions must be 
separated to provide “two chances of rehabilitation.” The court ruled that the purpose of 
“any” habitual offender law “is not obscure.” Such a law serves two purposes: “(1) to act 
as a deterrent to repeated criminal acts while affording the criminal two…opportunities to 
rehabilitation, and (2) to protect society against the incorrigible recidivist.” The court 
concluded that concurrent crimes should not count as proof of habitual criminality, ruling 
that the label only applies to those who have experienced, “separate terms…for separate 
offenses separately sentenced,” that “have been followed by separate chances at 
rehabilitation.” But the court recognized that, “the third time around defendant, to adopt 
the vernacular, ‘has had it.’”885 The California Supreme Court ruled little differently, 
stating one year earlier that the primary purpose of the law was “to protect society from 
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incorrigible criminals.”886 These statutory precursors to three strikes laws defined strikes 
not as three crimes, but as three opportunities to rehabilitate.  
Habitual offender laws are odd and underappreciated features of the U.S. criminal 
justice system. To this day, the American justice system’s emphasis on an individual’s 
background and criminal history as sentencing considerations is attributable to the 
influence of rehabilitative ideology and the indeterminate model. Contemporary variants 
of habitual offender laws, including career criminal or three-strikes laws, are common in 
American states. But they are remarkably unusual in comparison to countries in Europe, 
Asia, and Scandinavia, which rarely consider an individual’s background or personal 
history in making sentencing decisions. Nonetheless, in American jurisdictions, a prior 
record can have a greater impact on an individual’s sentence than the offense committed. 
The reliance on criminal history embedded into American sentencing systems is a legacy 
of rehabilitative ideology’s emphasis on predictive capacitation and rehabilitative 
potential.887 Even after the criminal justice system became untied from biological ideas of 
criminality, this is how notions of innate criminality remained embedded in the fabric of 
the penal system. The deterministic and individualistic aspects of rehabilitative 
ideology’s punitive features have infected how justice is meted out in America even 
while biological theory has waxed and waned in influence.  
It is unsurprising that habitual offender laws flourished next to state statutes that 
also conceptualized criminality in terms of biology. Well into mid-century, at least a 
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dozen states continued to authorize sterilization for criminal offenders.888 It is true that 
support for criminal sterilization soured in the 1940s after the Supreme Court struck 
down an Oklahoma law in 1942 in Oklahoma vs. Skinner that authorized compulsory 
sterilization of habitual offenders.889 But this supposed repudiation of the eugenics 
tradition was weaker than many observers suggest. Skinner did not overturn or limit Buck 
v. Bell but struck down the Oklahoma law for not differentiating crimes of “moral 
turpitude” from other offenses in defining the “habitual offender.” Justice Douglas, the 
decision’s author, elsewhere stated he thought sterilization statutes were constitutional if 
they contained appropriate “careful procedural safeguards.” Extant research shows that 
sterilization rates actually rose in the years immediately following Skinner, remained high 
through the 1950s, and only noticeably declined in the 1960s.890  
Beginning in the 1940s, American penology renewed its push to perfect the 
system of individualized treatment. The spread of indeterminate sentencing brought with 
it an emphasis on providing sanctions tailored to the individual, stunting the progressive 
potential of new social-structural explanations of criminality. Rehabilitative institutions 
and practices—including indeterminate sentencing, presentence investigation reports, and 
habitual offender laws—served as frameworks through which new ideas were channeled 
and modified. Practices and premises associated with rehabilitative ideology and notions 
of innate criminality were embedded into these institutions. Given the unity of 
individualistic and deterministic assumptions in rehabilitative frameworks, structural 
theories of crime lost their progressive bite. While some theoretical criminologists 
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viewed poverty and structural disadvantage as causes of crime rooted in economic and 
class relations, policymakers viewed them as individual level faults requiring micro-
solutions through rehabilitative reforms rather than broad-based political economic ones.   
V. Conclusion  
 By the onset of the Great Society, every state and the federal system had an 
indeterminate system and almost every one experimented with a habitual offender law. 
Numerous scholars have thus claimed in the 1960s, the rehabilitative ideal of American 
criminal justice reigned supreme. They then conclude that the political repudiation of 
rehabilitation in the 1960s and 1970s was a key driver of punitive politics that 
precipitated the onset of mass incarceration.891 
 What this chapter has illustrated is that the rehabilitative ideal played a significant 
role in laying institutional and ideological groundwork for mass incarceration. The 
politics of the 1960s and 1970s should not be viewed as “rejecting” the rehabilitative 
ideal. The punitive politics associated with mass incarceration was in part driven by an 
increased emphasis on one part of the ideal’s dual logic. Increased sentences for 
recidivists, three-strikes laws, and efforts to preemptively identify criminals based on 
criminal histories, socioeconomic backgrounds, and personal traits were not new in the 
latter twentieth century. Rather, they were integral to the spread of rehabilitative 
programming throughout the twentieth century. The onset of mass incarceration was not 
ignited by a rejection of rehabilitation; it was marked by a capitalization on an 
underappreciated punitive facet of rehabilitative logic.  
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Ira Katznelson has argued that the political economic reforms of the Great Society 
should be understood in terms established by the reforms of the postwar era, which he 
argues undercut the prospects for a robust social democratic politics in the U.S.892 
Katznelson’s argument also applies to crime policy, as the opportunities for the Great 
Society to promote structural reform as a solution to crime were limited by the resurgence 
of the rehabilitative ideal the 1940s. Any potential to link an understanding of criminality 
to social and economic dynamics was compromised by a revival of rehabilitative 
ideology that led policymakers to reinterpret macro-level crime theories in light of 
individual level dynamics. This laid crucial institutional and ideological groundwork for 
the crime politics and policies of the 1960s that directly preceded the onset of mass 
incarceration. 
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CHAPTER 7: BUSINESS POWER, KEYNESIANISM, AND CORPORATE 
CRIMINALITY IN MID-CENTURY 
 
“I suppose there is no agency in the world that can prevent crookedness.” 
- Richard Whitney, President of the New York Stock Exchange, 1933893 
 
 The relationship between the politics of street crime and corporate crime in mid-
century did not illustrate the pattern visible in Gilded Age and Progressive Era politics 
because they were not driven by a common set of ideas and ideologies. There is no set of 
thinkers or ideational trends that produced divergent constructions of both street and 
corporate criminality in the 1930s through 1960s. However, developments in the 
punishment of corporate crime during this period were connected to changes in New Deal 
politics that were also mirrored in the politics of street crime. Particularly, the politics of 
corporate crime during these years reflected the New Deal regime’s shift away from its 
social democratic basis in the 1930s to its more moderated version in the 1940s.  
 The story of corporate crime politics during the New Deal and postwar years is 
not one in which evolving ideas and ideologies contributed to policy change, as earlier 
chapters outline. Rather, it is one in which political actors operated within an institutional 
context that had been built upon certain practices, premises, and ideologies over time. 
Coupled with an evolving alignment of political forces, this tied New Deal political 
leaders in the executive branch and in Congress to a durable governing class ideology 
that was embedded into regulatory arrangements, economic policy, and the corporate 
criminal law. This is particularly clear in how policymakers articulated the language of 
“respectability” in defense of business leaders in securities, investment banking, and 
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other industries that caused the Great Depression. This language was nearly identical to 
political defenses of business leaders rooted in biological, anthropological, and eugenic 
theories of human behavior. This exhibits a degree of continuity in the state’s approach to 
monitoring corporate crime. Because this posture took shape earlier in the century and 
was embedded into institutions, notions that the “respectability” of individual corporate 
actors warranted a different response to their criminal actions became an institutionally 
grounded idea that was untied to biological ideologies. These ideas about corporate crime 
were institutionally entrenched in ways that kept their ideological power the same even 
though they were no longer explicitly rooted in bio-essentialism.  
 These prevailing institutional and ideological frameworks shaped interest group 
politicking and the policy choices of leaders of the New Deal coalition. Even during a 
period of substantial change in American politics, this governing class ideology 
conditioned how the state responded to the abuses, frauds, and scandals that precipitated 
the Great Depression. This was significant; in the wake of the Depression, there was 
tangible outrage at the financial industry for facilitating the crisis. The explosive findings 
of the Pecora Commission, a congressional inquiry that investigated the causes of the 
Depression, provided a political basis for the state to crack down on the abuses of Wall 
Street and finance in new ways. But it did not produce those changes given how leading 
business interests and New Deal political leaders politicized corporate crime.    
 Once again, political change related to corporate criminal law and regulatory 
policy can only be understood upon acknowledging shifts in the political economy. In the 
New Deal period, the financial sector had become a dominating force in the American 
economy. As the growth of the investment banking and securities industries took off in 
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the 1920s, debates about corporate crime became centralized in these sectors of the 
political economy. As a result, business leaders in investment banking, securities, and 
exchanges became the primary interest groups that carried ideas about corporate 
criminality into mid-century debates.  
Investment bankers and leaders of securities exchanges defused the potency of the 
Pecora Commission’s findings by articulating a defense of the familiar brand of 
regulatory ideology traceable to debates over the Interstate Commerce Act. Defenses of 
the character of businessmen, concerns about a vindictive public, and an emphasis on the 
complexity of the financial system all justified a regulatory approach to monitoring the 
industry in debates over the Securities and Securities Exchange Acts. But bankers, 
exchanges, and executives gave regulatory ideology a crucial twist by adapting it to the 
political context of the 1930s. They argued that too much criminalization or regulation of 
industry would impede progress at a time when the economy was struggling to pull out of 
the depression. In this sense, these legislative debates mirrored what David Vogel found 
between the 1960s and 1980s—that the political power of big businesses actually 
increases during economic downturns, when the public and policymakers are fearful of 
impeding economic revitalization through too much intervention.894 By adapting 
regulatory ideology to the context of the 1930s, investment bankers and exchange 
executives convinced lawmakers to rely on a familiar regulatory ideology to monitor 
markets rather than act on the populist impulses inflamed by the Pecora Commission.  
Preexisting institutional arrangements not only shaped the politics of industry 
leaders, but also of leaders of the New Deal coalition. This is particularly clear in the 
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politics of the era’s most prominent trustbuster, Thurman Arnold. Although FDR 
appointed him to run the Justice Department’s antitrust division from 1938 to 1943, 
Arnold’s personal writings and statements before the Temporary National Economic 
Committee in the 1940s belie his image as a fervent trustbuster. He regularly 
demonstrated a hesitance to use the prosecutorial powers of the antitrust division in lieu 
of civil or administrative interventions. Other members of FDR’s inner circle like James 
Landis and William O. Douglas, both of whom served as chair of the Securities Exchange 
Commission, were similarly reluctant to challenge the prevailing institutional structures 
in which they operated, which separated corporate crime from the criminal justice system 
through regulatory institutions.  
 By the late 1940s, the New Deal regime’s initial emphasis on regulation gave way 
to an emphasis on “commercial Keynesianism,” a variety of economic thought articulated 
by corporations and conservatives that emphasized the state’s capacity to tax and spend 
as the way to promote economic stability rather than robust regulation. In the 1940s and 
1950s, this shift away from regulatory politics discouraged state monitoring of exchanges 
and investment banking in ways that curbed earlier New Deal reforms. 
Even though developments in street and corporate crime were not rooted in shared 
wells of political thought during this period, the evolution of both strands of politics bear 
similarities rooted in the nature of New Deal political discourse. First, in both cases, there 
was an opportunity for a radical change in the New Deal’s earliest stages. Second, in both 
cases, appeals to older ideas, ideologies, and institutional dynamics channeled those 
impulses for change into directions that reaffirmed older trends. In the case of street 
crime, ideas emphasizing structural dynamics were reinterpreted through rehabilitative 
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frameworks in ways that emphasized the individual. In the case of corporate crime, the 
Pecora Commission’s potential to foster penalization of exchange officials and 
investment bankers was checked when bankers, exchange leaders, and executives 
channeled those impulses into regulatory ideology, imbuing them with a new political 
significance during the economic crisis. Third, by the 1940s, the prospects for radical 
change in both domains had been diminished by broader shifts in New Deal political and 
economic discourse as the regime’s statist instincts weakened. 
 The chapter begins by analyzing the place of finance and banking in the New 
Deal coalition, reviewing the shifting relationship between the state and core industries in 
the political economy from the 1930s through 1950s. Section II then examines changes in 
the ideational and political construction of criminality in the New Deal period. Section III 
examines how investment bankers and exchanges extinguished the prospects for radical 
reform coming out of the Pecora Commission by reframing regulatory ideology within 
the context of the Great Depression. This produced changes in the Securities Act and 
Securities Exchange Acts that favored financial interests and reflected older varieties of 
regulatory ideology. Section IV explores how shifts towards commercial Keynesianism 
in the 1940s entailed changes in the way corporate criminality was conceived. This 
neutralized any remaining potential for the New Deal coalition to promote robust statist 
reform in the realm of regulation or corporate criminal law. The section explores the 
findings of the Temporary National Economic Committee, the passage of the 
Administrative Procedure Act (1946), and the Justice Department’s antitrust case against 
an investment banking trust in U.S. v. Morgan (1953).  
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I. The Place of Business in the New Deal Coalition 
Accounts presenting the New Deal as having ushered in an industrially regulated 
state often assume that leading business interests of the era were hostile to the regime. 
Such scholarship suggests that the New Deal tamed these industries, as the regulatory 
logic of New Deal policy was founded on older progressive imperatives to order 
business-state relations.895 For instance, Fred Block’s neo-Marxist account suggests that 
the Great Depression neutralized conservative forces and created room for liberals and 
labor to promote regulatory change. Arthur Schlesinger’s seminal work argues that the 
New Deal was simply a vote-getting response to discontent with market failures in the 
wake of the collapse.896 
For other observers, this narrative is too simple. Many argue that as businesses 
mobilized in more coordinated ways in the latter twentieth century, they dismantled the 
New Deal’s achievements.897 Power elite theorists, new left historians, and scholars like 
Colin Gordon, William Domhoff, and Thomas Ferguson have made the case that capital-
intensive industries or financial interests worked with the New Deal coalition to stabilize 
the capitalist order.898 Theda Skocpol alternatively suggests that it was not the 
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mobilization of any specific business interests that limited the New Deal’s reforms, but 
rather the way popular demands were channeled through rigid institutional machinery in 
ways that led to “piecemeal reforms and…partially successful efforts” to promote 
economic recovery.899 
Much of this work highlights how the New Deal coalition accommodated and 
acquiesced to sectors of industry over time in ways that explain shifts in the regime’s 
political commitments. This chapter is thus contextualized within research identifying the 
postwar period as a critical juncture in the political development of New Deal 
liberalism.900 Examining the four phases of the New Deal outlined in the previous chapter 
illustrates key dynamics in the regime’s evolving relationship to banking and finance.  
Regulatory Policy in the Early New Deal, 1933-1937 
The early choices of the Roosevelt Administration were largely conservative 
ventures to save capitalism through emergency bills to stabilize the economy. The Glass-
Steagall law, the Securities and Securities Exchange Acts, and the National Industrial 
Recovery Act were all written with the assistance of financial interests. With the support 
of virtually all non-Morgan investment bankers, Glass-Steagall and the New Deal’s 
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securities reforms secured a place for finance in the New Deal coalition while becoming 
durable fixtures of American financial law.901  
Arguments from Block, Schlesinger, and others that the Depression depleted the 
political strength of financial interests and created an opportunity for liberal and labor 
militancy to drive reform assume that the public’s perception of corporate power soured 
in the 1930s.902 There is certainly reason to believe this was the case. In the wake of the 
Depression, the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency authorized an inquiry into 
the causes of the crash. Called the Pecora Commission for its chief counsel and former 
New York Assistant DA Ferdinand Pecora, the commission uncovered a range of abusive 
and fraudulent practices in the securities industry. In his sweeping historical analysis of 
investment banking in America, Vincent Carosso suggests that investment bankers had 
their reputations destroyed by the hearings. But Carosso also notes that many bankers 
insisted that some regulatory interventions were necessary.903 This complements 
historical accounts that non-Morgan bankers played key roles in the passage of the Glass-
Steagall Act, since they viewed the separation of commercial and investment banking as 
a way to destroy the foundation of Morgan hegemony in American finance.904 
The claim that the public was disillusioned with corporate power in the 1930s is 
notably qualified by Louis Galambos. In his research, Galambos reveals that there were 
five cycles of anti-business opinion from 1880 through 1940, with the Great Depression 
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sparking the final one. In a quantitative analysis of eleven public interest magazines, 
Galambos finds that there was a decline in public attitudes towards corporate power after 
the collapse, but that across the five cycles of anti-business opinion each successive one 
saw less hostility, with the 1930s being the weakest. His work shows that in spite of the 
collapse, the public remained generally accepting of the corporate order.905  It would thus 
be hasty to view the New Deal’s initial regulatory policies as manifestations of radical 
anti-business impulses, as investment bankers were crucial to shaping debates over the 
Securities and Securities Exchange Acts.906   
Historian Michael Parrish called the New Deal’s securities reforms “a 
conservative revolution which nonetheless horrified a great many conservatives.” New 
Dealers like Frankfurter, Landis, Cohen, and Corcoran designed the Securities Act to 
prop up the economy while minimizing state intervention into markets. Passed within the 
first hundred days, there was little time for bankers and securities officials to mobilize 
effectively, and the law did not reflect many of their core concerns. But by the passage of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, bankers and exchange leaders were able to mobilize 
even more successfully. The New Dealers involved in drafting the law wanted to 
empower the Federal Trade Commission to regulate the securities industry, but 
investment bankers and exchange officials led by Richard Whitney, head of the New 
York Stock Exchange, pushed for a separate commission to regulatory and flexibly work 
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with industries. The compromise that emerged with a Securities Exchange Commission 
showed that Congress was willing to accommodate entrenched economic interests.907 
The second New Deal from 1935-37 witnessed the passage of cornerstones of 
American social policy including the National Labor Relations Act, Fair Labor Standards 
Act, and Social Security Act.908 But Thomas Ferguson’s work shows how economic 
elites from capital-intensive industries where labor was a small expenditure and labor 
turbulence a minor concern allied with Roosevelt by supporting this pro-labor legislation 
in exchange for free trade policy.909 As a result, even the second New Deal helped to 
buttress the capitalist order by evening out competitive disparities resulting from private 
experimentation with benefits and garnering support for free trade. Peter Swenson has 
also argued that support for New Deal social policy among business can be understood as 
“post-facto cross-class alliances.” While some sectors of the economy supported New 
Deal social policy from the outset, politicians anticipated a process of policy feedback in 
which those in opposition would eventually realize how these reforms promoted healthy 
competitive dynamics.910  
It was in this context that several major regulatory reforms were passed in which 
debates about criminal behavior among firms were a major issue. Section III of this 
chapter examines this trend in the passage Securities and Securities Exchange Act. The 
post-Depression political context offered some opportunities for a break from past 
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approaches to regulation and criminalization, especially given the findings of the Pecora 
Commission. However, investment bankers, brokers, and exchange officials appealed to 
persistent ideological constructions of corporate criminality in ways that led to familiar 
outcomes—the creation of a regulatory agency with wide discretion to respond to crime 
through an assortment of non-criminal sanctions.  
Mirroring David Vogel’s analysis of business-state relations from the 1960s 
through 1980s, the legislative record reveals that investment bankers, exchange officials, 
and securities brokers had significant political power during the Depression because 
policymakers were reluctant to over-regulate the economy in ways that might inhibit 
recovery.911 In the wake of the Depression, regulatory ideology appealed to policymakers 
who were afraid to obstruct economic progress. Demands for criminalization of the 
securities industry were checked by an impulse to give regulators discretion to work 
cautiously with the industry and get it back on its feet. This serves as a testament to the 
institutional and ideological precedents of the regulatory state. The construction of 
corporate criminality built into regulatory ideology had political purchase even in the 
wake of the nation’s greatest economic crisis.  
The Development of Commercial Keynesianism  
The New Deal regime found itself in retreat in 1937 as Roosevelt’s new pump 
priming approach to economics foreshadowed postwar Keynesian policies of demand 
management. Insistent on returning to fiscal orthodoxy, Roosevelt facilitated a recession 
by cutting public investment and pursuing a balanced budget. As southern Democrats and 
Republicans coalesced with financial moderates in response, a conservative coalition 
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emerged to challenge the New Deal.912 This coalition was able to dial back some of the 
New Deal’s regulatory successes in the late 1930s.913 The Temporary National Economic 
Committee (TNEC) was the final gasp of the New Deal’s potential to promote a robust 
regulatory politics. When Congress created the committee in 1938 to study economic 
concentration, it appeared to mark a revival of anti-monopolism, but the TNEC praised 
industrial consolidation as efficient while defending state regulation of markets to 
monitor concentration. The TNEC attracted little attention when it published its report in 
1941, as anti-monopolist attitudes faded in the 1930s.914 
G. William Domhoff’s analysis shows that the liberal-labor coalition at the heart 
of the New Deal began losing to a corporate-conservative bloc in the late 1930s. He 
illustrates how these coalitions were in conflict from the New Deal’s origins, but that 
conservative victories became more frequent after 1937. By drawing on Keynesian 
theory, many corporations advocated a moderate conservatism that countered the 
orthodox conservatism of major business networks like the Chamber of Commerce. 
These corporate moderates aligned with a coalition of Republicans and Democrats from 
southern states to block liberal-labor initiatives and secure compromises on business 
regulation and taxation.915  
There was clearly a spectrum of opinions among corporate interests and business 
organizations regarding economic policy in mid-century. However, historian Robert 
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Collins has shown how the Committee for Economic Development (CED) emerged in 
1942 as a particularly influential and coordinated voice that represented a variety of 
businesses and industries and championed business-friendly economic policy. A 
business-led public policy organization, the CED was designed to help the state manage 
its transition to a peacetime economy. The CED accepted core precepts of Keynesianism, 
like occasionally using deficit spending to promote economic recovery, while rejecting 
hard left interpretations of Keynes from New Dealers like Alvin Hansen who defended 
progressive taxation, public investment, and redistributive policy. The CED was a major 
force in cultivating business support for a new economics rooted in a moderated 
Keynesianism in the postwar period.916  
Scholars have different ways of explaining the subsequent postwar shifts in 
economic policy. Most call the corporate-conservative bloc’s version of Keynesianism 
that prevailed “commercial Keynesianism.” While the early New Deal was characterized 
by a social democratic Keynesianism, this variant was more amenable to private 
enterprise and relied on state manipulation of the money supply to promote growth. A 
bipartisan persuasion, it encouraged the state to abandon the political commitments 
inherent to social democratic Keynesianism, including the pursuit of full employment, 
significant public investment, and the use of redistributive policy to bolster the 
purchasing power of the poor and middle classes. While commercial Keynesianism 
accepted some features of its social democratic counterpart, such as economic 
management and occasional deficit spending, it relied on bolstering growth by 
encouraging private investment rather than stimulating demand. This meant lowering 
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taxes on corporations and the wealthy, cutting social spending, and relying on automatic 
stabilizers like unemployment insurance to counteract the ups and downs of the business 
cycle. The war and postwar years were characterized by a debate between these two 
visions of governance—a statist one promoting social welfare and regulation and a 
moderated one emphasizing taxing and spending.917  
The New Deal’s original social democratic Keynesianism relied on an 
administrative politics regulating capital structures. New Dealers like Corcoran, Landis, 
and Cohen believed in mature economy theory, which was premised on the assumption 
that all the basic industries had developed and the nation would be trapped in stagnation 
without statist economic policy. But WWII prompted economic recovery in a single 
stroke, robbing mature economy theory of its credibility. Further, the ineffectiveness of 
the War Production Board diminished the public’s faith in the administrative state. These 
developments re-legitimized the public’s faith in capitalism, and defenders of social 
Keynesianism began to lose debates to corporate moderates and conservatives 
championing commercial Keynesianism.918 
As the political climate shifted, the commercial Keynesianism articulated by the 
CED took root. The CED claimed that the state should only act in compensatory ways to 
redress imbalances in the private economy without challenging capitalism. It pushed for a 
politics aiming to enhance growth through tax cuts to encourage private investment in 
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lieu of pursuing stability through state spending on welfare and public projects.919 This 
pushed monetary policy into the center of economic debates, deprived regulatory 
impulses of their urgency, and fused social policy to a vision of sustained economic 
growth driven by private investment. This stripped New Deal liberalism of its regulatory 
and collectivist instincts by replacing demands for state-led economic planning and 
regulation with compensatory policies to correct for the inequalities of capitalism.920 
This variant of Keynesian theory was more individualistic than social democratic 
Keynesianism. It turned the “forgotten men” of the New Deal into a mass of atomized 
consumers and viewed private investment as the key to spurring growth.921 This politics 
was thus directed towards corporate development and the promotion of consumer culture 
rather than promoting any sort of communal vision of social welfare.922 Efforts to revive 
social Keynesianism were routinely dismissed in the 1940s, as evidenced by 
conservatives’ quashing of the NRPB in 1943, which made room for the CED and 
Business Advisory Council (BAC) to gain power. The BAC, which also endorsed a 
compensatory version of Keynesianism amenable to capital, was created in 1933 in the 
hope that it could harmonize the Roosevelt Administration’s relationship with business 
and finance.923 As these organizations grew in influence in the 1940s, they hardened the 
conservative version of Keynesianism.924 The corporate-conservative coalition was 
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consequently able to win major legislative victories on regulation, spending, labor 
organizing, and taxation.925 
Historian Robert Collins argues that by 1948, “The American business 
community had at last domesticated Keynes.”926 The CED had worked with economists 
to promote rightward shifts in Keynesianism, leading Collins to conclude that economics 
is “partly a vehicle for the ruling ideology of each period as well as partly a method of 
scientific investigation.”927 The Justice Department’s attempt to file a high-profile 
antitrust suit against seventeen major investment-banking firms in the late 1940s and 
early 1950s backfired, and Eisenhower directly followed the recommendations of the 
CED in responding to fluctuations in the business cycle.928 The economic vision that 
prevailed in the 1940s embraced the revenue rather than spending side of Keynes’ theory 
and accepted a modicum of unemployment in exchange for tax reductions and increases 
in private spending. This turned the state into a technocratic manager of the economic 
order, limiting the capacity for Great Society reforms to promote regulatory reform.929 By 
the 1960s, the state could only correct for capitalist structures on the margins without 
challenging them, since commercial Keynesianism relied heavily on private 
investment.930  
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Regulatory reforms in the 1940s and 1950s entailed debates about crime in ways 
that mirrored the rise of commercial Keynesianism. In the early New Deal, major sectors 
of business supported regulatory reforms to save industries as long as they were not so 
strict as to obstruct economic revitalization. But by the 1940s, commercial Keynesianism 
became dominant and administrative politics were seen as hostile to progress. The 
Administrative Procedures Act was passed in 1946 to make sure that businesses could 
protect themselves against an overbearing regulatory state by infusing regulatory 
proceedings with the adversarial elements of American legalism. When the Justice 
Department filed a suit in 1947 against a combination of investment bankers, the 
defendants secured a favorable precedent in the 1953 ruling U.S. v. Morgan, which 
discredited the negative images of finance fostered by the Pujo Committee, Pecora 
Commission, and TNEC.931   
II. Regulatory Discourse and Constructing Corporate Criminality in the New Deal 
In 1949, Edwin Sutherland upended orthodox criminology in his book White-
Collar Crime, which emphasized how business practices that were legally punishable 
under criminal law were typically dealt with as civil or regulatory infractions. Sutherland 
defined white-collar crime as “a crime committed by a person of respectability and high 
social status in the course of his occupation.”932 This constituted the first intellectual 
attempt to systematically define the concept. While his definition was problematically 
broad, his emphasis on the crimes of powerful economic actors was a definitive turn 
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away from criminology’s focus on lower-class crime.933 And although his book was 
called White-Collar Crime, it could have more appropriately been titled Corporate Crime 
given his emphasis on the crimes committed by corporations. 
Studying 980 legal decisions brought against seventy large corporations, 
Sutherland argued that at least 779 of the 980 cases in his sample included grounds for 
criminal charges. However, he found that only 158 decisions—or 20% of the criminally 
punishable cases—were brought in criminal court. The remaining 80% were handled 
through regulatory or civil procedures. Sutherland pointed to the Sherman Antitrust Act 
as establishing this precedent. The law defined antitrust violations as criminal, but as a 
“second thought” authorized non-criminal procedures such as injunctions for handling 
antitrust cases. This, Sutherland argued, was mirrored in all subsequent regulatory 
legislation.934 He also recognized that corporations were among the worst recidivists, but 
that because their behavior was channeled through civil and regulatory channels, most 
avoided the repercussions of a single conviction.935 
While the roots of the regulatory pattern Sutherland discovered are really in the 
Interstate Commerce Act, his book outlined a rough case for the path dependent nature of 
the regulatory state. But he downplayed the institutional and ideational implications of 
his arguments. He did not discuss the favorable construction of corporate criminality 
embedded into the state’s regulatory machinery and left unaddressed the fact that the 
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regulatory state shaped how policymakers conceptualized corporate criminality. Instead, 
he made an individualized psychological argument that politicians handled white-collar 
criminals leniently due to the fact that they typically come from similar social strata, have 
friends in business, rely on business for money, and hope to secure private sector 
employment should they lose election.936 These are not trivial points, but Sutherland 
missed important historical, institutional, and ideological aspects of his own research. 
White-Collar Crime has been praised in subsequent decades for its path-breaking 
approach to examining an understudied type of crime, but at the time it had almost no 
impact on the discipline of criminology. Without a clear violation of criminal law, a 
finding of guilt, and subsequent punishment, many of Sutherland’s contemporaries felt 
that the behavior he studied could not be considered “crime” and were dismissive of his 
work.937 It was little different in political venues. While the Wickersham Commission 
employed Shaw and McKay to draft reports and state legislators cited the Gluecks, 
Sutherland’s research was completely absent in these circles. 
 Hagan suggests that White-Collar Crime was a reflection of the era’s anti-
business climate, but the limited impact of White-Collar Crime tells us more about its 
relationship to American political development than its publication does on its own.938 
Unlike many academic disciplines, criminology has been relevant to American politics, 
and in mid-century policymakers drafted reports and policies that drew on and modified 
prevailing criminological theories. But White-Collar Crime was ignored, despite being 
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published by one of the era’s most prominent scholars, indicating that Sutherland’s ideas 
did not cleanly fit into mid-century political discourse. While his book marked a 
significant moment for criminology, that it had virtually no impact while other leading 
criminologists were cited by state reformers and federal crime commissions suggests that 
his book should be viewed as an outlier rather than a reflection of the era’s politics.  
 Examining the texts and speeches of prominent New Dealers reveals that they did 
not share the perspective of corporate criminality articulated by Sutherland, because 
political change during the New Deal was not influenced by concurrent shifts in 
ideational constructions of corporate criminality. Rather, New Deal politicians operated 
within institutional networks in which certain ideas associated with regulatory ideology 
had been embedded. This shaped the politics of these individuals assumed to be fervent 
trustbusters, as they spoke in terms defending the “respectability” of powerful corporate 
actors while suggesting that prosecution was an inappropriate way to monitor their 
behavior. Reluctant to challenge capital structures or the basic design of state 
administrative agencies, the supposed trustbusters of the New Deal exhibited a reluctance 
to prosecute corporate crimes because the institutions they operated within kept them tied 
to the tenets of regulatory ideology.  
William O. Douglas is a good case in point. A key member of Roosevelt’s inner 
circle, Douglas was the SEC’s chair from 1937 to 1939. His tenure is often depicted as 
characterized by fights against Wall Street speculators.939 But his words belie his political 
posturing as an anti-business crusader. In a speech he delivered in 1938, Douglas 
described the SEC as a “mechanism of democratic government whereby capitalism can 
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discipline and preserve itself,” and one that was designed “to meet business on business 
terms.”940 He repeatedly insisted that exchanges were capable of self-regulation, and that 
businessmen had “sufficient brains, courage, and integrity” to monitor themselves. The 
government and the SEC, Douglas concluded, should only play a supervisory or “residual 
role.”941  
 One can look to the work of Douglas’s predecessor as SEC Chair, James Landis, 
for similar arguments. Landis viewed the creation of the administrative state as the 
answer to an institutional problem. He argued that agencies were designed to handle 
issues that courts and Congress were ill equipped to address. But he explicitly 
differentiated agencies from criminal justice venues. He claimed that commissions take 
on “less the appearance of a tribunal and more that of a committee charged with the task 
of achieving the best possible operation” of industry. He argued that agencies like the 
ICC should conceive their purposes “in terms of management rather than of police.”942 
He described the Securities Exchange Commission similarly, arguing that the 1933 
Securities Act was ineffective because it gave insufficient discretion to the FTC to 
enforce the law. The SEC, however, was given “powers to exempt securities from the 
operation of the 1934 Act” among other broad discretionary controls, making it a more 
flexible institution responsive to the demands and needs of the securities industry.943 
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 Perhaps the most telling statements come from Thurman Arnold, who ran the 
antitrust division of the Department of Justice from 1938 to 1943. Arnold filed and won 
more antitrust cases than the Department of Justice initiated in its entire previous 
history.944 However, his celebrated 1937 book The Folklore of Capitalism adopted a 
perspective that consolidation in industry was beneficial and ironically bemoaned 
antitrust laws as meaningless. He described them as “the answer of a society which 
unconsciously felt the need of great organizations” but wanted to “deny them a place in 
the moral and logical ideology of the social structure.”945 Arnold favored an expansion of 
the state’s regulatory powers, but specifically cautioned against prosecution. He wrote 
that an antitrust violation “is not an ordinary crime” because antitrust laws are “violated 
by respectable people.” Such a violation is thus “an economic offense, the seriousness of 
which is not related to the moral turpitude of the offender” which is why antitrust law “is 
different from ordinary criminal law” in its use of civil, regulatory, and criminal 
proceedings.946 For Arnold, only activities that artificially inflated consumer prices were 
appropriate targets for prosecution. In this sense, he viewed antitrust laws as vehicles to 
expand the state’s regulatory capacity only with an eye towards enhancing consumer 
purchasing power, not as tools to challenge the structure of the economy.947  
Even the era’s leading trustbuster adopted a politics antithetical to Sutherland’s 
claims. Arnold’s emphasis on using regulatory power rather than prosecution completely 
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accepted the existing institutional structures Sutherland was so intent on challenging. The 
statements of Arnold, Landis, and Douglas illustrate how New Deal reformers were more 
likely to uncritically accept the regulatory ideology embedded within the institutions they 
ran rather than challenge those institutional structures. This institutional context kept 
them wedded to the basic assumptions of regulatory ideology.  
 In the wake of the war, leaders of business and finance endorsed commercial 
Keynesianism in ways that quelled demands for federal regulation in order to allow 
business to lead the economic conversion. Essential to this political campaign was a 
justificatory rhetoric that rationalized businessmen as natural leaders that should not be 
impeded by the state. For instance, BAC members Henry Dennison, Lincoln Filene, 
Ralph Flanders, and Morris Leeds enlisted John Kenneth Galbraith to help them publish 
their 1938 book, Toward Full Employment. The authors argued that stronger use of 
monetary controls would enable the state to reduce its regulatory role. Although 
admitting that some businesses required monitoring, the authors wrote that those few 
businesses “can be controlled only because the mass of business remains relatively free.” 
They went on to claim that, “were more direct and detailed controls to be applied to the 
majority of business,” economic growth would become “impossible.” Thus, loosening the 
state’s regulatory reins in favor of an emphasis on monetary policy would effectively 
promote growth.948 The CED made similar arguments in Markets After War (1943), 
which stated that business “must assume a large share of the responsibility” for getting 
the economy back on its feet after the war. To do so would require “the best brains” to 
focus on these problems, and they wrote that the “courage, imagination and ingenuity” of 
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businessmen would promote growth more than statist regulation.949 The CED emphasized 
that it was “essential for the government, in cooperation with business” to “provide an 
economic environment favorable both to the expansion of production and the 
maintenance of profitable markets.”950 
 These trends in discourse about regulation did not reflect concurrent 
developments in criminology, but rather a continuity with older varieties of regulatory 
ideology. Sutherland’s lack of impact during a period in which criminology and politics 
were closely connected illustrates that his work was an outlier. Douglas, Landis, and 
Arnold could not hear his arguments given that Sutherland’s book was published after 
these men were in positions of power, but their words illustrate crucial dynamics about 
New Deal discourse as related to corporate criminality. While they adopted a 
comparatively more aggressive posture in relation to business than their predecessors, 
they also accepted the institutional structures in which they operated and the separation of 
regulation from criminal justice. It was these institutional designs that shaped their 
politics and perceptions of corporate criminality, keeping them committed to the basic 
facets of regulatory ideology.  
III. Securities Reform During the New Deal 
 In the wake of the stock market collapse in 1929, President Herbert Hoover 
warned the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) that it would have to adopt its own 
measures to curb fraud, thrift, and abuse, or his administration would push for legislation. 
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The exchange did not budge, and President of the NYSE Richard Whitney insisted that 
the industry had no major problems. What followed was a congressional inquiry 
exploring the causes of the Depression. Led by chief counsel Ferdinand Pecora, the 
“Pecora Commission” shed light on the fraud and exploitative practices so pervasive on 
Wall Street. The revelations of the hearings provided crucial insights leading to the 
Glass-Steagall Banking Act, Securities Act, and Securities Exchange Act.951  
 Three things are clear in the Pecora hearings, debates over the Securities Act of 
1933, and debates over the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. First, disagreements 
emerged across and within sectors of industry in how they politicized corporate 
criminality. While some industry leaders insisted they were innocent, others endorsed 
securities reform as necessary for reining in their most ruthless competitors. Second, and 
related, legislators, investment bankers, securities brokers, and exchange officials 
perceived the law primarily as a way to protect business, viewing investor protection as a 
secondary concern. The laws were built to revive business and protect industries from 
uninformed investors that might push frivolous suits on good honest businessmen. Thus, 
familiar dynamics associated with regulatory ideology characterized debates over 
securities reforms. But a third critical current, particularly present in legislative debates, 
was a concern shared by financial industry leaders and legislators that excessive 
regulation would impede economic recovery following the Depression. Just as David 
Vogel has found during other economic downturns in American history, the public and 
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policymakers were desperate to encourage growth and job creation, apt to listen to 
business’s demands, and hesitant to overregulate the economy during the Depression.952  
By reframing regulatory ideology within the context of crisis, leaders of finance 
derailed attempts to articulate new framings of corporate criminality. While much 
research on the New Deal suggests that populist outrage led to crackdowns on Wall 
Street, lawmakers’ concerns with restoring prosperity trumped populist impulses to 
penalize business. The Pecora hearings revealed truly explosive findings, but bankers, 
brokers, and exchange officials were able to extinguish their political potency with 
appeals to older facets of regulatory ideology during legislative debate.  
The Pecora Commission  
 The Pecora Commission opened its inquiry March 4, 1932, and hearings began 
little more than one month later on April 11. It was initially meant to be an investigation 
into short selling, a practice that is criminalized in many countries, but not the U.S. One 
of the Commission’s most frequent visitors was Richard Whitney. President of the 
NYSE, Whitney testified regularly on a range of issues, including short selling. He 
defended it as both a moral activity and “a necessary part of the security market.”953 To 
ban it, Whitney suggested, would force the American economy “100 years” 
backwards.954  
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 The Commission did not maintain a focus on short selling for long, broadening its 
scope during its two years of operation to explore a variety of fraudulent and abusive 
practices on Wall Street. Only a few months into its inquiry, the Committee revealed 
serious sins among members of the Radio Corporation of America (RCA). A hot 
technology stock in the 1920s, RCA saw its share prices skyrocket in a few months 
preceding the 1929 crash. The Pecora Commission uncovered that its values were falsely 
inflated by a group of investors dubbed the “Radio Pool,” who bought and sold RCA 
shares among themselves to create an appearance of activity that drove up their value. 
Once they pumped up the shares’ value, the pool’s operators pushed the stocks onto 
unsuspecting investors and paid newspapers and radio announcers to recommend the 
stock to the public.955  
 Shining a light on the Radio Pool’s abuses pushed the Commission’s hearings into 
the public spotlight. Thomas Bragg, one of the managers of the pool, insisted that the 
pool’s activities should not be construed as “manipulation,” stating that they simply 
intended “to go out and buy stock in the open market, and to sell it at a higher price to 
make a profit.”956 Similarly, after the Commission’s legal counsel William Gray called 
the activities of RCA “purely manipulation,” George Breen, a securities dealer involved 
with RCA, insisted they were no more than “buying and selling.”957 Whitney even 
reappeared before the Committee to defend pooling as an appropriate practice “for the 
purpose of making a profit.” He insisted that even if pools resort to fictitious transactions 
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to drive up share prices, it is no use to regulate them, since Whitney concluded “there is 
no agency in the world that can prevent crookedness.”958 
 The defenses offered up by those in the RCA pool did not hold up to the public. A 
front-page Chicago Tribune piece lambasted the arguments of Bragg, Breen, and other 
members of the RCA pool shortly after their testimony. Critical of the pool’s scheme, the 
piece highlighted that in one week in March of 1929, the pool orchestrated enough deals 
to net over $5.5 million in profits. The article noted that Bragg, Breen, and James 
McConnachie (another one of the pool’s members) all were compelled during their 
testimonies into admitting that Gray’s allegations were “probably right” that their 
activities constituted manipulation rather than honest buying and selling.959  
 With the public’s support, the Pecora Commission challenged additional activities 
common on Wall Street, including the practice of officers and executives of a company 
investing in their own stock. Interrogating Henry Warner, the President of Warner 
Brothers Inc., Senator James Couzens (R-MI) discussed the practice of officers buying 
and selling their own company’s stock in rapid succession to inflate share value in a way 
that did not reflect market conditions. Warner insisted that such a practice was both 
“ethical and helpful” to the industry, even if unsuspecting investors were left paying the 
cost when the activity ceased and the value dropped.960 William Fox of the Fox Film 
Corporation stated that he “manipulated,” his own stocks, that he was “proud of it,” and 
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would “continue to do it” as long as “the stock exchange permits him to.”961 Other 
brokers and executives insisted that the practice was not unethical, even when designed to 
create the false appearance of activity to excite the public.962 
 Perhaps the most explosive findings of the Commission came in regard to 
National City Company, a security affiliate of the National City Bank of New York. The 
Commission uncovered that National City routinely led investors into purchasing 
securities while providing little information as regards to their quality. National City 
regularly gave out large loans to questionable borrowers, including $8 million to Minas 
Geraes (a state in the Brazilian Republic known as a negligent borrower), $90 million in 
loans to Peru (which National City executives recognized as “an adverse moral and 
political risk”), and another $50 million to companies in Cuba and Chile without 
informing their investors.963 As the nation’s largest investment banking house, National 
City speculated on exchanges, participated in copper pool operations, and traded in its 
own stock up to 30 to 40 thousand times per day to inflate its value.964  
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National City executives routinely unloaded millions of dollars of securities 
backed by bad loans onto the public, and Charles Mitchell, the President of National City, 
saw no reason to change the company’s ways. When confronted with arguments from the 
Commission that publicizing the company’s spreads and information about its securities 
would stabilize the market, Mitchell insisted it would not. He said, “I can not yet 
conceive myself that the American practice has been wrong” in not publicizing the details 
of a company’s finances to investors.965 He argued that it was his “duty” to sell shares as 
long as customers viewed them as worthy investments, even when National City did not 
reveal it was unsound stock.966 Mitchell stated that letting executives share in the net 
earnings of a company’s financial maneuverings while insulating them from its losses 
encouraged an “esprit de corps” among officers, although he admitted it may have had 
“some influence” on the fact that 20% of the company’s securities were in default.967 
Ultimately, sharing information with the public would have served no purpose according 
to Mitchell. He concluded that, “there is no investor that I know of who would have had 
the slightest interest, or whose judgment would have been in the least affected” had the 
company publicized information about its questionable loans.968  
 Not everyone in the financial sector proffered up blanket defenses of the industry. 
In opposition to many of his colleagues, President of Chase National Bank Winthrop 
Aldrich took a different tack with the Commission and demanded greater federal 
regulation of the investment banking industry. He particularly directed his ire against the 
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tendency to combine investment and commercial banking in single entities, which had 
been essential to the consolidation of power by the Morgan Empire. Winthrop’s hostility 
was largely directed towards Morgan. When he was called to testify, Winthrop stated that 
he regulated his own business according to “a code of professional ethics and customs” 
that differentiated him from those he criticized.969    
While he insisted on regulation and separation of the two forms of banking, 
Winthrop also informed the commission that investment banking should be regulated 
with “as little restriction” as possible.970 He walked a careful line, telling the commission 
that prohibiting clearly harmful business practices was “sound” and “wise,” but qualified 
that “business enterprise, initiative and courage flourish in an atmosphere of the utmost 
freedom compatible with protection of the public interest.” He said the public is too eager 
to “blame all financial evils upon bankers,” but that regulation was necessary within 
limitations.971 His final recommendations for regulating investment and commercial 
banking were so severe that Senator Glass, who put his name on the bill that ultimately 
separated the two, described Aldrich’s proposals as “a straight-jacket” built on the 
assumption that bankers “are addicted to those excesses…of immoral greed.” 
Nonetheless, both Aldrich and Glass agreed that it was unfair to assume that all bankers 
were immoral but that regulation was necessary to some extent nevertheless.972 While his 
colleagues lashed out against any political calls for regulation of industry—a strategy that 
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would prove futile—Aldrich foreshadowed the industry’s eventual embrace of regulatory 
ideology as an alternative to criminalization.  
 The Pecora Commission inflicted serious damage on the reputation of stock 
exchanges, investment bankers, and Wall Street. But the hearings revealed splits among 
Wall Street leaders, with some offering strong defenses of their actions and others 
supportive of a moderate level of regulation. In debates over the Securities and Securities 
Exchange Acts, corporate interests either opposed the laws or viewed them as necessary 
to regulate a small handful of individuals and businesses. But both sides agreed on two 
things. First, they concurred that the state’s response to the crisis should be designed to 
protect business, not the consumer. Second, both camps agreed that legislation should not 
damage the already weakened economy. However, leaders of finance who made these 
arguments by drawing on regulatory ideology were more successful than their colleagues 
who opposed the laws entirely. By defending the character of bankers and exchanges 
officials while voicing concerns about an uninformed public armed with the power of 
prosecution, politically savvy bankers, brokers, and exchange leaders adapted regulatory 
ideology to the political context of the 1930s. This convinced lawmakers to rely on 
familiar concepts of regulation rather than try something new during the crisis. Again, 
this illustrates that business has to work within prevailing discourses to achieve its goals. 
Strict opponents of the New Deal’s securities reforms failed to achieve their goals, but 
leaders of finance who favored regulatory ideology secured laws designed to support 
industry, restore investor confidence, and promote growth while extinguishing the 
potency of the Pecora Commission’s findings.   
The Securities Act of 1933 
375 
 
 Passed within the first hundred days of Roosevelt taking office, the Securities Act 
was designed to ensure that buyers of securities received accurate information before 
investing in a security. The law required companies to write up a registration statement 
and a prospectus outlining relevant information about a given security and the 
corporation itself, including its financial statements, before issuing a security on the 
market. By providing transparency, the theory behind the law was that it would inhibit 
firms from engaging in fraud and help potential investors make informed decisions.   
With prominent New Dealers from Roosevelt’s inner circle leading the push for 
reform (including Corcoran, Cohen, Landis, and Frankfurter), the Securities Act was 
proposed to comprehensively monitor securities markets. The bill they drafted 
empowered the Federal Trade Commission to regulate the securities industry by 
monitoring corporations’ registration statements and prospectuses. Their bill quickly 
moved through Congress and Roosevelt signed it on May 27. It included civil and 
criminal provisions for the making of false or misleading statements, and it held the 
company, underwriter, and any individuals who signed the registration statement liable 
for falsehoods. Viewing the law as laying an even competitive floor under American 
business, Frankfurter, Landis, and the other New Dealers involved thought it would get 
the securities market back on its feet.973  
In the wake of the Pecora hearings, there was a push in Congress for criminal 
justice reform in securities markets. Testimonies before the House Committee on 
Commerce from members of the FTC asked for the law to “have teeth in it,” claiming 
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that the law should give the commission more than investigatory powers.974 There was 
even support for criminal justice reform from others within the financial community 
beyond Winthrop Aldrich. Representing the Investment Bankers Association of America 
(IBA), a prominent network of the nation’s largest investment banking firms, attorney 
William Breed told the committee that “the penalties for fraud should be broadened,” and 
supported giving the FTC powers to investigate fraud and enjoin securities sales.975 
 That the IBA came out in support of the Securities Act, even in part, is significant. 
It shows that there were meaningful splits among businesses. The IBA was one of the 
most unified voices for the investment banking industry at the time, and it statements 
reveal the deep support for reining in industry through regulatory reforms that included 
penalization.976 But the IBA’s support for the law was qualified by its other demands. 
Breed criticized the law’s strict liability provisions, contending that the law should only 
punish willful false statements and not accidental negligence. And while he endorsed 
penalties for fraud, he argued against subjecting violations of FTC rules to criminal 
sanction.977 Breed concluded by stating that the law should be written so as to “not cover 
the honest issuer or the honest director.”978  
Opponents of the law advanced similar arguments that the law was going to hurt 
people who ran their businesses honestly. Concerns about interfering with honest 
business focused on the strict liability provisions punishing negligence and willful fraud 
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equally. Senator Thomas Gore (D-OK), one of the most outspoken critics of Wall Street 
during the Pecora hearings, even mentioned this. Justice Department attorney Alexander 
Holtzoff tried to argue that the law should not just monitor dishonesty, “but also 
negligence and carelessness.” 979 Gore was unconvinced, replying that the law “bristled a 
little too much with punishments and penalties,” and would,” frighten everybody out of 
business.” He said the law should be fashioned so as “to deal with the dishonest minority 
and…not to frighten the honest” out of the market.980 Arthur Dean, counsel for a group of 
investment bankers, argued that the law should mirror the English Companies Act by 
allowing executives to prove that their behavior was an honest mistake or else the law 
would impede business among “responsible houses” and “encourage irresponsible 
houses.”981  
 Ollie Butler, legal counsel in the Department of Commerce, also stated that 
criminal penalties should only apply in the case of willful fraud. By imposing strict 
liability, “honest well-intentioned men” would be tepid in their business transactions for 
“fear of unintentional violation.” Meanwhile, “the clever crook or weakly dishonest 
person” would dominate the market. He warned the Senate Banking Committee that, 
“The popular dislike of investment bankers” should not lead them to the “hasty adoption 
of legislation which may superficially appear to be punishing the investment bankers but 
which upon analysis is in fact injuring the country as a whole.”982 Butler did not disagree 
with the bill’s inclusion of criminal penalties or its basic goal but feared that it could 
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injure the country by impeding business among honest bankers. His logic was built on 
certain facets of regulatory ideology—including a character defense of bankers to 
rationalize his opposition to criminal punishment—but like Gore, Dean, and others, he 
did not couple his critique of the law with clear proposals for regulatory policy.  
 Wound up in arguments about impeding economic recovery were familiar claims 
that executives’ actions should not be viewed as criminal by virtue of their character.  
Testimony from Penn Harvey, Vice President of Chase Harris Forbes in New York, 
illustrates this dynamic. He claimed that, “there are a great many honest men in the 
investment banking business” and that if legislators could “mingle” with the “financial 
men in New York,” they would conclude that they are “ordinary, good, [and] honest.” He 
did admit that there was a dishonest element that needed to be regulated “out of the 
business” to have “business restored to the confidence of the country.” However, he 
stated that this element “is a minority” and that Congress should not punish the whole 
industry “because of some one act that some person may have committed.” He said the 
law should promote “greater confidence” among the public in bankers but not be so 
stringent that good men “cannot do business and make an honest living.” 983  
Members of key House and Senate Committees heard business’s demands and 
presented the law less as a way to protect consumers and more to restore business 
confidence. In an April report, the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency stated 
that the bill had several aims, one of which was to “prevent further exploitation of the 
public,” from unsound securities by providing them “adequate and true information.” But 
all other listed aims were geared towards protecting business. They included “to protect 
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honest enterprise,” “to restore the confidence of the prospective investor,” and encourage 
business investment since they have “grown timid to the point of hoarding.”984 
 Deliberations took a turn when the bill reached the floor of Congress, where 
debate was animated by outrage at big business and an insistence that criminalization was 
necessary. Democratic Majority Whip Arthur Greenwood (D-IN) argued that the average 
banker “no longer has a strict sense of ethics.”985 Ernest Gibson (R-VT) called executives 
of banking houses “criminal,” saying that their crimes of “burglary, robbery, larceny, and 
fraud” cost the public $10 million annually.986 James Beck (R-PA) claimed that the 
corporate form “dissipates moral responsibility.” He stated that presidents of major 
corporations “will at times do things of an immoral character” because they viewed 
themselves as “the trustee for the stockholders,” even if it meant acting in financial 
irresponsible ways. His demands to put “predatory millionaires in jail” were met with 
applause on the House floor.987  
Other legislators took a different approach. For instance, James Parker (R-NY), a 
member of the House Interstate Commerce Commission, presented the bill’s primary aim 
as promoting economic recovery, leading him to conclude that it should not be too 
severe. He claimed that the bill does “two things.” One was “to protect the gullible 
investor,” but that, “more important is the protection of the honest business man upon the 
success of whose business depends the success of the country.” He stated that lawmakers 
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have been too “apt to think only of the man who has lost his money” and not “the men 
who are trying to do business and do business honestly.”988 Parker’s claims explicitly 
suggested that promoting economic recovery, not investor protection, was the law’s 
central purpose.  
Parker’s statements underscore a dynamic that has long distinguished the politics 
of corporate crime from the politics of street crime. While crime politics in America has 
often been victim-centered, debates about corporate criminality have instead painted 
industry leaders as the real victims of an ignorant public, a state too eager to meddle in 
their affairs, or the few bad men in business. In the New Deal era, this logic took on a 
special meaning. The protection of honest business from unscrupulous competitors and 
excessive state intervention became paramount to getting out of the Depression. For 
instance, much like Parker, Virgil Chapman (D) of Kentucky said the two purposes of the 
law were to protect the investing public and “at the same time to protect honest corporate 
business,” and the law should be written so businessmen had “no fear” of the law.989 
Clyde Kelly (R-PA) similarly stated that the bill protects “honest and legitimate industry” 
which has too often been “the victim of greedy and ruthless investment bankers.”990 In 
the Senate, Burton Wheeler (D-MT) outlined the law’s “general purpose” as “to protect 
the investing public and honest business.” He stated that by protecting enterprise, the law 
would ignite recovery by promoting business confidence, spurring employment, and 
restoring the public’s faith in securities markets. The notion that the law should protect 
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the investing public mattered, but Wheeler stated that protecting investors only mattered 
if it was tied to “restoring buying and consuming power” among the public. 991  
Representative James Mott of Oregon (R) pointed out how putting business 
before the investor mattered. He noted the Securities Act’s information provision 
requirements required corporations to give public investors detailed statements that 
rendered the seller only liable for actual fraud by making the buyer responsible for their 
purchase. Mott emphasized that this overlooked the fact “the average investor cannot 
read and interpret a balance sheet” and is largely unfamiliar with the financial structures 
of big business. A balance sheet can be technically accurate, but still “convey to the 
untutored investor the idea that an unsound company is sound.”992 In this way, the 
Securities Act differed from state “blue-sky” laws that protected investors against 
securities fraud by requiring sellers to register their securities, publish relevant financial 
details, and go through a merit review in which state agents determined if the security 
was of reasonable enough quality to be deemed a fair offering.993 The Securities Act gave 
firms protection by not including a merit review and instead applying the standard of 
caveat emptor, making the buyer responsible for understanding all relevant information. 
As a result, a firm could issue low-quality securities, but as long as it provided adequate 
information in its statements, they were legal to sell on the open market.  
Mott’s insistence to write the law to be more like a blue-sky law was dismissed by 
his colleagues. As member of the House Interstate Commerce Committee Charles 
Wolverton (R-NJ) stated, “the theory that underlies this proposed legislation is 
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different…from that which forms the basis of many of the so-called ‘blue-sky’ laws.” 
Wolverton stated that merit reviews would end up “hampering developments” in 
industry. He said such reviews would discourage innovation and investment, which is 
why the law placed responsibility with the buyer.994  
The final law included criminal provisions in addition to civil and regulatory 
ones—including a $5,000 fine or five years in prison for false statements—but was 
written with an eye towards minimizing state intervention into markets, as Congress 
chose not to model it after state blue-sky laws. Thus, neither opponents nor supporters of 
the law were entirely happy. Representative Carroll Breedy (R-ME) bemoaned that the 
administration “has listened to the representatives of big business” while Mott fruitlessly 
insisted on including stronger liability sections and blue-sky provisions.995 Investment 
bankers and exchanges secured some concessions and thought the Act was workable to 
an extent, but many believed its civil and criminal provisions amounted to strict 
prohibitions on necessary business practices. As a result, large sectors of the financial 
community perceived it as a sensationalistic reaction to the Pecora hearings.996 
The Securities Act was pushed through Congress in the first hundred days, giving 
business little time to mount a coordinated response. Alternatively, the Securities 
Exchange Act gave the financial community adequate time to mobilize and advocate. By 
framing their goals more clearly within the parameters of regulatory ideology—defending 
the character of businessmen and expressing concerns about frivolous prosecutions while 
advocating for regulatory commission—leaders of industry were more successful in 
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debates about the Securities Exchange Act. Investment bankers and exchange officials 
argued that a regulatory approach would protect industries first and foremost while not 
impeding economic recovery during the Depression. By arguing that regulatory 
discretion be vested in a separation commission, leaders of finance were able to secure 
the creation of a regulatory body to work with the industry in its interests.  
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
Michael Parrish’s account of the New Deal’s securities reforms illustrates how the 
Securities Act was written and passed within the span of a couple of months. The 
legislative record was characterized by diverse responses from various sectors of finance 
and industry. However, one demand voiced by several leaders of industry—the creation 
of a separate commission to monitor exchanges rather than the FTC—was not met. 
Further removed from the first hundred days and with more time to mobilize, the 
exchange officials and investment bankers who favored a commission mounted a more 
successful political campaign in 1934, championing regulatory ideology to pursue their 
goals.997 
The initial Securities Exchange bill written by the team of Landis, Cohen, and 
Corcoran empowered the FTC even more than the Securities Act did. Their bill banned 
the use of wash sales, matched orders, and joint trading accounts to create the appearance 
of market activity. It separated the functions of brokers, dealers, and underwriters while 
restricting the availability of credit for exchange trading, defining the permissible 
activities of exchange members, scrutinizing trading by directors, and making various 
financial affairs of listed corporations a matter of public record.  
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Thomas Corcoran, legal counsel for the Reconstruction Finance Corporation at 
the time, was the administration’s chief advocate of the law. He defended the law’s strict 
liability provisions that upset many in the financial community, arguing that like 
manslaughter, the behaviors targeted by the law should be criminal regardless of whether 
intent was present or not. He told the Senate Banking Committee that he believed it was 
no longer a “norm of the criminal law” to require proof intent, given the number of things 
that can be considered crimes “which are sheer matters of negligence.” He suggested that 
the reforms favored by Wall Street would limit regulators so much that it would amount 
to putting “a baby into a cage with a tiger to regulate the tiger.”998 His proposal included 
a $25,000 fine and 10 years of imprisonment as punishment not just for any violation of 
the statute, but also for any violation of FTC created rules.  
Representative Sam Rayburn (D-TX) in the House was the legislative advocate 
for the New Dealers’ proposal. But in conference negotiations, Rayburn eventually 
accepted the creation of a five-person commission in exchange for other concessions on 
the law’s specifics. As the first major confrontation Roosevelt had with big business 
separated from the chaos of his first hundred days, the law was significant, but it also 
represented a reluctance to offend entrenched economic interests. By giving a new 
commission rulemaking authority, Congress avoided difficult statutory decisions 
regarding floor trading, short sales, over the counter markets, and other issues that it left 
to the newly minted Securities Exchange Commission. 
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The first draft put forward by the New Deal team was broadly met with disdain 
from the securities industry, investment banks, and exchanges. For months, leaders of 
American finance appeared before the Senate Committee on Banking and House 
Committee on Commerce to attack the law, with Richard Whitney leading the bill’s 
staunchest opponents. He told the Senate Committee that regulating the exchanges 
through a “new board of seven members” drawn from the exchanges and including the 
secretaries of treasury and commerce would enable regulation of exchanges to be more 
“flexible and mobile.” He similarly told the House Committee that a separate commission 
could write rules that they “can immediately change” if necessary.999 
Leaders of banks and exchanges put forward arguments that corporations had 
long deployed in defense of regulatory ideology. For instance, many argued that the bill 
only regulated economics and not morality, rendering criminal provisions inappropriate. 
This is why the NYSE’s attorney Roland Redmond objected to criminally punishing 
violations of the commission’s rules, stating that such sanction should be restricted only 
to “what are really in their nature crimes.”1000 Michael O’Brien, an official of the New 
York Stock Exchange, stated that while legislators might believe certain transactions on 
the exchange are wrong, “We believe they are necessary to orderly markets.”1001Woodlief 
Thomas of the Federal Reserve said that he viewed the law through the lens of “economic 
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matters rather than morals,” and that from an “economic standpoint, gambling is not 
bad.”1002  
The unity among financial interests in giving the initial bill a chilly reception 
marked a significant difference from earlier debates over securities reforms. Even Paul 
Shields, a prominent New York commission broker who opposed Richard Whitney and 
represented Wall Street’s more moderate elements, said that the New Dealers drafting the 
bill went “way too far” and failed to “recognize that there are honest, decent people in 
this business, and that such people should not be destroyed” through too much 
regulation.1003 Legislators who thought the law did regulate morality even agreed that 
economic issues should trump moral ones. Edward Kenney (D-NJ) conceded that while 
exchange regulation “presents a moral problem,” questions about the financial structure 
of the economy “should be prominently brought to the front” of the debate.1004 In front of 
the Pecora Commission, Corcoran presented his proposal as “not at all a moral proposal” 
but rather “the result of the economic judgment of the community,” revealing that the 
depth of agreement regarding the bill’s economic rather than moral aims.1005 
In defending regulatory ideology as an alternative to Corcoran’s proposal, agents 
of the financial industry built on familiar claims about the character of businessmen, 
ignorance of the public, and complexity of markets. But wound up in these arguments 
was a unique appeal to lawmakers’ concerns about economic recovery. Bankers, 
exchanges, brokers, and other interested parties discouraged lawmakers from appealing to 
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populist impulses to crack down on industry by reframing regulatory ideology as a way to 
monitor markets without obstructing their revival.    
Richard Whitney’s testimony exemplified how this was done. Whitney informed 
the Senate Banking Committee that he was “in entire agreement with the proponents of 
the bill.” But while he favored some monitoring of exchanges, he feared that excessive 
punishment “would seriously disrupt our organized security markets and American 
business.” This was a recognizable aspect of regulatory ideology—that too much state 
intervention would hurt business. But Whitney went further. He warned the committee 
that without a separate commission, the law’s strict provisions would not only “punish 
stock exchanges for imaginary offenses,” but also would “throttle industry…and 
postpone the return of prosperity.”1006 Whitney thus linked his defense of regulatory 
ideology and attacks on the law’s strictest provisions to broader concerns about the state 
of the economy as the nation climbed out of depression. The NYSE’s legal counsel 
similarly stated that “general regulation” alone could achieve the law’s basic aims 
without criminal sanction. He said if Congress empowered a separate commission, they 
will “have accomplished all of the same possibilities of regulation without in any way 
hampering ordinary and legitimate business transactions.”1007 
 Major players in the securities industry and other exchanges shared Whitney’s 
concerns. Frank Hope, President of the Association of Stock Exchange Firms, informed 
the Senate Banking Committee that a separate commission specifically built to monitor 
exchanges would have the “elasticity and discretion” necessary to “practicably meet 
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situations as they arise.” He condemned Corcoran’s proposal, saying it “unnecessarily 
and dangerously” went beyond what was necessary. But Hope’s orthodox case for 
regulatory ideology was also tied to the economic climate. He insisted that Corcoran’s 
severe proposal would only cause further “confusion, conflict, and disorder” in the 
financial system, and that it could ultimately “regulate it out of existence.”1008 
Howard Butcher, the Vice President of the Philadelphia Stock Exchange, offered 
a stinging critique of Corcoran’s proposal before the Pecora Commission. He argued that 
Corcoran failed to adhere to Roosevelt’s demands in writing the bill, stating that, 
It seems to me that the bill does not take into consideration what President 
Roosevelt has repeatedly said, that we must go forward in a united group, that we 
must fight the depression, that we must make a united effort towards recovery. 
And I do not believe there has been any group of men who have responded more 
readily and more thoroughly than stockbrokers to that desire expressed by the 
president.1009  
 
Butcher’s statements went on to articulate a character defense of bankers, brokers, and 
exchange officials that was explicitly framed within, as he argued, making a “united 
effort towards recovery.” He claimed that most members of exchanges “have the highest 
standard of ethics there is,” but that in Corcoran’s bill, “we are to be treated as a bunch of 
criminals,” because Congress has focused its criticism on “one or two men,” paying no 
attention to the “250 of 253 other men who have rendered outstanding service.”1010 
Butcher claimed that it is “entirely unfair to take a group of men who have had an 
honorable existence” and punish them for actions that have previously been considered a 
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“routine matter of business…that is not adverse to the public interest…individual 
morals…[or] the law of our land.”1011 This led Butcher to insist on the creation of a 
regulatory body “conversant with the technical problems” associated with the exchanges, 
which could institute “reasonable limitations” on business. Without a commission to 
work with rather than against industry, he stated that the law took men “whom have 
honorable records” and turned them into “an unholy class,” grouped with people who are 
“undeserving of the confidence and respect of the Nation.”1012  
Many of the arguments made before House and Senate Committee facially read as 
standard cases for regulatory ideology, suggesting that criminal penalties would create 
more problems than they would solve. For instance, prominent investment banker G. 
Hermann Kinnicutt informed the House Commerce Committee that the bill’s “effort to 
cure a lesser evil will create a greater one.”1013 Theodore Gould of the Baltimore Stock 
Exchange stated that the law would “destroy all that is good in our markets.”1014 Eugene 
Thompson, President of the Associated Stock Exchanges, stated that the law attempted to 
correct a problem unique to the NYSE but in doing so overlooked the “damage that is 
going to occur to local exchanges” due to the law.1015 Frank Altschul, the Chairman of 
the NYSE’s Committee on Stock List, contended that Corcoran’s proposal would create 
so many “burdens and hazards” that it would force “the more responsible persons” to quit 
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because the law would “hamper the conduct of honest business.”1016 John Hancock of 
Lehman Brothers wanted to narrow the law’s penalties so that it only regulated the vices 
of industry without “touching the good” while the Secretary of the L.A. Stock Exchange 
said the law should not “unduly” penalize the whole industry “for the acts of the 
minority.1017 While these arguments read as orthodox defenses of regulatory ideology, it 
is important to understand the unique political meaning they had in 1934. By highlighting 
the instability of the early 1930s U.S. economy, major players in banking and securities 
convinced lawmakers to rely on regulatory ideology rather than try something different 
for fear of hampering economic recovery. 
The legislative record indicates that members of Congress internalized these 
concerns. In its initial report on the bill, the House Committee on Commerce stated that 
the law represented “the pleas of the representatives of the stock exchanges for the 
vesting of broad discretionary powers” in an agency. The committee stated that 
representatives of exchanges had “insisted that the complicated nature of the problems 
justified leaving much greater latitude of discretion with the administrative agencies than 
would otherwise be the case.” The report stated that “for that reason,” the law “leaves to 
the administrative agencies the determination of the most appropriate form of rule or 
regulation to be enforced.”1018 
On the floor of Congress, legislators argued that the bill should be moderate and 
reflect the interests of finance given their ongoing efforts to restart the economy. 
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Representative John Cooper (R-OH), a member of the House Commerce Committee, 
utilized this line of argument. He said that most businessmen were “honest and sincere 
men” who “suffered tremendous losses during the last 3 years of economic depression.” 
Cooper stated that,  
Industry and business today want to be let alone for a little while. They want to 
try to get on their feet. They are trying to recover. They are doing everything that 
is humanly possible to try to bring our country back to a sound economic situation 
again; but they are afraid that the restrictions placed upon them in this bill will 
retard economic recovery and not assist it.1019 
 
Cooper claimed that the businessmen who managed to keep the economy afloat during 
the crisis were now “afraid of this bill” and the way it empowered the FTC. He suggested 
that the law should not target the honest businessman and “destroy his standing and 
reputation,” saying that the “mere indictment of a prominent citizen is a sad thing” that 
hurts both him and his community.1020 
Representative Elmer Studley (D-NY) warned that empowering the FTC to 
monitor securities markets would reignite the depression. Saying that the men operating 
on exchanges were not “just a lot of bad boys” but “the most resolute and resourceful 
element of our people,” Studley claimed that “Wall Street will go to Canada” if 
Corcoran’s proposal became law. He concluded that should the bill succeed, “again we 
shall find ourselves the victims of our own folly.” He painted a bleak picture drawing on 
dark imagery, suggesting that the nation’s “most prolific source of revenue will be dried 
up and our business structure reduced to ashes.”1021 
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 Things were little different in the Senate, where the interpretation of the law was 
widely pro-finance. Frederic Walcott (R-CT) of the Senate’s Banking Committee 
informed his colleagues that the law must be carefully written so that it promoted “a 
recovery in our business institutions.” Without a separate commission to moderate the 
law’s provisions, Walcott called the proposal “a black eye to business” that would do “a 
great injury” to the economy. He concluded that a moderate law including a separate 
exchange commission was “important and vital to the recovery of business.”1022 Another 
committee member Hamilton Kean (R-NJ) advanced similar claims, calling Corcoran’s 
proposal “a hindrance to business” that would be “detrimental” to the economy.1023 
Senator Millard Tydings (D-MD) was convinced by these arguments, arguing that the 
Corcoran proposal would contribute to an “atmosphere of insecurity” that was “stopping 
the revival of many businesses.”1024 
 The Chair of the House Commerce Committee Sam Rayburn (D-TX) stated on 
the floor that Congress heard the concerns of business and responded by taking “much of 
this so-called ‘fright’ out of the bill” by reducing the criminal penalties from 10 years and 
a $25,000 fine to 2 years and a $10,000 fine. He said that, “the vast majority of business 
in this country is high-minded and honest.” To design the law with the interests of 
reputable businesses in mind, Rayburn framed the law as a protection for “the man who 
wants to conduct a straightforward and honest business” from the “desperadoes” in the 
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industry.1025 To Rayburn, the main point of the law was to protect honest businessmen 
from “desperadoes” making it impossible for them to succeed while abiding by the law.   
When the House and Senate passed their versions of the bill and it went into 
conference, Rayburn endorsed the Corcoran proposal. However, he gave into the Senate’s 
demands to create a separate exchange commission. When the conference committee 
submitted its final bill, it included a separate 5-person Securities Exchange 
Commission.1026 The final law made a violation of any of the law’s provisions susceptible 
to 5 years imprisonment and/or a $25,000 fine, but the Senate successfully ensured that 
violations of rules and regulations created by the Commission (and any false or 
misleading statements filed under a rule or regulation) could only be punished with a 
$10,000 fine and no prison time. And like previous regulatory laws, it granted the 
Commission to respond to behavior legally defined as criminal through a variety of 
administrative and civil sanctions.1027 
The securities industry secured major concessions in the Securities Exchange Act, 
not the least of which was the creation of a separate commission.  The SEC became a 
technical way of handling economic problems somewhat insulated from politics and, 
more importantly, of resolving industry problems on business terms. Jerome Frank, SEC 
Commissioner from 1937-1939 and its chair from 1939-1941, said that the SEC existed 
“primarily to preserve the capitalist form.”1028 William O. Douglas, SEC chair from 1937 
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to 1939, stated that the SEC should “meet business on business terms” and leave it to 
exchanges to primarily self-regulate.1029  
In the wake of the SEC’s creation, radical Keynesians were disappointed with the 
agency’s hesitance to intervene in the economy directly. Meanwhile, conservative critics 
mounted publicity campaigns panning the commission for slowing recovery by impeding 
private investment. As the recession of 1937 began, the financial community attacked the 
SEC by suggesting that it was responsible for obstructing growth. Congress responded 
with the Maloney Act of 1938. Heeding the considerations of over-the-counter market 
brokers and dealers, the law gave the SEC the authority to register voluntary national 
securities associations that worked to prevent fraudulent and manipulative practices in 
OTC markets. While subject to SEC review, the commission essentially handed 
exchanges discretion to self-regulate and write their own codes of conduct.1030 
By the end of Roosevelt’s second term, securities regulation had been modified in 
the interest of core financial interests and was enthusiastically supported by large 
segments of the financial industry. Despite some commonalities in their arguments, the 
bankers and financial leaders who fought the Securities Act were not as successful as 
those who lobbied for a regulatory commission in the Securities Exchange Act debate. 
Those who opposed criminal intervention into markets without offering an alternative 
during the Securities Act debates failed to situate their goals within discourses and 
ideological frameworks that were widely accepted and amenable to policymakers. By 
positioning their arguments within the parameters of regulatory ideology and framing the 
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regulatory model to have particular appeal during the Great Depression, the industry 
leaders who fought for the creation of the SEC appealed to prevailing political and 
economic discourses in ways that enabled them to achieve favorable policy outcomes.   
IV. Commercial Keynesianism and Regulatory Development 
 While the early New Deal was animated by debates over regulatory policy, the 
1940s were driven by a shift towards commercial Keynesianism. Economics became 
more about monetary policy and less about regulation. How this affected the state’s 
perception of corporate criminality and regulation can be seen in the trajectory of three 
developments—the Temporary National Economic Committee, the Administrative 
Procedures Act, and the antitrust suit US v. Morgan (1953).  
The Temporary National Economic Committee 
 In 1938, Congress created the Temporary National Economic Committee (TNEC) 
as an investigatory body to study the causes and effects of economic concentration.  
Prominent members of Roosevelt’s inner circle including Arnold and Douglass led the 
TNEC’s investigation. They defended a robust statist vision of regulatory Keynesianism, 
so the committee seemed to be a strong revival of anti-monopolism. But by the time its 
final reports were published in 1941, popular anti-monopolist attitudes had faded and the 
committee’s final reports garnered little attention.1031 Even if they had, the men leading 
the investigation were not the staunch anti-monopolists they were feared to be. The 
committee’s final report defended concentration as inevitable while revealing a hesitance 
to prosecute corporate violations in lieu of opting for regulatory approaches.  
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 In statements during the TNEC’s hearings, the FTC was often praised. Because it 
had a limited capacity to pursue prosecution, it was commended for working with 
businesses without penalizing them. William O. Douglass, who was just finishing his 
term as the SEC Chairman, lauded the FTC for its tendency to “cooperate with business 
by not making the corrective activity too severe.”1032 Erwin Douglas, one of the FTC’s 
commissioners, said he and his colleagues “are glad we don’t” have the authority to 
impose penalties or pursue imprisonment. He insisted, “we don’t want it,” and argued 
that the matters the FTC monitors “generally do not pertain to criminal matters in the 
ordinary acceptation of that term.”1033 Members of the TNEC were content with the fact 
that they lacked powers to prosecute anti-competitive practices because they did not think 
they were “ordinary” criminal actions.  
 William Douglas emphasized that the state’s regulatory powers had become 
generally overgrown. He lamented that the principle in criminal justice that it is better to 
“allow nine guilty persons to escape than to punish one innocent person” was abandoned 
in the regulatory system. He argued that regulatory expansion empowered the state to 
“take every violator by the back of his neck and rub his nose in the sand, regardless of the 
effect upon the innocent.” He said that, “because the innocent have been compelled to 
suffer along with those have violated” the law, there is “fear among many businessmen of 
what they call Government regulation.”1034 
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 Jerome Frank, also serving on the SEC, had similar anxieties. Instead of 
bemoaning the growth of the regulatory state, he made a plea for more procedural 
reforms to administrative law. He informed the committee that, “we need to safeguard 
against the abuse of the innocent” who have been victimized by the regulatory state. He 
argued that the regulatory process required “more safeguards…to prevent the abuse of 
criminal enforcing powers in the hands of prosecutors.”1035 His plea foreshadowed 
reforms that would take shape in the Administrative Procedures Act of 1946.  
 Thurman Arnold, at the time running the Justice Department’s antitrust division, 
advocated for greater use of civil proceedings in administrative cases. He said they 
provided “a speedier and more equitable method” than criminal charges while avoiding 
the difficulties of prosecution through criminal courts.1036 Arnold concluded that in 
antitrust cases, the state is generally “not dealing…with the criminal class” but with 
“ordinary law-abiding citizens.” Antitrust enforcement, according to Arnold, was 
designed to gives “assurance” to men in business “that they will not be forced into illegal 
practices” by their competitors.1037 
 The TNEC’s preliminary report, written in 1939, criticized the DOJ for making 
criminal proceedings a “normal procedure” for enforcing antitrust laws. The report stated 
that criminal remedies made it “extremely difficult to keep clearly before the public, the 
business community, and the courts the all-important fact that the antitrust laws must be 
                                                             
1035 U.S. Temporary National Economic Committee, 5:1851. 
1036 U.S. Temporary National Economic Committee, Investigation of Concentration of Economic 
Power: Hearings before the Temporary National Economic Committee, vol. 11 (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1939), 5155. 
1037 U.S. Temporary National Economic Committee, Investigation of Concentration of Economic 
Power: Hearings before the Temporary National Economic Committee, vol. 21 (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1939), 11314. 
398 
 
regarded primarily as an economic instrument and not as a moral tract.” The TNEC 
argued that the “connection between the idea of criminality and the idea of some sort of 
moral obloquy is deeply rooted both in the law and the national psychology.” As a result, 
it was misguided to pursue convictions for actions that “have a pernicious economic 
effect” but are committed “by responsible and reasonably well-intentioned men.”1038 This 
again illustrates the deep ways regulatory ideology was intertwined into regulatory 
mechanisms. What was reputed as a fervently anti-monopolist investigatory commission 
led by prominent trustbusters ultimately defended regulation over prosecution for 
corporate crime by suggesting that the character of the individuals involved excused their 
actions as legal, but not moral, wrongs.  
 The TNEC made the case that criminal antitrust charges were fundamentally 
unfair because of the “stigma of indictment” they carried. The committee emphasized 
that news of an indictment could ruin a business’s reputation, but that later acquittals are 
rarely treated as newsworthy. This was “extremely unfair,” especially to those facing 
charges only because they were forced into anticompetitive practices “by the necessity of 
survival in a complex business structure.” The TNEC’s preliminary report suggested that 
criminal penalties should be left unchanged, but that civil remedies should be made more 
available so that criminal charges can be pursued more selectively. The commission 
concluded that even in cases where criminal charges might be warranted, the lower 
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standards of proof in civil law and the absence of any stigma associated with being 
indicted made civil actions preferable.1039   
The TNEC’s final report and recommendations had only slight differences. It did 
recommend an increase in the maximum fine for a criminal antitrust violation from 
$5,000 to $50,000. Nonetheless, the committee endorsed its earlier recommendations to 
include more civil penalties as options given the “inappropriateness of the criminal 
remedies in many cases.”1040 Included in the report was a statement from Thurman 
Arnold promising corporate executives that the DOJ would not bring them to Washington 
“with a gun at their heads.” He said that the antitrust division is not “trying to regulate the 
industry,” because “we are so meticulous and so sensitive to those charges that we never 
even suggest what business ought to do.” He concluded that, “courts are properly 
reluctant” to pursue imprisonment, promising that the Justice Department had no 
intention to aggressively use the criminal features of antitrust law.1041 
 The TNEC was a final gasp of regulatory Keynesianism. Meant to revive anti-
monopolist sentiment, it only reaffirmed the idea that economic concentration was 
necessary, beneficial, and inevitable. Most importantly, New Dealers on the TNEC 
defended moderate regulatory responses to industrial combination because they feared 
that antitrust prosecutions made a moral statement they did not wish to make. This was a 
legacy of regulatory ideology embedded into the state’s regulatory framework, one which 
drove New Deal reformers to defend regulatory over criminal sanctions in antitrust cases 
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by promoting the assumption that industry leaders’ virtuous characters gave their 
arguably criminal actions non-criminal meanings. Although relatively unnoticed at the 
time, the TNEC’s case to limit the reach of the criminal provisions of antitrust law 
reveals important and underappreciated dynamics of New Deal era politics.  
The Administrative Procedure Act (1946) 
 Passed in 1946, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) reformed the way 
regulatory and administrative agencies propose, write, and enforce rules. One of the core 
pieces of American administrative law, it applies to federal executive departments and to 
independent agencies in four ways: it requires agencies to inform the public as to their 
organization and procedures; provides means for public participation in rulemaking 
through public commenting; articulates uniform standards for rulemaking and 
adjudication; and subjects agency decisions and actions to judicial review. The law 
concentrated the Executive’s authority to coordinate the administrative state, opened up 
the rulemaking process to the public, and established uniform standards for rulemaking 
and adjudication.1042 As a result, the law reshaped the relationship between the state and 
corporations by outlining procedural protections in regulatory proceedings.  
 The APA had its roots in 1939 when Roosevelt asked his Attorney General Frank 
Murphy to form a committee to study the operation of administrative law. The 
committee’s final report detailed its conclusions and recommendations, which served as 
the basis for several reforms to U.S. administrative law. Among its conclusions was an 
emphasis on the need for uniformity in administrative procedures given the vast 
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differences across executive departments and regulatory agencies in how they made rules, 
adjudicated disputes, and rendered decisions.1043 The report particularly noted that some 
agencies had effectively adopted the “adversary characteristics” of a courtroom. The 
committee praised this practice because it afforded the accused rights similar to those 
they would receive in a legal setting, such as apprising them of charges and evidence so 
they have adequate time and information to prepare a defense. When the committee 
argued that “there is need for procedural reform” in the administrative process, their aim 
was to protect those being charged through standardizing proceedings.1044 
 By standardizing the administrative process, the APA outlined specific rights for 
anyone subjected to regulatory oversight.  On the floor of the Senate, Chair of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee Pat McCarran (D-NV) described the APA as “a bill of rights for the 
hundreds of thousands of Americans whose affairs are controlled or regulated in one way 
or another by agencies of the Federal Government.” He stated that it was “designed to 
provide guaranties of due process in administrative procedure.”1045 Similarly, 
Representative John Gwynne (R-IA) said the law was designed to make regulatory 
hearings look more like legal ones by “bring[ing] into the practice of these bureaus and 
tribunals those principles of due process that we understand and that have been enforced 
in the courts.”1046 ICC Commissioner Clyde Atchinson even informed the House 
Committee on the Judiciary that administrative procedures would be greatly improved if 
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they were made more comparable to “an adversary proceeding,” with all the rights, 
procedures, and protections that come with it.1047  
 Reports from the House and Senate Judiciary Committees both described the law 
as a bill of rights in regulatory proceedings. The Senate Committee took the position that 
“the bill must reasonably protect private parties even at the risk of some incidental or 
possible inconvenience to or changes in present administrative operations.”1048 The bill, it 
wrote, “is designed to afford parties affected by administrative powers a means of 
knowing what their rights are and how they may be protected.”1049 The House Committee 
described the bill as “an outline of minimum essential rights and procedures” that 
“affords private parties a means of knowing what their rights are and how they may 
protect them.”1050 
 Standardizing regulatory and administrative procedures for the sake of those 
being monitored was a worthy reform, especially given the vast disparities in how 
agencies operated. But by infusing regulatory processes with the dynamics of adversarial 
legalism, the APA made litigation a prominent way of shaping the relationship between 
the regulatory state and industries. By importing elements of legal culture into regulatory 
operations, adversarial argument between opposing parties became a mechanism for 
determining administrative outcomes and establishing precedent for regulatory 
enforcement.1051 This uniquely American system of regulation, reliant on legalistic rules, 
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complicated regulatory proceedings and fostered a hostile relationship between business 
and the state. Well-resourced corporations have as many benefits in adversarial settings 
as they do in legislative ones, so while the APA constituted a noble attempt to standardize 
regulatory procedures, it also gave industry the opportunity to use litigation to secure 
favorable precedent and victories that were unattainable in other contexts.  
 By the late 1940s, state regulation was viewed as a threat to business-led progress 
rather than an effective way of managing the economy. In this context, any remaining 
hostilities to corporate concentration that flourished in the 1930s were quieted. This 
dynamic is particularly clear in the Justice Department’s failed suit against a group of 
investment banking firms in the case U.S. v. Morgan. 
The Decision in U.S. v. Morgan (1953) 
 In October of 1947, the Justice Department filed a civil complaint against 
seventeen of the nation’s top banking firms and the Investment Bankers Association 
(IBA). The suit, billed by Attorney General Tom Clark as one of the most important 
cases ever initiated under the Sherman Antitrust Act, was brought in the Southern District 
of New York and dragged on for six years.1052 The outcome highlights how by the 1950s, 
the power of antitrust law had been remarkably weakened and the negative image of 
bankers created by the Pecora hearings was largely discredited.  
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 The trial ran from 1950 to 1953. The state repeated the allegations of the Pujo 
Investigation, the Pecora Commission, and the TNEC in arguing that the seventeen firms 
named had combined and conspired to monopolize America’s financial markets. To those 
who were convinced of Wall Street’s corruption by these preceding investigations, the 
suit promised to deliver the final blow to one of the greatest monopolies in American 
business. The government alleged that the seventeen firms in the suit and the IBA 
monopolized underwriting and impeded competition in securities markets.1053 
 Wall Street accepted the suit with a telling response. John Hancock of Lehman 
Brothers declared that the charges were “based on ignorance of how business is done” 
and was initiated for reasons, “that will not stand the light of day” in court. Hancock 
insisted that Wall Street was already so well regulated that the securities industry 
essentially operates “in a goldfish bowl.” A spokesman for Glore, Forgan & Co. 
hearkened back to arguments advanced in the wake of the Great Depression, arguing that 
the state’s stringent monitoring of the securities industry was creating a climate similar to 
“the dark days of the Early Thirties.” 1054 What was most noteworthy is that investment 
bankers felt that courts would serve as a good venue in which to prove their innocence. A 
spokesperson for Kuhn, Loeb & Co. asserted that the suit was driven by “political 
reasons,” and concluded that it would be “constructive to have the issues in this case 
decided by our courts” so that the case could “end the long-continued efforts to harass a 
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business which plays so vital a part in our entire economy.”1055 Murray Hanson, counsel 
to the IBA, framed his response in legalistic terms, stating that the charges constituted an 
“attack upon the members of the association for having individually and collectively 
exercised their constitutional rights of petition and free speech.”1056 
During the opening statements of the trial, it became clear that the defendants’ use 
of legalistic language was not just a rhetorical weapon. Arthur Dean, attorney for the 
defendants, clarified how the case differed from the Pujo, Pecora, and TNEC 
investigations. He stated that those committees were always able to “select their own 
documents and their own witnesses to support their own theory.” In these instances, Dean 
said, “counsel for those under investigation…have been limited,” while the bankers were 
“denied the right to object or question other witnesses.” Dean emphasized that this was 
the first case in which investment bankers were able to tell their side of the story.1057  
Well-resourced and well-financed, the defendants successfully dismantled the 
government’s case, providing statistical evidence of market competition and attacking the 
government’s evidence for being incomplete.1058 On February 5, 1954, Judge Harold 
Medina ruled in favor of the firms and IBA, writing that he saw no evidence of 
combinations or conspiracies. He stated that the concentration in the investment banking 
industry was a “gradual, natural and normal” development. He wrote that it was produced 
by the, “Securities and Banking Acts…State Blue Sky laws…[and] SEC, ICC, FPC and 
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various state commissioners.” Medina concluded that the economic system that led to this 
concentration among banks was “the product of legislation by the Congress and 
administrative rulings by those functioning under the authority of Congress.”1059 
 The case gave investment bankers an opportunity to defend themselves and 
decimate the state’s case in court. Investment banking historian Vincent Carosso’s 
detailed account of the case concludes that the “image of the investment banker that 
emerged” after the ruling “was entirely different one the one that had existed before the 
trial started.” The trial gave bankers the chance to convince the public that the reports of 
the Pujo, Pecora, and TNEC commissions were built on misconceptions. What began as 
one of the most important suits ever filed under the Sherman Antitrust Act ended in an 
outcome that “shattered the old myth of a Wall Street money monopoly.”1060 
 V. Conclusion 
 By the 1950s, regulation was the state’s main response to corporate wrongdoing. 
Any potential in the earlier stages of the New Deal to create a new way of overseeing 
corporate crime was extinguished by bankers, exchange officials, industry executives, 
and legislators who appealed to older regulatory ideologies. By the 1940s and 1950s, 
shifts towards commercial Keynesianism ensured that the state not only viewed the 
prosecution of corporations as rarely appropriate, but also saw too much regulation as 
hostile to economic progress.   
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The political development of the regulatory state during the New Deal and mid-
century mirrors the story David Vogel tells about the latter twentieth century. During a 
period of economic crisis, legislators and the public were keen to listen to the demands of 
industry. At a moment where there was tremendous fear of over-burdening the businesses 
trying recover from the Depression, the voices of the primary sectors the economy were 
amplified in the political arena. Industry leaders used this opportunity to good effect, 
reframing regulatory ideology to have a specific appeal in the political and economic 
climate of the Great Depression.  
Most importantly, the story of the New Deal illustrates how deeply entrenched 
regulatory ideology was in political institutions. Policymakers intent on pushing back on 
the status quo who had reputations for cracking down on corporate power—like Thurman 
Arnold, William O. Douglas, and Thomas Corcoran—were in positions of power in the 
1930s and 1940s. Still, they remained wedded to the basic precepts of regulatory 
ideology that shaped the institutions they operated within. By the time political actors 
seeking real change secured real power, the regulatory approach to monitoring corporate 
wrongdoing had firmly established itself as a common-sense approach.  
The regulatory state was designed within a specific set of ideological parameters 
that hardened over time. The regulatory state sends an ideological message that the 
corporate actor who commits a crime is tangibly different from the “common criminal,” 
and his or her actions therefore take on a unique and more favorable meaning. This 
system exists next to a criminal justice system that expresses the ideological message that 
the poor are pathologically dangerous. Beginning in the 1960s, these two institutional 
arrangements worked in tandem to promote the class-based brand of punitive politics that 
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drove mass incarceration by channeling street criminality into criminal justice institutions 
and corporate criminality into regulatory arrangements separated from the dynamics of 
carceral growth.   
 
  
409 
 
CHAPTER 8: THE MUTUAL CONSTITUTION OF CLASS AND CRIME IN 
AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
“We are the good guys…We are on the side of the angels.” 
- Jeffrey Skilling, former Enron CEO, in    
the wake of Enron’s collapse (2002)1061  
 
 When Jeffrey Skilling told a Senate Committee shortly after Enron’s collapse that 
the company’s leadership consisted of “the good guys,” he made a familiar appeal. He 
defended his arguably criminal actions through reference to the good character and 
intentions of business leaders. But his statement also made an assumption—the 
assumption that everyone knew who the “bad guys” were.   
It is thoroughly documented that the U.S. is the world’s leader in incarceration 
and has also historically struggled to prosecute corporate crime. This project has 
illustrated how these phenomena are related. Distinctive ideational constructions of street 
and corporate criminality have been entrenched into U.S. regulatory and carceral 
apparatuses, but both reflect and reinforce a common set of ideas about who the “bad 
guys,” or the real “criminals,” are.  
 The state’s approaches to monitoring street and corporate criminality are products 
of a shared set of political and ideological forces. In the late nineteenth century, 
regulatory and rehabilitative ideologies were built around a common conception of 
criminality that poor, low-income, and socially marginalized populations fit and 
corporate leaders did not. These ideologies have travelled over time and been embedded 
into carceral and regulatory institutions that have hardened in ways that legitimize this 
politically constructed idea of criminality. This dissertation has shown how this idea 
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originated and, at formative junctures, was embedded into the state’s criminal justice and 
regulatory machinery.  
 This project makes several contributions to diverse academic literatures that are 
reviewed in section I. Section II explores how this leads to reinterpretations of several 
literatures in these fields. This is followed in section III with a review of directions for 
future research before finishing in section IV with an account of its policy implications.  
I. Overview of Primary Contributions  
 The findings presented in this dissertation make contributions to several 
literatures in political science and criminology. Particularly, the project speaks to 
research regarding ideas and institutions in American political development, the carceral 
state, corporate crime, the regulatory state, and business-government relations.  
Ideas and Institutions 
The rise of rehabilitative penology reoriented American criminal justice. An 
emphasis on the criminal rather than their crime, as well as assumptions about who the 
likely criminal was, were rooted into the criminal justice system and the regulatory state.  
Rehabilitative and regulatory ideologies embedded practices and premises into 
institutions that have kept policymakers tied to a durable governing class ideology of 
punishment. This was clear in the mid-twentieth century. New Deal era structural theories 
of crime lost their emphasis on class and social relations as they were channeled through 
rehabilitative frameworks, defusing the potential for the ideas of Robert Merton, Clifford 
Shaw, and Henry McKay to link criminal justice reform to social and economic reform. 
While ideas can shape political development, politics can also modify ideas as they are 
repurposed and channeled through preexisting institutional and ideological settings. 
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At the same time, political power cannot operate in isolation of prevailing 
ideational patterns. Chapters three, five, and seven illustrate how historically, business 
interests have strategically framed their goals within predominant discourses about 
criminality. Politically savvy business leaders have remained aware of how the public 
perceived corporate power and regularly relied on prevailing discourses related to crime 
and economics to articulate their goals. This underscores how dominant ideational and 
ideological currents of a political climate can delimit and condition the range of policy 
outcomes that can be pursued, even for powerful political actors.  
These conclusions comport with the spiral model of political development 
outlined by Rogers Smith. Conceptualizing political actors as operating within a context 
of preexisting institutions and ideas which they modify and use to form coalitions and 
pursue policy change, the model conceives of development as a cyclical process in which 
each cycle of development begins with a modified institutional and ideational context. In 
this framework, ideas, interests, and institutions are mutually constitutive forces that 
shape and are shaped by one another. 1062 This project shows the spiral in operation, 
stressing how varied interests have used ideas about crime to drive political change and 
how institutional contexts have modified and altered ideas at different times.   
The Carceral State and American Political Development  
 Political science research often emphasizes how law-and-order campaigns 
through U.S. history have stigmatized the poor and people of color as dangerous 
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criminals while building up the carceral state.1063 With leading scholars suggesting that 
the rejection of rehabilitation in the 1960s was a trigger for mass incarceration, this 
research has overlooked the influence of rehabilitative ideology on political development.  
 Chapter two demonstrated how the rehabilitative ideal reoriented the focus of 
American criminal justice from punishing the crime to punishing the criminal. The 
degree of rehabilitative treatment or punishment meted out to an individual hinged on a 
subjective judgment of his or her rehabilitative potential. Individualizing punishment in 
this way meant that whether an individual personally fit prevailing constructs of 
criminality became more important than their actions in determining how the state should 
respond to their behavior. Reforms to indeterminate sentencing statutes, vagrancy laws, 
the southern Black Codes, and crackdowns on labor mobilization hinged on the class-
skewed ideational construction of criminality attached to rehabilitative ideology.   
 Notions of natural criminality carried into schools of cultural, psychological, and 
eugenic crime theory in the early twentieth century. By the New Deal, social structural 
explanations of criminality were unable to dismantle rigid institutional frameworks and 
established practices that had been shaped by rehabilitative ideology and ideas of innate 
criminality. The deterministic understandings of crime articulated by Lombroso and 
Brockway had long been abandoned by penologists, policymakers, and scholars. But the 
policy innovations those men created, like the indeterminate sentence, were built around 
those ideas and had become firmly entrenched into America’s system of criminal justice.  
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 Long before incarceration rates skyrocketed in the 1960s, the institutional and 
ideological scaffolding for mass incarceration had been laid. Rehabilitative ideology was 
essential to this process. Rehabilitative thought facilitated the passage of habitual 
offender laws, the institutional precursors to contemporary three-strikes laws. Modern 
guidelines schemes and mandatory sentencing statutes are often written to increase terms 
of incarceration for repeat offenders. While punishing recidivism seems to be common 
sense to Americans, the U.S. is unusual in how heavily it considers a person’s criminal 
history in sentencing. This is a legacy America’s emphasis on the rehabilitative ideal and 
individualization of punishment. Defenses of contemporary banishment laws even bear 
resemblances to late nineteenth and early twentieth century justifications for vagrancy 
law reform—the poor are prone to crime and their socioeconomic status is an indicator 
that they will likely commit serious crime even if they have not yet.  
Assumptions about who can and cannot be rehabilitated and who is or is not likely 
to commit crime still color the way punishment is meted out in America. Ideas about 
innate criminality and predictive containment are central to the politics that have driven 
and maintained mass incarceration just as they drove brands of punitive politics earlier in 
the century. Even in the absence of the biological ideas that initially fueled rehabilitative 
ideology, key features of American criminal justice reflect the premises of rehabilitative 
ideology and carry class-skewed ideas about criminality into the twenty-first century.  
The Regulatory State and American Crime Politics   
The development of indeterminate sentencing, vagrancy laws and their 
contemporary variants, and other legal structures shaped by rehabilitative ideology show 
how people who fit prevailing ideational constructs of criminality have historically been 
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punished because of who they were in fear of what they might do. But in debates over 
regulatory law since the late nineteenth century, industry leaders who did not fit this idea 
have gone unpunished because of who they were in spite of what they actually did.  
Literature on mass incarceration has drawn attention to the politics of street crime 
at the expense of ignoring varieties of crime not punished harshly by the state. While 
criminologists recognize that regulatory bodies rather than traditional law enforcement 
agencies monitor corporate crime, political scientists describe this network of agencies as 
the “regulatory state” without any discussion of its relation to crime politics.1064 But the 
regulatory state is a relative of the criminal justice system and the political development 
of both institutions have been related processes. The regulatory state must be analyzed as 
a product of crime politics to fully appreciate its institutional design, purpose, and impact. 
  Even though it is under-addressed in political science scholarship, it is 
underwhelming to claim that the state channels street criminals into the criminal justice 
system and corporate criminals away from the prison. What is more important to 
understand is how and why a common politically constructed understanding of 
criminality has shaped both criminal justice and regulatory institutions. Chapters two and 
three illustrate how this common idea was sewn into rehabilitative and regulatory 
ideologies, which guided reforms to the criminal justice system and the initial political 
choices in the regulatory state’s design. Chapters four through seven demonstrate how 
carceral and regulatory frameworks have hardened over time in ways that legitimize the 
shared understanding of criminality embedded into both sets of institutions.   
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Opportunities to adopt new political approaches to monitoring corporate crime 
have been constrained by these institutional and ideological factors. Chapter seven details 
how reforms to regulatory policy and the corporate criminal law in the New Deal were 
not driven by a new ideational pool, as was the case in the Gilded Age and Progressive 
Era. Rather, major interests from the financial sector reframed regulatory ideology to 
have particular appeal to policymakers during the Great Depression, convincing them that 
a familiar regulatory approach would be the safest way to monitor the economy during 
the crisis. Further, policymakers who would be likely advocates of criminal sanction for 
executives, including Thurman Arnold and William O. Douglas, operated within an 
institutional environment built on practices shaped by regulatory ideology that kept them 
committed to a regulatory rather than criminal approach.     
Carceral and regulatory institutions operate together in ways that reinforce a 
message that only certain people count as criminal and deserve punishment. The poor and 
people of color can commit three property crimes and get locked up for life, whereas 
executives can perpetrate multiple frauds without sanction. This is a testament to the class 
biases inherent to the political construction of criminality. To reform the carceral state, 
the regulatory state, and the inequalities of U.S. crime policy, it is necessary to recognize 
how these institutions relate to one another and produce and legitimate those inequalities.  
Corporate Crime and Deterrence 
 Politicians repeatedly rediscover the problem of corporate crime in the wake of 
financial crises, prompting them to reinvent the wheel and seek new solutions to the 
problem. But despite these recurrent cycles and political campaigns to combat corporate 
wrongdoing, the state has never cultivated the consistent power to deter corporate crime.  
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Existing research demonstrates that regulators have historically been inconsistent 
in how they exercise discretion in responding to corporate crime. Agencies have tended 
to rely on regulatory responses over criminal ones to monitor business. Sutherland first 
found this in in 1949, when he discovered that only 20% of prosecutable actions by 
corporations were charged criminally.1065 It is little different today. A 2011 New York 
Times piece found that while the SEC discovered 51 cases of securities fraud committed 
by 19 prominent firms between 1996 and 2011, the agency initiated zero prosecutions.1066 
 Contemporary studies of corporate crime deterrence concur that the state’s 
inconsistent enforcement of the corporate criminal law has rendered both regulation and 
prosecution weak deterrents, but this is not to suggest that corporate offenders should be 
subjected to the dynamics driving mass incarceration. Scholars in this literature generally 
endorse the responsive regulation model as a framework for guiding the state’s response 
to corporate crime. 1067 Braithwaite and Ayres’s responsive regulation model suggests 
that the state should monitor corporations through regulatory tools before escalating to 
punitive sanctions for serious or repeated infractions.1068 This project complements their 
proposal. Braithwaite, Ayres, and contemporary analysts of corporate crime deterrence 
agree that regulation only has deterrent force if the criminal law constitutes a credible 
threat that firms will face should they fail to follow the law or modify their behavior.1069  
Overreliance on regulatory sanctions not only masks corporate criminality and reinforces 
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a class-biased conception of crime, but also it weakens the deterrent force of the criminal 
law and regulatory interventions.  
This indicates that pursuing harsh sentences for every executive in every case of 
wrongdoing is not necessary for regulators to achieve deterrence. As Schell-Busey et al.’s 
2016 research found, too much emphasis on any one type of sanction—regulatory, civil, 
or criminal—had poor deterrent power. A mix of sanctions applied consistently, as the 
responsive regulation model suggests, was the only enforcement pattern with any 
statistically significant deterrent value.1070 What is necessary is not severe sentencing for 
corporate crimes, but clearer standards for when agencies plan to escalate to punitive 
sanctions accompanied by a willingness to follow through and adequate funding for 
agencies to pursue difficult cases. Specific guidelines on when to deploy regulatory 
sanctions or refer cases to the Justice Department and consistent enforcement of existing 
laws would create more certainty of criminal sanction. Empirical analysis indicates that 
making criminal prosecution a credible threat in this way would improve the deterrent 
force of both the criminal law and regulatory and administrative sanctions.  
Business-Government Relations in America 
 Scholars of business-government relations in the U.S. have made claims ranging 
from sweeping assertions about the almost unchecked capacity of big business to 
constrain democratic institutions to nuanced claims about the specific ways in which 
businesses have used their political might to secure their policy preferences. Universal in 
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this literature is an emphasis on how corporations have regularly exerted enormous 
political influence in American politics.1071  
 Research on the development of business-state relations in the U.S. often points to 
conflicting junctures as “the moment” when large corporations organized in a 
coordinated fashion. David Vogel emphasizes the 1960s as a period when business 
interests mobilized in their own defense while William Domhoff argues that the New 
Deal was undone by the late 1930s as corporations coalesced to facilitate a shift to pro-
corporate governance.1072 However, most scholars agree that business was unorganized in 
the late nineteenth century and thus mounted an insufficient defense against the Populists. 
Unable to counter distaste for free markets through a coordinated response, a common 
conclusion is that business lost in the face of a push for an administrative state.1073 
 This project illustrates that corporations were not on the run in the nineteenth 
century and how they managed to secure some of their most significant goals. This 
revises accounts from scholars like Steve Fraser who stress the rise of populist aversion 
to wealth inequality in the Gilded Age by illuminating how and why populist rhetoric 
failed to produce policy change.1074 The idea that businesspeople were staunchly opposed 
to the regulation of free markets does not play out in the legislative history. Focusing on 
the role of crime politics in regulatory debates clarifies that railroads got what they 
wanted. They supported free markets in rhetoric but in practice preferred a minimal 
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regulatory state as an alternative to statutory criminal prohibitions on industry practices. 
Even in the absence of business advocacy groups to coordinate large-scale mobilization 
of various corporations, individual businesses and certain prominent sectors of the 
economy were able to effectively take political action in their own interests.  
As the political economy evolved, various industries become more or less 
dominant. Consequently, different coalitions of corporate powers carried and modified 
ideas associated with regulatory ideology and corporate criminality across time. While 
railroads promoted the regulatory approach in the late nineteenth century, financial 
interests carried regulatory ideology into Progressive Era policy debates. And in the New 
Deal and postwar years, it was Wall Street financiers and bankers who drew on familiar 
elements of the regulatory approach to pursue their policy goals. 
Business’s political power has never been absolute. Businesses often secure their 
favored policies, but their ability to do so is constrained within a window defined by the 
discursive and ideological contours of the political climate. Chapters three and five show 
that corporations were aware that they were popularly condemned and accordingly 
framed their goals in policy debates within language about crime and economics that had 
popular appeal. Chapter seven illustrates how business reframed regulatory ideology to 
have a unique significance during the Great Depression. Big businesses do not simply 
hold vetoes over public policy. Rather, successful corporate interests have tended to 
frame their political goals within prevailing political discourses and ideological currents.  
The Mutual Constitution of Class and Crime 
 The role of ideas about crime in APD and associations between carceral and 
regulatory development shed light on the mutual constitution of class and crime in 
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America. Inequality, class difference, and crime have long been theorized as phenomena 
rooted in a shared set of personal individual pathologies. Exploring the nexus of 
criminology, political economy, and political development reveals how class and 
criminality have been mutually constitutive constructs in American politics.  
The persistent power of rehabilitative ideology has embedded a naturalized 
understanding of criminality into class relations. Rehabilitative and regulatory ideologies 
both treat an individual’s social or economic condition as a determinative factor in 
shaping the state’s response to his or her behavior. Behaviors common among the urban 
poor have been criminalized to preemptively detain individuals deemed prone to crime, 
while executives have been viewed as inherently good in ways that imbue their arguably 
unethical actions with positive meanings. These distinctions have been presented as 
natural rather than socially and politically constructed, turning a class ideology of 
punishment into a common-sense approach to governance and social control.    
Naturalizing class and crime produced a cycle that drove twentieth century 
political development. Chapters two and three show how rehabilitative and regulatory 
ideologies were embedded into institutions and chapters four through seven show this 
cycle at work. As carceral and regulatory frameworks expanded and complexified, the 
ideological constructions of criminality embedded into them were reproduced and 
legitimated by governing institutions. This project thus builds on critical criminological 
scholarship by showing how carceral and regulatory institutions are instilled with class-
skewed understandings of criminality that they have reinforced over time. 
 The label of criminality has had broad political purchase beyond class. Terms like 
“incorrigible,” “born criminal,” “habitual offender,” and similar variants have historically 
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been used as receptacles into which any undesirable population can be placed. The unity 
of individualism and determinism in rehabilitative ideology has legitimated multiple 
prejudices. The project thus highlights how varying ideologies of oppression, including 
racism, nativism, and classism, cannot be wholly understood in isolation in the context of 
American crime politics. Discourses that naturalize and link inequality and crime have 
legitimized a range of ascriptive ideologies. The class skew of the prison population can 
only be understood if we recognize how political constructions of class and criminality 
have been interrelated in American political development and how the carceral and 
regulatory states have internalized and reproduced these constructions.     
II. Implications for Existing Literatures  
 This project prompts a rereading of extant research on a number of topics in law 
and American politics. First, it promotes a reinterpretation of literature on the carceral 
state’s development. Second, it alters understandings of regulatory reform in the second 
half of the twentieth century. Third, the project challenges arguments that the rise of mass 
incarceration has been characterized by a full rejection of the rehabilitative ideal.      
The Political Development of the Carceral State 
 Leading scholars often identify the 1960s as a trigger for the onset of mass 
incarceration, emphasizing conservatives’ backlash to civil rights and the Great Society 
as a spark for carceral growth. They conclude that this led to a rejection of rehabilitation 
and the proliferation of punitive reforms.1075  This project adds to the work of scholars 
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who challenge this narrative by pointing to developments in earlier periods that shaped 
the institutional and ideological context out of which the carceral state developed.1076   
 Three-strikes laws, harsh sentencing for career criminals, and the promulgation of 
strict guidelines designed to predict a defendant’s criminal tendencies and calculate their 
sentence were not entirely new in the second half of the twentieth century.1077 These 
policies were connected to older ideas associated with rehabilitation. Risk assessments 
were fundamental to the rehabilitative ideal, as indeterminate sentences were designed to 
match an evaluation of a defendant’s criminal tendencies and rehabilitative potential to an 
individualized sentence.  Indeterminate sentencing was built on a dual logic to reform and 
release some inmates while indefinitely containing incorrigibles, and laws resembling 
three-strikes statutes were rationalized as extensions of rehabilitative logic as early as 
1907. In the 1950s, California even experimented with a system resembling a risk-
assessment guidelines model that predicted defendants’ criminal tendencies through a 
multi-factor schematic based on an individual’s personal traits and history. The state 
explicitly presented it as part of its commitment to the rehabilitative ideal.  
This sheds new light on current crime politics. Contemporary risk assessment 
measures, such as guideline calculations of defendants’ criminal history scores, reflect a 
punishment calculus that estimates an individual’s criminal predilections. Harsh 
sentences for three-strikes offenders reflect the notion that recidivists are incurably 
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criminal and the only solution is incarceration. It is easy to take these policies for granted 
as common sense, but in global perspective, America is highly unusual in how heavily 
state and federal jurisdictions rely on criminal history as a factor in criminal 
sentencing.1078 The popularity of such policies is a legacy of the rehabilitative ideal and 
its emphasis on tailoring punishment to the rehabilitative potential of each individual.   
Evaluations of rehabilitative potential are subjective and often rest on 
considerations of an individual’s socioeconomic background, behavioral history, and 
personal traits. With poverty, class inequality, and criminality all treated as linked 
phenomena, the poor and low-income classes have been disproportionately subjected to 
the rehabilitative ideal’s punitive aspects geared towards predictive incapacitation. While 
vagrancy laws were used to punish the poor in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
modern banishment laws reflect the same premise that punishing the poor for minor 
crimes will incapacitate the “incorrigible” before more they commit more serious crime.    
This reveals how class-skewed ideologies about inherent criminality that 
undergirded punishment in the late nineteenth century still infect the justice system with 
naturalized understandings of criminality. Because white-collar offenders are seen as 
neither requiring rehabilitation nor carrying traits warranting enhanced sentences, they 
remain insulated from the punitive prong of rehabilitative ideology. The punishment 
calculus of rehabilitative ideology shapes the class profile of the prison population by 
reserving the labels of habitual criminal and three-strikes offender for lower class and 
low-income individuals. Although the criminal justice system today does not reflect bio-
determinist understandings of crime to the extent that it did in the nineteenth century, 
                                                             
1078 Tonry, Sentencing Fragments, 51–63. 
424 
 
central features of American criminal justice are relics of the rehabilitative ideal and have 
transmitted notions of innate criminality into the twenty-first century.   
 It is important to realize that these policies are not entirely new innovations of the 
carceral state, but rest on core facets of rehabilitative ideology. We can only make sense 
of the rise of mass incarceration if we recognize that the politics for this brand of 
punitiveness has been around for a long time. Late nineteenth century shifts towards 
rehabilitation pushed policy in both benevolent and punitive directions in ways that have 
had a durable impact on the development of American crime politics. The onset of mass 
incarceration was not marked by a rejection of rehabilitative logic, but a reframing of it 
emphasizing the ideal’s punitive prong at the expense of downplaying its reformative 
aspects. Pushing rehabilitation as a way to check carceral growth is likely to exacerbate 
punitive aspects of contemporary crime policy shaped by rehabilitative ideology.  
Reassessing Consumerism and Regulatory Reform in the 1960s 
 Scholars often argue that the 1960s were a critical period for consumer protection. 
Criminologists suggest that Ralph Nader’s Unsafe at Any Speed, Rachel Carson’s Silent 
Spring, and the fallout Ford suffered after the Pinto recall provided impetuses for 
reforming the corporate criminal code.1079 Political scientists view these developments as 
reshaping the federal bureaucracy without any recognition of their relationship to crime 
politics. While some scholars argue that these constituted meaningful consumer reforms, 
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others suggest that corporate interests effectively ensured that agencies like OSHA and 
the EPA were vested with vague mandates leaving them vulnerable to capture.1080  
 The failure of these literatures to contextualize these developments within a broad 
understanding of American crime politics is a significant flaw. This project’s historical 
scope provides new insights into how these developments were related to and distinct 
from general currents in crime politics. Various coalitions have modified regulatory 
ideology in debates about crime depending on historical and economic circumstance, but 
by depicting corporate criminals as sympathetic figures, regulatory ideology limits the 
capacity to label those hurt by corporate actions as victims. In the 1960s, the nation’s 
network of criminal justice institutions ensured that voices demanding criminal justice 
reform, including otherwise liberal groups like the victims’ rights movement, were 
channeled into promoting harsh justice.1081 Literature on regulatory reform during the 
1960s shows how the institutional structures constituting the regulatory state channeled 
voices demanding shackles on corporate crime into regulatory directions.  
 In the context of this project, these literatures take on a new significance. An 
institutional context designed to promote a class-skewed brand of punitive politics had 
begun to take shape well before the 1960s, with roots dating back to the regulatory state’s 
origins and the rise of the large corporation in the nineteenth century. But public attitudes 
hostile to corporate power in the 1960s were separated from the punitive impulses driving 
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mass incarceration not only because those voices were channeled through institutions 
separated from the justice system. They were also separated from the victims’ movement.  
The public has historically been labeled consumers rather than victims in 
instances of corporate wrongdoing. Regulatory ideology has actually depicted 
corporations as the real victims of an ignorant public that frivolously demands 
prosecutions. Assumptions that consumers’ policy preferences about the economy are 
based on uninformed beliefs and would unfairly hurt business have been central to 
regulatory ideology and have helped to limit the state’s power to prosecute corporate 
crime. This project illustrates how and why demands to restrain corporate power in the 
1960s were disconnected from the era’s victims’ movement that was directed towards 
criminal justice reform, leaving these voices directed into regulatory reform.   
Rehabilitation, Political Discourse, and Criminology 
 Existing literature on mass incarceration mischaracterizes the role rehabilitative 
ideology has played in advancing the prison boom and driving punitive politics, but the 
rehabilitative ideal has also shaped the development of the discipline of criminology. As 
the Wickersham Commission noted, perhaps the single greatest contribution Lombroso 
made to criminology was “centering attention on the criminal rather than the crime 
committed.”1082 The rehabilitative ideal brought two new analytic foci to the study of 
crime—an individualistic framework and deterministic assumptions about human 
behavior. The rehabilitative ideal served a project of individuation and was built on the 
assumption that certain people were innately predetermined to commit crime. 
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 These assumptions about individualism and determinism shaped alternative 
variants of crime theory in the Progressive Era, including eugenic science and cultural 
theory. Even into the New Deal, emphases on the individual faults of offenders were 
difficult for crime theorists to dislodge in their attempts to focus on social and economic 
contributors to criminal behavior. Scholars have addressed how prevailing governing 
ideologies are related to simultaneous patterns in criminological research, but this project 
shows nuances in how these relationships operate.1083 There is a connection between 
political discourse and crime theory, but criminology is in some sense its own path 
dependent phenomenon. There are moments where new ideas mark larger or smaller 
breaks from prevailing trends, but rehabilitative ideology and its focus on personal traits, 
determinism, and risk assessment has conditioned the development of criminological 
theory. The positivist bent to contemporary criminology, specifically its emphasis on 
identifying the causes of individual-level behavior, is partially a legacy of how Cesare 
Lombroso, Zebulon Brockway, and other architects of the rehabilitative ideal redirected 
criminology to focus on studying the individual criminal rather than the crime.  
III. Future Research  
 There are several avenues for extensions of the project, including analyses of the 
ideational and ideological currents of latter twentieth century politics and the politics of 
street and corporate crime from the 1960s to today.  
Ideas and Ideologies 
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 Three ideologies have shaped political debates about inequality in the second half 
of the twentieth century—human capital theory (HCT), culture of poverty theory, and 
neoliberalism. HCT is the oldest, as it began to take shape in the 1930s and became 
prominent ideology in the 1960s.1084 HCT posits that human resources, including skillsets 
and personality traits, are forms of capital that dictate the worth of labor one brings to the 
marketplace. Chicago school economists, notably Gary Becker, popularized HCT by 
using it to justify the inequalities of liberal capitalism.1085 Culture of poverty theory’s 
clearest basis was in Oscar Lewis’s work, in which he described the lifestyles adopted in 
historically marginalized communities. While his initial theory mirrored a Marxist 
anomie theory, sociologists and policymakers warped his theory in the 1960s to mesh 
with delinquent subculture theory and focus on individual-level dynamics. 
 Ideological commitments to human capital and culture of poverty theories primed 
American politics for a transition to neoliberal governance. Neoliberalism is an 
ideological framework in which market schemas are used to rationalize all aspects of 
human life. Logics of market choice and competition become organizing principles for all 
public policy. Although neoliberalism is philosophically committed to less government, 
this does not always manifest in neoliberal policy, which often repurposes the state to 
impose market dynamics into areas of life in which markets do not exist. Neoliberalism 
became particularly dominant in the 1980s after the collapse of the New Deal order.1086 
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 Prevailing governing ideologies are linked to patterns in criminological research, 
so the current revival of bio-criminology should be considered in conjunction with the 
consolidation of neoliberalism.1087 Research over the past twenty years has focused on 
psychophysiology, neurology, and genetics in explaining crime while endorsing policies 
similar to the eugenic ones advocated by nineteenth century scholars.1088 The 
implications this project has for the revival bio-criminology will be discussed in a latter 
section.  
 Neoliberal politics has been especially favorable to aspects of regulatory 
ideology.1089 Many scholars point to the post-1980s financialization of the economy as a 
trigger for an uptick in corporate criminality.1090 These scholars agree that 
financialization has glorified the pursuit of profits to the extent that illicit tactics, 
corporate rapacity, and market manipulation are viewed as laudable actions done in the 
name of growth.1091 It seems counterintuitive that neoliberalism would accept any aspect 
of regulatory ideology given its promotion of regulatory rollback. But while the idea that 
corporate lawbreakers are properly understood as upright and enterprising as opposed to 
“criminal” has been at the heart of regulatory ideology for a century, the neoliberal 
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moment and celebration of market ideologies has amplified these biases as part of the 
process of financialization.   
 Rehabilitative ideology also reinforces neoliberal political imperatives by locating 
the causes of behavior and inequality in individuals. This masks the social and economic 
factors that drive inequality and emphasizes personal responsibility as the solution. Along 
with biological explanations of crime and inequality, rehabilitative ideology legitimizes 
the neoliberal notion that social assistance is a misguided attempt to aid people who are 
irredeemable. Together, bio-criminology and rehabilitative ideology justify the neoliberal 
agenda of welfare retrenchment and carceral expansion, which produces disadvantaged 
neighborhood loaded with obstacles to upward social and economic mobility.   
 A sizable literature explores how mass incarceration is linked to neoliberalism.1092 
However, future extensions of this project can illustrate how regulatory reform, 
rehabilitative ideology, and bio-criminology are connected to these shifts and how 
durable class ideologies of punishment have carried into twenty-first century politics.  
Trends in Street Crime 
 There are many ways in which culture of poverty, human capital, and neoliberal 
ideologies related to rehabilitative ideology and developments in the politics of street 
crime from the 1960s to today. Liberal discourse revived the rehabilitative ideal in the 
1960s.1093 Then in 1974, Robert Martinson published his famous article concluding that 
rehabilitative interventions had little to no effects on recidivism reduction, which 
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conservatives interpreted as proof that “nothing works” to rehabilitate inmates.1094 
Conventional narratives often end here, concluding that this constituted an abandonment 
of rehabilitation in favor of a harsh ethic of punishment. Ostensibly this seems true, as 
scholars of the 1970s defended deterrence and retributivist penologies while rejecting the 
utility of rehabilitation, pushing scholars and politicians on the left like Marvin Frankel 
and Ted Kennedy to join the chorus rejecting the rehabilitative ideal.1095 The bipartisan 
breadth of this alliance made being anti-rehabilitation the only viable political position.  
While this moment constituted a reframing of criminality, this reactionary politics 
did not wholly reject the rehabilitative ideal. Many of the reforms associated with the 
carceral state’s rise drew on logic only found in rehabilitative ideology. Rehabilitation 
was not necessarily the foremost cause of mass incarceration, but it has been overlooked 
as a contributor to it. In spite of policymakers’ rejections of rehabilitation, sentencing 
guidelines and three-strikes laws were built on core aspects of rehabilitative ideology.  
The federal guidelines, published in 1987, quantified offense seriousness and 
criminal history into scores which were used to calculate ranges within which judges 
could sentence defendants.1096 The House and Senate insisted that rehabilitation was an 
inappropriate rationale for incarceration, but that rehabilitation should still be a goal of 
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the justice system under the guidelines.1097 As a result, “Rehabilitating the offender” was 
listed among the primary goals of the justice system in the 1987 guidelines manual 
published by the U.S. Sentencing Commission, which Congress charged with writing the 
guidelines.1098 The logical reciprocal to rehabilitation—the predictive incapacitation of 
incorrigibles—thus manifested in the guidelines regime. The Commission defended 
scoring criminal histories by arguing that, “Repeated criminal behavior is an indicator of 
a limited likelihood of successful rehabilitation.”1099 Judges were also allowed to consider 
non-carceral sentences issued for rehabilitative purposes as well as uncharged, dismissed, 
or acquitted conduct in determining a defendant’s rehabilitative potential.1100  
The Armed Career Criminal Act of 1982 similarly used behavioral histories to 
judge a defendant’s rehabilitative potential. The law instituted extended sentences for 
those convicted of multiple firearm offenses. The Senate Judiciary Committee endorsed 
the law by stating that the armed career criminal was “effectively beyond rehabilitation,” 
rendering it “necessary to terminate his career by lengthy incarceration.”1101  
States witnessed similar developments. For instance, California was a national 
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leader in promoting three-strikes laws in the 1990s.1102 Two years after the state passed 
its three-strikes law in 1994, the state Department of Corrections did a retrospective 
analysis of the law and linked it to rehabilitative ideology. The report quoted Los Angeles 
Deputy DA Matt Hardy as saying that the law targeted individuals “who are never going 
to change.” DA Bill Gravin even defended the sentencing of Jerry Williams, who stole a 
slice of pizza and got 25-to-life due to his previous convictions, by arguing that he “has 
been given numerous opportunities by the court to change his criminal behavior.”1103  
Another example of the dual prongs of the rehabilitative ideal at work was in the 
treatment of juveniles in the 1990s. While the super-predator scare drove harsh justice for 
youths deemed irredeemable, these reforms were coupled with increases in community-
based services to reform juveniles. These practices were seen as complementary, 
highlighting how the contradictory logic of the rehabilitative ideal persisted over time.1104    
The history of the eugenics movement indicates that the current renaissance of 
bio-criminology could augment the punitive aspects of rehabilitative ideology. This is 
especially clear in Adrian Raine’s 2013 book The Anatomy of Violence. Raine is perhaps 
the leading scholar of bio-criminology today. His book was so well-received that it was 
adapted into a pilot for a CBS series about tracking criminals through biological analysis, 
highlighting how biological constructs of criminality can seep into popular discourse.1105 
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In the book, Raine claims to uncover connections between violent crime and 
neurological factors.1106 He endorses mandatory treatment and incarceration for at-risk 
adults and juveniles, thus mirroring the duality of rehabilitative ideology, while 
describing crime as a “biosocial” phenomenon driven by biological and social forces. 
While some of the social factors he discusses warrant attention, like lead exposure, others 
disregard how crime is tied to economic relations. For example, he emphasizes how 
unstable homes and low parental supervision are correlated with juvenile delinquency, 
leading him to defend the eugenic proposal of requiring people to apply for state licenses 
to have children.1107 This evades an analysis of what causes parental absenteeism, 
neglecting that the poor often work multiple jobs, suffer from higher death rates, and 
disproportionately face incarceration. By neglecting these details, Raine overlooks how 
social disadvantage is produced and how his solutions would exacerbate those problems 
by ostracizing people from their families and communities.1108   
Bio-criminology and eugenics are not isolated to academia. At least nine states 
have legislation permitting the use of chemical or surgical castrations for sex 
offenders.1109 Since 2015, state authorities in California and Tennessee were found to 
have been illegally coercing inmates and defendants into sterilizations.1110 Non-profits 
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like the MacArthur Foundation also keep bio-deterministic understandings of criminality 
alive in seemingly progressive circles by utilizing research about brain development to 
promote juvenile justice reform. While seeking to minimize sanctions for juveniles, this 
strategy inadvertently reinforces deterministic understandings of juvenile criminality.1111 
Analyses of the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1982, Sentencing Reform Act of 
1984, state three-strikes laws, and the revival of eugenic politics are potential routes for 
assessing how the rise of mass incarceration has been linked to rehabilitative ideology. 
Exploration of how organizations like the MacArthur and Heritage Foundations rely on 
bio-criminology could provide insights into the networks that keep these ideas politically 
relevant in progressive and conservative circles. Additional research could also study 
how courts are increasingly relying on risk assessment scores calculated by private 
companies to make parole, probation, and sentencing decisions in individual cases.1112 
Trends in Corporate Crime 
 There are numerous directions for future analysis of corporate crime politics from 
the 1960s to today. A good starting point would be David Vogel’s research, which shows 
how the wave of regulatory laws passed in the 1960s constituted a form of 
entrepreneurial politics driven by savvy lawmakers who realized that the public would 
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support them once mobilized. He concludes that this spate of reforms were passed 
because of the economy’s health, which made it hard for corporations to oppose 
regulations on the grounds that they could not afford them.1113 Future research could 
examine the passage of the Financial Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966, which 
expanded the enforcement powers of federal banking agencies, to see if and how 
lawmakers politicized regulatory ideology during these debates.  
 Future analysis would also have to examine the 1980s, when both the left and 
right accepted financialization as a business unto itself rather than a catalyst for other 
businesses to grow. Rana Foroohar has shown how Reagan-era reforms led businesses to 
prioritize risky financial ventures over investments in product quality and job creation. 
For instance, she discusses the SEC’s 1982 legalization of share buybacks, through which 
companies can repurchase shares of their own stock, which were previously considered 
an illegal form of market manipulation since they gave firms a way to inflate their share 
prices.1114 This is just one way in which financialization prompted firms to focus on 
increasing share value over growing their companies by decriminalizing market activities 
in the name of the neoliberal “bigger is better” and “markets know best” ethos.  
 There are numerous examples of how the political shifts of the 1980s through 
2000s unleashed America’s financial institutions and resulted in crises. The Savings and 
Loan Crisis of the 1980s was precipitated by the passage of the Garn-St. Germain 
Depository Institutions Act of 1982, which allowed operators of thrift institutions to 
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profit while shielding themselves from detection for undercapitalizing bad loans.1115 The 
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act was passed in 1989 as an 
attempt to correct this problem.1116 The story of energy-trading company Enron in the 
2000s followed a different trajectory. After accounting firm Arthur Andersen helped 
Enron perpetrate a massive accounting fraud, Andersen was criminally convicted and 
received 5 years of probation, a $500,000 fine, stripped of its licenses, and forbidden 
from doing accounting for public companies. The conviction was reversed on appeal, but 
the prosecution destroyed Andersen and the reversal hurt the DOJ’s reputation. After the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed in 2002 to monitor corporate accounting and disclosure, 
federal prosecutors were reluctant to pursue corporate prosecutions out of fear that they 
could face backlashes for destroying firms and then having those convictions 
reversed.1117 
Brandon Garrett has shown how after Andersen, prosecutors began using deferred 
prosecution agreements in cases of corporate wrongdoing. DPAs, which were designed 
for juveniles in the 1930s, have been adapted for corporations in the modern era. They 
allow firms to avoid convictions by mandating reforms to internal compliance systems 
and instituting fines far smaller than the damage caused without requiring admissions of 
guilt. They enable prosecutors to score public relations victories by imposing fines that 
appear massive without alienating corporate interests and are issued regularly to repeat 
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offending corporations.1118 A close look at DPAs, which are essentially rehabilitative 
opportunities for corporate bodies, would be a promising direction for future research.  
 The familiar story of the S&L and Enron scandals also played out in the lead up to 
the Great Recession. Many experts agree that the repeal of Glass-Stegall laid crucial 
groundwork for the 2008 collapse.1119 The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission did not 
shy from condemnatory language in studying the collapse, using the word “fraud” over 
150 times in its final report to describe what caused the crisis. But in John Hagan’s 
words, the Commission’s influence was “uninspiring.”1120 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 it helped create left the “tough work” of 
writing regulations to the Federal Reserve and Securities and Exchange Commission, 
where the bill was kept in a crippled state. As of 2013 less than half of the two hundred 
regulations necessary to enforce it were in place. Firms hired armies of lobbyists and 
regulatory lawyers to delay its implementation and “defang” the law of its bite.1121  
 How these debates about regulatory reform from the 1960s through today 
reflected tenets of regulatory ideology would be the focus of future analysis. An analysis 
of Justice Department policy would also be promising, particularly exploring the rise of 
“too big to fail” politics as exemplified in Eric Holder’s 1999 Justice Department memo 
declaring that prosecutors should consider the collateral consequences of corporate 
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convictions. Realistically only a small sample of these topics could be subjected to 
meaningful scrutiny, but all are promising avenues for analysis. 
IV. Policy Implications 
 A number of policy implications follow from this work. They regard the revival 
of the rehabilitative ideal, the resurgence of bio-criminology, how to reform the 
regulatory state, and ways to reform the criminal justice system.  
The Rehabilitative Ideal and American Crime Politics 
 In recent years, numerous policymakers have expressed support for a return to the 
rehabilitative ideal. Barack Obama, Hillary Clinton, and Bernie Sanders have all spoken 
of rehabilitation as an alternative to mass incarceration.1122 This is a perspective shared 
by those on the right, including conservative operative Grover Norquist.1123 Georgia’s 
Republican Governor Nathan Deal has even received praise as a national leader in 
criminal justice reform for investing $17 million into measures partially designed to 
rehabilitate low-risk non-violent offenders.1124 And public opinion research indicates that 
the public in deep-red Texas supports rehabilitative measures for those behind bars.1125  
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 There is good reason to be cautious about a revival of the rehabilitative ideal. The 
resurgence of rehabilitation has historically been coupled to bursts of punitive policies 
framed as necessary complements to rehabilitative measures. It is thus unsurprising to 
hear President Trump state that “We will be very tough on crime, but we will provide a 
ladder of opportunity to the future,” in the same breath while endorsing policies to 
rehabilitate federal inmates.1126 Research has expressed surprise that public support for 
rehabilitation coexists alongside public support for punitiveness, but these are not 
mutually exclusive positions.1127 The theoretical structure of rehabilitative ideology 
entails support for both. Rehabilitative measures have been implemented next to harsh 
justice practices in the past and there is no reason to think they would not now.  
 Social and economic inequalities have long shaped criminal justice outcomes in 
the U.S., but scholars have not recognized how the rehabilitative ideal has naturalized 
rather than combatted those inequalities. It has promoted a project of class control by 
rationalizing the economic condition and criminal behavior of the poor as natural 
phenomena rooted in unfixable individual defects. By conceptualizing criminality as a 
function of personal faults among the poor that can only be treated through micro-
interventions, rehabilitative ideology has hardened class distinctions and legitimized 
punishment over social assistance as the optimal way to address inequality and crime.  
                                                             
1126 Ledyard King, “Trump Administration Wants to Help Prisoners Re-Enter Society Sooner, If They 
Deserve It,” USA Today, February 27, 2018, 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/02/27/trump-administration-wants-help-
prisoners-re-enter-society-but-wont-reduce-include-sentencing-reform/378922002/. 
1127 Francis T. Cullen, Bonnie Fisher, and Brandon Applegate, “Public Opinion about Punishment and 
Corrections,” in Crime and Justice: A Review of Research, ed. Michael Tonry, vol. 27 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2000), 1–79. 
441 
 
 This is not to say that rehabilitative interventions have no value. In-prison 
educational opportunities, vocational training, and good behavior incentives have 
intrinsic worth. To promote reentry, it is reasonable to make incarceration as much like 
life in society as possible. But reformers must recognize the dangers inherent in 
rehabilitative ideology. Now as in years past, rehabilitative discourse obscures the 
structural, social, and economic forces that contribute to what gets labeled and punished 
as crime by promoting an emphasis on personal responsibility and self-improvement. 
This masks how the state’s abandonment of low-income communities contributes to 
crime. A focus on correcting individuals can lead to complacency in demanding 
structural reform and ultimately feed the politics of law-and-order advocates.  
 It is problematic when the effectiveness of rehabilitative measures is measured by 
their impact on recidivism reduction. A serious commitment to lowering crime rates must 
recognize that criminality is not just a function of personal agency that can be corrected 
by reforming individuals, but a product of social and economic forces. Meaningful crime 
reduction also requires political economic reform, like adequately funding public 
education so that inmates do not need to receive their GED during a prison term. Public 
investment in neglected communities should be used to create jobs so that inmates 
reentering society can actually use the educational or vocational training they receive 
behind bars. Bulking up public housing and guaranteeing ex-felons access to it would 
guarantee that reentering offenders would not sleep on the street while looking for work.  
 Rehabilitation is a political form of punishment that allows the state to grant 
certain individuals social and political equality over others while limiting the weapons in 
the state’s crime reduction toolkit to micro-interventions. It absolves the state of any 
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responsibility for pursuing comprehensive reforms that could make a deep and tangible 
difference in former inmates’ lives. Rehabilitative discourse today is likely to generate 
the same dual tracks of policy we have seen in the past. Whatever rehabilitative measures 
may be implemented will be reserved for inmates only “if they deserve it.”1128 Those who 
do not will be subjected to severe sanctions that will be presented as complementary to 
rehabilitative programs. Without a politics aiming to reform the deeper social and 
economic inequities that shape U.S. crime policy, the rehabilitative ideal will again 
promote a project of individuation designed as both remedial and repressive.    
The Resurgence of Bio-Criminology 
Advocates of rehabilitative reform should be cautious at a moment when genetics 
research is growing in influence. A growing body of bio-criminology linking crime to 
congenital biological and genetic factors presents its policy implications as both punitive 
and therapeutic and thus reinforces the abusive facets of rehabilitative ideology. 
Rehabilitation’s relationship to eugenics suggests that a joint revival of bio-criminology 
and rehabilitative ideology could lead to more support for the eugenic practices that have 
already been implemented in many states.  
Rehabilitative ideology’s class-skewed philosophy has long been disguised by 
scientific clothing. Repeatedly, theoreticians of crime have explained the “rehabilitative 
ideal” and its reciprocal punitive aspects as parts of the same whole by relying on 
disputable empirics infected with a class ideology. From Brockway through Raine, 
biological research has provided “proof” that the Anglo-Saxon upper class is different, 
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and largely superior, to others. This has provided an empirical basis for rationalizing the 
criminality and economic condition of undesirables as natural while turning the label of 
criminality into a catchall category into which any population deemed offensive to 
bourgeois sensibilities can be contained. These accounts have hardened the link between 
a facially progressive rehabilitative discourse and the criminal justice system’s class 
biases by masquerading long-standing prejudices as facts.  
This underscores connections between race and the development of American 
criminal justice. Much like nineteenth race scientists sought to hierarchically organize 
humanity based on racial traits, contemporary bio-criminologists argue that criminality is 
a naturally occurring trait in certain people. But labels of natural criminality have evolved 
and been populated with different “inferior” racial categories over time. Blacks, Italians, 
Irish, and other immigrants were treated as natural criminals in the nineteenth century, 
and scholars like Raine populate the category with undesirables today by hiding their 
ideological commitments underneath technical language. The science of race and science 
of crime have long worked in tandem to justify control of marginalized populations, and 
racial categories have served to distinguish gradations of inferiority and criminality.   
The rehabilitative ideal is built on these brands of scientific theory reflecting a 
class-biased and racially skewed understanding of who counts as a “criminal.” This has 
had counterintuitive implications for offenders who do not require rehabilitation, 
including corporate defendants. Since executives do not fit the image of the criminal type 
requiring rehabilitation or control, they cannot be labeled incorrigible. They do not 
require compulsion to work, sterilization to prevent future criminality, or enhanced 
punishments for repeat offending to learn. This is because their behavior has consistently 
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been attributed to structural forces rather than personal traits.  
Corporate criminals are hard to prosecute for many reasons, but their exclusion 
from rehabilitative discourse and bio-criminological research has worked to their 
advantage by insulating them from labels of incorrigibility. The few modern bio-
criminological projects that do study white-collar criminals reinforce favorable 
perceptions. While not intended to present white-collar criminals in a flattering light, a 
2011 study comparing the brain functionality of white-collar to street criminals 
concluded that “white-collar criminals have better executive functioning, enhanced 
information processing, and structural brain superiorities” than street offenders, creating a 
sharp contrast from the notion of pathological deviance associated with crime.1129  
It is a testament to the class biases of our prevailing political understanding of 
criminality that poor offenders can commit three minor offenses and get incarcerated for 
life, whereas wealthy ones can commit multiple far more damaging offenses without ever 
being sanctioned. The class ideology of the rehabilitative ideal has ensured that labels 
like “habitual criminal” and “three-strikes” offender have been reserved for lower class 
offenders. The biological study of crime has ensured that the state’s most severe 
sanctions are only directed at the poor and low-income classes.  
What the Regulatory State Can Learn from the Criminal Justice System:  
How to Punish Corporate Crime Without Contributing to Mass Incarceration 
 
There are two trends in criminological research within which this project’s 
implications about regulatory ideology should be assessed. First is the literature on 
corporate crime deterrence. Academics have long debated whether the corporate criminal 
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law is such a weak deterrent that regulation should be prioritized over prosecution or 
whether the criminal law, when used effectively, can deter corporate law breaking.1130 
Those who endorse Braithwaite and Ayres’s model of responsive regulation contend that 
the consistent use of criminal sanction could deter corporate crime and enhance the 
efficacy of regulatory measures by backing them with credible threats of prosecution.1131 
Again, this project complements the responsive regulation model by emphasizing 
the need for consistency and clarity in agency responses to corporate crime. It also notes 
that empirical deterrence studies suggest that a consistent mix of responses based on the 
sanctions pyramid is the best way to promote deterrence.1132 These analyses indicate that 
optimal deterrent effects follow the use of a healthy mix of sanctions, including the 
consistent and regular use of prosecution by regulators, rather than an overreliance on 
prosecution or the meting out of a few wildly severe sentences.  
This connects to a different literature consisting of accounts from academics, 
journalists, and other observers who offer stinging critiques of Wall Street and demand to 
subject white-collar criminals to lengthy prison terms.1133 But visceral outrage at the likes 
of Martin Shkreli and Bernie Madoff fuels a rhetoric that can, if unchecked, be 
counterproductive. It is true that deploying more criminal sanctions in response to 
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corporate frauds that inflict magnitudes more damage than street crime could help the 
economy by encouraging healthy market conditions, despite the pleas of business that it 
would obstruct the engines of growth.1134 But those who evaluate corporate crime in 
isolation from the broader character of American crime politics often endorse a “lock ‘em 
up” mentality. Punishing every executive for every crime with savagely long terms just to 
satiate our outrage is an impulsive and dangerous position to take.  
 When the state gives in to punitive instincts in corporate cases, it produces a few 
high-profile convictions in which defendants get sentences so severe they defy 
sensibility. The 845-year sentence meted out to Sholam Weiss and Bernie Madoff’s 150-
year sentence are two examples of this dynamic at work.1135 This satiates the public’s 
demands for punishment while obscuring structural problems with the regulatory state, 
corporate criminal law, and political economy. For example, Madoff’s sentence 
distracted the public from the fact that the SEC failed to uncover his Ponzi scheme after 
initiating five inquiries into his operations over sixteen years. Punitive responses 
discourage public conversations about more difficult topics, like how the underfunding of 
agencies like the SEC encourages regulators to focus on easy cases rather than more 
serious and challenging ones so their statistics look good when they submit funding 
requests to Congress.1136 And ratcheting up every corporate case to the level of Madoff or 
Weiss would be a reckless answer, as subjecting every corporate criminal to such extreme 
sentences would only exacerbate the problems of mass incarceration. This is why the 
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responsive regulation model—which emphasizes consistency in prosecution rather than 
severity and has received support from empirical analysis—is a better model for deterring 
corporate crime than ruthless sentencing.   
While consistency in criminal sanction would encourage deterrence, reactive 
responses are also not a complete solution to reducing corporate crime. Much like with 
rehabilitative interventions, reforms to regulatory policy and the corporate criminal law 
will only work in conjunction with changes to the political economy. Some prosecutions 
could help the economy if they are used as complements to regulatory tools, but only 
relying on these types of reactive interventions overlooks how financialization has 
heightened the criminogenic tendencies of industries. Rana Foroohar has argued that 
America should “put finance back in service to business and society.” She suggests that 
simplifying banks, reducing their debt, structuring corporations to act in the public 
interest, and incentivizing companies to seek growth strategies outside of finance would 
promote such change.1137 These types of reform, however, are unlikely in the near future.  
A more immediate way to address these problems is to recognize that clarity and 
consistency in criminal sanction are the keys to deterrence over severity. Changes to the 
economy and reformation of a business culture that glorifies fraud are fundamental ways 
to reduce corporate criminality, but an increased focus on clarity and certainty in 
prosecution could have immediate deterrent effects right now.1138 This would require 
more federal funding for agencies; clearer agency guidelines on when to escalate 
sanctions; a dedication among regulators to follow those guidelines; and an increased 
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allocation of resources to the Justice Department’s white-collar crime division to enable 
prosecutors to pursue prosecution rather than DPAs.  
What the Criminal Justice System Can Learn from the Regulatory State:  
Contextualizing and Decriminalizing Poverty and Homelessness 
 
 It is true that social and economic reform would help check carceral growth, but 
this has unrealistic short-term prospects as a reform strategy given how out of step it is 
with basic facets of American political culture and its emphasis on individual 
responsibility. However, there are two ways in which the criminal justice system can 
learn from the regulatory state to make immediate progress in scaling back the carceral 
state. This includes directing attention to correcting structural conditions conducive to 
crime and decriminalizing behaviors that do not deserve punishment.  
 First, it is not impossible to imagine policy responses to crime that reflect a 
structurally contextualized understanding of criminal behavior. This is clear in the 
regulatory approach to punishment, which conceptualizes criminality as a function of 
market structures and industry dynamics that agencies are designed to monitor more than 
the people operating businesses. By locating the causes of crime in market conditions, 
agencies are built to encourage healthy behavior among firms through regulatory 
interventions. The FTC’s design is a clear example of this. As Brandeis said, the FTC 
was built to focus on “preventing the conditions which lead to the criminal tendency.”1139 
If one were to read his comments out of context they would seem spectacularly out of 
step with the typical currents of American crime politics. That is because his philosophy 
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reflects a distinctive approach to monitoring crime unique to regulatory ideology—as 
something rooted in structural factors and economic conditions rather than individuals.  
 It is not unprecedented to adopt this kind of approach to street crime. A case in 
point is deferred prosecution agreements. The DPA model theoretically escalates 
sanctions dependent on severity and recurrence, but in its original form, it recognized the 
deeper structural factors that contributed to crime. DPAs constituted an attempt to 
channel disadvantaged juveniles away from the justice system, aware that exposure to the 
prison could encourage future offending. DPAs today have been divorced from their 
socially attentive basis and are primarily used for corporations, but the early form DPA 
model reveals that it is possible to implement policy responses to street crime that are 
cognizant of how structural dynamics outside of the individual contribute to criminality. 
Still, a revival of DPAs as a response to street crime would only be a small step forward.  
It is admirable to advocate reforms recognizing that crime is linked to social and 
economic forces, but this is unlikely to lead to short-term solutions for those currently 
ensnared in the carceral state. Treating structural inequalities as the cause of carceral 
growth promotes long-term commitments that are unlikely to garner much political 
support or reduce prison growth now. Marie Gottschalk has highlighted how this 
progressive “root cause” discourse obscures other problems with the prison crisis by 
overshadowing America’s tendency to mete out ruthlessly long sentences for behavior 
that goes unpunished in many other countries. She defends direct reforms to penal policy 
as more effective solutions, include slashing sentences for minor crimes and for violent 
and sex offenders who cease to pose threats to public safety over time; a constitutional 
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amendment to protect human dignity and improve the conditions of U.S. prisons; and the 
elimination of barriers to public services, voting, and employment for ex-felons.1140 
 This highlights a second lesson the criminal justice system can learn from the 
regulatory state. Focusing on political economic reform as the way to reform mass 
incarceration overshadows America’s penchant for criminalizing an overwhelming array 
of behaviors common among the poor that are simply not criminalized elsewhere. 
Whereas regulatory ideology dictates that behaviors not deemed inherently wrong should 
not be criminalized, victimless crimes unavoidable for poor and low-income populations 
are criminalized with cruel severity in America. From the age of anti-tramp acts to their 
contemporary banishment law variants, states and localities have long punished the poor 
for behaviors that are inescapable parts of their daily lives. America should treat crimes 
associated with poverty the way it treats crimes associated with markets—as behavior 
driven by structural forces that do not reflect the personal depravity of individuals.  
  A good place to start would be the repeal of banishment laws. Politically justified 
by the notion that neighborhood deterioration is a precursor to serious crime, banishment 
laws are modernized versions of vagrancy laws designed to criminalize behaviors 
common among the poor.1141 Katherine Beckett and Steve Herbert have detailed a variety 
of legal tools used by cities that blend criminal, civil, and administrative law to keep the 
poor out of certain public and private spaces in cities after they commit minor offenses 
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like sleeping in public or panhandling.1142 This is not just a trend present in a few cities. 
As of 2014, over 400 cities had various criminal restrictions and bans on sleeping in 
public, begging, and loitering.1143 The spread of these laws has been connected to broken-
windows policing and the criminalization of “quality-of-life” offenses while causing 
public defenders’ misdemeanor caseloads to skyrocket.1144  
Banishment laws share affinities with the anti-tramp acts of the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth-centuries. Both subject the urban poor to increased police monitoring 
for victimless behavior that are unavoidable parts of their daily lives. Both also depict 
poverty and homelessness as precursors to serious criminal behavior that warrant 
preemptive criminal responses. While political economic reform would improve the lives 
of those in disadvantaged communities, we should not divert attention away from the 
hyper-criminalization of victimless behaviors among the poor. Misdemeanor convictions 
often carry the same collateral consequences as felony convictions, and overburdening 
public defense systems deprives many offenders, including those facing serious prison 
time, of a meaningful defense by directing public resources into defending minor crimes.   
There must be a tremendous scaling back of laws criminalizing homelessness and 
poverty. In this sense, the regulatory approach provides a useful model. Sleeping in 
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public or begging for money are inexorable parts of being homeless. Under the regulatory 
approach, these behaviors would never be criminalized in the first place. Resources 
would instead be directed towards monitoring the economic conditions that cause 
poverty, homelessness, and these attendant behaviors so as to prevent their occurrence.  
This is a more useful model for how street criminality should be monitored. 
Structural reform is a noble goal but requires long-term commitments that are unlikely to 
provide immediate relief for populations subjected to carceral scrutiny. An emphasis on 
correcting the social and economic factors that produce homelessness should not cause us 
to overlook the callous way the criminal justice system punishes poverty. Large-scale 
decriminalization of loitering, panhandling, sleeping in public, and similar offenses 
would reduce the state’s abusive over-criminalization of poverty in the short-term.  
V. Conclusion  
 It is crucial for scholars to understand how rehabilitative ideology, regulatory 
ideology, and the class biases of American criminal justice are related. It is also necessary 
for policymakers to understand that while long-term commitments to political economic 
reform would help to ameliorate problems of street and corporate criminality, these 
solutions overlook immediate and pressing problems. Clarity and consistency in 
enforcement of the corporate criminal law by regulators and radical decriminalization of 
behaviors among the poor are necessary steps to helping people currently trapped in the 
carceral state while deterring crime in corporate boardrooms. 
 Most fundamentally, there needs to be a recognition that carceral and regulatory 
institutions work together to reinforce a message that only certain people count as 
“criminal” and deserve punishment. It is a testament to the class biases inherent in the 
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American political understanding of criminality that a California man can get sentenced 
to 25-to-life for stealing a pizza but major corporations can commit devastatingly harmful 
frauds again and again without consequence. To meaningfully reform the carceral state, 
the regulatory state, and the deep inequalities of American crime policy, we must 
recognize how these institutions have internalized, reproduced, and legitimized a 
common politically constructed understanding of criminality.  
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